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Social Scene—East & West

Post-Industrial Society Ideology & Education

Détente

Leszek Kolakowski John A. Armstrong
Earl Callen Bill Treharne Jones

Communist Parties

Italy Scandinavia China Albania

Lenin

David Anin George Leggett Michael Heller

Soviet Prisons

Document from Perm Camp No. 35

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Post-Industrial Society: East and West*

Robbin Laird

I. The Problem of Creating Post-Modern Authority

Authority in its original sense is dead in the modern world. The security and promise of tradition have been thrust aside in men's search for a better life. Stability in the modern age depends on the skilful manipulation of community resources to provide the appearance of security.

What was authority? Authority in the pre-industrial era was a belief in the sacredness of the past. The founders of a human community deep in the mists of time were the models of proper behaviour. They were closer to perfection than men existing in an ephemeral present. The future promised only renewal or degeneration, for perfection was deeply embedded in the past. Hannah Arendt commented on the Roman concept of authority that:

> . . . Old age, as distinguished from mere adulthood, was felt by the Romans to contain the very climax of human life; not so much because of accumulated wisdom and experience as because the old man had grown closer to the ancestors and the past. Contrary to our concept of growth, where one grows into the future, the Romans felt that growth was directed toward the past.[1]

The passage of authority from a vibrant, life-shaping force to an object for mere historical contemplation was expressed in the twin ideals of the modern world—progress and equality. The belief in progress focused upon the future as the era of human advancement, not as the stage of degeneration or regeneration alone. Contemporary man was not inferior to historical man, and in fact, could be better than man had ever been. History was moving in a progressive direction with no end to the possibilities for the improvement of humanity. Progress would be achieved by the accumulation of human knowledge which would be used for the general good of man. Equality as well as progress suggested the possibility of human perfectibility: no one has made this connexion more clearly than de Tocqueville:

> In proportion as castes disappear and the classes of society approximate one another, as new facts arise—as new truths are brought to light—as ancient opinions are dissipated and others take their place—the image of an ideal perfection, for ever on the wing, presents itself to the human mind. Continual changes are then every instant

* The author wishes to acknowledge the support of the Research Institute of International Change and the encouragement of its director Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski without whom the article would not have been written.

1 Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future* (New York, 1961), p. 136.

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> occurring under the observation of every man: the position of some is rendered worse; and he learns but too well, that no people and no individual . . . can lay the claim to infallibility; the condition of others is improved; whence he infers that man is endowed with an indefinite faculty of improvement.[2]

Progress and equality, then, are the dynamics of the modern concept of authority. Man exists to conquer nature so that he may be freed from his natural condition of material scarcity, and improve the quality of his life. Progress and equality have become tied to the ethic of growthmanship and productivity in the modern world.

II. The Core Synthesis of Authority in the Modern World

For most major philosophers who have believed in the possibility of progress, this belief has been linked with a belief in equality, either equality of opportunity or equality of free men—progress and equality are not separate in the modern mind. Illustrative of the tendency to connect progress and equality are the writings of Condorcet, Comte and Marx. For Condorcet, the expansion of human knowledge leads almost automatically to an improvement in social conditions. Knowledge, power and will are naturally joined in bringing about an improvement in human conditions. Inequality of income, inheritance and educational opportunities will be necessary for progress, but this inequality will not result in the loss of the common man's self-respect. "Even the effects of the differences between man will be mitigated and the only kind of inequality to persist will be that which is in the interest of all and which favours the progress of civilization, of education and of industry without entailing either poverty, humiliation or dependency."[3] The differences in learning which remain will be based on differences, "Among upright men who know the value of learning without being dazzled by it."[4] For Comte, inequality is both more necessary and more justified than it was for Condorcet. His society is built upon the foundation of scientific sociology. The scientists who developed and understood the laws of science would govern in the interests of all, for reason would be transcendent. The savants will, as Bury commented, "administer a system of universal education and will draw up the final code of ethics. They will be able to protect the interests of the lower classes."[5] Thus equality of opportunity and inequality of status would be in the common interest. Such a society was anathema to Marx, but in his writings too, progress was not to be rejected in favour of equality, but was the very soil in which true equality could grow. Marx wrote: "But strangely enough it has never struck anyone that, after all, the method of division [of labour] essentially

[2] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. H. Reeve (New York), p. 33.
[3] Marie Jean Antoin Nicolas Caritat Marquis de Condorcet, *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind*, trans. J. Barraclough (London, 1955), pp. 173–74.
[4] Ibid. p. 183.
[5] J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (1932) (further ed. New York, 1955), p. 300.

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depends on how much there is to divide and that this must surely change with the progress of production and social organization, so that methods of division may also change." [6]

Inequality was based on the division of labour which was necessary to provide abundantly for human needs. But when the means of production become as highly automatic and productive as they have and will become in the later stages of capitalism, it will perhaps be possible to produce goods abundantly without a highly developed division of labour. Thus, equality would not come at the expense of progress.

The modern state has been both cause and consequence of the productivity ethic. It is a cause in so far as the state uses the centralized domination of society to implement the goals of modernization. In so doing, the imperative of state dominance has caused the state to reduce the meanings of progress and equality to those most susceptible to definition from above. It therefore links them with the productivity ethic, which, with its numerical indicators of success, provides a measurable and hence controllable proof of success. The modern state is also a consequence of the productivity ethic in so far as its activity is legitimized to carry forward the goals of progress and equality.

A centralized state is required in order to regulate the expansive interchange of information, goods and services required for scientific, technological and economic growth. The operation of the centralized apparatus has required the recruitment of capable, achievement-oriented men. The process of recruiting capable men minimized or destroyed traditional ascriptive class barriers, while new criteria based on merit were built in their place. Equality of opportunity has been an integral part of the drive towards the centralization of the state.

The modern state can be regarded as rational in so far as it is capable of increasing human technological control over the environment. To improve technological control, the state has come to be modelled on the image of the machine. The increased efficiency of the social division of labour has been nurtured. The capacity to co-ordinate a highly complex division of labour has increased the dominance of state centralization over social energies. Rationalization has become equated, in short, with the state's capacity to direct social energies from above with a minimal level of protest or " noise distortion."

III. Challenges to the Industrial Synthesis

Productivity, the linchpin of the industrialization synthesis, has, in good dialectical fashion, cracked under its own pressure. The successful pursuit of productivity has resulted in the need to supersede it, but the transition is a complex and dreadful process, involving conflict and the selection of winners and losers.

[6] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence, 1846–95*, trans. D. Torr (New York, 1942), p. 229.

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(a) *Progress*

Progress as productivity is called into question as a result of the "closing circle" of the ecological crisis: economic growth has generated processes which are destroying man's environment. The pollution problem may necessitate the imposition of national and then international limits on production in order to assure survival. Technologies which promote growth in one sector may be injurious to the common interest, threatening existence. Recently a panel of the American National Academy of Sciences commented:

> Decisions concerning the development and application of new technologies must not be allowed to rest solely on their immediate utility to their sponsors and users. Timely consideration must be given to the long-term sacrifices entailed by their use and proliferation, and to potentially injurious effects upon sectors of society and the environment often quite remote from the places of production and application.[7]

This ecological crisis calls for a subjective turning inwards of human knowledge and practice, making a new ideal of progress as subjectivity, focused on the comprehensive assimilation of results of research in various fields of expertise. Instead of promoting the use of technology simply because it has been developed, or pursuing research merely for the sake of possible further production, the focus would shift towards a new level of scientific endeavour in which the scientists pursue a synthesis of knowledge across various disciplines in order to determine the impact of current discoveries on the environment.

There are comprehensive problems of the balance between natural and human environments, and also the problems associated with the invention of human conditions through genetic or social engineering. These call for a "holistic" view of man, somewhat like the approach suggested by Dubos in his writings.[8] The focus should be upon quality control, rather than on quantitative output of goods through research applications.

There is a need, then, for each isolated scientific discipline to adopt broader criteria for scientific development. This might involve the creation of scientific centres for researchers capable of synthesizing a wide range of knowledge so that a more qualitative advance of knowledge which takes account of latent global benefits and disadvantages can occur.[9] Even more extensive changes may be necessary to break the analytical separation of the branches of knowledge. Thus, in the very earliest years of education, a central part of the curriculum might have to be concerned with the interconnexions of knowledge.

[7] As quoted in Daniel Bell, "The Corporation and Society in the 1970s," *The Public Interest*, No. 24 (Summer 1971), p. 20.

[8] René Dubos, *Man Adapting* (New Haven, 1965); *So Human an Animal* (New York, 1968).

[9] Barry Commoner, *The Closing Circle* (New York, 1971), p. 189.

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Professor Phenix of Columbia University has planned an excellent curriculum designed to focus specifically on the problem of the interconnexions of knowledge. His reforms suggest the necessity of considering the " organic " or synthetic quality of human life rather than isolating the compartments of knowledge.[10]

Progress as productivity is called into question by the expansion of man's capabilities and the spread of his desire to control directly the interconnexions between technology and human life. In short, the qualitative directions of life are brought into focus, a problem for which the analytical mind is not trained. As information and knowledge become the moving centres of development, the question of choice is directly raised. Which sectors of expertise ought to be developed? For what purposes will the information generated by a particular sector of expertise be used? Technological growth generates both opportunities and problems; although this characteristic of technology is not new, the desire to bring the relationship between technology and the social world under control is. What formerly occurred spontaneously, post-industrial man wishes to bring under his conscious direction. The necessity to control the effects of economic growth and the possibility of human control over the natural and social world create most of the problems of post-industrial society.

(b) *Equality*

Progress as productivity in the industrial synthesis tended to require recruitment on the basis of merit and promised to improve the condition of all by a full implementation of this ideal. Absolute increases in knowledge and goods were joined with the possible fulfilment of human equality. With industrialization, traditional barriers to human mobility were broken down and the possibility of equality for all became realizable. Equality in this sense meant, as Plamenatz defined it, that, " men should be able to acquire the skills they are by nature best fitted to acquire no matter what the occupation and social status of their fathers." [11] As industrial society is transcended, we must face the problem of whether other meanings of equality ought to be pursued and whether extending the meaning of equality would block progress.

Equality has had a wide range of meanings in human history. First, equality has meant opportunity to serve on the basis of merit. Second, all men who hold a certain position may be treated equally even though their position provides them with an opportunity to be treated unequally with regard to outsiders. Third, equality has referred to common human qualities. Men deserve respect regardless of their attainments in social competition. Fourth, equality treats men as having basic, material needs, and if some have failed to satisfy those needs for themselves, it is the

[10] Philip Phenix, *Realms of Meaning* (New York, 1964).

[11] John Plamenatz, " Diversity of Rights and Kinds of Equality " in J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman, eds., *Equality* (New York, 1967), p. 87.

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obligation of the community to fulfil those needs. The four meanings may be roughly reduced to two—equality of opportunity to achieve merit and equality of persons. Equality of opportunity and equality of persons are linked in so far as equality of opportunity involves abstracting persons from unequal environments. Bernard Williams considered that: "This abstraction of persons in themselves from unequal environments is a way, if not of regarding them as equal, at least of moving recognizably in that direction." [12]

Basically, however, the two meanings of equality are in conflict with each other. The first emphasizes competitiveness among men which creates barriers to a recognition of their common humanity. Equality of opportunity confers rewards upon those who succeed and shame on those who fail. Equality as mutual respect urges consideration of people independently of the goods which are conferred by equality of opportunity. Even though these two meanings conflict, neither one can exist entirely in isolation from the other. A society can exist only if there is mutual recognition of the interests of the other and if power is conferred upon those who are considered meritorious in the community. The conflict between the two kinds of equality in post-industrial society has been created by man's success in manipulating his environment. For example, the American programme for the eradication of poverty has been based upon the idea of compensating the disadvantages of a ghetto child so that he would have an equal or more than equal opportunity to receive a good education. Thus, government intervention has placed a new set of "reinforcers" in the environment of the ghetto child. Nevertheless, equality of achievement has not resulted. Arthur Jensen has challenged the conventional assumptions of the equality of opportunity school of thought by asserting that the 15-point difference observed between the mean IQ scores of black and white Americans is caused almost entirely by genetic differences.[13] If this is an accurate picture of the situation, should research be concentrated on increasing our knowledge of genetics so that the genetic code might be manipulated to equalize the potentials of the gene pool? Should hierarchical differences be abolished through genetic-psychological-socio-political engineering? [14] The conflict between the two kinds of equality has been experienced in America as a shift from a concern for equality of input (i.e. equalizing services) to equality of output (i.e. equalizing outcome). The Soviet educationalists experienced a similar conflict concerning the Khrushchev proposals for educational reform in 1958. These proposals called for a strong infusion of practical experience in industry by the student prior to entrance to the university. An upshot of this proposal

[12] Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality," in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds. *Philosophy and Society*, 2nd series (Oxford, 1962), pp. 127–28.

[13] Arthur Jensen, *Genetics and Education* (New York, 1972). The British *Black Papers* on education are based on a similar observation.

[14] See for example, Leon Kass, "Making Babies—The New Biology and the 'Old' Morality," *The Public Interest*, No. 26 (Winter 1972), pp. 18–56.

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might have been to impede the growth of the meritocracy in the Soviet Union.[15] Among the opponents of the proposal were scientists such as Sakharov who argued that instead of impeding the intellectual development of the gifted, the gifted ought to be developed as a national resource.

The conflict between the two types of equality raises the spectre of conflict between equality and progress. Is progress to be defined as the equalizing of outputs or the equalizing of inputs? Should resources be expended for the development of unequal abilities in order to develop knowledge which would allow conscious modification of the human condition? Or should resources be mobilized to construct a society in which progress would be defined as the abolition of meritocracies?

(c) *State Rationalization of Social Development*

The absorption of the concepts of progress and equality within the productivity ethic legitimized the state in the industrial epoch. However, the productivity ethic, increasingly perceived as irrational, threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the state. But it is not the rationalization of social development itself which is being called into question, it is the legitimacy of the bureaucratized state which blocks the process of rationalization in terms of generating new technics and potential for social change. Bell has identified the centrality of theoretical knowledge for innovation and policy formation as the axial principle of development in post-industrial society.[16] The proliferation of knowledge leads to the problem of choice in social management. What alternatives are provided by the growth of this body of knowledge? In a recent report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the expanded role of science in guiding choice has been emphasized; "It will fall partly to science to develop the criteria of selection and to illuminate the implications for various social values of alternative technological choices."[17] Alexander Akhiezer, a Soviet scholar, has also emphasized the central importance of the growth of knowledge for social management: "The scientific and technological revolution . . . is destined to transform the production of knowledge into a determining form of labour. . . . The process of the qualitative development of labour provides the key to understanding the motive forces of progress and society's ability to make its development the object of its own vital activities."[18]

The intellectual and the expert become a central force in the development of society. Bell has argued that the rise of the new intelligentsia

[15] See Philip Stewart, "Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process: The Repeal of Production Education," *World Politics*, 22, No. I (Oct. 1969), pp. 29–50; N. K. Goncharov and F. F. Korolev, eds., *Novaya Sistema Narodnogo Obazovania V SSSR* (Moscow Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, 1960).

[16] Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York, 1973), p. 14.

[17] *Science, Growth, and Society* (Paris: OECD, 1971), p. 21.

[18] A. Akhiezer, "The Scientific and Technological Revolution and Guidance of Social Development," in *The Scientific and Technological Revolution: Social Effects and Prospects*, trans. from Russian, ed. R. Daglish (Moscow: Progress, 1972), pp. 162–63.

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is resulting in the emergence of a new status hierarchy. " In the scientific city of the future there are already foreshadowed three classes: the creative elite of scientists and the top professional administrator . . . ; the middle class of engineers and the professorate; and the proletariat of technicians, junior faculty and teaching assistants." [19] Similarly the Soviet sociologist, Rutkevich, has in effect, identified the growth of the intelligenstia with the movement of progress: " The enlargement of the intelligentsia on account of other social groups . . . is a result of the general progress of society." [20] In short, the capacity to actuate social energy through the interaction between organized knowledge and decision-making sectors becomes the focus of state rationalization.

IV. The Scientific-Technological Revolution (STR) and the Soviet Interpretation of Post-Industrial Society

(a) *The STR as an Upsurge in the Productive Forces*

The Soviet understanding of the STR proceeds from the analysis of the " dialectical essence " of the phenomenon. The STR cannot be understood without an examination of its structural interconnexions with social progress. The STR will form various meanings and realities dependent on the social structures within which the STR is generated. Only by recovering both poles of the dialectic—the STR and social development—can the essence of " change " induced by the emergence of the STR be understood. The argument runs that the " dialectical unity " of the STR with Soviet development will result in acceleration of historical progress only in a society in which the " true essence " of the STR unfolds, namely, in a socialist society.[21]

The Soviet authors conceptualize the STR as a gigantic leap forward in the productive forces of society.[22] But these changes, which are universal in advanced societies, necessitate changes in production relations. No existing society has completely solved the problem of unifying the productive forces with the necessary production relations.[23] But socialist society has an edge on capitalist society because it is based on the public ownership of the means of production. The objective requirement for controlling and accelerating the STR would be the creation of a truly scientifically managed society which could consciously direct its own development. As V. G. Marakhov and Yn. S. Meleshchenko have noted: " The further development of the STR depends to no small

[19] Bell, op. cit. pp. 213–14.

[20] M. N. Rutkevich, " Izmeneniye Sotsialnoi Struktury Sovetskovo Obshchestva I Intelligentsia," in G. V. Osipov, ed. *Sotsiologia V SSSR* (Moscow, 1965), Vol. I, pp. 408–9; see also E. A. Arab-Ogly et al. *Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaya Revolyutsia I Obshchestvennyi Progress* (Moscow, 1969), p. 8.

[21] " O Sushchnostie Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoi Revoliutsii," *FN*, No. 5 (1973), pp. 87–110 and No. 2 (1974), pp. 96–107.

[22] V. G. Marakhov, " Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaia Revoliutsiia i Sozdanie Materialno-Tekhnicheskoi Bazy Kommunizma," *FN*, No. 4 (1971), pp. 11–18.

[23] Iu. S. Meleshchenko, " Osobennosti i Nekotorye Sotsial'nye Problemy Sovremennoi Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoi Revoliutsii," *FN*, No. 3 (1969), pp. 3–9.

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extent upon success in the conscious, scientific regulation of the very process of the revolution itself. . . ." [24]

(b) *The Science-Technology-Production Cycle*

Science is becoming a productive force in its own right in advanced society.[25] The growing social role of science is creating a revolutionary transformation in production itself in which science leads production.[26] Science is shifting from a passive force (merely studying nature) to an active, productive force which transforms nature.[27] Science is a form of social awareness which develops knowledge concerned with the world about us in terms of laws of development of nature and society. As S. A. Tyushkevich noted: "The essence of science and its basic content are expressed in discovering the laws of development for the objective world and their use in the interests of social practices." [28]

Science as an immediate productive force is mediated through technology—through the materialization of knowledge.[29] Technology originally arose out of man's immediate need to ease his labour burden, through the creation of new tools and implements. These advances were made largely on the basis of practice, without the intervention of scientific knowledge. In the context of the STR, technology is guided by science: "spontaneous" technological development is becoming a "conscious" direction of technological development on a scientific basis.

The relationship between science and production has passed through three stages culminating in an ever more organic interrelationship.[30] The first stage is the period from the appearance of scientific knowledge until the Industrial Revolution, when science was largely alien to production. The second stage began with the appearance of machine production. Science in this stage began to analyse and to explain the operating principles of existing machines. In the current, third stage, the relationship between science and technology is reversed. Science leads production. The basic technological imperative is to incorporate scientific achievements into practice. Production is becoming scientifically organized.

The growing role of science in production signifies not the separation of theory from practice, but a base for testing reality and for uncovering laws with the potential for transforming nature and society. Technology provides knowledge of how man might control nature: production

[24] V. G. Marakhov and Iu. S. Meleshchenko, "Sovremennaia Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaia Revoliutsiia i ee sotsialnye Posledstviia v Usloviiakh Sotsializma," *VF*, No. 3 (1966), p. 139.

[25] Ia. M. Zhukovskii, *Nauka Kak Proizvoditelnaia Sila Obshchestva* (Moscow, 1973).

[26] V. G. Marakhov, *Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaia Revoliutsiia i Kommunizm* (Moscow, 1971), p. 8.

[27] S. P. Mal'skii, *Nauka i Vsestoronnee Razvitie Lichnosti* (Kishinev, 1974), Chap. 1.

[28] N. A. Lomov, ed., *Nauchno-Tekhnicheskii Progress i Revoliutsiia v Voennom Dele* (Moscow, 1973, trans. by U.S. Air Force—Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 12.

[29] Iu. S. Meleshchenko, *Tekhnika i Zaknnomernosti ee Razvitiia* (Leningrad, 1970), pp. 122–34.

[30] *Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaia Revoliutsiia i Sotsializm* (Moscow, 1973), pp. 21–29.

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management provides information on existing levels of technology in production practice. The emergence of the science-technology-production cycle creates a real possibility for society to direct consciously its own development.[31]

(c) *The Man-Production Relationship and the Scientization of Society*

The emergence of a scientized production system decisively changes man's place in the production process.[32] In earlier stages of development, man has been a direct component of the production process. Under the influence of the STR man is increasingly freed from this process; the content of labour is changing, and man increasingly performs his productive function by discovering new scientific laws and their applications to production practice. The roles of the scientist and the technological innovator are heightened. Intellectualization of the content of labour draws the scientist and worker together in a single process of transforming society on the basis of science.[33] Increased demands are placed by the process of intellectualization of labour upon the existing skill levels of society. The professional qualifications of workers must be raised rapidly. The STR increases the number of jobs for highly trained workers and places great demands on existing workers to become more highly trained.[34]

The growth of intellectual labour is heralded by the emergence of automation. Ideally (i.e. in conditions of the full flowering of the " inner laws of technological development ") the cybernetization of production entails a qualitative change in the man-technology system whereby man is freed from direct participation in the production process. According to Volkov: " The monotonous and formalized mechanical actions can be left entirely to machines and the searching, heuristic creative activity to man." [35] How is this qualitative change possible?

Technology was defined by Volkov as, " the system of artificial organs of activity of social man, organs of his power over nature, formed in the historical process of the embodiment in natural material of labour functions, habits, experience, and knowledge, and in the cognition and use in production of the forces and laws of nature." [36] Whereas mechanization began the process of transferring basic physical working functions to technology, automation entails the transference of mental functions. The progressive transference of routine human functions to the machine makes possible the growth of human creativity and its application to social development. Again, quoting Volkov, " Freedom for man's development is, at the same time, freedom for technological

[31] " Chelovek-Nauka-Tekhnika," *VF*, No. 8 (1972), pp. 34–40.
[32] N. V. Markov, *Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaia Revoliutsiia* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 151–74.
[33] *Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaia Revoliutsiia i Sotsializmo*, pp. 143–73.
[34] V. V. Krevnevich, *Vliianie Nauchno-Tekhnicheskogo Progressa Na Izmenenie Struktury Rabochego Klassa SSSR* (Moscow, 1971), Chap. 4.
[35] G. N. Volkov, *Era Robotov Ili Era Cheloveka?* (Moscow, 1965), p. 36.
[36] Ibid. p. 25, original in italics.

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progress. Automation creates the necessary conditions for the free development of man's faculties. . . ." [37]

The capacity of society to innovate is becoming a decisive indicator of progress. Progress is increasingly defined with reference to the capacity to innovate in the scientific-technological sphere and to incorporate these innovations within society in a positive manner (i.e. minimizing the so-called "negative" effects of scientific-technological change).[38] The decisive change in the man-production system signifies the growing significance of scientifically grounded management for the development of society. Such a system must be capable of combining innovations in the scientific-technological sphere with development in the social sphere. According to *Voprosy Filosofii*: "The progress of science, technology and production constantly places people in situations which require a ramified and at the same time efficient managerial apparatus and constant flexible intervention in the affairs of society." [39]

The scientization of society is the "objective" law of the emergence of the STR as the decisive indicator of change in our own epoch. Alexander Akhiezer thought that: "The scientific and technological revolution requires that the whole of human practice, and not only individual spheres, should be transformed into a scientifically grounded and guided process." [40] The upsurge in the power of the productive forces associated with the STR will reach full expression with man's mastery over the humanized environment. Society can develop itself through the emergence of a dynamic and unified science-technology-industry-society system of interaction in which man exercises control over the entire system.

V. The Problem of Perceiving Change in an Era of Scientific-Technological Revolution

There is profound ambiguity in the Soviet interpretation of what kinds of changes are necessary to create a scientized society. The ambiguity revolves around the dialectic of universality and particularity. On the one hand, the process of change initiated by the STR is universal in character according to the Soviet interpretation. But on the other hand, the STR requires decisive change in identities and structures only in capitalist society.[41] Put in other terms, the ambiguity revolves around the point of interpreting the effects of the STR on advanced societies.

[37] Ibid. pp. 34–35.

[38] "Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaia Revoliutsiia i Ee Sotsialnaia Problematika," *VF*, No. 12 (1971), pp. 3–16.

[39] "Chelovek-Nauka-Tekhnika," *VF*, No. 8 (1972), p. 33.

[40] A. A. Akhiezer, "Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaia Revoliutsiia i Upravlenie Razvitiem Obshchestva," *VF*, No. 8 (1968), p. 17.

[41] I. A. Kozikov, *Problemy Sootnosheniia Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoi i Sotsialnoi Revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 31–43; V. I. Gromeka, "Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskie Protivorechiia Nauchno-Tekhnicheskogo Progressa," *Ssha*, No. 2 (1972), pp. 47–55; A. Pokrovsky, "Some Sociological Aspects of the Scientific-Technological Revolution in the Capitalist World," *IA*, No. 2 (1971), pp. 24–30.

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The Soviets continue to use the dichotomy between capitalist and socialist production relations. But the dichotomy is challenged by their very admission of the universality of the process of change in the productive forces associated with the STR. The continued use of the dichotomy is a case of political/psychological repression of the implications of a universal STR effect.

For the Soviets to admit their participation in the construction of a yet unknown universal history would challenge the legitimacy of the capitalist-socialist dichotomy. By admitting the necessity for constructing universal responses to universal problems (i.e. that the construction of scientized society is a task unresolved by any current definitions of social identities) the Soviets would be forced to scrutinize the nature of their own social structures and social identities. This task is denied as necessary from the outset. Thus, Alexander Akhiezer writes, " The scientific and technological revolution finds a suitable social structure in socialist society. And socialist society finds in the scientific and technical revolution the scientific and technical basis for its progressive development." [42]

The assertion of the complete harmony between Soviet historical legacies and the STR is an unconscious denial of the necessity for qualitative change in those historical legacies. The central symbols and institutions of the regime are perceived to be capable of absorbing the challenges posed by the STR. Thus, for example, the central symbol of the rationality of the Soviet polity, namely, the capacity to *plan*, coupled with the institutional rootings of this symbol are characterized as the " main advantages " of socialism in absorbing the consequences of the STR.

Because state planning has become fully institutionalized, society is considered able to plan its future development rationally in the context of the STR.[43] This complete identification of the organ with the function, the conviction that state planning signifies the capacity of the society to plan, is a manifestation of the apparent incapacity or unwillingness of many Soviet thinkers and politicians to consider the possibility that fundamental or even decisive incremental change might be necessary in their society in order for the Soviet Union to cope with the STR.

The assertion frequently made that the Soviet Union has planning and capitalist countries do not (attempts at state planning in the West are seen merely as masks for monopoly capital) [44] tends to impede critical dialogue on social changes necessary to improve the capacity of Soviet society to plan in the context of the STR. According to the Soviets, the STR requires planning which is complex (i.e. capable of providing a dynamic, systematic overview), forward looking (i.e. capable of providing a picture of the long range results of the STR in order to

[42] Akhiezer, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
[43] M. Volkov, " Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaia Revoliutsiia i Preimushchestva Sotsializma," in *Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaia Revoliutsiia i Sotsial'ny Progress* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 107–16.
[44] *The Political Economy of Capitalism* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 212–13.

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make strategic choices) and scientific (i.e. capable of being founded on the dynamic unity of social and natural sciences).[45] Discussions of such changes are conducted on a technical level, a level implicitly asserting the capacity of the system to create adequate planning systems through incremental changes. Critical thought is reserved for critiques of developments in capitalist society.

Such discussions beg the question: if there are universal processes of change occurring in the advanced nations associated with the STR, why should the Soviet Union stand alone in being able to maintain without change her particular historical identity? The ambiguity of admitting universality and denying its effects on their society is more deeply rooted than a mere desire to maintain the vitality of the capitalist-socialist dichotomy as an ideological justification for existing structures of power. If the Soviet Union were defining her place in history in isolation from universal history, then the ambiguity would not be of much historical significance. If the horizon of the self identity of the Soviet polity were fixed only on her own border or those of her socialist allies, then the challenges of universal developments might be isolated as some disease external to the development of the Soviet Union herself. But she is not immune. Beneath the assertions of dogmatic purity lies an ambiguous dialogue reluctantly engaged in by the Soviets about the dynamics of advanced societies. The Soviet Union is defining her place in history in large part in reaction to other advanced nations, as for example in the case of managerial science. "One of the basic needs of socialist society in the period of gradual transition to communism is to improve the system of organization and management as demanded by an objective process that is constantly enhancing the role of management both in production and in other spheres of human activity."[46] Enhancing the role of management entails placing work on a scientific basis. Lenin emphasized the need for uniting science with practice, but after Lenin's death a "subjective, voluntaristic approach to the solution of a number of organizational problems"[47] arose. But Soviet leadership is now placing the task of management again on a scientific basis.

A major aspect of the task of improving management is the study of foreign experience. This is fully in accord with the Leninist tradition. In March 1923, in his work "Better Fewer, But Better" Lenin stressed the significance of foreign experience for the development of Soviet society. "We ought at once to announce a contest in the completion of two or more textbooks on the organization of labour in general and on management in particular. . . . We ought to send several qualified and conscientious people to Germany, or to Britain, to collect literature and study this question."[48] Lenin also emphasized the importance of

[45] E. D. Modrzhinskoi and Ts. A. Stepaniana, *Budushchee Chelovecheskogo Obshchestva* (Moscow, 1971), Pt. 4.

[46] D. M. Gvishiani, *Organizatsiia i Upravlenie* (Moscow, 1972, 2nd ed.), p. 5.

[47] Ibid. p. 7.

[48] As quoted in ibid. p. 27.

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writing a critical study of Taylorism and applying modified Taylorism in Soviet industry. According to Gvishiani, Lenin believed that " . . . a distinction should be made between its scientific achievements, reflecting the actual nature of large-scale social production, and those of its standards that were conditioned by the needs of capitalist exploitation." [49]

Although adoption of foreign experience for the further development of Soviet society is necessary, such experience must not be uncritically accepted. It is necessary to take a strictly " . . . critical approach to foreign experience, the creative assimilation of its positive elements and at the same time resolute rejection of anything engendered by the specific features of capitalism and therefore inapplicable to socialist development." [50] For example, cybernetics and systems theory are crucial components of the development of bourgeois managerial theory, and open up great opportunities for investigating the management process scientifically. " Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that the theory of management can be elaborated entirely by means of cybernetics and or only within the framework of this science." [51] Socialist social production relations and management functions are qualitatively different from their capitalist counterparts; " Exaggeration of the role of common features is both theoretically unsound and leads to practical mistakes. Of course, *one cannot manage socialist production without knowing the law of feedback.* But successful management based solely on the laws of cybernetics is also impossible. *Moreover, this approach may obscure the main advantages of socialist management.*" [52]

In short, advanced capitalist experience should be studied in order to accelerate Soviet development, but, in the process, the advantages of the Soviet system must not be negated.

> While stressing the fact that the experience of management accumulated in the capitalist countries should on no account be ignored, one must add that the opposite extreme—its uncritical acceptance and overestimation—can be no less harmful. Such mistakes are usually due, on the one hand, to being poorly informed, and, on the other, to not having sufficient grasp of the advantages of the socialist system of production over the capitalist system.[53]

The Soviets deny their involvement because they wish to avoid the " dysfunctionalities " of the STR which are appearing in the West. Their immersion in the particular is an attempt to absorb change without the shocks of change. The denial of the comparability of the problems of change among the various advanced nations is most clearly seen in the denunciation of the validity of the conclusions of Western thinkers analysing advanced industrial society. The entire gamut of Western thought, running from Bell to Brzezinski to Marcuse is placed under the

49 Ibid. p. 28.
50 Ibid. p. 31.
51 Ibid. p. 21.
52 Ibid. my emphasis.
53 Ibid. p. 29.

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umbrella concept of "convergence."[54] The perception of shared problems is blocked from the outset by identifying all thinkers and systems of thought suggesting universality of problems (albeit not of the universality of their resolution) as based on the theory of convergence,[55] which in turn is identified as a weapon in the arsenal of imperialist propaganda.[56] The act of drawing implications of the universality of problems of change in historical legacies due to STR, and the act of subverting the Soviet system are equated.[57]

Several components of "convergent" or "post-industrial" thought are brought into sharp focus by the Soviet theorists for the purpose of denying their relevance to a "developed socialist society." First, some capitalist thinkers are said to consider scientific and technological development to be running beyond human control. They are pessimistic concerning the possibilities for progress in advanced society.[58] According to Soviet authors, this is characteristic only of a capitalist society. Runaway technology and science is caused by the private ownership of the means of production and the concomitant absence of social planning.[59] Second, all the nineteenth-century ideologies are irrelevant to the problems of post-modern society, except Marxism. The STR calls for a true "science of society" and Marxism has provided the foundations for such a science, which enables society to direct its evolution in the interest of all its members. The absence of recognized dominant ideology in the West is a manifestation of the spiritual poverty of the new scientific-technical elites in capitalist society. These sectors conceive of themselves as a new managerial class operating outside the capitalist framework, but, in reality, science and technology are serving the interests of monopoly capital. The new managerial or social engineering ethos is a manifestation of "false consciousness" on the part of the new scientific-technical elites.[60] Third, capitalist thinkers consider the working class in the context of advanced society to be a conservative

[54] M. Sh. Bakhitov, *Kritika Sovremennykh Tendentsii Antikommunizma* (Moscow, 1973), Chap. 1.

[55] V. S. Semenov, "Osnovnye Cherty i Sotsial'nyi Smysl Burzhuaznoi Teorii Konvergentsii" in M. B. Mitin, ed., *Sovremennye Burzhuaznye Teorii o Sliianii Kapitalizma i Sotsializma* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 19–36.

[56] G. A. Arbatov, *Ideologicheskaia Borba v Sovremennykh Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniiakh* (Moscow, 1970), especially the introduction; *Borba Idei i Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaia Revoliutsiia* (Moscow, 1973). See especially I. A. Maizel' and Iu. S. Meleshchenko, "Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaia Revoliutsiia i Krizis Sovremennoi Burzhuaznoi Ideologii," pp. 7–56.

[57] See V. Bol'shakov's articles in *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, 25 and 26 Aug. 1970.

[58] G. Gerasimov, "Nazad, K Tekhnofobii," *ME i MO*, No. 12 (1971), pp. 132–34; V. F. Kormer and Iu. P. Senokosov, "Od Teknologicheskogo Determinizma k Posttekhnokraticheskomy Videniiu," *VF* No. 7 (1972), pp. 34–45.

[59] K. I. Shilin, "Nravstvennyi Krizis v Amerikanskoi Nauke," *VF*, No. 11 (1971), 164–68; G. S. Khozin, "Nauka i Tekhnika, Ideologiia I Politika," *VF*, No. 1 (1973), pp. 71–82.

[60] L. N. Moskvichev, *Teoriia "Deideologizatsii": Illiuzii i Deistvitelnost'* (Moscow, 1971; N. Novikov, "Evoliutsiia Teknokraticheskoi Ideologii v Ssha," *ME i MO*, No. 6 (1974), pp. 98–108; V. Kortunov, "'Deideologisation' Social Roots and Class Essence," *IA*, No. 6 (1970), pp. 63–69; V. Mikheyev, "'The Managerial Revolution' Myth," *IA*, No. 9 (1972), pp. 58–64.

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force. For these thinkers the young or the intellectuals (i.e. the new scientific-technical elite) provide the only sectors for revolutionary consciousness. Whilst the alienation of the new elites from capitalist reality makes revolution possible, the base for true revolution must rest upon the working class, according to the Soviets. The " false consciousness " of the new managerial ethos mentioned above blocks consideration of the " true interest " which the scientific-technical elites have in common with the working class, namely, the overthrow of the capitalist order. For only by overturning the capitalist order will the problems generated by the STR be resolved.[61]

The components of " convergent " thought are said to be reflective of capitalist reality, not of advanced society in general. In short, the problems generated by the STR are not universal in character but are due to the continued existence of a particular order, namely, capitalism. Only socialism provides the social possibility of developing the STR in the genuine interests of man.

But how can Soviet society define progress with reference to developments in the West without introducing similar problems to those occurring in the capitalist world? The very capacity to relate the developments of Soviet society to those in the capitalist world in terms of similar stages of advanced development implies a similarity of problems, a recognition blocked by the assertion that such recognition is tantamount to ideological error and social treason. The depth of the historical irony which is lived through as ambiguity is simply that the Soviet ideologists define their stage of historical development with reference to advanced capitalist development, whilst denying the universality of historical problems.

The consciousness of the universality of these problems and of the ambiguity of their perception, is both repressed and repressive. Repression is evident in the claim that the very existence of " post-industrial society " theories is proof of the bankruptcy of capitalist societies. Thus, in U. A. Krasin's critique of Bell the assertion is made that the dimensions of post-industrial society identified by Bell objectively require communist transformation.[62] Without the slightest hesitation, " cognitive dissonance " takes over. The entire range of problems associated with the STR which are causing " post-industrial changes " in social structures in the capitalist world are reduced to a verification for the communist transformation throughout the world.[63]

The ambiguity is also repressive. A link had been made by the Soviet " establishment " between the necessity of blocking the spread

61 I. A. Sokolov, " Nauchno-Tekhnicheskii Perevorot i Revoliutsionnyi Protsess," *VF*, No. 3 (1971), pp. 70–82 and No. 4 (1971), pp. 13–24.

62 Iu. A. Krasin, " Apologeticheskaia Sushchnost' Teorii Postindustrial'nogo Obshchestva," *VF*, No. 2 (1974), p. 67.

63 M. B. Mitin and V. S. Semenov, " Dvizhenie Chelovechestva Kommunizmu i Buryhuayznaia Kontseptsiia 'Edinogo Industrialnogo 'Obshchestva '," *VF*, No. 5 (1965), pp. 35–46; Iu. K. Ostrovitianov, " Postindustrial'naia Tsivilizatsiia ili Kapitalizm v 2000 godu? " *VF*, No. 7 (1969), pp. 30–41.

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of convergent thought and the task of controlling the Soviet intelligentsia.[64] The majority of Western analysts of advanced society point to a shift in the historical relationship between men of knowledge and men of power, whereby the former become more important with respect to defining the options for historical development. Soviet politicians and ideologists have quite clearly perceived that the proliferation of a belief in convergence theory might strengthen the political will of the Soviet intelligentsia. A high degree of ideological vigilance is therefore fostered to stop "penetration of foreign ideology" among its members.

[64] E. M. Zhukov, "Leninizm i Sovremennost'" *VAN*, No. 1 (1969), pp. 18–26; V. Sol'shakov in *Pravda*, 13 Jan. 1972.

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Education and Ideology in the USSR

Dimitri Pospielovsky

BOLSHEVIK and other radical educationalists used to attack the pre-revolutionary Russian educational system on account of its class nature, its strictly hierarchical system, with full subordination of the student to the teacher, and its elitism. They also claimed that the tsarist school system was artificially isolated from real life and that, therefore, its graduates were unprepared for real life and applied work. The school programme was, they said, too theoretical and academic.[1]

From 1918 onwards, there was much experimentation with new methods. The role of the teacher was reduced and much emphasis was placed on self-government by students, applied work in school and the " sandwiching " of school work with real productive labour. One of the leading early Soviet educational theorists, P. P. Blonsky, prophesied the final withering away of the school and the teacher altogether, and he was not alone in supporting this theory.

The laws of the early Soviet republic aimed at breaking up the old elite classes by banning entrance to universities for children of the " exploiting classes " and through creating the " Workers Faculties " (crash courses for preparing politically reliable but barely literate workers for the universities), which facilitated entrance to the universities for the proletariat.

The poor results of the experimental schools and the workers' faculties—which, as a rule, created technicians, but not intellectuals—brought about in the thirties a complete reversal of these educational policies. Traditional grade schools of several types were introduced in which examinations, grading and " authoritarianism " played an important role. The reforms of the 1930s gradually introduced a new class segregation into general education. In this field, three basic types of school were introduced: primary, with four forms; the seven-year school which included the four years of primary school and three years at secondary level; and the complete secondary with 10-year education. But as the percentage of places reserved in the 10-year school for the seven-year and four-year school graduates did not correspond to the total number of graduates of these schools, it soon became obvious that the

[1] See, for example, V. I. Lenin, *Lenin o narodnom obrazovanii* (Moscow, 1957), particularly his statements on the pre-revolutionary, revolutionary and Civil War periods; N. Krupskaya, *Izbrannye Pedagogicheskie proizvedeniya* (Moscow, 1955), particularly her articles and statements up to about 1923, whereupon she began to modify her views; N. Yordansky, *Massovaya trudovaya shkola* (Moscow, 1923). and other works; A. Lunacharsky, *O narodnom obrazovanii* (Moscow, 1958) (Lunacharsky was, however, one of the first among the Soviet leaders to begin to confess the ills and errors of Soviet education and to recognize the merits of the pre-revolutionary *gimnaziya*); P. P. Blonsky, *Trudovaya shkola* (Moscow, 1919).

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majority of graduates of the two lower-level schools could not and did not enter the complete secondary school at the right level. The four-year school was at first the main type of rural school; the seven-year school predominated in the industrial workers' settlements and small factory and mining townships. Gradually, however, the four-year rural school was transformed into a seven-year school, and by the end of the 1950s the latter became the typical rural school. The creation of several types of vocational schools, some with a seven-year general education, others with four, as the prerequisite for entry, made it usual for the graduates of these general schools to go to vocational schools, rather than to aim at complete secondary and university education. The 1936 Constitution lifted all limitations from children of the "exploiting classes," and in 1940 tuition fees for grades 8 to 10 of the secondary school and for higher education were introduced, while the students of the vocational schools not only continued to enjoy free education but were automatically paid a stipend and received free food and lodgings.[2] This helped further to stratify the educational system. The following table illustrates the progressive class stratification of the Soviet school:

University Students by Class Origin in the USSR

(*In percentages*) [3]

Parents	*1933*	*1937*	*1966* (Rostov only)	*1966* (Sverdlovsk only)
White collar ...		42 [a]	57·7	40·4
Urban workers ...	48	34	38 [c]	52·4 [c]
Rural workers and peasants ...		21	4·3 [b]	7·2 [b]

[a] White collar workers made up 17 per cent of the total population in 1937.
[b] This refers to peasants only, not workers on state farms.
[c] This presumably also includes workers on state farms.

The following table, while showing the same characteristics and referring only to the 1960s, compares the hopes of graduating high-school students as to their future education and the rates of the realization of these hopes in relation to students' social origins [4]: [*table overleaf*]

[2] In 1956 the fees were abolished. See A. Boiter, *The Khrushchev School Reform*, Central Research Department, Radio Liberty (Munich, 1958).

[3] R. Feldmesser, "Social Status and Access to Higher Education: A Comparison of the United States and the Soviet Union," *Harvard Educational Review*, No. 2 (1957); V. Kantorovich, "Konkretnye issledovaniya," *Novy mir*, No. 12 (1967); V. Shubkin, "Molodyozh vstupaet v zhizn'" ("Youth Enters Life"), *Voprosy filosofii* (hereafter *Voprosy fil*), No. 5 (1965), p. 65.

[4] V. A. Tishchenko, *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, No. 8 (Aug. 1957), p. 58.

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	1966, City of Gorky (%)	*1964, City of Novosibirsk* (%)	
	Youngsters entered higher educational establishments	Wanted to enter higher educational establishments	Were accepted at higher educational establishments
Urban white collar	82	93	82
Rural white collar		76	58
Urban industrial workers ...	61	81 (all workers)	58
Employees of service industries ...	46		
Rural workers and peasants ...	10	76	10

Furthermore, between 1965 and 1968 throughout the Soviet Union " the proportion of intellectuals and their children attending day courses at higher educational establishments rose from 41 to 45 per cent (of the total body of day students), while that of collective farm background dropped from 19 to 16 per cent." [5]

Khrushchev, with his working-class distrust of the intellectual and his hopes for the swift construction of communism,[6] instituted in 1958 the educational reform which was finalised in 1959 in the law On Strengthening the Ties between School and Life. Because of falling standards resulting from the reform, specialized schools began to be set up, of which the best known are the Schools of Physics and Mathematics, attached to several of the best universities of the country and intended primarily for brilliant children from rural and distant provincial areas. The pioneer in this field was the Siberian Affiliate of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR at Akademgorodok near Novosibirsk, which was followed by Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev universities and, more recently, by those of Kharkov, Vilnius, Erevan and others. In order to enter these schools, students are required to sit three sets of selective competitive examinations in mathematics, physics and other subjects, and to spend part of one summer in an " Olympiad " camp organized by the relevant university. The lucky few who pass spend their last two high-school years in these prestigious institutions and are taught by first-rate university professors.[7]

[5] Sergei Voronitsyn, " Class Distinction in Soviet Higher Education," *Bulletin*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, No. 11 (Munich, Nov. 1970), pp. 43–44. Also: D. Pospielovsky, " Educational Success and Class Problems under Socialism," *Radio Liberty Research* (hereafter *R.L. Research*), CRD 360/70 (12 Oct. 1970).

[6] Another, and probably decisive, reason for this reform was the catastrophic decline in the birth rate during the Second World War, making it desirable to have these generations start full-time work as soon as possible. Also, the post-war baby boom was soon felt, hence the plan to make entrance to the universities more difficult.

[7] A. Kolmogorov, " Radost poznavat mir," *Pravda* (1 Dec. 1963). Detailed reports on the Novosibirsk school appeared in *Ogonëk* in 1965. There are also linguistic high-schools, and high-schools with biochemical, musical or artistic emphases, etc.

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KHRUSHCHEV placed emphasis on part-time education, not only at university, but also at high-school level. Educationalists, especially after his removal, began to criticize this, saying that no evening or correspondence teaching could replace full-time study.[8] Furthermore, in practice, workers often do not take advantage of part-time study opportunities, even where they exist. Such an admission was published by *Pravda*.[9] The article complained that industrial workers were avoiding education-extension courses. The factory discussed in the article had over 1,500 workers; of these over 300 were below 35 years of age and had less than eight years' general education. In the last few years " only twenty to twenty-five workers attended evening classes, that is, at a factory where the management encourages their study and where there is room for sixty more babies in the nurseries." The article stated that this was not an exceptional case. It had recently become more difficult to recruit workers to evening schools; many of those recruited leave, and the level of education of those who attend " leaves much to be desired ": " attendance at schools of rural and working youth [part-time general] has become notoriously bad." As the earnings of teachers depend on the quantity and success of students, they go out of their way to recruit them and give them much higher marks than they deserve.

Though there has been much criticism of Khrushchev's emphasis on part-time education (an emphasis that is partly traditional), in practice, this sector of education, especially at university level, remains very important. The following table shows the tremendous growth of evening and part-time university study after Khrushchev's reform of 1959:

	1950–51	*1959–60*	*1965–66*	*1967–68*
Total no. of students ...	1,247,000	2,267,000	3,861,000	4,311,000
Full-time	818,000	1,146,000	1,584,000	1,887,000
Evening and correspondence ...	429,000	1,121,000	2,277,000	2,424,000
Numerical prevalence of the latter over the full-time category	–389,000	–25,000	693,000	537,000

	1970–71	*1971–72*
Total no. of students ...	4,581,000	4,597,000
(a) Full-time	2,241,000	2,309,000
(b) Evening and correspondence	2,340,000	2,288,000
Numerical prevalence of category (b) over (c) ...	99,000	–11,000

[8] See, for example, Yu. Shpakov, " Vtoraya zhizn rabfakov," *Pravda* (24 Jan. 1969).

[9] " Pochemu pustuyut party v vechernei shkole," *Pravda* (28 Jan. 1969). This is not an isolated article; there are many similar ones to be found in the Soviet press.

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Here we see a definite and rapid growth of the evening and correspondence sectors of higher education until the post-Khrushchev school reform in 1966 and a gradual reversal of the process after the reform, when the part-time sector begins to decline somewhere between 1968 and 1970. The total number of first year-students in the academic year 1968–69 was about 900,000, of whom 416,000 were going to be day students, that is, almost a half of the total, further decreasing the number of part-timers.[10]

This second failure of the combination of school with labour is another blow to orthodox Marxism in the Soviet Union, with its theory of the all-round communist, capable of doing many types of work. The first attempt to apply the labour-productive principle to education was made in the 1920s and was given up in the thirties. Khrushchev tried again in the fifties, and the attempt was quietly abandoned under the pressure of the intellectuals and the technocrats in the second half of the sixties.

The specialized high-schools which came through the back door of Khrushchev's reform to ensure the continuation of scientific progress are another blow to the basic ideological tenet of the obligation to give everyone equal educational opportunity. However, just like the British 11-plus system, the Soviet system of selecting children for the best schools at the age of 15 is now occasionally being criticized. Andrei Kolmogorov, Academician of Physics and Mathematics, writes: "I think that the network of such schools will continue to expand gradually with profit for our science and technology. But it must be remembered that to count *only* on the early selection at the age of 15 would be wrong. In this way we can deprive science of very talented and greatly needed people. Moreover, we should think over whether it is right that the question of a young man or a girl entering university or not is being decided at the age of 17." Kolmogorov quotes examples of scientists who had been very average students and whose talents emerged only much later. This article confirms that attendance of special schools is becoming more and more a decisive factor in whether a candidate is selected, that is, would pass the competitive entrance exams with the highest marks for university, particularly for full-time day study, which alone provides a really satisfactory level of higher education. This tendency is likely to increase with the growing disproportion between the number of high-school graduates and the number of available places in establishments of higher education.[11] In this

[10] *Pravda* (16 Apr. 1968). The data in the statistical table is from: (1) *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1959 g.* (*National Economy in 1959*) (Moscow, 1960), p. 740; (2) *SSSR v tsyfrakh v 1965 g* (*The USSR in Figures*) (Moscow, 1966), p. 133; (3) *SSSR v tsyfrakh v 1967 g.* (Moscow, 1968), p. 126; (4) *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR, 1922–1972* (hereafter *Nar. khoz.*) (Moscow, 1972), p. 430. Calculations in the fourth line of the table are the author's.

[11] The sociologist, N. Aitov, calculated that in 1970 there would be five million graduates of all sorts of secondary schools, but only 940,000 freshman places at the higher learning establishments. ("Obrazovanie i zhizn," *Oktyabr*, No. 7 (1966). The real intake in 1970 was only 911,500. (*Nar. khoz. 1922–1972*, p. 440.)

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situation, it is difficult to see how the problem raised by Kolmogorov could be solved.

THE 1966 school reform is likely to increase stratification.[12] One of its aims was to provide for a general secondary education, " in the main," for the whole population by 1975. However, the difference in the quality of education between the big city, small town and rural schools was at the time great and has increased with the rapid expansion of secondary education in such a short period of time. P. A. Kashutin, rector of the Lenin Pedagogical Institute in Moscow, complained about the great contrast in the quality of the various pedagogical institutes, and said that irrespective of the quality of the institutes, insufficient numbers of teacher-candidates were graduating from them, as *Gosplan* cut down every year on the numbers of first-year students planned by the education ministries for the day sectors of these institutes. He said that there was a continuing overproduction of engineers, who consequently often performed the jobs of technicians, but, at the same time, not enough university-educated teachers were being produced even to cater for current needs, let alone for the 1970s, when needs would multiply with the introduction of general 10-year education throughout the country.[13] In 1961, over 90 per cent of all future primary school teachers (the four-year schools) of the country were studying in secondary teachers' schools; that is, teachers' college with three to four years of specialized studies after a seven- or eight-year primary and secondary education. In the school year 1955–56, of those teaching in grades five to seven, 29 per cent had not attended the now defunct teachers' institutes, which provided for two years of further study after completion of the 10-year general education. Even in grades 8 to 10, 23 per cent of teachers of the main subjects did not possess full higher pedagogical education (pedagogical institutes and university faculties with four to

[12] As indirectly admitted by Peter Kapitsa towards 1971, when he said that the screening out of the gifted children from regular schools to the special ones deprives the former of talent and general brightness. A gifted student sets standards for the rest of the class and pulls it ahead with himself. He helps to teach other students and in this process learns more himself. Thus " ghetto " schools for the gifted have a negative effect not only on the regular students but on the gifted ones as well. (" Nekotorye printsipy tvorcheskogo vospitaniya . . . ", (" Some Principles of Creative Education . . . "), *Voprosy fil.*, No. 7, 1971, p. 20.)

[13] " S pritselom na desyatiletiya," *Pravda* (6 Feb. 1968). To attain a greater proportionality between the needs of the national economy and the quantity and quality of education, Birman suggested a system of economic accountancy for centres of higher learning. First, they should undertake paid research contracts for industries and other state enterprises; second, graduates should be sent to an enterprise or institution for a trial period. If their work proved satisfactory, the hiring institution would have to pay educational establishments the average price of training each specialist; if their performance is poor, the employers have the right to send them back to their schools. Thus the enterprises would stop their extravagance in hiring unnecessary numbers of graduates, while the schools would be forced to give their students a better education and to demand of them a better quality of study. Birman's article (*Literaturnaya gazeta* (hereafter *Lit. gaz.*) (10 Apr. 1968)) met with several objections. See for example, Magnitsky, *Lit. gaz.* (22 May 1968); Dainovsky, *Pravda* (20 Apr. 1968).

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five years of study), not counting the teachers of music, mechanical drawing and gymnastics, who often have only a secondary specialized education.[14] This was prior to Khrushchev's introduction of eight-year obligatory education and the 1966 reform introducing compulsory full secondary education. The training of teachers has not kept up with demand. In 1965, 93 per cent of all primary schools were in rural areas, while "students graduating from the rural primary school, having entered grade 5, are not always capable of following the programme successfully."[15] As most of the incomplete secondary schools are also to be found in rural areas and as teachers usually only go to rural schools if they cannot find jobs in the towns, the gap continues and increases at the higher level of education, especially since, in many cases, the growth in the number of incomplete and complete secondary schools in rural areas results in the up-grading of village teachers with insufficient training to teach in these schools. All this results in a very low proportion of peasants' children at the universities.[16]

To alleviate this situation, many universities have been running special correspondence and even residence courses to prepare graduates of the rural schools for university entrance examinations. In 1969, it was decided to bring in a decree of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, On the Organisation of Preparatory Sections Attached to Higher Educational Institutions, which ordered the setting up of such courses, of 8–10 months in duration (the former for full-timers, the latter for part-timers). Only demobilized soldiers and children of peasants and workers would be admitted to these courses. The political context of this measure becomes clear in the section which declares that the local trade union, *komsomol* and Party organizations will decide who is to be sent on such courses. It is well known that the bulk of the dissidents in the Soviet Union are members of the intelligentsia, who have been brought up in an atmosphere of greater leisure and in a tradition of more independent and critical thinking than the children of workers and peasants. The most trusted university students, especially those who are university *komsomol* activists, are, as a rule, children of the humblest

[14] I. A. Kairov, ed., *Sovetskaya shkola na sovremennom etape* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 210–217.

[15] *Narodnoye obrazovanie*, No. 12 (1967), p. 11. Quoted by I. Vekesser, "Nachalnaya shkola—slaboe zveno sovetskoi shkoly," *R.L. Research Bulletin* (Munich, 21 Mar. 1968).

[16] The present First Secretary of the Komsomol, E. Tyazhelnikov, a teacher by training, wrote that the majority of students of rural eight-year and 10-year schools lag behind their urban fellows in level of education. Only 40 per cent of rural schools of the Chelyabinsk Region have physics laboratories, and less than 20 per cent have chemistry laboratories (*Pravda*, 7 Jan. 1968). A. Arseniev, a member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, also complains about the quality gap between rural and urban high-schools (*Trud*, 30 Feb. 1968). The Minister of Education of the USSR, M. Prokofiev, in his speech at the All-Union Congress of Teachers on 2 July 1968, stated: "The transition to general secondary education will demand an additional number of teachers of the senior grades, especially in the rural areas. We must take effective measures to provide rural schools with higher educated teachers" (*Komsomolskaia pravda* (hereafter *Kom. pravda*), 3 July 1968).

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families, particularly from the rural areas, who tend to be grateful for educational opportunities. The authorities hope to assure for themselves at least a minimum of loyal supporters among the student and future professional bodies by granting special privileges to those peasants' and workers' sons who are recommended by the Party and its affiliate bodies. Most probably, the main criterion for the selection of candidates for these courses is not their academic ability, but their political reliability, as had been the case with the " Workers' Faculties " of the twenties and thirties. That these courses would place those attending them in a more privileged position than that of the children of the intelligentsia is shown by the decree itself, for it provided that graduates of these courses be accepted by the universities without the competitive entrance exam, which remains in force for those entering university straight from high-school. Furthermore, the latter are not fully prepared for the university by their high-schools either; a recent study has shown that 85 per cent of the Moscow University first-year entrants had to hire private tutors on finishing high-school in order to prepare themselves for the university entrance exams.[17] The inadequacy of the 10-year primary and secondary school course is further demonstrated by official reports a year after the institution of the preparatory courses. These state that at practically all the 191 institutions of higher learning where the preparatory courses were established, children of white collar workers and intellectuals have been accepted. At least one Western researcher interprets this as a sign that there have not been enough sufficiently literate workers' and peasants' children to fill all the vacancies on the courses and that to fulfil the student plan, the administrators were forced to accept children of intellectuals and white collar workers.[18] Children of peasants made up a total of about 20 per cent of the student body attending the courses; i.e. about 4,000 persons (out of a total of 20,000) across the whole USSR. There are at least three reasons for the failure to recruit peasant children: (1) the shortage of young people in collective farms; (2) the reluctance of collective farm administrators to let their serf peasant children leave the farms, lest they never return; (3) the extremely low standard of rural education.

On the other hand, the readiness of the children of intellectuals and white collar workers to volunteer for the preparatory courses provides more evidence of the inadequacy of the Soviet high-school education.

[17] A. Khalamaizer, *Kom. pravda* (28 Aug. 1969).

[18] I. V., " Okonchilsya pervyi god podgotovitelnykh otdelenii pri vuzakh " (" The First Year of the Functioning of the Preparatory Sections has Ended "), *R.L. Research*, CRD 313/70 (27 Aug. 1970). See also: *Byulleten Ministerstva vysshego i srednego spetsialnogo obrazovaniga SSSR* (*Bulletin of the Ministry of Higher and of Specialized Secondary Education of the USSR*), No. 7 (July 1970), p. 10; *Kom. pravda* (16 Aug. 1970), p. 1; an article by A. Balov and V. Kuznetsov, *Molodoi kommunist* (hereafter *Mol. kom.*) (*The Young Communist*) No. 3 (Mar. 1970), pp. 100–105; Yu. Yakovlev, " Oglyanutsya pered finishem " (" A Reflection Before the Finish "), *Uchitelskaya gazeta* (hereafter *Uch. gaz.*) (4 Apr. 1970), p. 3.

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It is more probable than not that it was precisely the sons and daughters of Party and government functionaries for whom exceptions were made and who found their way to the courses. Thus the principle of making education harder to obtain for members of the traditional non-Party intelligentsia was probably being followed; hence the lack of visible reprimands to the administrators of the courses for ignoring the original stipulations on acceptance of students.

THE cramming of the four-year primary school course into three years, in accordance with the latest school programme has already proved unsatisfactory and has resulted in higher rates of failure in the primary school years. All these complaints suggest that the attempts to cram full general education, in the present circumstances of the greatly increasing scope of the sciences, into a mere 10-year period is utopianism. With the 8–10 month preparatory pre-university course, or its replacement by private tutorship, plus the attempt to telescope primary education, the actual duration of general education comes to nearly 12 years, a figure equivalent to that of most Western countries. If we add to this the fact that the length of basic university study is one year longer than in most Western countries (two years longer than in Britain), that the school and university week is six days instead of five as in most other countries and that the academic year is longer and vacations shorter than in the West, it is obvious that the productive efficiency of Soviet education is considerably lower than that of the West.

One of the reasons for this is to be found, again, in the basic general education and in the quality of teachers, which is usually low, even with those who have had higher training. Teachers' pay has been very low and a high proportion of teachers have to stay in small towns and rural areas, an unattractive prospect since the standard of living is so low. Furthermore, teachers are overloaded by such " voluntary " duties as giving political lectures and running workers' clubs. Only the poorest students, who have failed entrance exams to other faculties, go to the institutes of education. Two Soviet authors cite some striking figures: in the last 20 years, in the RSFSR alone, 1,505 persons received Ph.D.s in education, but there are only 27 Ph.D.s among the teachers of the Republic's general education schools.[19] The situation has improved somewhat since teachers' salaries were raised by an average of 26 per cent in January 1965. Rural teachers' pay was increased even more to offset in part their particular living hardships. Nevertheless, with the emphasis of the Soviet economy on heavy industry, with its classification of teaching, services and medicine as " non-productive " work, the pay of teachers and of the medical profession continues to lag behind the national average wage, and the gap is still increasing.

[19] " Yesli na troyechku, to v uchitelya," *Uch. gaz.* (26 Nov. 1960); V. Etinger and Yu. Orlov, " Nuzhen li shkole srednii uchitel'," *Oktyabr*, No. 6 (1968).

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	Average Wage *	*Average Teacher's Pay* *	*Average Pay of the Medical Profession* * (includes nurses, etc.)
1964	91	78	65
1965	96	94	79
1967	104	96	82
1968	113	103	90
1970	122	106	92
1971	126	107	93 [20]

* In rubles per month.

It is for this reason that teaching, the medical profession and the services are completely dominated by women, who have been squeezed out of the other, better paid, university-trained professions by men. It is not only the teaching profession which is dominated by women; pioneers' leaders, librarians, and social club cultural organizers are also predominantly women. As a result of this domination of education by women, articles have appeared in the Soviet press about the "feminization of man," which goes hand in hand with the growing rudeness of boys and lack of chivalry. The articles put forward the theory that boys need men as senior colleagues and teachers, as, at a certain stage of growth, only men will appeal to them as a moral authority. Deprived of the leadership of men, they despise the moral authority of the female instructor, in fear of being branded as "sissies" and "mummy's boys." To prove their masculinity, they begin to behave arrogantly and rudely. At the same time, having been brought up by women, they lack masculine courage, strength of will-power and perseverance, thus falling easy prey (through hero-worship) to the older boys from the neighbourhood. Consequently, say the articles, the new generation of boys tends to combine female weaknesses and immaturity with brutality—potential qualities for entering upon the road to delinquency. Some Soviet authors explain the growing incidence of hooliganism, petty crime and alcoholism among teenagers and youths in this way.[21] The low standards of the average teacher, the poor equipment of many—particularly rural—schools, and the lack of opportunities for rural school graduates to go on to university—all these factors are responsible for the already high and increasing rate of school failures in the Soviet Union. The failure rate increased sharply after the implementation of Khrushchev's reform in 1959, with students spending too little time on education and too much on vocational training or production work. In the school year 1964–65, there were 900,000 failures at the summer examinations in

[20] *SSSR v. tsyfrakh* (1965), pp. 126–127, also p. 120 (1967); and *Narodnoye khozaistvo SSSR v. 1968 g.*, pp. 554–556; and *Nar. khoz . . . 1922–72.* pp. 350–351.

[21] See for example: "Vremya byt muzhchinoi," *Lit. gaz.* (15 Oct. 1969); "Gde vy, d'Artaniany," ibid. (8 Oct. 1969); "Muzhestvennye zhenschchiny? Zhenstvennye muzhchiny?" ibid. (1 Jan. 1970).

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the Russian Federal Republic alone; this republic contained 55 per cent of all the primary and secondary school students in 1965. In 1968, it was reported that in the whole of the USSR two million students failed the examinations and had to repeat the year. It should be noted that the total number of primary and secondary school students remained practically static between 1965 and 1967–68, with an actual drop of 60,000 students in the RSFSR, that is, a " weight " drop of the RSFSR student body to 54 per cent.[22]

One of the factors in high-school failure is called by the Soviet press the " psychological barrier," namely, inertia created by the feeling that one has no chance of going to university anyway. This is particularly true of the rural schools. If, in the rural areas, the lack of educational perspectives results in a high rate of failure, in the urban areas, most high-school graduates who, having failed the university-entrance exams, are forced to go to work, look upon these jobs " as a forced and temporary brake on the road to university." [23]

The greatest fault of the Soviet educational system is, ironically, regarded as the fact that schools are too exclusively geared to the pursuit of intellectual professions. " In our country an adolescent . . . is readily condemned for offering his services *for pay*. . . . Even badly paid unmarried mothers carry the full burden of all the material care for their studying children. Before Revolution . . . both university and high-school students, even of very well-to-do families, as a rule, used to earn pocket money by tutoring or helping in *Zemstvo* work. Abroad, adolescents from different social strata normally earn on the side by working as porters, salesmen, dishwashers, repair workers, and so on. . . . It is no wonder, then, that Soviet students, not used to any of this work, whether they be the children of industrial workers or intellectuals, " decide that they are made only for intellectual professions. . . . And when life forces them to become industrial workers, this is taken by them as an insult, even as a failure of their whole lives." The author of these words, V. Kantorovich, accuses the Soviet propaganda machine and writers and journalists of having created over the decades of the Soviet regime a false scale of job values, whereby " almost the whole mass of would-be high-school graduates are preparing themselves to become electronic engineers, pilots, radio engineers. . . . At the same time, a great number of professions . . . do not enjoy any prestige in the eyes of the senior high-school students, *as well as the whole of our society*. This is first of all the service industry, including commerce. . . . The term ' a service employee ' has become, not without help from journalists, almost a synonym for extraction of tips. . . . ' To trade ' has become

[22] Calculated from data in *SSSR v tsyfrakh . . . 1965*, pp. 137 and 129 respectively. A. Arseniev, *Trud* (30 Feb. 1968). He also states that between grades 1 and 8 about 20 per cent of students drop out, primarily as the result of failing examinations and being forced to repeat the year.

[23] " Obrazovanie i professiya: vsegda li soyuzniki? " *Lit. gaz.* (3 July 1968), p. 10.

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almost to mean 'to cheat,' 'to steal.' Manual labour is treated with contempt by the Leningrad senior high-school students." [24]

Some Soviet sociologists, concerned by the apparent "over-production" of high-school graduates, carried out surveys of employers' preferences as to the educational level of workers. 75 per cent of the employers who were asked said they preferred workers with eight or less years of general education; 25 per cent preferred those with a full 10-year education. When asked how many years of education they thought a worker should have, 7 per cent of employers gave a figure of 10 years, 30 per cent eight years, while 68 per cent believed that seven or less were sufficient. Their reasons were that high-school graduates looked upon factory work as an enforced temporary delay in education, were thus not interested in their work and took the very first opportunity to leave for an educational establishment. The sociologists conclude that general education was an obstacle to becoming a skilled worker and an "enemy" of vocational training and factory work.[25]

Other authors totally disagreed with this position. I have already quoted Kantorovich who criticized the Soviet school for its abstract intellectual trend and the propaganda machinery for praising some professions while treating others, such as trade and commerce, with contempt. N. Aitov suggests that there should be a differentiation of emphasis in the last two years of high-school, with about 33 per cent of schools geared towards preparing students for university education and the remainder training their students to be highly skilled workers. This, he writes, would even out the chances of higher education for the representatives of all social groups, which is not the case now. In fact, his findings in 1967 in Ufa and Orenburg in the Urals revealed that whereas the average education of (urban) workers and employees who were the children of peasants consisted of 7·31 years of schooling, that of workers' children was 7·66 years, and that of the children of other employees was 12·22 (i.e. full secondary plus over two years of university education). The sociological findings of the Novosibirsk scholars referred to by Kantorovich, showed that ". . . . the children of the urban intelligentsia predominantly go to the universities . . . the road towards intellectual professions has been facilitated for the hereditary intellectuals. . . ." [26] In this context, it does not follow that Aitov's prescription would in any way provide for a greater equality of the chances of higher education for all classes. Most probably the children of intellectuals will again, on the strength of their general culture and background, make up the absolute majority of the ninth and tenth school forms geared to higher education, while the "masses" will provide the other two-thirds preparing for a career as an industrial worker.

[24] V. Kantorovich, "Sotsiologiya i literatura," *Novy mir*, No. 12 (1967), pp. 154–155.
[25] "Obrazovanie i professiya: vsegda li soyuzniki? *Lit. gaz.* (3 July 1968).
[26] "Vseobshchee srednee obrazovanie i ego sotsialnye posedstviya," *Mol. kom.*, No. 3 (1968), pp. 62, 157.

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IT is interesting to note that the opponents of general full secondary education for all operate on the basis of the Marxist ideological premise that consciousness must be determined by the environment and by the laws of economic necessity: "The premature transition to such forms of education which are not warranted in life by the real needs of the national economy leads only towards a delay in the youth's entry into independent life, gives knowledge which is unnecessary, and awakens interests which society is incapable of satisfying." [27]

The arguments of the supporters of full secondary education are completely "idealistic," to use the Soviet terminology; the basic position that "spiritual needs should not be ahead of the real possibilities of their satisfaction . . ." is, according to Kantorovich, wrong. His main argument in favour of general secondary education is its role as a factor in building up a cultivated human being (*vospitanie*). He reveals another fact of social stratification in Soviet education: only four per cent of all the students of incomplete secondary factory schools (FZU: *Fabrichno-zavodskie uchilishcha*—vocational training schools) have highly skilled parents, while 43 per cent of the parents of regular senior high-school students are either highly skilled workers or (educated) employees. Many of the FZU students come from broken homes and they tend to form gangs. Many "difficult cases" also have their roots in these factory schools. An article replying to the claim that higher levels of education increase labour turnover quotes another sociological finding: 78·8 per cent of alcoholics arrested by the militia in Gorky had less than seven years' education, "and although 50 per cent [of all the arrested drunkards] were below 30 years of age, none of them was studying. Statistics show that the rate of crime is radically lower among those who possess a full secondary education." [28] Both Kantorovich and the latter article refer to the experience of the United States to justify their defence of full secondary education. Contradicting the claims of official Soviet propaganda, that with the achievement of the full general secondary education the Soviet Union will be ahead of the whole world, it is stated that "the length of obligatory education in our time is 10 years in the United States, England and France, and nine years in West Germany and Japan." To support their criticism of the university and profession-oriented Soviet "polytechnical" (i.e. emphasis on mathematics and physics) school, the author again refers to the American example: "Formerly pragmatic and utilitarian, [the American high-school educational approach] has now become purely educational. The aim of the school, they now say in the USA, is to give knowledge, to develop abilities, not simply to prepare the graduate . . . for one or another professional activity." Kantorovich criticizes Soviet schools from

[27] Kantorovich is disapprovingly quoting Shubkin, without naming the source, ibid., p. 156.

[28] R. Gurova, "Soyuzniki vsegda," *Lit. gaz.* (14 Aug. 1968). It is significant that M. Prokofiev, Minister of Education of the USSR, praises Gurova ("Shkola—eto politika," *Zhurnalist*, 11/1968) for her reasoned defence of secondary education.

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the same standpoint: "The contemporary [Soviet] school . . . serves as a stepping stone to university . . . overloads the students with the knowledge which is necessary for the university entrance examinations . . . but has no time to . . . awaken, strengthen, stimulate in the senior students those cultural interests which would be independent of their future professions. . . . The school does not develop tastes in the arts and literature; often, it does the opposite, repels the students from literature, particularly from the works covered by the school programme." [29] An interesting point is that this view of education was supported by the then RSFSR Minister of Higher and Specialized Education, V. N. Stoletov, now the President of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. He stated that the aim of Soviet society is to allow such a "gradual broadening of the higher education that anyone willing should be able to receive it." In that era, he continues, there will be more graduates than openings which correspond strictly to the type of education received. Then the enterprise managers will have the opportunity to select the best specialists from among the graduates, rather than being forced to take someone with a diploma simply because he has a diploma. He maintains that if a university graduate does not work in the field in which he qualified, it should not be considered a tragedy and that the prevailing view that the state loses money invested in the student in such cases is fallacious, for the nation as such gains in having as high a percentage of educated and cultivated citizens as possible.[30] It is significant that a senior state bureaucrat should have been influenced by the ideas of Russia's leading educationalists and sociologists, thus initiating a major break with the traditional Soviet utilitarian concept of education.

These authors come close to recognizing the merits of Western education, that is, its ideology, for in the Soviet context, "school means politics. . . . The Soviet school . . . is responsible for graduating politically literate, ideologically convinced fighters for communism. . . ." [31] Yet it is namely here, in the sphere of ideological education, that the Soviet school is having its greatest difficulties. The 23rd Party congress stressed the necessity of raising the ideological level of university students. The new school programmes have introduced the compulsory study of "scientific atheism" at establishments of higher education in addition

[29] Kantorovich, *loc. cit.*, pp. 156–160.

[30] V. N. Stoletov, *Kom. pravda* (9 Oct. 1969). Peter Kapitsa advocates the extension of university education opportunities to all academically qualified young people, irrespective of whether the national economy would be able to absorb so many university graduates into jobs corresponding to their education. He argues that altogether, with modern technology, the national economy would have needed considerably fewer specialists than are currently employed, had it not been for the colossal military industry and economic aid to underdeveloped countries. Education, he argues, is necessary to make people more cultured, so that they would spend their growing leisure time in a more satisfactory way and would have greater cultural and intellectual interests. He cites the US, where 55 per cent of all high-school graduates go to college, as an example for emulation. (*Loc. cit.*, pp. 16–21.)

[31] Prokofiev, *loc cit.*, quoting Lenin, as requoted by Brezhnev in his speech at the 1968 Soviet Teachers' congress in Moscow.

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to the study of Marxism-Leninism and the elements of dialectical materialism, which is obligatory in all faculties. Nevertheless, some students do not pay as much attention to the " social sciences " (in other words, ideologico-philosophical studies) as they do to technical subjects. " In the higher educational establishments one often sees half-empty classrooms where the social sciences are taught." The teachers' newspaper, *Uchitelskaya gazeta*,[32] reported on a case where a university teacher of Party history came to the *Komsomol* to complain that her students had completely ceased to study the history of the Party. Cases have been reported where a student graduating from university passed all the examinations with top marks, but failed " scientific communism." In the Ukraine, " various theoretical sections of Marxism-Leninism are superficially treated by the teachers; . . . the lessons of some pedagogues, because of their low ideological, theoretical level . . . do not awake independent thinking in the students." [33] In many regions of the Republic, 40 per cent of secondary school students have had the lowest pass mark in history and social studies (*obshchestvovedenie*). A secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, Torsuev, complained about the lack of ideological vigilance of the students as well as about the low standards of teachers of the main ideological subjects: " Young people should understand how acute is the ideological struggle . . . around the key issues of philosophy. . . . Two philosophic currents . . . have attracted the particular interest of a certain section of our youth in the last few years: neo-positivism and existentialism . . . many students who demonstrate an active interest in philosophical problems are at the same time dissatisfied with the teaching of social sciences. Over two-thirds of the students investigated by sociologists in Moscow stated that the main defects of the teaching of social sciences at the higher learning establishments are its lack of relevance to the real problems of modern life, and the unwillingness of teachers to reply to pointed questions." [34] Almost one year later, Academician A. Alexandrov stated that it was unfair to criticize the students for lack of interest in ideological studies. In fact " they are not interested in bad teaching," and some teachers lack broad erudition, independence of thought and do not dare to give answers to the so-called " pointed questions." [35] This comment came nearly two years after the 23rd Party congress resolution calling for the expansion of ideological studies at school, and a year and a half after the decree of the Soviet Government, On the Measures for the Improvement of Preparation of Specialists and for the Improvement of Conduct of the

[32] F. D. Ovcharenko, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian CP, addressing the Ukrainian teachers' congress, *Pravda Ukrainy* (20 June 1968), p. 2.

[33] Torsuev, *Kom. pravda* (17 May 1967).

[34] *Pravda* (19 Mar. 1968), p. 3.

[35] *Pravda* (9 Sept. 1966), p. 2; *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, No. 11 (1966), pp. 70–77; *Sovetskaya Latviya* (24 Mar. 1966); *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (29 June 1966 and 19 June 1968).

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Higher and Specialised Secondary Education, which called for the intensification of the study of the theories of Marxism-Leninism.[36]

THE poor state of ideological studies has haunted Soviet schools ever since the original revolutionary zeal vanished. Some recognition of this on the official level has been pointed out. In last-ditch attempts to improve the ideological situation, several measures have been taken by the authorities, including a number of decisions on the improvement of the teaching of social sciences in high-school and at the universities, desire to increase the numbers of children of humble origins at the higher educational establishments, and the like. One of the latest measures of this kind was the development of a five-year plan of ideological instruction at the centres of higher learning. An instruction to this effect was issued in 1971 with a detailed programme for the introduction of obligatory ideological studies in all faculties of educational establishments. This was a follow-up to the decisions of the 24th Party congress of March–April 1971: "The whole effort of education and bringing up of youth must serve the purpose of the forming of communist convictions and morals, of limitless devotion to the socialist fatherland in the new generation."[37] This is only one of numerous attempts to revive the dead ideology by means of bureaucratic coercion —all of which have so far failed, harming young minds on the way, and going counter to all the proposals of educationalists and other leading Russian intellectuals dealing with the problems of education. As Peter Kapitsa has emphasized: "The school . . . must by all means avoid all forms of coercion of the natural inclinations of individual students . . . *the creative process manifests itself in man . . . when he is doing something without an exact instruction, but has to decide on his own how to act.*"

For genuine sociologists and educationalists who are just paying lip-service to the official ideology a much graver problem is the progressive limitation of opportunities for Soviet high-school graduates to enter university, and the meritocratic character of Soviet life and education. Their dilemma is how to overcome the prejudice against menial jobs, so that Soviet graduates unable to continue their university education would not feel as frustrated as they do today. As we have shown, these writers have admitted that in North America, for instance, students and other young people from educated families readily engage in such jobs without any contempt for them. They could not, however, because of censorship, objectively analyse this paradoxical phenomenon: in the "proletarian, classless" Soviet Union manual and semi-skilled (or even highly-skilled factory work) labour is treated with contempt, while in the "capitalist class society" of the USA no jobs are beneath consideration. Neither could they describe in detail the much higher social

[36] D. Pospielovsky, "An Ideological Five-Year Plan for Soviet Students," *R.L. Research* CRD 312/71 (Munich, 18 Oct. 1971).
[37] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 20–22.

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mobility both ways in the USA as compared to the USSR, as a result of which incomplete education is no tragedy for an American, while it is for a Soviet citizen—certainly socially, and very often materially.[38]

THE main line of criticism directed by leading Soviet intellectuals against the Soviet school system has been that it is too authoritarian and that it does not sufficiently develop the personality, that it instructs rather than educates (to use the French connotation of the word, or the Russian *vospitanie*). Some scientists have even established a connection between Soviet education and the problem of the new type of industrial manager, a man with considerable initiative and daring. They claimed that the authoritarianism and dogmatic narrowness of the school precluded the development of such a personality, which is an essential prerequisite for industrial progress. Academician Peter Kapitsa, the famous Soviet physicist, advocated that the appreciation of modern art, which expands man's creative initiative—an essential quality of the modern administrator—should be a part of the modern educational process. He stated that the school should include in its programme the development of artistic and cultural tastes and interests in students and be undogmatic in its approach.[39]

A recent *samizdat* document sheds some light on the background to the Kapitsa interview.

The document is the disturbing autobiography of a 42-year-old Soviet political prisoner, Mikhail Makarenko (*né* Hershkovich), who was arrested in 1969 and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment plus a fine of 25,000 rubles shared with his friend, Slava Rodionov, who received a milder sentence of three years. Their guilt was in founding in 1965, at the Novosibirsk Academic City, a private gallery of modern art. This was the first instance, at least since the late twenties, of an art gallery being organized privately in the Soviet Union, financed entirely out of the personal funds of founding members, who received a meagre salary of 40 to 72 rubles per month for their efforts from the Siberian Section

[38] The issue of mass education, including adult education, was once discussed by the author with a Moscow militiaman, who was himself a part-time evening high-school student. He maintained that the main stimulus for these studies was financial. When I told him that in England fewer people studied part-time than in the USSR, he refused to accept my praise for the Russian quest for knowledge and said that the simple reason was that the pay of an uneducated Soviet citizen was at semi-starvation level, hence his need for more education. " In the West it is different," he said, " the workers live well, so they can afford to enjoy their private life and not study in the evenings."

[39] The interview with Kapitsa appeared in *Yunost*, No. 1 (Jan. 1967). A similar tying together of the economic reform and education is seen, for instance, in an interview with Academician Mikhail A. Lavrentiev, Chairman of the Siberian Section of the USSR Academy of Sciences, who stated that the knowledge received by the current graduates at the Soviet centres of higher learning lags 10 to 20 years behind modern science. Consequently new ideas and new discoveries made by advanced scientists at Soviet research institutes are extremely hard to implement in industry and other branches of national economy. This has a detrimental effect on Soviet industry, on its economy, and, naturally, on the economic reform. (" Ot idei do mashiny " [" From an Idea to the Machine "], *Lit. gaz.*, No. 1 [1 Jan. 1970], p. 10).

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of the Academy of Sciences only after having run the gallery for six months, whereupon they also received apartments in faculty housing. To sustain the gallery and to purchase and borrow collections for exhibition, Makarenko donated a part of his private collection (which included a Rembrandt and many other precious paintings) to the gallery, selling the rest of his collection for a total of 34,000 rubles and spending the entire sum on the gallery. The fees they charged for visiting the gallery were all paid into the State Bank towards a fund for the eventual construction of a large-scale gallery at the Academic City. By 1968, enough money had been collected to build such a gallery, an architectural model was made, a site was selected, and local newspapers announced the plans to go ahead. It was then that the KGB caught up with the work, closed the gallery, confiscated all the collections, and had its two chief activists arrested and sentenced on false evidence.

Not only was the element of private initiative in this venture impermissible from the Soviet point of view, but the gallery was also specializing in modern art, particularly in Russian modern art, an art which has been banned in the Soviet Union since the late twenties and most of whose early representatives had either been forced to emigrate, or died in Soviet concentration camps. Makarenko's gallery became famous in the Soviet Union, although it had hardly ever been mentioned in the Soviet press. It was visited by General de Gaulle and received praise from world-famous foreign and Soviet museums and galleries. Marc Chagall was invited to visit it and was willing to present, as a personal gift, his whole private collection of art to the gallery and to the Soviet Union as a whole. It was precisely on the eve of Chagall's exhibition and his hoped-for visit that the gallery was shut and its founders arrested.

Their aim, writes Makarenko, was to resurrect the genuine modern Russian art, pull it out from the underground, and aesthetically re-educate the masses. The gallery, situated in a town of 15,000 inhabitants, was always full and rarely closed on weekends before 1 or 2 a.m. It was very often frequented by visiting groups of school children from areas hundreds of miles away. The aesthetic education of children was particularly in Makarenko's mind, and he was surprised how Soviet youngsters, completely ignorant of modern and abstract art before visiting the gallery, were really thrilled, and how readily they listened with deep interest and attention to the lectures on modern art given by him and his seven assistants.[40] But even Kapitsa's statements in defence of modern art saved neither the Novosibirsk gallery nor Makarenko and his friends,

[40] M. Ya. Makarenko, " Iz moei zhizni " (" From My Life." An addition to the Appeal to the RSFSR Supreme Court) (15 Dec. 1970); AS 1250, pp. 59–106 (AS [Arkhiv samizdata] and the number designate the Radio Liberty *samizdat* archival numeration). See also: Trial report in *Pravda* (13 Oct. 1970); a Moscow correspondent's report on Makarenko and the trial in the *International Herald Tribune* (13–14 Apr. 1970); an earlier report on him praising Makarenko and his activities: " Puteshestvie v Akademgorodok " (" A Journey to Academic City "), *Ogonëk*, No. 17 (Moscow, April 1967; and D. Pospielovsky, " Kto takoi Makarenko? " (" Who is Makarenko? "), *Radio Liberty Research*, CRD 366/70 (19 Oct. 1970).

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despite the fact that the Soviet press is full of articles by pedagogues sounding the alarm that the Soviet school ignores the issues of aesthetic education and the development of cultural tastes and independence of mind in students, all of which results in infantile minds and generations of semi-educated people who do not know what to do with their leisure time or how to make decisions. This reflects negatively on their behaviour both at work and at home and makes poor managers out of them, which is detrimental to the progress of the modern scientific-technological revolution, while making private and social life uninteresting and empty.[41]

THE well-known Soviet writer, Veniamin Kaverin, recalled with nostalgia in his reminiscences [42] the educational methods in Soviet universities in the twenties, when students had been free to attend any lectures in any faculty as long as they finally passed their examinations. This freedom of choice and decision, he wrote, had made the students mature and responsible much earlier than students today. In his own case, this practice allowed him to be registered at two different faculties at the same time and to receive simultaneously diplomas in two different subjects. This system also forced the lecturers to present their lectures as interestingly as possible; for students simply did not attend boring lectures, and overcrowded the auditoria where a popular lecturer was teaching. As far as literature is concerned, Kaverin remembers that at his high-school in Pskov, where he studied before the revolution and in the very first years of Societ rule, the teaching was much more exciting than it is now. There was more variety in textbooks and more originality. His teacher of literature understood that it was necessary " not to study literature, but [to study] *by means of literature.*"

A leading Soviet educational theorist, Professor Alexei Leontiev, has discussed similar problems concerning the independence of the mind. This is becoming particularly necessary, because every few years scientific progress makes obsolete the knowledge acquired at university. " The main aim of education," he said, " must be not the remembering of ready-made formulae, but the assimilation the habit of the independent acquisition of knowledge, which will allow every individual [specialist] to move ahead together with the ever-accelerating scientific-technological progress." To achieve this, he says, the whole educational system must be overhauled.[43]

[41] See, for instance: I. V., " Ravnodushie molodëzhy k klassicheskoi muzyke . . ." (" Soviet Youth's Indifference to Classical Music . . ."), *R.L. Research*, CRD 264/69 (1 Aug. 1969); L. Zhukhovitsky, " Vospitanie chuvstv " (" Development of the Emotional Side of Life "), *Lit. gaz.*, No. 12 (13 Mar. 1970); A Chudakov, " Zhivoe slovo i kanony khrestomatii " (" The Living Word and the Canons of Literature Text-Books "), *Lit. gaz.*, No. 41 (10 Oct. 1973); Ya Bilinkis, " Urok dlya literaturovedov " " A Lesson for the Literature Experts "), *Lit. gaz.*, No. 42 (17 Oct. 1973); A. Nuikin in *Pravda* (22 Dec. 1967), pp. 2–3; A. Birman, " Reforma i chelovek " (" The Reform and the Man "), *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 12 (Dec. 1967).

[42] " Za rabochim stolom," *Novy mir*, No. 9 (1965), pp. 151–168, particularly pp. 151–152; also, " Sobesednik," *Novy mir*, No. 1 (1969), pp. 156–168. The issue of making attendance of university lectures voluntary again was discussed in the Soviet press in 1971, but nothing has been done in this direction.

[43] See his interview in *Pravda* (22 Feb. 1968).

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HOWEVER, from the vantage point of 1975, it can now be said that despite the relative frankness of the criticisms of some of the basic policy premises of Soviet education on the pages of the official press, the practical application of these criticisms has been bordering on nil. The demand for more scope and broadness in the teaching of literature has resulted in the inclusion at last of Dostoevsky in the syllabus as from 1967. The new Russian literature programme for 1968 included one work by Dostoevsky: *Crime and Punishment.*[44] But in the principles of education nothing has improved. In fact, there are signs of a certain deterioration, at least at secondary school level. At least two out of four of the original and most famous physical-mathematical schools have been badly affected by the purges of the dissidents between 1968 and 1972. The pioneer of these schools, the one at the Novosibirsk Academic City, was badly hit in the course of 1968 when many of its leading teachers actively participated in protests against the trial of Galanskov, Ginzburg *et al.*, as well as against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Most of these teachers were sacked. The section of Mathematical Linguistics at the Novosibirsk University was closed for the same reasons. Owing to purges, the continued existence of the Philology and the Northern Siberian Languages Sections also came into question.[45]

The Physical-Mathematical School No. 2 in Moscow, which was the second one to be founded after Novosibirsk, had practically ceased to exist by September 1972, after eight years of fame. Just as in Novosibirsk, the students of this school, besides attending regular classes where they were taught by brilliant teachers, hand-picked by the School Principal, also attended special lectures given regularly by the most popular professors of Moscow University and other centres of higher learning in Moscow, as well as by full members of the USSR Academy of Sciences. These scholars received no extra pay for these lectures. It was not only in mathematics that the graduates of this school excelled at the universities, but also in literature, art, history and other subjects. The teachers, enjoying relative creative freedom (unusual for Soviet conditions) enhanced in their students love for literature, creativity and an " acute interest in social problems."

Information on the " free spirit " of the school was, however, gradually being accumulated on the desks of officials until the early part of 1971,

[44] N. Dolinina, " Vstuplenie v literaturu " " Introduction to Literature "), *Lit. gaz.*, No. 49 (4 Dec. 1968). The author of the article praises the new Form 9 (of the ten-year school) literature textbook for being an aid to independent reading rather than a dogmatic text, and for containing a chapter on Dostoevsky, previously omitted from all Soviet school textbooks. The book is: B. I. Bursov, *Russkaya literatura* (" Russian Literature ") (Moscow, 1968).

[45] No reports on the eventual fate of these university departments are known to the author. See *Chronicle of Current Events*, Nos. 1 (Apr. 1968), 2 (June 1968), 1 (6) (Feb. 1969)—all in *Posev* spec. ed., No. 1, pp. 7, 15–19, and 63 respectively.

M. Makarenko, in the abovementioned document, informs about other " trouble " in the Academic City in 1968–69; e.g. mass protests of university and the physical-mathematical school students and teachers against the threatened and later effected closure of his modern art gallery there and against his, Makarenko's, ousting from the Academic City, etc.

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when a former teacher there, I. Kh. Sivashinsky, applied for an exit visa for Israel, and his daughter, a tenth grade student, applied to be released from the Komsomol. Then the trouble started: commissions visited the school; the principal was sacked, some of the best teachers resigned in solidarity with him. Professors stopped delivering their lectures. Students who had been commuting from distant parts of Moscow and the suburbs resigned and switched to local schools. In February 1972, the purge went into full swing: all history teachers but one, and all language and literature teachers were sacked. New teachers were appointed by the District Party Committee, instead of this being the perogative of the school principal, as was formerly the case. Even the Minister of Education, Prokofiev, could not stop the purge, although he tried. Now, the report adds, the school differs in no way from any other standard Soviet school and has fewer students than places, whereas before there were several candidates for each student vacancy.[46]

We have seen that several Soviet scholars criticized the principle of elitist secondary education, of hand-picking gifted students and sending them to special schools. What they meant, however, was giving the regular schools the same facilities and creatively-free programmes as those enjoyed by the few special schools, not equalizing the special schools downward to the drab average!

But apparently this is one of the constant laws of a centralized bureaucracy: situations it tries to improve, it in fact makes worse.

Police measures have apparently lowered the quality of the elitist schools without markedly improving the regular schools. They have succeeded in silencing criticism of the educational system as well as constructive suggestions by intellectuals on how to improve it. They effectively stamp out idealistic private initiative to raise the cultural level and intellectual curiosity of students, but are incapable of offering anything satisfactory in exchange. Consequently, free discussion of education, like so many other subjects, is forced to move into *samizdat*.[47]

[46] " Konets vtoroi shkoly " (" The End of the Second School "), *Chronicle of Current Events* (hereafter *Chronicle*), No. 27 (Oct. 1972); *Volnoe slovo*, No. 6 (1972), pp. 51–54. Among the original and most popular teachers of Russian literature at that school was the minstrel, half-Russian, half-Korean, Yuli Kim, Peter Pakir's son-in-law. He was sacked in 1968 for signing various petitions of protest against political trials (*Chronicle*, No. 2, *Posev* spec. ed., No. 1 (1969), p. 16). Another one was Ilya Gabai, also a popular minstrel, who, after spending three years in a concentration camp for defending the rights of Crimean Tatars to return to the Crimea, committed suicide on 19 Oct. 1973, having apparently been intimidated by the KGB in connection with the case of his former friend, Piotr Yakir. See " Raby li my? K gibeli Ilyi Gabaya " (" Are we slaves? On Gabai's Suicide "), *Posev*, No. 12, Dec. 1973, pp. 3–6

[47] See for instance: The Sakharov, Turchin, Medvedev Letter to Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny (Moscow, 19 Mar. 1970): AS 360, p. 9; Sakharov's Memorandum to Brezhnev (5 Mar. 1971); AS 1136, p. 9; " Ushcherbnoe obshchestvo " (" Defective Society "), Sakharov's Interview on Swedish Radio, *Posev*, 8 (1973), p. 7.

Solzhenitsyn's criticism of some aspects of Soviet education, or more correctly,of the principles of the upbringing of new generations, can be seen in his short story " For the good of the cause," which is a factual acount of an event that happened in the city of Ryazan where he lived and taught at the secondary school, which is the subject of the story. In Solzhenitsyn's story, as in real life, the students were asked to work without pay

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The inwardly insecure and cowardly bureaucracy, fearing all fresh ideas lest there be something " subversive " in them, thus artificially creates another sphere of criminal activity. It presents otherwise loyal and apolitical individuals concerned with the problems of education and willing to devote their time and money to education in the widest sense of the word, with the choice of becoming totally silent or carrying on in the illegal field of *samizdat* and thus becoming subject to criminal persecution. Neither of these is conducive to educational progress or national development. The resulting outwardly stagnant society, given the presence of intellectually dynamic elements, becomes pregnant with conflict.

on the construction of a new school building. When the building was completed, however, the local city administration confiscated it for its own needs, forcing the cheated children who received no payment for their work, to remain in the cramped, dilapidated old building. The detrimental results of atheistic education have also been discussed by Solzhenitsyn in his " Easter Procession " and in his Lenten message to Patriarch Pimen. The neo-Slavophile *samizdat* review, *Veche*, No. 2 (19 May 1971) (AS 1020), pp. 103–4, published a letter by an orthodox priest who blamed the amoral, de-spiritualized, materialistic and morally relativist Soviet education for the mass alcoholism and immorality of modern Soviet youth. He contrasted it with the Christian minority (mostly neophytes) among the young people who are stated to be sober, moral, responsible and good patriots. He called for the reintroduction of religious instruction in schools, at least on a voluntary basis and then " in ten years we won't recognize ourselves." There is a very personal *samizdat* account of Soviet education by Andrei Dubrov: " Tak my uchimsya " (" That's How We Learn "); (Aug. 1972), AS 1178; it is an account of how he was persecuted at school and college for his dissident views and connections, and how his " academic records " were made dependent on his political behaviour. A more interesting recent account of the Soviet school system is by a Soviet teacher who recently arrived in the West in the wave of the Israeli campaign. See: T. Valinov, " Antishkola " (" The Anti-School "), *Posev*, No. 11 (Nov. 1973), pp. 41–45.

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The Soviet-American Confrontation: A New Phase?

John A. Armstrong

THE relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States has been the dominant aspect of American foreign policy, indeed, the central element of world politics, for 30 years, and this condition shows no sign of changing in the near future. For a time, excessive concern with China and exaggeration of the potential of the Third World obscured this centrality. Today, both those who hope that *détente* has really replaced the Cold War, and those who fear that the recession of American influence implies an extension of Soviet power, implicitly concede the dominance of the Soviet-American relationship, whether as collaboration or confrontation.[1]

Interminable arguments have gone on, especially during the past 10 years, about the effect of the American social system or American national character upon the bipolar distribution of world power. Unquestionably there has been such a thing as American "globalism." American obsession with control over the course of world affairs outside its borders has, I think, been a critical factor in maintaining this skewed bipolar distribution. In the beginning, and even at this late stage, however, it seems that the massive force behind bipolarism has been the nature of the Soviet system, and the American contribution has been, largely, a misjudged reaction to that force.

For all of the 30 years that the USSR has been a dominant world force—and for nearly as long before—an equally interminable argument has focused on the relative importance of Russian national interest and communist ideology in forming Soviet foreign policy. I have been involved in that argument; but, like many other Soviet specialists, I have come to regard the debate as sterile. No one questions that Russian elites, if not ordinary Russians, perceive themselves as having 'national interests," nor can one realistically dismiss Marxism-Leninism as obsolete or inconsequential. Just a few months ago Brezhnev reiterated the half-century-old ideological theme:

> The foreign policy of the CPSU and our Central Committee is permeated with deep concern for the welfare of the Soviet people. At the same time this policy is fully in keeping with the interests of all revolutionary forces and with the innermost aspirations of all peoples. It is a class-oriented, socialist and truly internationalist policy.[2]

1 This essay is a personal view, some of it unadulterated hindsight. Just how much, the interested reader can judge by comparing my present views to those I expressed in "The Soviet-American Confrontation: A New Stage?," *Russian Review*, XXIII (Apr. 1964), pp. 97–115.

2 *Pravda*, 15 June 1974, trans. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXVI, No. 24, p. 7.

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In a way more directly relevant to Soviet-American relations, Soviet spokesmen fiercely insist that *détente* is only another framework for overcoming the United States and its associates: " . . . the implementation of the principle of peaceful coexistence means neither the preservation of the social and political status quo nor the weakening of the ideological struggle and activity of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries but, on the contrary, creates more favourable conditions for their development." [3]

We ignore or minimize such intransigence at our own peril. Nevertheless, ideological belligerence must not be interpreted exclusively—or, I believe, even primarily—as a reflection of deep conviction. It is above all a conditioned reflex of a bureaucratized oligarchy self-righteously proud of its own accomplishments and intensely motivated to legitimize its continuing grip on power.

Even in Lenin's day, communist ideology—while unquestionably more fervent—served as a legitimization for the iron rule of a small elite in Moscow over a vast, heterogeneous empire. In fact, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Lenin created was a physical continuation of the Tsarist Empire—a notorious " prison of peoples." Today only 54 per cent of the Soviet population consists of Russians, yet the extremely centralized regime based in Moscow is controlled by an elite which is disproportionately Russian in ethnic background and overwhelmingly Russian in language and culture. But this is not the only source of instability in the Soviet pyramid of power. After the second world war, Stalin took the fateful step of extending his empire over 100,000,000 satellite people. Stalin's successors have desperately clung to most of this extended domain, repeatedly using force to maintain imperial rule in Eastern Europe. Both the " Suslov doctrine " of 1956, formulated to justify the Hungarian invasion, and the " Brezhnev doctrine " of 1968 utilize Lenin's concept of " proletarian internationalism " to legitimize the massive armed intervention which has effectively prevented most Eastern European countries from practising self-determination.

By the restrictions they impose on other communist-dominated states, these doctrines of the Moscow Politburo blur the distinction between nominally independent members of the Eastern European " socialist commonwealth " and the constituent republics of the USSR itself —which, in formal, legal terms also have the right of secession. This blurring stems, in fact, from the vivid perception of the Moscow leaders that any movement towards national self-determination originating in Eastern Europe has neither logical nor practical reasons for halting at the formally established frontiers of the Soviet Union. In fact, the heady Czechoslovak liberation atmosphere rapidly penetrated the adjoining Ukraine. Since this republic, with its nearly 50,000,000

[3] Communiqué on Spanish-Soviet communist meeting, *Pravda*, 16 Oct. 1974, trans. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXVI, No. 42, p. 5.

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people, is the cornerstone of Soviet multinationalism, the slightest stimulation of its case for self-determination intensely alarms the Soviet leadership. Recent attacks on a "bourgeois nationalist" conference in Ontario suggest the hysteria which afflicts the Soviet regime when its rule over non-Russians is criticized:

> A notorious gathering [devoted to] "problems of contemporary Ukraine" was held in Canada. . . . As we have already said, the conference delegates were all luminaries of contemporary Western scholarship. To a man, all are doctors, all—professors. Objective and well-wishing. Old friends of ours . . . there is Doctor Metodiy Borecky from Washington—a veritable record breaker, who is active in so many anti-Soviet organizations that he even outdoes some of his colleagues. Or Doctor Yaroslav Bilinsky from the University of Delaware, a great advocate of bringing grist to the anti-Soviet mill. . . . We have here Doctor John Hazard. He visited the Soviet Union a number of times. It is true that in our country very little is known of him as a scholar. He is better known as a spy, since the good doctor spent most of his time in espionage activity. At Columbia University in the USA, he simultaneously works in the field of anti-Sovietism along with the well-known "sovietologist" Zbigniew Brzezinski. . . . A highly aromatic bouquet, is it not? What is more, one that is generously sprinkled with dollar water, which the imperialist bosses never grudge for the conduct of ideological subversion. . . . They really are good little lambs. Of the kind best described by the old folk saying: "A good little lamb, but it howls like a wolf." Let them howl. Let them even stand on their heads. It makes not the slightest difference to us.[4]

Faced with this extraordinary complex of national forces, the Russified leadership of the USSR has—apart from sheer force—only one means of legitimizing its rule. Without the Leninist assertion that the Soviet "Fatherland of World Revolution" is just the happy foundation stone for a world state of perfect communism, the contemporary Soviet imperium in Europe and Asia is an incredible anachronism. In order to avert disclosure of their anachronistic imperial rule, the Moscow oligarchy will continue to reiterate Leninist formulas. Whether any given leader—or the oligarchy as a group—is really convinced of the validity of these formulas is impossible to determine—and in any case not highly relevant for foreign policy makers. What *is* crucial is the Soviet impulse to attain *credibility* for the Leninist assertion of the coming victory of world communism by achieving occasional, though possibly superficial, gains at the expense of the "capitalist" countries, above all the United States. It is this expansionist urge, prudent and limited though it may be at any given moment, which constitutes the real significance of Soviet rejection of ideological coexistence. And

[4] Stepovoy, "Good Little Lambs from McMaster," *Perets* (Kiev, Nov. 1974), p. 10, trans. *Digest of the Ukrainian Press*, XIX, No. 2, pp. 28–29. As far as I have been able to determine, my own remarks at this conference have been ignored in the USSR. This is a footnote, not a complaint.

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it is precisely because the Soviet oligarchy is inextricably caught in the web of ideological legitimizations and their foreign policy implications that any verbal formula like *détente* signifies only another phase of confrontation between the two systems.

THE peculiar combination of defensive legitimization of the Soviet oligarchy's rule and periodic expansion to maintain the credibility of that legitimization has posed a fundamental problem for United States policy in the post-War world. A characteristic over-reaction has been to take the talk of world revolution at its face value, and thus to believe that there is a conspiracy in which all communist parties constitute menaces of comparable significance. Equally deleterious has been the under-reaction which assumes that the USSR will behave simply as an over-sized member of the traditional international balance of power. Throughout the 1960s, American policy often appeared to adopt both faulty interpretations at once. Thus President Lyndon B. Johnson hoped, until the brutal Czechoslovak invasion made such a meeting unconscionable, to conclude his administration with a spectacular summit conference "settling" world problems with the Soviet leadership. Simultaneously, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, over-reacting to the Lin Piao doctrine of triumph of the "world village" over the "world city," stridently argued that the real villains on the world scene were the Chinese communists, since (it apparently seemed to him) a communist proclamation anywhere in the world was to be taken at face value.[5]

During the first Nixon administration several of these dubious principles were discarded. The most striking improvement was the reversal of policy toward the Chinese People's Republic; for America this was the first step towards re-establishing a multilateral balance of power. United States policy became less concerned with maintaining complete control of the course of world events, but the United States continued to act as a reserve force to counteract Soviet expansionism. By sporadic but energetic interventions against Soviet clients who were attacking American clients, the first Nixon administration threw Soviet policy off balance by making the cautious Moscow leadership uncertain how far it could go without provoking an American response. For example, in 1970 vigorous warnings to Syria deterred that Soviet client from its aims of overthrowing Jordan in collaboration with Palestinian guerrillas. Through the concept of linkage, progress in negotiations with the Soviet regime at least theoretically was made contingent upon Soviet restraint across the whole range of world affairs. By 1972 it seemed plausible to hope that the USSR would accept the "rule of alliance responsibility" long advocated by the United States: that

[5] See especially his statement to the House Armed Services Committee, *The New York Times*, 19 February 1965.

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either superpower had a responsibility for restraining the client countries which it had armed.[6]

As the second Nixon administration repidly declined into a condition of policy paralysis, many of these apparent gains were abandoned. The most striking retreat occurred during the Yom Kippur war of October 1973. The element of uncertainty concerning American reaction to provocation, which had restored flexibility to American policy during 1969–72, vanished in favour of the nervous telegraphing of US intentions toward adversaries which had characterized the futile step-by-step escalation policy of the Johnson administration. Once again, as in the 1950s and 1960s, it was apparent that Soviet clients might launch a surprise attack against American clients without direct American retaliation. Even when the Soviet clients were on the verge of catastrophic defeat, they were sheltered from the consequences of their errors, for Washington kept the American client on a tight leash. Most significant of all was American abstention even verbally from holding the Soviet regime responsible, although its massive arms build up, its continuous resupply of munitions, and its direct threats to Israel were indispensable factors behind the Arabs' attack and the frantic efforts to avert their defeat.

Far from condemning the Soviet Union for what was a violation of anything which could be called, by the loosest definition, a "spirit of *détente*," the expiring Nixon administration pushed harder than ever for formal agreements. Among these the immensely complicated SALT II negotiations deserve extended consideration which I can hardly provide here. Regardless of debate over particular provisions, it is evident that a strategic arms limitation agreement was at the very least as advantageous to the USSR, with its overstrained productive capacities, as for the US. A strictly bilateral agreement, decoupled from other considerations, appears most appropriate in the arms area. Consequently, in the evident absence of Soviet restraint of its expansionist clients, all that the United States could hope to gain from linking negotiations was help for the unfortunate dissenting minorities within the Soviet empire. As I suggested above, this is an extremely touchy matter because it lies close to the basic structural principles of the Russian elite's rule. No foreign policy considerations will lead Moscow to loosen its rigid control over the peoples of the USSR, or even of its most important European satellites. During the 1970s, however, it became increasingly apparent that the Soviet regime *might* regard considerable, though limited, emigration of dissenting elements to be an acceptable way of coping with long-run control problems. There are numerous precedents for such "safety valve" releases by dictatorial regimes. The most striking recent instance is the exodus of about 1,000,000 Cubans; in Russian history, the departure of nearly 2,000,000 Jews (together with numerous Polish and Lithuanian Catholics) between 1890 and 1914, constitutes a precedent

[6] The phrase is James Payne's in *The American Threat* (Chicago, 1970), p. 80.

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of sorts. Undoubtedly the more systematically ideological legitimization of the Soviet oligarchy makes the safety-valve solution more difficult. Any mass emigration constitutes a painful rejection of the regime's claim to represent the wave of the future. Rejection by an ethnic element like the Soviet Jews, with its cosmopolitan attachments and associations with the Revolutionary myth, is particularly traumatic. To an increasingly xenophobic, anti-Semitic Soviet elite, however, the departure of large numbers of Jews might appear the "lesser of evils"—especially if it was the price of significant foreign advantages.

Nevertheless, the tragic flaw in the American bargaining position in 1974 was not entirely a misjudgment of the limits of the possible in negotiation linkage, but the failure—extending back at least to the beginning of 1973—to impress the Soviet leadership with its need to provide a quid pro quo for advantages from the American side. To put the matter bluntly, the Administration insistence on adding massive trade benefits to the lesser commercial concessions (wheat deals and Aeroflot exploitation of American air travellers) conveyed the impression that the US was over-eager for Soviet trade. While correctly perceiving a strong Soviet desire for access to financially favourable American technology, yet also correctly understanding that this motive was limited, American spokesmen, private as well as public, presented a contradictory and confused picture of American motivations. If—as the original linkage concept enforced by Nixon in 1970 implied—Soviet negotiators had been quietly but firmly informed by a united body of American policy-makers and opinion leaders that further trade concessions depended on concrete, substantial but finite Soviet accommodations in other areas, results might well have been gratifying. Instead, it appears, the Moscow leadership came to believe that the dominant American elites were intent on trade for trade's sake, either for short-range private gains or because the capitalist economy was desperate.

In fact, some American negotiators (whether private or of the Government) appear to have wanted large, quick commercial deals in order to create vested American interests which would constitute a lobby for continued good relations with the Soviet regime. The less disingenuous counterpart of this dubious theory is the belief (heard occasionally among the New Democratic alliance as well as the big business supporters of the Administration) that commercial concessions to the USSR will involve the Soviet elite in a web of profitable contacts which will, in a reasonably short time, alter its expansionist motivations. In other words, "a fat communist is a good, or at least a peaceful communist." My own investigations of the impact of European commercial exchange and technological contacts with the USSR during the early 1960s, when this cliché was common, convince me that these expectations are a chimera.[7] External trade and imported technological expertise are a

[7] Some account of this research is presented in "Sources of Administrative Behaviour: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons," *American Political Science Review*, LIX (Sept. 1966), pp. 643–55.

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strictly delimited area of Soviet activity, insulated from the decisive majority of the communist elite apparatus as well as from the masses of the people. It is quite feasible for the regime to maintain these profitable but limited arrangements in an isolated cultural compartment, especially if—as has occurred during the past 10 years—the regime ruthlessly suppresses domestic dissent. On the contrary, to a modest but significant degree acquisition of advanced American technology in fields like computers strengthens the Soviet leadership's impulse to centralized, monolithic control.

More important in the present circumstances, when American power is receding, American determination is questioned, and the American economy is faltering, is the way in which US readiness to extend trade concessions may convince the Soviet leaders that their ideological prediction of the demise of capitalism is accurate. It is striking to note how a perceptive diplomat, William L. Clayton, perceived this danger in 1945, at a time when American power was at its height. Referring to the loan terms (more generous than Mikoyan had dared request) formulated by the Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and his assistant Harry Dexter White, Clayton wrote:

> . . . by making this new proposal, we would definitely give the impression that we were most anxious, almost on any terms, to make available postwar goods to the Soviet Union. While we are naturally desirous to increase our trade with the Soviet Union to the maximum, and it is in our interest to do so, it would be tactically harmful to deepen the impression they already have that no matter what happens we are going to have to sell goods to the Soviet Union in order to keep our own economy going.

SINCE September 1974 the case for large trade concessions seems to have declined still further. The continuing outpouring of Soviet arms to Syria, the rapid development of Soviet ties with a communist-backed Portuguese government, and evidence of renewed North Korean intransigence were concrete indications that *détente* placed few inhibitions on Soviet activity—either before or after Congressional refusal to endorse massive credits, and despite accelerating private credit arrangements. Indeed, manifest American timidity in the confrontation in the Middle East plus Soviet perception of capitalist greed in commercial negotiations probably have had exactly the reverse effect of emboldening the Soviet leadership to transgress the limits of its habitual prudence. Most recently increasing boldness in flouting American interests has been more apparent in Indochina. One must conclude, reluctantly, that the American clients in South Vietnam and Cambodia would have succumbed eventually in any case. But their eventual fall to internal disorder and local guerrilla attacks would have had a very different impact from the actual massive conventional invasion by North Vietnamese troops. Whatever the motivations of the Hanoi

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regime and its backers, the effect was to humiliate the present Administration by demonstrating that it had no capacity to respond even to a flagrant, across-frontiers aggression resembling the North Korean invasion of 1950. North Vietnam does not produce the hundreds of ultra-modern heavy tanks, fleets of army trucks, long-range heavy artillery, or the SAM missiles which interdicted South Vietnamese air intervention, nor does China. All of these indispensable tools were stamped "made in the USSR"—possibly even in the Kama Truck Factory. In the perspective of this massive challenge, an American response like the Mayaqüez incident, however justified it may have been, is bound to appear ephemeral.

If Soviet activities in Indo-China are not confrontation under thin verbal disguise, it is hard to say what would be. Indeed, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said as much in plain Russian not a year ago:

> We make no secret of the fact that the foreign policy of our socialist state is class oriented. It follows from this that the Party devotes paramount attention to strengthening the unity and solidarity of the socialist commonwealth. . . . The decisive aid and support of the USSR and other socialist commonwealth countries helped the heroic Vietnamese people to achieve victory in their long and difficult struggle. This victory is an event of universal significance.[8]

In effect, Gromyko was reasserting the regime's ideological legitimization by admonishing the Soviet and satellite peoples that communism was once again moving toward world dominance. In his inimitable way Gromkyo was doing us the favour, nine months ahead of the rebirth of North Vietnamese aggression, of repeating the warning that the late Dean Acheson so cogently delivered in 1950 during another Soviet-backed aggression:

> At the next meeting I suggested that Mr Attlee would be making a serious mistake to believe that the American people would follow a leadership that proposed a vigorous policy of action against aggression on one ocean front while accepting defeat on the other. The public mind was not subtle enough to understand so ambivalent a policy, which was fortunate because it would be a wrong policy. Discussion of priorities was one thing; wholly different attitudes on the same issue on two sides of the world was another.[9]

Unhappily, as Robert Conquest shrewdly observed recently (quoting another distinguished British sovietologist, Hugh Seton-Watson), to many Americans in the international field:

> What 200,000 Communist party officials, from Brezhnev down to the secretaries of party branches in factories or collective farms, tell their subjects is all camouflage: the *real* views of the Soviet leaders are what some nice guy from the Soviet delegation at the UN

[8] Supreme Soviet election speech, *Pravda*, 11 June 1974, trans. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXVI, No. 4, p. 12.

[9] *Present at the Creation*, (New York, 1969), p. 482.

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said over a quiet drink, or what an itinerant Midwestern scientist heard from some friendly academician in Novosibirsk.[10]

During the past six years, however a remarkable shift in American opinion-making circles' perception of the Soviet Union has occurred. For the first time the extent of *ethnic* as well as individual repression in the USSR is becoming apparent to American intellectuals. This shift has not yet extended to some of the new breed of politician or the old breed of businessman, and even some of the converted are highly inconsistent in their practical proposals. But the shift to recognizing the true face of Soviet authoritarianism affords a real opportunity for generating support for a strong American policy. Unfortunately, the official policy of *détente*, by refusing to identify the real problem which the Soviet regime poses, works as Acheson foresaw, to disarm not merely the Executive, but the American people, and thus in the end further undermines the Executive's ability to act.

LET us not imagine that *publicly identifying* the Soviet regime as the source of many of America's problems would imply unremitting hostility. If the dominant, underlying relationship between the USA and the USSR has always been one of adversaries, it is equally true that there have always been highly significant areas of cooperation. After all, the 30 years coexistence of the two superpowers has necessarily entailed a good deal of mutual adjustment, tacit or explicit. At present, explicit adjustment is clearly called for in the area of arms limitation. In retrospect, it appears clear to me that this was an unfortunate area for applying the " linkage " concept. If future negotiations were based entirely on the position that both superpowers have an overriding interest in carefully balanced limitations, achieved by hard, technically sophisticated bargaining in private, much might be accomplished without jeopardizing either party's broader political interests.

If this analysis of basic Soviet political interests is accurate, even in general terms, there is little immediate scope for significant bargaining on other issues. After the American retreats during 1973–75 the prospect of securing Soviet adherence to the " principle of alliance responsibility," if it ever really existed, seems remote. From the humanitarian standpoint even moderate concessions on emigration would be extremely gratifying; but in the broader perspective negotiations on this issue must be regarded primarily as an overdue American public awakening to the fact in the long run that hard bargaining rather than unilateral concessions secures bettter results in dealing with the Soviet leadership.

A more far-reaching implication of publicly recognizing the Soviet regime as the principal adversary of the United States would be clarification of American relations with third countries possessing significant power potential. Between the lofty aspirations for a Pentagonal world and

[10] " A New Russia? A New World?," *Foreign Affairs*, Apr. 1975, p. 496.

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the localized efforts at Vietnamization—neither of which, alas, has proved to be highly productive—there is a considerable field for encouraging positions of strength partially independent of American power. Instead of allowing the delicate Chinese connection to cool, it could be encouraged; despite repeated disappointments there may still be some opportunities for encouraging a consolidated Anglo-French nuclear deterrent. Smaller but significant opportunities may already be at hand in the Third World. At the moment of writing concern focuses on Korea; but official spokesmen and most American media studiously avoid recognizing that (as in 1950) the real danger is Soviet power behind Kim Il-Sung's bluster. The true grounds for United States' fear for the viability of the South Korean republic (which is inherently larger and stronger than its Communist rival) are (i) massive Soviet armament of North Korea; and (ii) concomitant American limitation of South Korean offensive capacity (especially in the air) precisely because Washington fears *its* client might be *too* successful in a conflict with Moscow's. In the Middle East, American media (*not* in this case, official quarters) equate Iranian "greed" in raising petroleum prices (in order, to a considerable degree, to acquire the military and economic capacity to safeguard the entire area from the USSR and its clients) with Libyan efforts to use oil as a lever for expansion. Here a recognition of the crucial difference between expansionist instruments of Soviet policy and self-concerned obstacles to this policy would drastically clarify American policy. Legitimate concern with the possibility of Soviet lodgement in the Portuguese Atlantic would take on a different tone if this area were viewed, in the first instance, as part of a broader Luso-Brazilian interest sphere. At present, instead of encouraging the surging Brazilian power to look outward, niggling American criticisms (most recently on the issue of nuclear development) convey the implication that the United States is intent on thwarting any encroachment on its Atlantic—or global—dominance.

Obviously, criticisms of Brazil and similar reservations about other potential autonomous positions of strength, are stimulated by illiberal characteristics of the countries' regimes. Even if American policy were really a strictly ideological "defence of the free world" against communism, however, some distinctions would be in order. However unfortunate it may be, many societies of the Third World, and indeed the First World, do not appear to be able to sustain liberal democracy. In several societies (Brazil and Greece) though, dictatorships, like democracy, have proved impermanent. There is always the chance that the next turn of the wheel will result in a stable liberal system; at the very least the old rascals have been replaced by somewhat less entrenched new ones. In sharp contrast, *no* communist dictatorship (most emphatically not the perennial favourite of Western opinion, Tito's Yugoslavia) has ever been succeeded by a liberal system—or, indeed, by a non-communist regime of any kind.

While the reasons for this striking permanence of communist regimes are complex, the Suslov and the Brezhnev doctrines provide a nearly

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invincible Soviet " reserve army " behind every Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. Ultimately, therefore—or so it seems to me—even the most ideologically oriented doctrine of American foreign policy must confront the overwhelming importance of the Soviet factor. As suggested earlier, I personally prefer to avoid simplistic ideological assumptions, and therefore need not attribute overriding significance to the domestic regimes of countries which the United States might encourage as positions of independent strength. American moral indignation, often a great force for good, can operate most effectively at the national level by exposure (sometimes with the assistance of government information agencies) of tyranny and by rescuing the tyrants' victims. Both in the Soviet bloc and in non-communist dictatorships, direct American intervention is apt to be counterproductive. The hope that the United States could overthrow communist regimes, if it was ever justified, is clearly ruled out by the world balance of forces. Naïve American attempts to thwart communism in Third World countries by social engineering (this charitable phrase is meant to comprise the succession of official crimes and blunders which would have bewildered a Talleyrand) should be equally ruled out.

Instead of impotent intervention against distasteful regimes, an economizing—and consequently a politically viable—use of American power should consist of " keeping the ring clear " for independent third forces by offsetting *Soviet* intervention in their parts of the world. When a Soviet client fails in aggression, the United States should prevent the USSR from sheltering it from the penalties of defeat. Ordinarily, the American offset could be limited to selling or lending arms and economic support *equal or superior* to that the Soviet Union supplies to its clients in a given area. The Angola imbroglio seems to be a paradigm of how *not* to offset Soviet intervention. The Executive indignantly protests that Congressional obstruction impedes sound policy: but it should have foreseen that insistence on business as usual with the USSR would hardly convince populist isolationist Congressmen that a real danger has arisen. A a result, the USSR and its Cuban client have been able to set a new precedent of immense potential—their ability to dispatch with impunity a full-scale expeditionary force to a theatre remote from the present Soviet dependencies.

Obviously, the use of American power to offset the USSR's is incompatible with either isolationism or self-flagellation. Skilfully applied, however, this tactic could constitute a salutary recognition of the limits of American ability to influence others' ways of life and a sensible adjustment to the American people's limited willingness to sacrifice. There is no denying that lowering the level of national sacrifice entails, in the short run, somewhat higher risks of escalation caused by actions of countries which the United States would no longer control. In one sense, these temporary risks are part of the price for the emergence of a truly plural world. In a deeper sense, accepting temporarily higher risks constitutes a rational gamble against the immense risks of escalation which would occur if (i) an isolationist America, suddenly confronted

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by an emotionally unbearable Soviet aggression, lashed back blindly; or (ii) a global policeman America, overcommitted and encountering widespread resistance, took the same irrational course.

In the final analysis, openly recognizing the Soviet regime as the principal problem is a step necessary to secure a stable domestic basis for American foreign policy. It is in this connection that numerous aspects of official American-Soviet relations, trivial in themselves, are disturbing. Summit conferences have rarely if ever been useful. At best they convey the very erroneous impression that the current American leadership can "deal" with the current Soviet leaders because of personal affinities. At a lower level, since 1972, exchanges of people have sharply accelerated, but their nature has significantly changed in the direction of Soviet preferences. Instead of protracted individual visits, carefully controlled *Delegatsiya* tours are the order of the day. Technologically dubious joint space ventures compete for attention with the time-worn publicity ploy of reciprocal naval visits. Impresarios, politicians. and educational administrators (assuming these categories are distinct) join in folksy banter with visiting Komsomol *apparatchiki*—although America has not yet been required to host a deliquescent KGB careerist.

At best these activities are symbolic; they are no substitute for substantial changes in Soviet-American relations. With the prestige of official endorsement behind them, however, such symbolic acts confuse the man in the street who, as Dean Acheson foresaw, cannot understand why he should make heavy sacrifices to support a foreign policy when its makers intermittently assure him that we no longer confront a powerful adversary. Plain recognition of this confrontation would not mean the end of exchanges, which are important, though hardly essential, for scholarly and specialized purposes. Ending the ballyhoo would, however, dissolve inflated expectations, and enable the growing intellectual recognition of ineradicable Soviet repression to provide backing for a firm American foreign policy.

Given such a first policy, the United States could cease to fritter away the little leverage it has with Moscow. With a moderate framework of expectations, it might well turn out that a good deal more could be accomplished by tough quiet negotiation than anyone now anticipates. How much better it would be to take as one's guide these prescient words written 17 years ago:

> Soviet leadership has been able to blackmail the West from both its strength and its weakness. We recoil before Soviet power but we also fear to exploit Soviet difficulties. This difference in the willingness to assume risks has been the fundamental Soviet advantage in the postwar period, nearly overcoming the bankruptcy of its social system and the instability of its leadership structure.[11]

—to quote Dr Henry Kissinger.

11 *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, (New York, 1959), p. 387.

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US-Soviet Scientific Exchange in the Age of *Détente*

Earl Callen

WORLD WAR II left the world with two superpowers, first one and soon both possessing the means to destroy the other and much of the rest of the world too. For 25 years the East and West sat glaring at each other, their fingers on the nuclear trigger. Transnational contacts between citizens were viewed with suspicion, and intelligence agents filed dossiers on those who trafficked with the enemy.

In that atmosphere communication withered—except between scientists. Science has always been an international venture.[1] Moreover, American scientists, having " known sin " in J. Robert Oppenheimer's characterization, by developing the atomic bomb, felt a special obligation to forestall its use by maintaining a dialogue with their Eastern counterparts, on science, on arms control, and peace. That dialogue, which helped pave the way for the test ban for example, served the world well.[2]

[1] In the sentence of Galileo, pronounced in 1633, the Inquisition found him guilty of " maintaining a correspondence with German mathematicians " (i.e. Kepler).

[2] Before 1972 most contacts between scientists of the US and the Soviet Union were unofficial, through personal professional relationships, or during attendance at scientific conferences. Official relations in the field of science and technology were extremely limited until 1956, when a poliomyelitis epidemic in the Soviet Union encouraged the dispatch to the US of a team of Soviet medical scientists. At the same time an American team of epidemiologists and microbiologists toured the USSR. This exchange led to the signing in 1958 of the Bilateral Exchange Agreement. The American institution responsible for administration of this interacademy exchange programme has been the National Academy of Sciences. Functioning concurrently with the NAS-administered programme were also several small intergovernmental (HEW, AEC) exchange programmes, and the non-governmental Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants, which later evolved into the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). At the Moscow Summit Meeting in May, 1972, four executive agreements were signed, providing for greatly enhanced agency-to-agency cooperation in science and technology, environmental protection, space exploration, and medical science and public health. Further agreements were subsequently signed in the fields of powerful uses of atomic energy, agriculture, transportation, and world oceans. During the 1974 Moscow Summit Meeting. additional agreements were signed in the fields of energy research, housing and other construction, and of research on heart disease and development of an improved artificial heart. There are now 11 such interdepartmental agreements.

The number of persons participating in the US National Academy—Soviet Academy of Sciences exchange programme has never been large—15 man years in 1970–71, 18 man years in 1972–73 and 28 man years in 1974–75. This is the total flow, about equally divided in the two directions. Under this programme in the 1974 (fiscal), 35 Americans travelled to the USSR and 51 Soviet scientists came to the US.

Under the agency-to-agency Summit agreements there were 113 individual visits by Soviet scientists to the US in 1970, 246 in 1972, and 463 in 1974. Visits by American scientists to the USSR under the programme totalled 98 in 1971, 262 in 1972 and 531 in 1973.

The Comptroller General has issued a report, *A Progress Report on United States–Soviet Union Cooperative Programs*, 8 Jan. 1975, reviewing progress on three of

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Because science transcends national boundaries, and because for a quarter century scientific exchange so demonstrably served the interests of world peace, it has become an axiom, an unconscious tenet of the unwritten scientific credo. It is one of those things scientists believe in without realizing that they believe. It is that belief that many of us have now come to challenge.

In 25 years the world has changed. The " mind-set " of the Cold War is no longer appropriate. We do not hover on the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. This is the age of *détente*. Last year 2,000,000 tourists travelled to Moscow. Each year dozens of international sports competitions, congresses and conferences are held in the Soviet Union. Trade between the US and the USSR was in 1971, at 250,000,000 dollars, still down near the level of the Cold War freeze. Since then it has, on a rough average, doubled in each succeeding year. The largest

these programmes, the science and technology, environmental protection, and space exploration programmes. It is probably too soon to pass judgement. The report notes, in its findings and conclusions, that " to date the exchange of information has been limited and of little technical benefit to the United States." (p. i). In summarizing mutual benefits from the environmental protection programme the report concludes that " overall, the US program chairmen we interviewed felt that in a strict ' know how ' exchange the agreement favors the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has, by and large, been reluctant to provide the United States with information at any time other than during personal contacts at joint working group meetings . . . Many chairmen are having difficulties in assessing trade-offs in their programs. They readily admit that on a strictly technological and scientific level the United States does not really have much to gain. However, they are of the opinion that because of the global nature of environmental problems everyone benefits no matter where the environment is improved and everyone suffers when environmental problems are allowed to go unsolved."

Another report on the exchange programme, *Inventory of US–Soviet Cooperative Programs in Various Areas of Science and Technology* has been prepared by the National Academy of Sciences, Commission on International Relations, Section on USSR/Eastern Europe, dated Nov. 1974. This report, which contains current budgets, reviews both the Academy-to-Academy and interagency programmes.

From the NAS report the reader obtains a more positive view of the exchange programmes than from the Comptroller General's report. But here too there are demurrers. Of the agreement on cooperation in the field of environmental protection, which the report describes as one of the most active, it says " While the US environmental program is more advanced than the Soviet effort in nearly all major areas, US participants have reported good Soviet work in several specialized fields from which the US could presumably benefit." It should be noted that this programme, for which the US lead agency is the Environmental Protection Agency, is a small effort—the fiscal 1974 budget was $35,000.

The summary of progress in cooperation in agriculture administered on our side by the US Department of Agriculture and funded at $23,700 states that " Reportedly, Soviet performance in the exchange of agricultural economic information, an area of importance to the US, remains less than satisfactory. The results of the bilateral consultations on agricultural economics were disappointing. The Soviets continued to resist furnishing estimates on future production consumption, demand and trade of major agricultural commodities. At the same time, while the Soviets permitted a US winter wheat team to travel to observe crop conditions, they were extremely reluctant to receive a similar visit by a spring wheat team, first postponing the visit and then approving it only after strong representations by the US Department of Agriculture. Comments by a certain Soviet official to the effect that the USSR had made a mistake in agreeing to provide forward estimates of trade in agricultural commodities suggest that this will continue to be a difficult matter to implement. The non-sensitive agricultural research and technology projects, from which the Soviets would seemingly stand to learn more than the US, are being implemented without difficulty."

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American corporations are now represented on the new Soviet-American Trade Council, and are aggressively pursuing business in the Soviet Union.[3] Science is no longer the sole channel, or even the major medium in which the on-going dialogue between East and West is conducted. Scientists can at last afford the luxury of asking why, and how, scientific exchange should proceed. For the issue, as we see it, is not whether to expand scientific contact between nations, but on what terms. A significant and increasing fraction of the American scientific community is coming to believe that the interests of science, and of mankind, are best served in the present era by conditioning scientific exchange on behaviour consistent with a few basic principles.

THESE principles were summarized in a petition by the 6,500-member Federation of American Scientists (FAS):

> Co-existence and *détente* between East and West make it all the more important that we, as scientists, insist on the right of our Soviet and Eastern European colleagues: to communicate and travel freely for scholarly purposes; to function as scientists inside their countries (or, if not so permitted, to leave them to function as scientists elsewhere); and, in general, to debate their views inside their countries and abroad.

These principles are elaborated in another FAS statement,[4] which reads in part:

> In the long run, military security requires that obstacles be put in the way of easy and rapid reversals of *détente*. The right of intellectual dissenters to be heard by the populations of their states is basic to this issue. So long as nuclear armed states exist, it is entirely appropriate—as a security matter—for citizens everywhere to advocate the intellectual freedom required to ensure that *détente* is not lightly discarded.

The statement argues that there is evidence that *détente* leads to increased repression, as Soviet ideologues strengthen the barriers against Western ideological penetration. It continues: "Mankind needs science badly and science is a cooperative endeavor. We cannot afford to do without the cooperation of the brilliant Soviet scientists. This cooperation requires that they have the right to speak and travel freely on matters of scholarly interest. . . ."

The statement acknowledges the special obligation of scientists to see that the product of their thoughts is not misused:

[3] In appendix VIII of the Comptroller General's report, ibid., Richard W. Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, comments that "The list of US firms (doing business with the USSR) is considered to include sensitive and proprietary information. We request that it be treated as such, and deleted from the unclassified body of the report." And so it has been. But from whom is this information being kept secret? The Russians?

[4] Statement of the Council of the FAS on the Responsibility of Scientists under Conditions of *Détente*, Vol. 26, No. 8, (Oct. 1973).

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> Without the right to criticize its use, and to have our criticism heard, how will we fulfil our obligations? It is no accident that Dr Sakharov's actions reflect moral concern associated with his work on the hydrogen bomb. . . . We must protect and cherish this sense of morality abroad, as we rely upon it in ourselves at home. . . . We have an obligation to protect one another in the exercise of the freedoms we require. . . . Colleagues of the international community of science, we are each other's keepers. . . .

WE are familiar with the history of Soviet political interference with international conferences—the Soviet delegation arrives at the last minute, when it is too late to do anything about its consisting not of the speakers invited, but rather persons of demonstrated Party fidelity. Philip Abelson, editor of *Science* and chairman of the US National Committee for Geophysics, writes:[5]

> The standard practice of the Russians is to participate in the planning of international scientific meetings and to submit titles and abstracts for them. Almost invariably, however, a substantial fraction of their participation is cancelled at the last moment and after the program has been set. On this occasion (the meeting of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, Grenoble, 25 August to 6 September, 1975) the customary practice was followed, but the absences were more extensive than usual. More than half of those scheduled to make presentations did not appear, including some conveners of sessions. . . . It was also noted that the Russian delegation seemed to be weighted toward politically reliable types. . . .

Mutatis mutandis, foreign applicants to internationally sponsored conferences in the Soviet Union are also sometimes denied visas on political grounds, and usually at the last possible moment, when it is too late to do anything about it.[6]

I personally witnessed Soviet police, with rifles, barring the door of Moscow State University to Soviet scientists[7] who wished to attend the IUPAP-sponsored International Conference on Magnetism in Moscow, August 1973, because they had applied for exit visas to emigrate to Israel.[8]

[5] Philip H. Abelson, " International Geophysics: Science Dominates Politics," *Science*, 190 (3 Oct. 1975), p. 34.

[6] Some ways international conferences could be protected against political abuse are suggested in E. Callen and E. A. Stern, " Abuses of Scientific Exchanges," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 31 (Feb.1975) p. 32; also see: E. A. Stern, " Scientific contact between the US and the USSR," *Physics Today* (Apr. 1975), p. 9.

[7] For an account see " Moscow, Notes on a Scientific Conference," *The Atlantic*, Vol. 233 (May 1974).

[8] International Union of Pure and Applied Physics. IUPAP is a member union of ICSU, the International Council of Scientific Unions. Both IUPAP and ICSU have rules on the free circulation of scientists, prohibiting the exclusion of scientists from their meetings on non-scientific grounds. The Soviet Union is a sponsor of ICSU, and is represented on the governing councils of ICSU and of IUPAP.

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Soviet scientists who are activists, dissidents, civil libertarians, loyal critics, or applicants to emigrate are not allowed to work, frequently not allowed to leave, jailed, harassed, isolated, ostracized, and denied opportunity to function as scientists. Their books are removed from Russian library shelves. References to their papers are blanked out in Soviet photocopies of foreign journals.[9] They are not permitted to hold meetings. Readers may have heard of the Moscow seminar of physicists and mathematicians. The first meeting of the seminar was held during the Magnetism Conference, to allow those who were barred from the conference to discuss research with foreign scientists. An International Seminar on Applications of Physics to Other Fields of Science was to be held in Moscow, in Professor Alexander Voronel's apartment last summer, except that those of us who applied from abroad were denied visas, and the Soviet sponsors, including Voronel, were imprisoned.

Since the recent release of Voronel from the Soviet Union the seminar has met in the apartment of Professor Mark Azbel. On 14 April we received a cable[10] signed by 45 of the seminar's participants, informing us of their persecutions. The KGB intends to destroy the seminar. They will not allow scientists to associate, even for scientific purposes, unless it is in a controlled, government setting. In the Soviet Union scientists

[9] See my testimony in the Hearings on *Détente*, Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd congress. At the hearings there were exhibited pages from Western scientific journals, and the altered versions of the same pages, photocopied and distributed in the Soviet Union. For example, an article on genetics by the exiled dissident biologist, Zhores Medvedev, was entirely deleted in the Soviet version of *Nature*. A letter by the physicist John Ziman was similarly excised. A particularly striking example of Soviet censorship concerned the Soviet physicist Benjamin Levich, a former member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, who has been unemployed for several years, since applying for an exit visa. Professor Levich is the author of a textbook on physics, once widely used in the Soviet Union, but now unavailable even in libraries. In two articles in the Journal of the Chemical Society (London), *Faraday Transactions*, the author P. P. Schmidt referred to the Levich-Dogonadze theory of oxidation-reduction 30 times. The name "Levich" has been simply blanked out everywhere in the Soviet version, leaving gaps in the text and references.

Another example of Soviet censorship of foreign scientific journals, one subsequent to the Russian signing of an international copyright agreement, appears in "What's Wrong With This Picture," in *Science* 189 (29 Aug. 1975), p. 703. The picture shows the table of contents pages of *Science* (14 March 1975), and of the version of that issue copied and distributed in the Soviet Union. In the Russian version a letter to the editor, the editorial, and two articles have been deleted.

[10] The cable reads, in part: "Some members of the seminar . . . are subject to persecutions for so-called 'parasitism' . . . Shepelev and Azbel received call-up notices for doing retraining in the Soviet army . . . Brailovsky was threatened with being charged with insulting a militia-man whom he never saw, in a situation he was never involved in. Dr. Rosenshtein was warned that he might be charged with anti-Soviet activities . . .

. . . On the 3rd of April . . . two agents stopped Professor M. Azbel . . at the railway station in Chernovts . . . and explained to him . . . that he will not be allowed to return to Moscow for several months . . ."

On 12 May, Azbel was permitted to return to Moscow. The next day he was ordered to report on 19 May for induction into the army for "retraining." Azbel's induction was deferred, but on 28 May he was called to the KGB and informed that he must close down the seminars, which are "an anti-Soviet action planned and led by the Israeli Secret Service," or the KGB would "permanently change his address." (Article 65 of the RSFSR Criminal Code provides the death penalty for espionage).

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are not allowed to think for themselves about biology, chemistry, or solid state physics.[11]

The Soviet Union is far behind the US technologically, and requires massive infusions of American know-how to catch up. The technology gap and economic gap, manifested by economic indicators and by the testimony of experts,[12] are evident to any traveller.

Voronel was recently interviewed by *Science* magazine[13]:

> He described Soviet scientists and the officials who control them as desperately eager for travel abroad for both material and intellectual reasons:
>
> "The brains of Russians and Americans may be the same but their up-bringing is different. There is a constant lack of ideas in Russian science. . . . We have strength in details but very few new ideas. The current for new ideas comes always from the West."
>
> Voronel accused Soviet officials of "systematic stealing of technology" from the West. He alleged that the "stealing" takes place literally through clandestine means, and more generally, through taking advantage of ordinary contacts with Westerners.
>
> Voronel advised Western scientists . . . "participating in exchanges to make as many informal contacts as possible, and not to see only those people whom the authorities want them to."

SIX years ago, Robert Byrnes, in a memorandum for the Subcommittee on National Security of the US Senate wrote:[14]

[11] *TASS* (10 Dec. 1974), explains: "Some Western organs of propaganda, for instance the Associated Press, the *Washington Post*, and the *New York Times* more than once made a fuss about convocation in Moscow of the so-called 'International Scientific Seminar of Physics' . . . The so-called Soviet organizing committee includes some 10 physicists who were temporarily denied exit visas . . . They were denied the visas for one reason since they all, through their former work have knowledge of defence secrets, which the Soviet Union naturally does not intend to share with Israel and Western Intelligence Service. As a result of this, some of these physicists, in an ostentatious gesture, left their jobs, while others refused to accept new jobs in their speciality.

"And why should, say, Alexander Voronel, engage in scientific work in the USSR, if hostile anti-social activity brings him far greater profits? Handouts in currency remitted from the West are showered on members of the organizing committee. To pay for handouts of the Zionists, persons like Voronel fall all over themselves to sow discord between peoples in our close-knit multi-national family.

"Competent organs of the USSR now receive dozens of letters from prominent Soviet scientists, including those of the Jewish nationality. They demand that measures be taken to put an end to these anti-Soviet activities camouflaged as science . . .

"The seminar is organized on the initiative of suspect persons, and does not represent an official invitation. I believe that such pseudo-scientific events are impermissible. This undertaking must be stopped and a possibility, of such practice must be precluded."

[12] See Hearing on *Détente*, ibid., also Hearings on Negotiations and Statecraft, before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, US Senate, 1973.

[13] "Soviets Said to Gain More from Scientific Exchanges," *Science* 188 (23 May 1975), p. 814.

[14] Robert F. Byrnes, "International Negotiation, Exchanges of Scholars with the Soviet Union: Advantages and Dilemmas." Memorandum prepared at the Request of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operation, United States Senate, October 1969. In terms of numbers, the exchange of scientists and engineers is now in better balance than it was in 1969.

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> Those of the Party and the government who make the decisions (as to who should be permitted to go abroad on exchange programs) . . . seek to strengthen the Soviet system and to weaken ours. Their primary concern has been to obtain scientific, technical, and military information from the United States. They have, in short, sought to use the exchange programs to strengthen their economy and to obtain important information and techniques from a more advanced country. Almost 80 per cent of the Soviet participants in the basic program administered by the Inter-University Committee have been scientists or engineers, while somewhat less than 10 per cent of the Americans have been in science and technology. Thus, the Soviet Union has obtained a significant increment to its scientific and technical knowledge from these programs. . . .

In a recent article,[15] Robert Conquest makes the intellectual case for the " tough " approach to science and technology exchange:

> The Soviet quandary is one which has affected Russia for nearly three centuries. Since Peter the Great, that country's rulers have sought the technology of the West with the purpose of arming and equipping a political culture based on totally anti-Western standards. Indeed, Peter and Stalin after him sought Western techniques with the greatest assiduity at the precise times when they were enforcing serfdom and autocracy on an unprecedented scale.
>
> The trouble is, and always has been that to obtain Western technology while rejecting the civic culture of the West is in the long run not satisfactory—a connection Marxists should be the first to admit. The newly imported techniques may render armaments superior for a certain time, as they did the Russian artillery industry in the 1820s, at a period of maximum political regression. But sooner or later these transplants wither on the vine. Now, at a time of quick technological change, Moscow once again seeks the fruits of—on this occasion—the Third Industrial Revolution: that is electronics, computerization and so forth.

IN considering how to improve the rules under which exchange programmes operate we must distinguish between rules for selection of candidates for the academy-to-academy programmes, rules governing the rights of foreign scientists, and rules protecting the rights of scientific nationals of the host state.

With respect to that part of the exchange programme administered for the US by the National Academy of Sciences, we should require that candidates be selected on the basis of scientific merit alone, and that for half the total number of awards preferential consideration be given to persons designated by the recipient nation, with such persons designated on the basis of scientific merit alone. This would improve the quality of the Soviet scientists we receive.

As regards the rights of visiting exchange scientists in a host state,

[15] R. Conquest, " A New Russia? A New World?" *Foreign Affairs*, 53 (April 1973) p. 482.

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we should insist that participants be free to correspond with scientists of the host state without political interference, and be free to travel and meet with the scientists of the host state for scholarly purposes.

The terms of the present exchange agreements afford participants no statutory support in exercising rights guaranteed to American citizens by the US Constitution, and guaranteed to Soviet citizens by the Soviet Constitution (but which Soviet citizens know better than to assert). Suppose an American physicist, an exchange visitor, seeks to discuss with Mark Azbel some problem related to Azbel-Kaner resonance in solids, he will be advised by his Soviet co-workers that writing to, calling (if the phone is not disconnected—it is), or meeting with Mark Azbel is unwise, even dangerous (there is always the possibility of being beaten up by "drunken hooligans"). If the visitor persists he will be warned by the head of the host laboratory and placed under surveillance by the KGB. If he contacts Azbel he will be castigated and repudiated by his Soviet hosts, and in all probability he will be evicted from the Soviet Union. The American scientist in the Soviet Union has pawned his freedom, and the KGB holds his trip as collateral. Illegally but effectively, he is intimidated by the secret police, as are his Soviet hosts. Our lack of policy on scientific freedom is unwise, unnecessary, and unfair to our scientists abroad. We expect them either to forgo legitimate productive professional relationships with those scientists the Soviet Union wishes to isolate, or to risk expulsion. Why do not the exchange agreements specify rights of free speech and association? It would be emphasizing no more than what each government claims to grant already.

With regard to the rights of scientists of the host nation, we suggest as a precondition to all exchange agreements that scientists be free to function professionally, to meet and work both with foreign visitors and with their fellow nationals and, if they so desire, to emigrate.[16] Scientific exchange benefits the Soviet Union. Soviet scientists carry back from the US knowledge of advanced technology. US scientists in the Soviet Union show their hosts how to build and use our latest devices. As a price for their assistance it is not unreasonable that American scientists ask for liberalization of Soviet political constraints, a relaxation which would not only ameliorate the difficult circumstances under which Soviet scientists labour, but would contribute to world peace.

Reform of the exchange agreements would tell the Soviet scientific community that we American scientists are not "good Germans," recluses content with any arrangements which allow us to hide in quiet laboratories, but that we believe in basic democratic rights, and we care about the welfare of our fellow scientists abroad.

[16] The problems of resettlement of Soviet scientist *émigrés* are discussed in Y. M. Rabkin "Soviet Jews: The Bitter Aftermath of Emigration," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (June 1975), p. 35.

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East German Cultural Scene

Bill Treharne Jones

HUMOUR is not a characteristic normally associated with East Germany, let alone her leaders. This assumption of humourlessness is generally correct, yet even Walter Ulbricht, who was installed by Stalin and ruled the country for a quarter of a century with an iron hand, was capable of flights of humour, albeit macabre. One example was experienced by some 300 writers and artists who were summoned in 1962 to an extraordinary meeting in the Central committee building in East Berlin. The calling of the meeting was, in part, a response to pressure by liberal members of the communist intelligentsia on their party leaders to follow the Russian example and publish Alexander Solzhenitsyn's book about life in a Soviet labour camp, *One day in the life of Ivan Denisovitch.* Its publication in East Germany would, the intellectuals felt, document their own country's break with its Stalinist past and encourage more liberal policies, not least in cultural matters. It was precisely such precedents that Walter Ulbricht wanted to avoid setting. At the meeting he made his position quite clear. " Some people," he declared, " are interested in writings on the labour camp atmosphere in Siberia. We do not need such literature here as we have no labour camps " [*which is true*]. " But we do enjoy good relations with the Soviet Union and we can organize visits for comrades who want to learn more about the Siberian camp atmosphere . . . There have been demands for the publication of books by an author called . . . " His voice trailed off uncertainly, as if he really did not know the name, " Solzhenitsyn! " cried out one of his supporting cast; Ulbricht nodded assent and continued: " If the comrades in Moscow wish to print anti-Soviet literature that is their business. But such literature will not be published here, in the German Democratic Republic."

Ulbricht's remarks [1] concerned cultural policy, yet they illustrate an attitude which pervades East German policies in many other fields: namely, of being more papal than the Pope, of pursuing policies which are sometimes more orthodox than those proclaimed in Moscow. On occasions, such as the meeting described above, Ulbricht even dared to criticize the Soviet Union for deviating from what he saw as the correct course.

THE East German communists are more orthodox than any of their comrades in the satellite states. They have to be, because their dependence on Russia for their survival is much greater. The leaders in, say, Poland or Hungary have their problems, but none of them suffer the permanent trauma of ruling only part of a nation. Hungary, for example, is a national state, East Germany is not. Mr Kadar does

[1] My source is a private conversation in East Berlin (hereafter PCEB), on 2 Aug. 1972.

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not have to worry about having a Western Hungary as a neighbour, whose greater political freedom and more efficient economy are a perpetual reminder of his regime's failings: a communist leader in East Berlin can never cease to worry about West Germany. It is not just the common nationality; the problem is that the television and radio broadcasts which most East Germans receive and the flood of visits by friends and relations made possible by the new agreements keep alive contacts with the West. An East German citizen can never forget the alternative Germany on the other side of the Wall, and this prevents his leaders from developing a sense of security. They are nagged by the perpetual fear that too much experimentation, too much liberalization will encourage popular demands, first for a social democratic system, and then for unification with a similarly orientated Western Germany. Such changes would rob the communists not only of their power but also of their state.

These basic considerations severely restrict the East German leaders' room for manoeuvre. One might therefore be forgiven for assuming that the scope for cultural development was restricted; that the results were at best a slavish imitation of the more conformist aspects of Soviet culture. This assumption is only partly true. Besides the party hacks, whose large output disfigures East Germany's cultural scene, there exists an array of able writers and film makers who, despite the difficulties, have started to develop a "national" culture. I call it "national" because, although since it is written in German and is inevitably influenced by both Germanies' cultural heritage, it is specifically East German in the sense that it is trying to grapple with the real problems of GDR society.

THIS cultural development is not new: its first appearance was in the 1960s, and its roots go back even further. At the same time, this development has been frequently slowed down or halted. Such interference occurs every time the Party leadership feels the artists and writers are going too far in their examination of the country's problems. The last period of repression lasted from 1965 until 1971. Since then, however, various factors have combined to allow what is probably the greatest easing in the Party's attitude towards the arts since 1957. Much of the credit must go to Erich Honecker who took over from Ulbricht as party chief in May 1971, for it is he who has encouraged this relaxation.[2] That he should have done this is strange. After all, as security chief in Ulbricht's days, as the man who was responsible for actually organizing the physical construction of the Berlin Wall,[3] he had the reputation of being a greyfaced bureaucrat and hardliner. Furthermore, it was he who helped to instigate the last period of artistic repression. At the eleventh plenum of the Central Committee of the

[2] PCEB, 8 Nov. 1971 a.o.

[3] See pp. 188–91 of Heinz Lippmann's *Porträt eines Nachfolgers* (Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln 1971).

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East German Communist Party, in 1965, he attacked the intellectuals for "portraying alleged shortcomings and defects in the GDR . . . How is an ideology of unrestrained philistine scepticism going to help the workers? . . . If we wish to raise productivity along with the standard of living we cannot promote nihilistic and morally corrupting philosophies in literature, films, television and the press." [4]

Hardly the words of a man who has presided over a modest, but real cultural thaw. But apparently Honecker has changed since the mid 1960s; and by the time he took over as party chief he was well aware of the widespread depression within the cultural community. Numerous conversations with writers and artists, some of them officially in disfavour because of their "liberalism," convinced him that a new start was necessary.[5] He realised that the clampdown which followed the eleventh plenum—where he himself had figured so prominently—had produced only stagnation. Most of those who had been attacked had withdrawn, unrepentant, into silence. Younger writers and artists, fearful of invoking official disfavour, were not even bothering to submit their works for publication. The result, as Honecker admitted at the 1971 Party congress, was that artistic creation showed signs of "superficiality, formality and boredom." [6]

Six months later Honecker issued a clarion call, the echoes of which are still reverberating around East Germany's cultural circles. "In my view," he said, "there can be no taboos in the fields of art and literature, so long as one's starting point is basically socialist." [7]

It would be a mistake to consider Honecker's statement in isolation. The concession it offered was typical of Honecker's domestic policies during his first years of power. Just as the artistic community was offered more freedom, so the country's youth was offered those once reviled symbols of imperialist decadence, Levi jeans, specially imported. Such concessions were—and are—intended to improve the standard of living and quality of life of East Germans from all walks of life; they are not a sign of liberalization as they do not in any way undermine party supremacy. Indeed Honecker has accompanied his concessions by a number of measures (such as the nationalization of the remaining not insignificant sector of industry still in private hands [8]) which emphasise his orthodoxy. But the fact remains that Honecker has shown greater realism and flexibility than his predecessor in handling the East German population.

However, Honecker's mildly reformist image was also dictated by foreign policy considerations. In 1971, Brezhnev was committed to successfully concluding the difficult negotiations with the three Western powers on a Berlin agreement. This required, among other things, that

[4] *Neues Deutschland* (hereafter *ND*), 16 Dec. 1965.
[5] PCEB, 13 June 1974.
[6] ND 16 June 1971.
[7] From the fourth plenum of the Central Committee of the SED (East German Communist Party), ND 18 Dec. 1971.
[8] Mar. & Apr. 1972.

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East Germany open the Wall for visitors from West Berlin. Ulbricht opposed this concession, thus forcing the Russians to interfere in the affairs of the GDR more than they usually do: thanks to their influence Ulbricht was dumped and Honecker installed in his stead.[9] As a Soviet nominee he duly provided the concession necessary to complete the Four Power Berlin Agreement. However, he did not go unrewarded. As part of the elaborate series of agreements negotiated by the four powers and the two Germanies, the GDR finally achieved the aims it had vainly sought since its inception; namely diplomatic recognition by the West and membership of the United Nations. Of course, diplomacy being what it is, the achievement of these aims was by no means inevitable. That, in itself, was reason enough for Honecker to ensure that his domestic policies would, by their relative mildness, help rather than hinder the chances of Western recognition. Within this framework, even the dissident singer Wolf Biermann, though not the dissident philosopher, came to be the beneficiaries of a process which had more to do with "high politics" than with any cultural inspiration or aesthetic revelation on the part of the GDR leadership.[10]

THE first beneficiary was Ulrich Plenzdorf. In 1972 he took East Germany by storm. Almost overnight he emerged from the comparative obscurity of the state film organisation, the DEFA, where he is a staff screenplay writer, to become a national figure. If his name was seldom mentioned by the media (the omission was intentional), it was on many people's lips. Plenzdorf's fame rested on his play, *The New Sufferings of Young W*, which was being performed to packed-out theatres up and down the country.

Ulrich Plenzdorf is a tall mild-mannered man, just turned 40. Like many young and not so young East Germans, especially those from the arts world, he wears a jeans suit. Plenzdorf differs from the rest only in so much as his "Western" appearance is more pronounced: there is the bushy hair, cut in Afro style, and the rectangular dark glasses.

Plenzdorf once described how he came to write his hit, at a public meeting—only attended by a few dozen people—at the Club of Cultural workers (the Party jargon for artists) in East Berlin.[11] He originally wrote *The New Sufferings* as a screenplay in the mid-1960s, but the DEFA was not very impressed. However, he decided to turn the

[9] Lippmann, op. cit. pp. 222–23.

[10] In the mid-sixties both figures earned the displeasure of the Party. After strong criticism, they were banned from performing or publishing their works. However Havemann and Biermann have—despite the efforts of the Ministry of State Security—managed to maintain contact with their public via West Germany. Their works have been smuggled out to the West and then broadcast by those West German television and radio stations which can be picked up in the GDR. In Biermann's case, there have—since Honecker took over—been a number of attempts to rehabilitate him, attempts which have failed either on account of his refusal to compromise or because of resistance, if not sabotage, by conservative hardliners within the Party.

[11] Klub der Kulturschaffenden, 12 Oct. 1972.

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screenplay into a story because he was so involved in the subject matter. "I wrote it in the sort of style I would like to read myself. I think this is understandable when year after year one has been prevented from doing what one wants to do." [*a reference to clashes with the DEFA authorities over earlier scripts*]. "I felt I had suppressed my own wishes and swallowed my pride for too long." At the time of writing Plenzdorf firmly believed that his story would never be read outside his own circle of friends, but on an impulse he sent it to the senior producer of a leading provincial theatre. Success was instant: the producer dropped everything to stage a dramatized version of the story.

Young W, is Edgar Wibeau, an East German teenager who decides to drop out after a row at work which ends with him dropping a metal plate on the foreman's toe. Edgar absconds. He goes to East Berlin and settles in a hut on one of the city's many allotments. There, free from the obsessive cleanliness, order and punctuality that have oppressed him hitherto, he indulges his passion for rock music and abstract painting. A chance meeting with a kindergarten teacher called Charlie (a girl), develops into an intense passion, only to founder as Charlie is already engaged: to a dull, conformist soldier. Rejected, Edgar hurls his energies into the construction of a new paint-spraying machine he has invented himself. His work reaches a frantic pitch when he learns that his mother has at last found out where he is and is on her way to collect him. Either over-exertion or world-weariness (after losing Charlie, he feels he has nothing to live for), causes Edgar to be careless with the improvised electric motor he is using. While testing it, he electrocutes himself, and dies. But not in vain. The remains of Edgar's contraption are found by workmates from a building site where he had occasionally worked to pick up some money. They reassemble his machine and, with the help of proper materials, see that it could work.

It might surprise people in the West that this play has been a sensation with any public. After all, what Edgar does is pretty common among Western teenagers. The important thing, however, and this is the clue to Plenzdorf's enormous success in his own country, is that Edgar's feelings and reactions have touched a vital chord in East German youth. So many young East Germans know the world which forced Edgar to abscond: the broken home where the one remaining parent is too overworked to exercise proper parental care, the unimaginative and authoritarian methods at school and in the factory, and above all the relentless pressure to conform and "improve" oneself—to the greater glory of socialist society. The pressures are not so much political as social; their keynote is performance. The duller members of society must produce more, the brighter ones must forever gain new qualifications: both groups must work to increase economic productivity. This is what East German society is geared to, and this is what East German children are programmed to from the earliest years. Inevitably young people find many aspects of this system irksome, and this is why they identify with Edgar. Many of them would certainly dare to say what he

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says but are too conformist actually to do what he does. Edgar's actions —such as dropping the plate on the foreman's toe and running away— are things they could only dream of. One of the participants at the meeting mentioned earlier explained Edgar's appeal. He said: " The case of Edgar Wibeau is not typical in our society. Admittedly the yearnings he articulates are widespread; but the practical conclusions he draws— and acts on—are not."

Edgar Wibeau has a parallel in the West. In many ways he is to the articulate and questioning section of East German youth of today, what Holden Caulfield was to the Anglo-American equivalent of the early 1960s. Caulfield was the hero of J. B. Salinger's bestseller, *The Catcher in the Rye,* the mixed-up American teenager who runs away from home and school. Significantly *The Catcher in the Rye* is one of Edgar's two favourite books (the other is *Robinson Crusoe!*). The choice is no accident: Plenzdorf makes no bones about Salinger's strong influence on him. Indeed Plenzdorf has used Salinger's method to reach his public. Edgar, like Holden earlier, does not just echo the sentiments of many young people, he also uses their language. Edgar speaks a mixture of Berlin dialect and teenager slang, a style of language to be heard in any East Berlin pub or youth club, and which Plenzdorf learnt by listening to the kids who played around the block of flats he lived in. Like much slang used by teenagers in big city areas, Edgar's is direct, punchy, idiosyncratic and often highly amusing.

An example of Edgar's language and attitudes comes when he is settling down in his hut on the allotment and begins to realize that from now on he can do what he wants to. Among the few possessions he has brought with him he discovers his jeans:

> Jeans of course. Can anyone imagine life without jeans? Jeans are the classiest pants in the world. For them I'd give up all those synthetic rags from the Young Fashion shops which always look so straight. In fact I could give up everything for jeans—except perhaps for the most way out thing of all. And except for music. And by music I don't mean some *Händelsohn Bacholdy*—no not that but genuine music, mates. I've nothing against old Bacholdy but it doesn't exactly grab me. I mean of course real jeans . . . anyone who wears genuine jeans knows what I mean. But that doesn't mean that every guy who wears genuine jeans is a genuine jeans wearer. Most people haven't a clue what they're wearing. It half kills me when I see some 25-year-old git, who's squeezed his fat hips into his jeans . . . You know for me jeans are not so much a sort of trouser as an attitude. I've sometimes thought one shouldn't grow older than 17. Once they reach 18 they're finished. You can't talk to them any more. At least that's how I've found them. You know what I mean?[12]

Young East Germans understand Edgar all too well. They understand him too when he later goes on to sing his song—(it is in American

[12] This excerpt (my translation) from pp. 26–27 of the West German ed.: Ulrich Plenzdorf, *Die neuen Leiden des jungen W* (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main 1973).

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English of course) in praise of blue jeans. The song, like other parts of the play, is accompanied by a rock group, intoning that heavy rather old fashioned sound which is characteristically East German. Rock and jeans are as much a part of a teenager's life in East Germany as in West Germany. Indeed they may play an even more important role in East Germany as they are not so readily obtainable as in the West.

After years of disapproval the Party now tolerates, even encourages, pop music. Yet it is concerned that such music played in East Germany should not just imitate Western pop. Hence the attempts to develop a specifically socialist and East German style of pop. Hence the fact that young people cannot buy the music they want most—the latest Western titles—in the shops: they have to record them from West German pop programmes. Equally, when they go dancing they know that their own groups and discothèques are forbidden (officially at least) to play more than 40 per cent of Western titles in any one evening. Limited supply is also a feature of the jeans market. Although jeans have been regularly imported since 1971, deliveries are usually snapped up the moment they appear in the stores as demand completely outstrips supply: an East German teenager selling a pair of Levis privately can expect to get up to 200 marks (£33·00).

In many ways the staging of Plenzdorf's play matches the relaxation of the party's attitude towards pop music and jeans—those two symbols of Western culture. Yet toleration is one thing, public deification is another. Edgar Wibeau does not just wear jeans, he proclaims them as an attitude to life. For youthful audiences used to stage heroes more interested in fulfilling their production norm, such remarks are shattering. Instead of the usual unpopular obligation to go to the theatre, within the framework of their school or factory " Cultural Plan," East German teenagers have queued for hours in all weathers just for the chance of standing at the back of the auditorium. At last they have found someone who speaks their language.

Plenzdorf's appeal is, however, not just limited to young people. The honesty and the openness with which he discussed problems hitherto taboo appealed to large sections of the intelligentsia. The sigh of relief was almost audible. I still remember the emotional outburst of a young woman at the club meeting mentioned earlier: " After seven lean years, at last a book one can read from beginning to end again and again." Silence followed. I do not know which embarrassed the other participants more: the sudden display of feeling: or the public reference to the baleful effects of the eleventh plenum.

This young woman's attitude was not shared by the Party's conservatives who disapproved of Plenzdorf's play. Their criticisms went beyond attacking the rather Western " packaging " of the play. What worried them was the play's implication that their society had failed to produce happy individuals living in harmony with their environment. Why else, they argued, would Edgar leave home, fail to register his new " address " with the police (an omission which produced much head-shaking), fail to

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find regular employment, and finally die in circumstances which strongly hint at wilful negligence, if not suicide.[13] If such behaviour is not frequent, the conservatives argued, there was no need to put the play on in the first place: plays should depict "typical" East Germans tackling "typical" problems, and solving them inside, not outside, society.[14] Edgar Wibeau, they said, was not typical of East German youth, and his anarchistic tendencies made him an undesirable prototype.[15]

Of course, if there was no counter argument to the conservative criticisms, the play would doubtless have been banned. For all his rebellion Edgar is, in his own anarchistic and Utopian way, a communist. The evidence for this is found in rather unexpected places. One example is his criticism of compulsory national service. Edgar says he has always felt himself to be a keen pacifist whenever his thoughts touch on those unavoidable 18 months in the armed forces. This received a lot of applause when I saw the play in East Berlin. However, Edgar goes on: "I could sign on for life whenever I see those pictures of atrocities in Vietnam." The applause here was more perfunctory. Perhaps the most decisive evidence of Edgar's basically communist attitude is his invention of a paint-spraying machine. Admittedly he dies working on the machine, but society benefits from the invention.

These aspects of the play provided the liberals with ammunition in their argument with the conservatives about the play's suitability. However, unlike most Party disputes, which are conducted internally, the pros and cons of the *New Sufferings* reached the public, in the form of a lengthy and sometimes polemical discussion in the country's leading cultural magazine, "*Sinn und Form*."[16] But few reviews of the various productions of the play in different theatres appeared in the press, and in the summer of 1973. Honecker publicly criticized the play. Although it was not banned, the tenacious opposition by the conservatives to the filming of the play has prevailed.[17] They have evidently argued that it is one thing to tolerate the play being staged in theatres, however numerous, but quite another to offer Plenzdorf's questionable creation to a mass audience.

THE tenacity of the conservatives' opposition to the filming of Plenzdorf's play was largely due to the fact that communists are traditionally more sensitive about films than any other artistic medium

[13] PCEB 25 Oct. 1972.

[14] During a private conversation on 27 Oct. 1972, Professor Alfred Kurella, a leading conservative who had been a candidate (associate) member of the Politburo (1958–63) and also chairman of the Politburo's Cultural Commission (1957–63) told me that Plenzdorf's play was a symptom of a development he deplored, namely the concentration on the individual's private problems at the expense of examining important world problems. Kurella described this reprehensible artistic development as an "Abrutschen ins Privat."

[15] PCEB 30 Aug. 1973.

[16] See, for instance, "Diskussion um Plenzdorf" in *Sinn und Form*, XXV/I/1973.

[17] PCEB 17 May 1974.

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simply because films have, or can have, the greatest mass appeal.[18] In 1973, the conservative communists were even more sensitive than usual after the enormous box office success of a new home-produced (DEFA) film, which they felt had a variety of severely reprehensible features.[19] Two-and-a-half million East Germans saw the film in the eight months after its première, five times the audience for the average DEFA production.[20] The film's success appears all the greater when one considers that the conservatives were able to prevent the film either from receiving any publicity,[21] or—absurd as it may seem—from being shown in many of the country's 15 district capitals![22]

The film, *The Legend of Paul and Paula,* has been called alternatively the first East German pornographic film or a socialist *Love Story*. Either description, though generally misleading, contains an element of truth. As regards its story-line, *The Legend* is a rather *kitsch* love story: it tells of the affair of a married, opportunist government official (Paul), with an undereducated unmarried mother (Paula), who slaves away in a supermarket. The pornographic epithet was earned by the first part of the film which describes their previous liaisons before meeting each other. The amount of nipple per square foot of film in the opening sequences is, even for Western eyes, certainly rather generous but then, of course, East Germany has a lot of catching up to do. This at any rate was the justification which was to be heard. Judging by the reaction of the teenage girl who was sitting in front of me in East Berlin when I saw the film, I would say the justification was understandable. She was evidently seeing the film for the second time to make sure that the girl with her did not miss a single erotic detail.

However, neither the sentimentality nor the eroticism of this film detracts from its virtues. It differs from many East German films in so far as it has pace, imagination and is not didactic, thanks to the director, Heiner Carow; the female lead, Angelica Domröse (who can occasionally be seen driving round East Berlin in a yellow Fiat sports car) and yet again, the screenplay author Ulrich Plenzdorf. One of the most imaginative sequences is a fantasy which takes place when Paul and Paula, garlanded and scantily dressed, enjoy a banquet on the double bed in Paula's flat. Paula wishes a jazz band would play for them, and it suddenly appears. Then they both imagine their bed has been transferred to one of those massive barges which sail the Spree, Berlin's main river. Paula's father was a barge captain and soon he and other relatives, also long since dead, appear on the barge to join the celebration.

The film is unabashedly romantic. Plenzdorf has explained that the use of the word "legend" in the title was quite deliberate. The film makers wanted to tell the story "as it could have been, with all the

18 Private Conversation in West Berlin (hereafter PCWB) 12 June 1974.
19 PCEB 14 Mar. 1974.
20 PCEB 22 Nov. 1973.
21 PCEB 17 May 1974.
22 PCWB 3 July 1973.

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speculation and exaggeration which always inevitably grow around any story." [23] The director, Heiner Carow, has pointed out that the word "legend" was chosen because "the film could not be categorized as a film about this or that problem. To have done that would have meant moralizing, telling the public what was right and good for Paul and Paula. But we could not do that: life is too complicated to be reduced to simple moral options." [24]

Carow's anti-didactic approach is matched by honesty in portraying the social realities of socialist Germany. Paul and Paula are both proletarian, at least in their origins. Paula lives in a condemned block where she even has to fetch the briquettes to heat her ramshackle apartment from where they are delivered on the pavement outside. The contrast with Paul, a member of the new class who has forgotten his origins, could not be stronger. He lives opposite Paula, on the other side of the street, in the supposedly elegant (but actually dreadfully *petit bourgeois*) comfort of his modern flat. When it comes to depicting his attitude to work, the film makers indulge in a little satire. Paul is a personal assistant to a government minister and as befits a man of his standing, he—along with other privileged colleagues—is collected from home every morning by a chauffeured limousine. However, his departure is anything but dignified: the car pulls up with a jolt, his colleagues, who have already been picked up, lean forward in their seats in eager anticipation. Paul jumps in and they all start playing cards!

Viewers meet Paul's colleagues again near the end of the film when they come looking to see why he has not been to work for several days. (Paul has, in fact, been spending the time trying to persuade a reluctant Paula that he really wants her). "We've come to collect you," his colleagues tell him, "you'll have to explain to the boss why you've been away from work." One of his colleagues, standing behind the other, makes the point graphically by making a sprinkling motion over his head. In Germany, such a gesture means scattering ash on one's forehead —sackcloth and ashes.

Both this depiction of East German methods with recalcitrant personnel and the card-playing scene upset the conservatives. As one of them told me, "Such episodes undermine the authority of the Party because viewers will assume the behaviour patterns they reflect are standard in our society." [25]

However the conservative criticism of the film did not stop here. There was something deeply disquieting about both the main characters in the film. If they are in any way typical of East Germans today then their lives belie the communist claim to have built a new and better society: Paula is as poor, lonely and bored as many of her working class contemporaries in Western society; Paul seems more interested

[23] Quoted By Heinz Kersten in *Deutschland Archiv* (hereafter *DA*) 5/73, p. 458.
[24] Ibid.
[25] PCEB 12 Sept. 1974.

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in status and career than in serving the people, yet he is prepared to give up his privileges when he finds a woman who can give him the love and understanding his wife is apparently incapable of supplying. Yes, Paula does finally accept him but she is soon faced with a terrible decision. She is pregnant by Paul but the doctor tells her that she would not survive another confinement. She wants the child so much that she takes the risk and dies.

Conservative functionaries saw this tragic end as a criticism of socialism. They felt that Paula's death, like Edgar's, was by implication basically caused by the inadequacies of East German society. Death in an East German play or novel is not only a social criticism. It is also an ideological criticism. The occurrence of death in a socialist work of art must be ideologically negative as it is an irrational breach in the otherwise irresistible march of scientific socialism (i.e. Marxism) towards human happiness and perfection.

BOTH the mass popularity and the conservative criticism of the play and film under discussion indicate what was new about them, what differentiated them from the other products of the cultural scene. However a characterization of the works is more difficult. In both of them interest is focused on the individual, his problem and his fate. Yet although society is in this sense secondary, it is by no means passive, for it provides the context within which the individuals operate and so is partly responsible for their problems. The depiction of these problems inevitably entails criticism of aspects of East German society. Yet for all the satirical overtones, this criticism is realistic, as the weaknesses it highlights do exist. Equally this criticism is communist in spirit given that the intention of the artist is to hold up a mirror to their system as it exists so as to improve it, not to destroy it. (Thus Plenzdorf, himself a party member, describes himself as " communist to the core." [26] His attitude reflects the attitudes of cultural circles in East Germany as a whole which, despite their differing shades of opinion, are—unlike the circles of the cultural intelligentsia in other East European countries —basically Marxist).

A COOL October evening in East Berlin. At a doorway along one of the wide, modern streets in the city centre which divide one impersonal block of flats, shops and offices from another, stand a small crowd of mostly young people, wearing the usual dress of young East Germans: jeans and anoraks. They are waiting to be allowed in for a poetry reading. Perhaps " hoping " would be a better word than " waiting " as the official on the other side of the glass door has already explained that only those with invitations will be permitted entry. The young people hope that the official will relent when he sees that not all those invited have come; they hope that his explanation was not a

[26] *Der Spiegel*, 14 May 1973.

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political excuse, made to ensure that the reading does not turn into an acclamation.

Half an hour later, the reading is due to begin, but the small hall where it is to be held is still not full. Whispered consultations are conducted by besuited, bureaucratic-looking figures. As the reliable public they had invited has let them down, they decide to risk letting in the uninvited. A message is sent to the doorman and the young people enter. In possible contrast to their fellows in the West, they do not make for the seats. They file in quietly and stand rather shyly in the aisles at the side, or sit at the foot of the stage.

The poet walks in, a slightly-built man of 40, dressed, as older Germans would say, correctly, in a dark suit and white nylon shirt with silver-grey tie. Moving his weight alternately from one foot to the other, and with a boyish, slightly embarrassed grin, Reiner Kunze modestly introduces himself.

The reading [27] was a minor milestone both for Kunze and for the Party in its endeavour to ease up on cultural matters. It was the first time Kunze had been allowed to read his lyrics publicly since 1968, the year he had left the Party in protest against his country's participation in the occupation of Czechoslovakia.[28] In fact, Kunze was only one of thousands of East Germans, communist and non-communist alike, who were appalled by the forceful destruction of the Dubcek experiment. However, Kunze's opposition probably went deeper as Czechoslovakia is in a way his spiritual home. It was in this Slav neighbourland in the early 1960s that Kunze found the inspiration which enabled him to develop from the almost conformist poet, who had stuck closely to what the regime required of him, to the poet he is now. (His discovery of Czechoslovakia was closely associated with the Czech woman doctor who wrote to him after hearing some of his verse read on the radio and who is now his wife). Over the years Kunze came to know personally leading Czech writers and many of his own poems were published (in Czech) in Czechoslovak literary magazines before appearing anywhere else.

Not unsurprisingly, the invasion by the Warsaw Pact states was a shattering blow for Kunze. With characteristic honesty and bravery he protested—and suffered as a result. The regime refused to publish anything he wrote, even his translations of Czech and Hungarian poems into German. For every publication in the West, whether a whole volume or merely one poem in an anthology, Kunze was fined 300 Marks (about £50·00 at the present exchange rate) for breaking the East German copyright laws. Party propagandists attacked Kunze's writings as anti-communist and as " obsessed with the inner life "; his picture of East German society they dismissed as a malicious distortion. One hardliner even described Kunze as a pathological case.

[27] Haus der Ungarischen Kultur, East Berlin, 25 Oct. 1973.

[28] The biographical information in this, and the following paragraph, are drawn from Jürgen Wallmann's, " Reiner Kunze—ein Porträt," (hereafter Wallmann) in DA 11/74.

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Tucked away in the Thuringian backwoods town of Greiz, Kunze was at the mercy of local officials whose horizons were even narrower than those of their colleagues in East Berlin and whose exploitation of their power monopoly was correspondingly cruder. The poet and his family were persecuted in a variety of small ways, which included attempts to interfere with his daughter's education.[29]

The burden on Kunze can be imagined. Financially he could at least manage, as the family could live on his wife's earnings. But physically the pressures were more difficult to counter as Kunze has never been a healthy man. Born in a working-class home where the father, a miner, was often out of work, he was the only one of three children to survive. According to Michael Hamburger, in an article in *The Guardian*,[30] Kunze barely survived a skin ailment, the result of malnutrition, that demanded his immersion for six months in baths of milk. Since then he has been seriously ill at least twice.

Many a poet, particularly a sick one, living under a regime which alternately reviled and attempted to isolate him, would have capitulated or disintegrated. Not Kunze; he has remained steadfast. As he himself has said: "For me there can be no compromise in the creation of art."[31] Yet although Kunze has refused to bend to the pressures exerted on him, these pressures have influenced his development. In the *Guardian* article mentioned earlier, Hamburger wrote: "By nature he is a lyrical poet of delicate perception, not the satirical let along polemical poet he was forced to become when his right to these perceptions was questioned or denied." Kunze uses images from everyday life in a small town and the countryside nearby to reflect the repression he himself has suffered; as in this poem, *The End of Art:*[32]

You must not, said the owl to the woodgrouse,
you must not sing of the sun
The sun is not important.

The woodgrouse took
the sun out of its poem

You are an artist,
said the owl to the woodgrouse

And all was dark.

Another poem, *Low Volume*,[33] draws a parallel between the twelve years (1933–45) of Nazi rule and the repression in East Germany since then:

Then for
twelve years
I was forbidden to publish

29 PCEB 20 Nov. 1972.
30 8 May 1975.
31 Interview with the Hessischen Rundfunk (hereafter Rundfunk), quoted in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 11 July 1973.
32 *Sensible Wege* (Rowohlt, Hamburg 1969)—my translation.
33 *With the Volume Turned Down*, translations by Ewald Osers, London Magazine Editions 1973, (hereafter Osers).

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says the man on the radio
I think of X
and start counting

Yet for all his polemic, Kunze has denied that he ever wants to leave East Germany:

Locked out of books
Locked out of newspapers
Locked out of meeting rooms
Locked inside this country
Which I would choose every time.[34]

Equally, Kunze has always insisted he is a committed socialist. He explained recently:[35]

> A writer can't be a conformist or a fellow-traveller, since what matters to him is the truth. He can only be—how should one put it—a "fellow-fighter": and though he would like to have the emphasis put on the *fellow,* he finds he has to stress the *fighter* part of his role. Unfortunately, many people don't understand this intricate dialectic.

Since 1971, the leadership of the East German Communist Party has begun to tolerate Kunze's intricate dialectic. Many, if not most, of the restrictions on him and his family have been lifted. For the first time since before 1968 he has been allowed to travel to the West. His most important trip so far has probably been to Munich, in the summer of 1973, to receive the Literature Prize of the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts. In his short speech of acceptance he spoke of the "darkness" in his "part of the world," while making it quite clear that he was not an "opposition" writer.[36] However it was an interview with West German television, recorded during the visit, in which he reiterated in careful but unmistakable tones his condemnation of the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries, which annoyed powerful hardline party functionaries in his own country. Kunze's remarks are believed to have brought Erich Honecker great difficulties.[37] Although no immediate reprisals followed, it is significant that in the following year Kunze was obliged to cancel at very short notice a further visit to Munich where he was to have been publicly invested with the membership of the Bavarian Academy.[38] Kunze has also had difficulties in accepting some of the other invitations from Western countries,[39] though they did not prevent his visiting England earlier this year.[40]

Perhaps the most important indication of Kunze's "rehabilitation" was the first publication of his works in his own country for five years.

34 *Sensible Wege.*
35 *The Guardian,* 8 May 1975 (hereafter *Guardian*).
36 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (hereafter *FAZ*), 12 July 1973.
37 PCEB, 20 Dec. 1973.
38 Wallmann, p. 1168.
39 Ibid.
40 *Guardian.*

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Altogether 30,000 copies of his volume *Letter with a Blue Seal* were printed—a sensationally large edition in East German terms.[41] Even these copies were rapidly bought and many people resorted to a practice usually reserved for forbidden literature smuggled into the country: they borrowed the book and then typed or wrote out a copy for themselves. Such copies can be bought and sold on the black market.

The official response to Kunze's volume was barely audible. Instead of the lengthy reviews which usually greet new publications, only one of East Germany's many newspapers and magazines reviewed *Letter with a Blue Seal*, the satirical weekly, *Eulenspiegel*. And even this review was short and hostile; its author contented himself with accusing Kunze of "elite arrogance," "eccentricity" and "self-isolation."[42] *Eulenspiegel* doubtless reflected the feelings of many party conservatives, for although Kunze left out of the book some 50 of his most controversial poems (including those which declared his solidarity with Solzhenitsyn),[43] many of those which were included had as their themes feelings which supposedly have no place, and whose existence is denied, in socialist society: the isolation of the individual, resignation, desperation, even suicide.

Just how much some East Germans respond to these themes was clear at Kunze's first poetry reading in East Berlin. It would be no exaggeration to say that there was an atmosphere of heightened awareness: everyone's aesthetic and political antennae were attuned to the slightest nuance and to the many layers of meaning which characterize Kunze's spare, almost aphoristic verse.

Not surprisingly, the greatest applause was reserved for the lyrics with a political message. Perhaps the most popular were *The End of Art*, quoted earlier, and *Pushkin's Mikhaylovskoye*.[44] The latter was presumably written after a visit to Pushkin's home, which for a time during the war was on the Front. However, a poem which begins with the—for both Russians and East Germans—sensitive subject of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, ends with a defence of artistic creation against repression from any source:

The front-line here
ran through the garden

Uneasy, but without
a sense of guilt

Forgive me

Whoever
were the aggressors now here they'd be
faced by
me

41 *DA* 6/75, p. 570.
42 *DA* 11/73, p. 1135.
43 *DA* 9/73, p. 905.
44 Osers.

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Whoever were to invade
the open gardens of poets

The implications of both these poems for the East German cultural situation were plain enough. Yet at this poetry reading Kunze, while in no way compromising his beliefs, refrained from being what the party conservatives would call provocative: he read virtually none of his poems which, because of their plainly controversial nature, have hitherto only been published in West Germany.

Maintaining integrity without being provocative is possibly more difficult for a writer of Kunze's age than for one of the older generation. Reiner Kunze was 12 in 1945. Although Nazism and the war must have left their mark, most of his life—starting with the formative teenage years—has been spent under communism. East Germany is his home, the country which he would "choose every time." Such identification makes a writer vulnerable psychologically: such a background also makes him materially vulnerable, especially if the earnings from his publications in the West are small.

A writer who is less vulnerable in either sense is the 63-year-old novelist Stefan Heym. Although he shares the distinction with Kunze of enjoying a partial rehabilitation, his position *vis-à-vis* the regime is substantially different. Heym is one of a dwindling corps of writers and artists who made their name long before the GDR was founded. His first successful novels were actually written in English and published in America in the 1930s and '40s. Both *Hostage* and *The Crusaders* were bestsellers, and *Hostages* was even made into a film.[45] Heym's success as an English language writer is, friends say,[46] partly due to his first wife, Gertrude, whom he met in the United States after having to leave Germany in 1933, being a Jew and a communist. Before the war he edited an anti-fascist German language weekly in New York: during the war he served with the American forces, winning a commission in the field. He was also decorated. However, the replacement of the Wartime Alliance by the Cold War presented the Marxist Heym with a dilemma which took a few years to resolve. In 1945, as the GI editor of an American army of occupation newspaper, he refused to write an anti-Soviet editorial and was discharged. Later, he protested against the United States' involvement in the Korean War by returning his war medal to President Eisenhower. The persecution of the McCarthy period finally prompted him to leave.

Thus when Heym arrived in East Germany in 1952, he was a man of 40 who had already made his mark on the world. His experience abroad, combined with his position as an established writer of some financial means, gave him a certain independence in his relations with

[45] Details of Heym's career from pp. 115–16 of *The Queen Against Defoe* (Hodder & Stoughton, London 1974), (hereafter *Defoe*).

[46] PCEB, 20 Dec. 1973.

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the regime. He was to need his stature and independence in the years to come. For although his arrival was a pleasing fillip to the fledgling East German state, struggling with a recalcitrant population and a devastated economy, trouble was bound to come. This was because Heym's views strengthened the prevailing feeling of the Moscow-trained leadership that communists who had spent the Nazi years in the West were not as reliable as those who had fled to the Soviet motherland. The trouble was that Heym, for all his Marxism, had imbibed too much of the liberal-democratic tradition of America (a tradition symbolized perhaps by the silver dollar he always carries around in his pocket).[47]

The liberal component of Heym's politics is to be found in a lengthy interview he gave in West Germany three years ago.[48] Criticism, he insisted, should be encouraged, not discouraged. The repression of criticism " represents," he said, " a fear that if people begin to think about their own problems, they might be less amenable to being good citizens—which I think is ridiculous. I think the more that people are made to think the better it is for socialism." Heym explained that the development of a more creative literature required certain changes: " They cannot be made in out-and-out opposition to the leadership of the party or to the Soviet Union. They will come about because socialism is developing. And we must be active in helping these changes to come about. That is, or should be, the position of responsible writers in the socialist world. I am trying to act along those lines."

Heym's call for a sort of pluralism within the communist framework, his belief in a liberal Marxism, threatens the Party's claim to possess a monopoly of truth. This conflict lies behind most of the clashes he has had with the party hierarchy. Shortly after his arrival in East Germany he withdrew, on the advice of high officials, a manuscript he had offered for publication on the Workers' Revolt of 1953.[49] However, Heym's major conflict came during the notorious eleventh plenum when he was one of the group of writers and artists pilloried by the hard-liners.[50] Seven lean years followed, in which none of the three books he wrote were published in East Germany. The publishers told him that for one book there was not enough paper (an old excuse) and that another might be " misunderstood." [51] So Heym had to be content with his books appearing in the West (although the West for Heym is not only West Germany, but, as he always writes an English language version of his books, the English speaking world as well).

Considering the nature of the books, the reticence of the East German authorities was explicable. Although all three have historical themes, the issues they discuss, the morals they point, are all too relevant for citizens of communist states. Two of the books, *Uncertain Friend* [52] and *The*

[47] PCEB, 19 Sept. 1974.
[48] *Defoe*, pp. 120 & 117.
[49] *Defoe*, p. 118.
[50] See p. 17 of Ilse Spittmann's, " The GDR," in *Problems of Communism*, July/Aug. 1967.
[51] *Defoe*, p. 122.
[52] Cassell, London 1969.

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King David Report,[53] discuss aspects of Stalinism. *The King David Report*, one of Heym's best books, is an allegory on the problems of writing history under a Stalinist system. Set in biblical times, it describes how King Solomon asks the historian, Ethan, to be secretary of a commission specially set up to prepare an official report. Ethan is reluctant to accept the appointment as he knows that what Solomon wants is not an objective history but a distortion of the past which will legitimize his own position as King:

> I saw that Solomon had thought of practically everything, and that there was no escaping his favour. I also saw that I might end, as some writers did, with my head cut off and my body nailed to the city wall, but that, on the other hand, I might wax fat and prosperous if I guarded my tongue and used my stylus wisely. With some luck and the aid of our Lord Yahveh, I might even insert in the King David Report a word here and a line there by which later generations would perceive what really came to pass in these years and what manner of man David ben Jesse was: who served as a whore simultaneously to a king and the king's son and the king's daughter, who fought as a hired soldier against his own blood, who had his own son and his most loyal servants assassinated while loudly bewailing their death, and who forged a people out of a motley of miserable peasants and recalcitrant nomads.[54]

Ethan takes his calling as a historian even more seriously than this excerpt would suggest. Bravely disregarding official warnings he proceeds systematically to research how both Kings David and Solomon sought and exercised power. His investigations bring to light techniques usually associated with the totalitarian repression of the twentieth century but which, in their essence, have existed ever since the first dictatorships. Concentration camps and lunatic asylums for political opponents, secret police and show trials all figure convincingly in the book—along with the Orwellian technique of sentencing someone to be a non-person, a punishment Solomon reserves for Ethan himself, for daring to find out the truth.

Matching the techniques of dictatorship are the appropriate attitudes. Remarks by Solomon's ministers faithfully reflect the attitudes of functionaries of many one-party states today. Thus Zadok the priest asks:

> Where would we arrive if everybody doubted everything and went on his own search for the truth? Why, the great resplendent temple we are building would collapse before its construction was finished; the throne which King David erected and on which his son Solomon sits would topple! [55]

Solomon's chancellor, Josephat, tells Ethan:

> But contradictions are there to be smoothed over, Ethan, not to be stressed. Contradictions puzzle and embitter the heart; but

[53] Hodder & Stoughton, London 1973 (hereafter *KDR*).
[54] *KDR*, p. 11.
[55] *KDR*, p. 42.

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> the Wisest of Kings, Solomon, wishes all of us, and especially the writers of books, to accentuate the more edifying aspects of life. We are to strike a happy medium between what is and what we want people to believe, and to reflect the greatness of our epoch.[56]

No East German reader could fail to spot the parallels between Solomon's Israel and Stalin's Russia. His sensitivity would be that much greater than a Western reader's simply because East Germany, like other communist countries, has never properly come to terms with Stalinism; the present party leaders fear that an examination of what Stalin did could undermine their own power.

As it is East Germans have been able to read Heym's latest novels. In a statement in a volume of stories published by Hodder and Stoughton Heym[57] describes with characteristic tartness how he learnt of his rehabilitation:

> On April 10, 1973, *Neues Deutschland*, official organ of the Socialist Unity (Communist) Party carried a two-column story on Stefan Heym in which the paper's editors sprinkled him with faint praise as an author firmly allied with us in the struggle against imperialism. The item closed with the surprise announcement:
>
> Stefan Heym's new historical novel, *The King David Report*, is being prepared for publication in the GDR.
>
> *Neues Deutschland* proved to be well informed: in the weeks following Heym signed contracts with East German publishers not only for *The King David Report* but also for his novel on Lassalle, *Uncertain Friend* and for his *Queen Against Defoe*, the three titles previously taboo in the GDR.
>
> Journalists and others have queried Heym as to the reasons for the sudden turnabout. There was no certain answer, Heym told them, but there was the story of a conversation he had with a comrade then quite powerful in the field of arts and letters. This comrade stated he might consider publishing the Lassalle book, after some changes of course, but *Defoe*—never!

[*This book is a novelette on Defoe. In 1702, the latter anonymously published a pamphlet about the right way to deal with dissenters, for which he was arrested, tried and put in the pillory. However a popular demonstration forced an unwilling government to release him.*]

> Heym recalls having replied, "I'm afraid this is a question of identification. If you identify yourself with the Earl of Nottingham then you can't possibly permit this book to be printed in the GDR, just as Nottingham could only try to suppress Defoe's *The Shortest Way with the Dissenters* in the England of Queen Anne. But if your heart is with Defoe the revolutionary, as the heart of a communist should be, then it is your damned duty to have the book published here.
>
> The logic of the argument apparently prevailed; the GDR authorities gave in to their communist conscience.

[56] Ibid.

[57] *Defoe*, pp. 125–26.

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The authorities may have given in to their consciences but they were plainly embarrassed by the result; hence the paucity of reviews on Heym's books in the media.

To draw parallels between Heym and the poet Reiner Kunze might seem a questionable undertaking. They are, after all, different in so many respects. Yet both share a concern for truth in a socialist society and both try to remain true to their beliefs without condemning themselves to being boycotted by the regime. The path between integrity and compromise is extremely narrow and slippery yet by traversing it reasonably successfully both authors have widened the means of expression available to the literary community in East Germany.

A widening of the means of expression is the last thing the conservatives want. In 1972 and 1973, as we have seen, they continually murmured against and sniped at the new books, plays and films as they appeared. To start with, most of their disquiet was expressed behind the scenes, but in May 1973, at the ninth plenum of the Central Committee, it reached the public and their spokesman was none other than Honecker himself. Although he did not mention Plenzdorf by name, there is no doubt that Plenzdorf was his main target and that he was referring to the *New Sufferings of Young W* when he criticized writings which portrayed individuals who " imposed their own private *sufferings* on society." Clearly, Honecker also had Plenzdorf's works in mind when he complained about " various films and plays which portray lonely and isolated human beings, living in a vacuum, bereft of social relationships. These characteristics show that the basic attitudes of such works do not match up to—indeed are opposed to—the claim made by socialism on art and literature." [58]

Politburo member Kurt Hager, who is responsible for ideology and culture, was more specific and went out of his way to criticize Edgar Wibeau's two favourite books:

> Of course our ideal is not *Robinson Crusoe*. The ideal of an isolated individual, whose qualities are to a certain extent only visible outside society, contradicts not only the essence of scientific socialism but also the reality of our society. If there is a model of socialist man, then it is certainly neither *Robinson Crusoe* nor *The Catcher in the Rye*. The example I would choose is Pawel Korchazin in *How the Steel was Hardened*, who, together with others, fought for the victory of our great cause.[59]

An amusing feature of Honecker's speech [60] was a remark which he might have been wiser to avoid. It cropped up in a passage where the Party Leader was grumbling about works of art which were critical of East German society. Honecker was particularly bothered by a phrase in a

[58] *ND*, 29 May 1973.
[59] *ND*, 30 May 1973.
[60] My attention was drawn to this point by Hans Dietrich Sander's analysis of the ninth plenum in *DA*, 7/73.

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play (by the young playwright Volker Braun), running at that time in East Berlin, where one of the characters proclaims that "the GDR is the most boring country in the world." Honecker, or more probably his speech writer, was apparently unaware of a true story described by Stefan Heym in his manifesto, published in 1965, on the role of the writer in socialist society entitled: *The Boredom of Minsk*. Heym opens the manifesto by describing how Bertolt Brecht reacted churlishly to an enthusiastic report on the second Soviet Writers' Congress in 1955. He records Brecht as saying "I'll tell you when the Soviet Union has a real literature again—when a novel appears there which begins something like this: 'Minsk is one of the most boring towns in the world.'" It could be argued that the appearance of a similar sentence in East German literature is of equal significance.

Why did Honecker criticize the very artistic renewal he himself had encouraged? He told one writer[61] that, personally, he was irritated by "the most boring country in the world" passage and upset by the near-suicides of Edgar and Paula in the Plenzdorf works. There is no doubt that the conservatives were in a good position to influence Honecker, given their strength at all levels of the party and state hierarchy. Of course Honecker had winkled out some of the more notorious hardliners and dogmatists from the central party and state machines soon after taking over,[62] but there was a limit to what he could do.

His ability to clean out the official hierarchy at district and lower levels, where, as we have seen in Kunze's case petty Stalinism is often most entrenched, was even more limited. Honecker's dilemma as a new leader can be imagined; anxious for a smooth takeover, preoccupied by far greater problems than those of culture, he could not immediately sack every official compromised by the 1965 cultural freeze. Such a step would have meant replacing almost the entire Politburo—including himself! Instead Honecker sought to develop his authority by more subtle means: he retained almost all the existing members of the Politburo—many of whom had always had mixed feelings (to say the least) about Honecker's policies of "no taboos in the arts."[63] They now had the opportunity to return to the *Kulturpolitik* of Ulbricht's later years. The evidence is that before the ninth plenum this is precisely what they were doing, though not without prompting.

Liberal intellectuals believe much of the prompting[64] came from the hack authors and artists who had—and have—a vested interest[65] in cultural stagnation. They knew that a freer atmosphere would cut down the demand for their works, thus reducing their royalties. They feared that cultural relaxation would lead to them losing the lucrative

61 PCWB, 8 June and 17 Oct. 1973.
62 PCEB, 12 Jan. 1972.
63 PCEB, 17 Oct. 1974.
64 PCEB, 16 Aug. 1973.
65 PCEB, 2 Aug. 1972.

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and influential positions they held as officials of the various artists' bodies. These positions gave them access to the Ministry of Culture and the relevant Party departments. Some of the most notorious hacks (such as Erik Neutsch) were actually members of the Central Committee. Older hardline writers, such as Alfred Kurella, a former associate member of the Politburo responsible for cultural affairs (who enjoyed until his death last June the distinction of being one of the very few Germans still alive to have met Lenin), were able to use their contacts in the *Apparat* and their knowledge of its working to good effect.

These men knew how to play on the fears of those in power on cultural matters.[66] Above all they could strike terror into the hearts of the Party bosses by uttering one word: Prague.[67] If there was one thing that all the East German leaders wanted to avoid it was a Prague Spring in their own country. They remembered that in Czechoslovakia it was Novotny's concessions to the intellectuals and toleration of cultural variety which paved the way for Dubcek and his "socialism with a human face." [68] They knew that any attempt to introduce this brand of communism into East Germany would deprive them of their offices and even threaten the very edifice they had so painfully constructed since the Second World War. The fear of Prague was felt not only by the old style *Apparatchiki* but also by Honecker and the younger men he was installing to implement his limited programme of reforms. Then as now Honecker and his men wanted to make the system they had inherited work: they did not want to replace it.

In 1972 and 1973, the conservatives felt that the germs of a Prague situation were present.[69] In addition to the effects of the cultural relaxation they could point to the growth of Western influence as another ingredient of a possibly counter-revolutionary brew. The Western influence was a consequence of *détente*, specifically of the Four Power Agreement on Berlin, which had led, among other things, to the opening of the Berlin Wall for visits from the West. It will be remembered that it was precisely this provision which Ulbricht had so strenuously and fatefully opposed; and although Honecker had been temporarily prepared to accept it, the conservatives around him were deeply unhappy. The colossal number of visits only semed to confirm their fears: in 1972 alone, the first year of the Agreement's operation, 6,000,000 visits were recorded: in other words every one of West Berlin's 2,000,000 people visited friends and relatives in the East on an average of three times.

These trips meant that the East Germans, though still prisoners in their own land, could re-establish human contact with the West for the first time since the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. The "East-West"

[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] PCWB, 3 July 1973.
[69] Ibid. See also Honecker's Policy Puzzles, a talk written by me for BBC World Service current affairs talks (30 May 1973).

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conversations which resulted enabled them to test for themselves the conflicting claims made by Western television and radio on the one hand and by their own media on the other. Many party members—and not just the conservatives—feared the comparison of living standards which inevitably featured in these chats, they even feared the revival of a common national sentiment transcending the Wall and minefields dividing Germany. However, what disturbed them most in 1972 was the possibility that contacts with the West would strengthen popular disenchantment with the regime and so trigger off demands for liberalization. Many Party members believed that the Prague Spring was due in no small part to the toleration of Western visitors and Western influence. The Party leadership recognized, indeed shared, the concern of so many Party members and saw to it that the speeches made at the ninth plenum were peppered with references to the need for renewed ideological vigilance against the West. None other than Honecker himself emphasized that Western cultural values should not be allowed to reach East Germany: "We have always rejected 'a realism without limits' which is devoid of socialist ideology and which drifts towards the brackish waters of bourgeois thought." [70]

A further arrow in the conservative quiver was labelled "the foreign policy situation." [71] It will be remembered that one of the factors originally favouring cultural relaxation was the need to present an image to the West which dovetailed with Russian *détente* policy in Germany and weakened the ideological and moral objections of public opinion in the West to diplomatically recognizing the GDR. By the spring of 1973, the force of these considerations had weakened. All the Western countries (bar the USA and she was bound to follow) now had embassies in East Berlin so the GDR could now regard Western opinion with more equanimity. Equally, the main goals of Soviet policy in Germany—the negotiation of the Four Power Agreement and of the treaties whereby Bonn recognized Europe's post-war frontiers—had been concluded. Consequently Moscow's close interest in Germany was waning, reducing the pressure on the East German leaders and restoring to them some, though not all, of the room to manoeuvre they had enjoyed previously. The continuing constraint was the need to avoid disturbing Brezhnev's plans for *détente* elsewhere in Europe. However this was much less constraining than that in force from 1970 to 1972, and the conservatives were quick to point out that in the fields of literature and the cinema, as in many others, the level of tolerance could now be lowered.

The causes of the outburst at the ninth plenum may be clear enough but the same cannot be said of its consequences. Initially some East German intellectuals feared that the ninth plenum would prove to be another eleventh; that the authorities would ban undesired films, refuse to print controversial books, denounce unorthodox artists and authors

[70] *ND*, 29 May 1973.
[71] PCEB, 17 May 1974.

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and deprive them of contracts and any official posts they might hold. There is evidence that some party functionaries, especially those in the provinces, expected just such consequences.

The lector of the important Hinstorff publishers in the Baltic part of Rostock told a contact of mine that during the first three weeks after the plenum he had a lot of trouble with the district Party leadership.[72] The latter evidently thought that the ninth plenum was a signal to start interfering with Hinstorff, which as the publishers of Plenzdorf's *New Sufferings,* has for some time enjoyed the reputation of being one of the country's more adventurous publishers. Yet the district Party leadership was soon to learn that such an interpretation of the plenum was wrong, or at least too crude. True, the offending line in Braun's play was removed, but performances continued: and so indeed did performances of Plenzdorf's play and film. Furthermore the publication of Kunze's poems and Heym's books went ahead as scheduled.

A comparison of the comments at the ninth plenum with those at the eleventh shows a great difference in both style and content. The threats and personal denunciations which characterized the eleventh were lacking at the ninth. Honecker himself is reported to have said that the purpose of his speech had been merely to express his opinion, not to give the signal for a cultural purge.[73] This was also presumably hinted at by the Vice-President of the GDR Federation of Writers, himself a prominent novelist, Hermann Kant, at a meeting in West Berlin. Honecker's remarks were, he said, a contribution to the " creative clash of opinions " which was supposed to be a feature of the new cultural policy.[74]

Visible support for this optimistic interpretation of Honecker's speech seemed to have come a few months after the ninth plenum when one of the editions of the official Party newspaper, *Neues Deutschland,* actually carried a picture of Honecker talking to Plenzdorf.[75] It was accompanying a report on the Writers' Congress which was being held at the time. Admittedly Plenzdorf was only partially visible, but the contrast was clear: the Party leader, correctly dressed in a suit and with his hair well-groomed, smiling a little awkwardly at the controversial writer with Afro hair and jeans. Interestingly, the privilege of seeing a communist leader talking to a writer he had criticized less than six months previously—an event hitherto unheard of in East Germany's cultural history—was not granted to readers of the " Republic " edition of the paper which serves all areas outside East Berlin.[76] (Perhaps the Party felt that readers out in the sticks might not appreciate the picture's real significance). The picture was only carried by the " Berlin "

72 PCEB, 25 Sept. 1973.

73 PCWB, 17 Oct. 1973.

74 Majakowski Galerie (meeting place of the West Berlin branch of the Gesellschaft für deutsch-sowjetische Freundschaft), 6 June 1973.

75 *ND*, 16 Nov. 1973, ' B ' Ausgabe.

76 PCEB, 17 May 1974.

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edition of the paper, an edition whose readership included those whom the Party evidently wanted to influence: congress delegates, the cultural intelligentsia in general (which is concentrated in the capital anyway) and the growing number of Western diplomats and journalists now resident. The message to these groups was clear: the ninth plenum has not disrupted the harmonious relationship between the Party and the more controversial writers, the criticisms uttered at the plenum do not spell the end of the new *Kulturpolitik*.

UNFORTUNATELY the indications are that this message was false, that the picture in *Neues Deutschland* was more of an optical illusion than a reflection of reality. At the same time as Honecker was chatting with Plenzdorf, officials lower down the scale were rejecting scripts he had completed since his two great successes. There have also been attempts to tempt him back to orthodoxy. Party officials have suggested he should write a Part II to the *New Sufferings* which would, they hope, repudiate the heretical ideas of the first part.[77] "You must develop yourself," they have said to him, meaning he should rehabilitate himself in the eyes of his conservative critics.[78] Plenzdorf has resisted these pressures.[79]

Stefan Heym has also run into difficulties. Last autumn he came close to publishing his novel *Five Days in June*, the first comprehensive interpretation of the 1953 Workers' Revolt to be written by an East German. Considering the delicacy of the subject (Ulbricht's regime was only rescued from destruction at the hands of the workers by Soviet military intervention), it is astonishing that the ban came only after an East Berlin publisher had accepted the script and the signing of the contract was merely awaiting the clarification of legal details.[80]

Five Days in June is a revision of an earlier novel, *The Day X*, which Heym wrote shortly after experiencing the revolt at first hand. An English journalist who has lived in East Berlin for over 20 years, and who has read the manuscript of *The Day X*, describes it as neo-Stalinist.[81] Considering that Heym wrote in the first flush of enthusiasm for his new socialist fatherland (he had only just arrived in East Germany when the revolt broke out), such a judgment is plausible.

However, *Five Days in June* (which has been published in West Germany[82]) is a more liberal interpretation of the revolt. Heym describes the growing alienation between the workers and the Party at a fictional factory, an alienation caused by the Party losing contact with its roots. Heym's hero, the chairman of the factory union branch, foresees the resistance which will follow the regime's decision to increase pro-

77 PCEB, 22 Nov. 1973.
78 PCEB, 14 Mar. 1974.
79 The only work of Plenzdorf's to reach the public since the *Legend* is a dramatization of Günter de Bruyn's novel, *Buridans Esel*, which was first performed in a small provincial theatre in the autumn of 1975. No further details available.
80 PCEB, 19 Sept. 1974.
81 PCEB, 8 Aug. 1973.
82 *5 Tage im Juni*, (C. Bertelsmann Verlag, Munich 1974).

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duction norms and decides to disobey Party orders—a fateful step in a Marxist-Leninist organization where Party discipline counts for so much. The hero concludes that the strength of the workers' movement depends on the ability of its leaders to admit they have made mistakes and, if necessary, resign. A poignant conclusion, for although, as the book reminds us,[83] the congress which met after the revolt added a paragraph to the Party Statute making self criticism and criticism of the Party the duty of every member, no East German leader then or since has really criticized his Party's role in precipitating the Workers' Revolt. Equally the Party has never published a proper analysis of the revolt, and though one or two authors have touched on it,[84] no writer except Heym has written a full-scale novel about it. The subject is taboo.

It was one thing to allow Heym to publish historical novels which only referred to the present by implication. It was quite another for him to write about one of the most delicate chapters in the Party's history, one which for the present hierarchy is a nightmare it can never forget. One intellectual explained the banning of the book this way: "There are certain people in this country who are frightened of jumping over their own shadows. There is a Stalinist tradition that rulers cannot admit to their own mistakes. Contrary to the rules laid down in the Party Statute, criticism is allowed to reach up to Central Committee level, but no higher." [85]

Heym's breach of a taboo outweighed the more orthodox features of the book: although the hero believes that in certain circumstances party discipline must be broken, he never for a moment considers any structural reforms within the Party which could make the criticism he desires a real possibility. Equally Heym makes great play of the activities of West German agents as one of the causes of the revolt, thus echoing the official propaganda line. These hostages to orthodoxy did not help him. One can well imagine that if the Party were to choose to break its own taboos, it would choose a safer and less controversial writer than Stefan Heym.

The contradiction between the public continuity of policy exemplified by the *Neues Deutschland* picture and the reality behind the scenes (neither Plenzdorf's nor Heym's difficulties have been reported in the country's media) is more than an example of communist doublethink. It reflects a conflict which has split the Party and the cultural intelligentsia from top to bottom. In the Politburo the division, very roughly speaking, is between Honecker and his supporters who wish to continue the new *Kulturpolitik*, albeit along a slightly narrower path, and an opposing group, possibly led by Kurt Hager, who wish to narrow the path still further or block it completely.[86] The precise line-up of

[83] *5 Tage*, p. 5.
[84] For example, Hermann Kant's *Das Impressum*, Fritz Selbmann's *Der Mitläufer* and Anna Segher's *Die Entscheidung*.
[85] PCEB, 17 Oct. 1974.
[86] PCEB, 22 Nov. 1973, 14 Mar. & 19 Sept. 1974.

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supporters on either side is impossible to define, partly on account of the dearth of information, but partly also because it probably varies from issue to issue. (The Politburo has as many trimmers and opportunists as any other political body in the world—one such is Kurt Hager who, after a long period of wavering,[87] has finally come down on the conservative side). The situation at the top has been described by one well-informed writer in these words: "There are endless struggles behind the scenes and our leaders are always changing their minds. One day they agree with your suggestion—the next day they say it is impossible." [88]

DESPITE the confusion, the contours of the politico-cultural landscape can be perceived, if dimly. Since the ninth plenum—though not immediately, for these things take their time to work through—the Party has shown the writers and film makers that there are limits to how far they can go in exploring new avenues of expression. The emphasis in Honecker's now almost historical call for an end of taboos in the arts so long as the works produced are basically socialist in outlook, has shifted from "no taboos" to "basically socialist." The result of this shift is that the flow of exciting new films, plays, novels and poems which began after 1971, has almost dried up. The policy of toleration has been replaced, at least in the world of cinema and literature, by a policy of tokenism. Admittedly, interesting works do still appear, but what is missing is attempts to tackle problems of present-day East German society. It is not that the country's writers and film-makers have run out of inspiration, rather that the Party is forcing them to keep their controversial scripts locked up in their desks at home.

[87] PCEB, 17 Oct. 1974.
[88] PCEB, 22 Nov. 1973.

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New York Times:

Editorial of May 8, 1975 : A variation imagined by Leszek Kolakowski

30th Anniversary of the New Order in Europe: Victory for Common Sense!

TODAY is 30 years exactly since the Nazi army, having conquered Russia and Britain, definitively established the New Order of True Freedom in Europe. A good opportunity for a moment of reflection. After the last friendly meeting of President Gerald Ford with the Great Chancellor of the Third Reich, Joseph Goebbels (who, in spite of his age, is in remarkably good shape and good humor), and after several meetings of the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs Baldur von Schirach, we see clearly how the new creative atmosphere of *détente* ultimately prevailed over the regrettable remnants of the Cold War.

Let us recall: after Mr. Adolf Hitler, the creator and the first Great Chancellor of the New Order of True Freedom died in 1953, the new era of so-called de-Hitlerization of Nazism began almost immediately; for a long time however both politicians and scholars in America failed to grasp its real and profound meaning. Only recently, after years of errors, American statesmen and historians have succeeded in getting rid of so many out-of-date, vulgar anti-Nazi clichés which simply identified Nazism with Hitlerism and prevented us from perceiving both the complexity of Nazi history and the historical sense of the New Order of True Freedom in Europe.

New research by many sober scholars, free from the primitive prejudices of a former generation, has produced an entirely different and—we firmly believe—much more genuine picture of the last decades of European history. Let us mention just a few points from this long needed revision.

First of all, nobody denies some regrettable points in the policy of the late Mr. Hitler and even—dare we say so in our free country—some actions that without any great exaggeration may even be called crimes. The fact that no Jew in Europe was allowed to continue his life, that half the population of Poland, the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia and a third of the Russian population etc. were not encouraged to remain alive, must have cast a shadow on the New Order in the eyes of many people. In fact Mr. Hitler seems not to have realized the damage he himself inflicted on those countries. And the latest investigations of American economists have proved beyond doubt that the heavy concentration of European industry in building gas chambers and crematoria shifted

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their metallurgical resources from more important tasks and delayed the post-war economic recovery.

However, " the past is over," as old Mr. Himmler, honorary President of the Americano-European Friendship Association wisely remarked yesterday in Berlin during the banquet in honour of Kissinger. The past is over indeed, but this does not need to prevent us from peeping sometimes into its intricate and often misunderstood mysteries.

We must not forget that, as a result of the profound dialectical movement of history, the same policies—unpleasant though they may have been in some respects—not only had their brighter and more positive sides, but they contributed enormously to the dynamic and impressive progress since then, both in economic and cultural spheres. There are no Jews in Europe any more; but as a result of this, anti-Semitism has virtually disappeared from Europe, which is not the case—we ought to admit frankly—in the U.S. The European population gained enormously in mobility: so for example the whole of the population of Holland is now cutting trees in North-Eastern Sweden, while overpopulated regions of Bavaria were shifted into their place; the Czechs are busy in the mining industry of former North Russia, while the Germans were replaced in agriculture by workers from Poland and the Ukraine. Who can deny that demographic mobility is one of the best-tested signs of social progress? And let us look at industrial statistics: Belgium's steel production has tripled since 1939, while the lumber industry in Finland—thanks largely to workers from Italy—jumped a massive 600 per cent in comparison with pre-war production. " What is obvious, is obvious," as President Ford admitted during his dinner with Minister Ribbentrop after they had signed their historic Mutual-Passionate-Love Treaty.

The point is that many cold war propagandists not only for years absurdly equated excesses of Hitlerism with Nazism, but what is worse, they kept making clumsy comparisons of Nazism with Stalin's criminal, murderous regime, which was fortunately overthrown by Nazi armies in May 1945. To justify this fantastic identification, they even invented the word " totalitarian," which provided them with a convenient instrument to sell their anti-scientific ideas to an American audience. Recent research has refuted entirely and definitively this nonsensical concept. Also refuted is the naïve view, which even some scholars have shared until now, that Nazism from its very beginning had had, so to say, a built-in tendency which was to explode in the bizarre policy of Mr. Hitler's final years. We now know that there was no " pre-determination " of this sort. Let us take the Jewish problem. Mr. Hitler's early program is anti-Jewish, certainly, but it does not say a word about the necessity of killing all Jews in gas chambers; the most extensive research has failed to find this idea in *any* early Nazi writings! And later on, with Nuremberg law, the Jews were simply prevented from marrying Aryans in order to preserve racial purity. We may criticize this legal action (although it must be admitted that it introduced a clear-cut legal

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order after a period of chaos and uncertainty), but again, it had nothing to do with gas chambers. Jews were deprived of some rights, and we may criticize this as well, although after the great Nietzsche we know how little meaning the celebrated right of voting has. Later on, in 1940, Jews were simply ordered to live in ghettoes; historical research once again fails to prove any idea of gas chambers in this period. It was not until a couple of years later that the regrettable decision came. It would be silly and entirely unhistorical to trace back the gas chamber concept to Mr. Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, where it is entirely absent. To do this would be projecting the present onto the past in the belief that everything was pre-ordained. In fact, there were many stages in Nazi policy towards Jews, and at each stage all the options were open—nothing was defined by the mysterious forces of ideology allegedly working in the very cradle of the Nazi movement.

In the light of this research the very concept of "Hitlerism" is increasingly useless. We are dealing with many years of a complex historical process, each year differing from the previous and the following one. What in fact is "Hitlerism"? And how is it to be defined? As for Mr. Hitler himself, what a simplified image of him we are left with after years of cold-war propaganda! We tend to forget that he sponsored films which, even if we do not entirely agree with their content, were artistically excellent. He ordered the publication of the works of Goethe and Schiller. He built roads and impressive public buildings, carefully discussing many of the projects with his architects (some of whom were his friends); he abolished unemployment in Germany and later in Europe, while we now have seven million people out of work in the U.S. Let us be more modest and show more common sense, a quality which is fortunately well on its way to victory.

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The Road to Power: The Italian Communist Party and the Church

Edgardo Bartoli

MAY 10 1974, should have marked a turning point in Italian politics. The referendum on the repeal of the act instituting divorce, promoted by a group of zealots of *Azione Cattolica*, had been rapidly stripped of its religious motivations and turned into a supplementary general election aimed at restoring the Christian Democratic Party—which was showing signs of disarray after nearly 30 years in government—to the position of absolute hegemony it had held in 1948. Divorce in itself had become but a pretext for a confrontation with the Left and the "lay" parties. The referendum—after all attempts to avoid a "holy war" had failed—had become a synonym for the choice of a regime, allegedly either Catholic or communist; a choice which was expected to materialize in a blank mandate for the Christian Democratic Party to safeguard the status quo and decide the future.

Former Prime Minister Fanfani had promptly seized the opportunity provided by the referendum to make an overall bid for power, by placing himself at the head of the "abolitionists" and staking all his inexhaustible ambitions on the anti-divorce cause. In his capacity as secretary general of the Catholic party he thus forced it into the most incomprehensible adventure of its post-war history.

Never before had the Italian conundrum appeared so garbled and obscure. *The Times* of London lamented the "grotesque" trial imposed on Italy, the country which until a few years before had been "the envy of the world" and was now unrecognizable in its state of "deliquescence," intellectual and political as well as economic. The campaign for the referendum reached peaks of vulgarity unprecedented even in a traditionally turbulent public life. Fanfani got to the point of addressing a Sicilian audience with the warning that, had divorce been retained, the wives and daughters of his listeners would inevitably have become homosexual. His strategy was simple enough: he needed to mobilize the most bigoted section of the electorate, while winning votes from those who, being irreconcilable with the Communist Party, were resigned to anything—even to blackmail—for fear of something worse. In this manner he planned to obtain a plebiscite which would have given the Catholic party the monopoly of power, and himself the monopoly of power within the Catholic party.

But on 10 May nearly 60 per cent of the electorate, including a large number of Catholics, voted in favour of divorce. The artificial construction collapsed with a deafening roar, leaving a surprisingly small amount of rubble, of political debris. A year later, the issue of divorce is a distant

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recollection devoid of any actual significance—it remains one of the many issues which have stirred the country without actually affecting it.

Nothing dramatic happened in Italy then, and nothing has happened since. For nearly 30 years Italian politics have evolved with the same apparent motion as the colourful spiral of a barber's pole. From the days of the "Communist threat" and the "Catholic dyke" to the present prospect of a Catholic-Communist *entente* everything has revolved and changed, but nothing tangible has come about. None the less, or exactly because of that, expectation has attained the quality of a cliff-hanger. How long will it all last? The spiral has taken to spinning faster, its colours overlapping and mixing into new hues. The fascist revival, with its bombs and failed coups, is just a black stripe visible by contrast. Actually, a fascist re-emergence is as unrealistic as a violent communist take-over. But what is still real in Italy, this mother of realism in Spirit and in History?

Probably Italian politics are too deceptive to be significant, too hermetic to be really interesting. The newspaper reports from Rome, with their repetitious undertones of deprecation and concern, testify to the impenetrability of the subject. Even observed from within, public life in Italy seems to be entwined with a mysterious substance which blurs its contours; and if one tries to pierce this film of delusiveness, everything crumbles and vanishes as though that substance were responsible for holding things together—as it happens with Etruscan corpses that disintegrate on first contact with air. The immediate consequence is that any political event, however trivial or momentous, is liable to take on a significance completely different from that which it would have elsewhere. As in Confucian China, words do not necessarily correspond to concepts, so that it is hardly possible to call things by their own names. Communists and Catholics are included, of course, in this reference.

Consistently, the conviction prevails in Italy that political logic as conceived within the national borders, like original wines, can only be consumed on the spot. This acceptance of one's own characteristics as something unique, with consequent resignation and complacency at the same time, might merely be the hallmark of provincialism. But, whatever the symptoms, Italy lacks the very essence of provincialism: the consciousness of her identity, the unconsciousness of its caricaturable characteristics. She is in fact over-conscious of her caricature—where else is self-criticism more pervasive, imaginative, passionate?—and unconscious of her real identity. Her image, reflected in a multitude of distorting mirrors, never suggests a clear individuality, with all that it implies: the necessity of being what one is, the impossibility of changing oneself to suit the needs of the moment. Paradoxically, one can almost say that nothing is impossible in Italy, which is why nothing is possible either. Everything is equally necessary and disposable, certain and improbable. In the end, anything can be equated with anything else, or be reinvented to suit this purpose.

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This applies particularly to the old "dialogue" between Catholics and communists. There are no outlandish accents, but there are no precise words. The politicians nod and wink, the theorists allude and hypothesize. The suspicion of a theological dispute is dispelled by the presence of common people in the audience. Then it arises again when they say that this encounter constitutes the essence of our age, that in Italy, once more, two universal creeds face each other. . . . One can only bow to the vagaries of history, stifling an intellectual yawn.

In the political scientist's laboratory the Italian case, winnowed of all the chaff, is filed in the drawer among the "pluralist polarized systems." Pluralist because of the number of political parties, polarized because there are two poles of attraction: the Christian Democratic Party and the Communist Party.

The two poles do not provide two coherent points of reference. The Communist Party, in spite of its still extant "democratic centralism"—the internal rule of Stalinist descent outlawing any distinction between majorities and minorities and foisting perennial unanimities upon the party—is divided by and large between a radical wing and a moderate one. The differences are subtle, as shown by the exemplary case of "Il Manifesto," a group thus named after their journal, who were forced out of the Party seven years ago for their "Chinese" sympathies [1]; though, paradoxically, they were not in opposition to the new democratic line of the Party, but rather in opposition to its old lack of internal democracy muffling every voice of dissent, whether liberal or Stalinist.

The Christian Democratic Party is in fact a confederation of sub-parties, or factions (*correnti*). It shelters at least six of them—many more at times of crises—endlessly merging, splitting, making tactical alliances, parting with each other. A Christian Democrat is an unfathomable person whose political identity is determined by his alleged religious creed, and is therefore available for many sorts of political creeds. Actually, in the Christian Democratic Party there is room for everybody, economic planners and advocates of *laissez-faire*, pro-communists and quasi-fascists, populists, chiliasts and technocrats. In this welter one can detect a Left and a Right: the Left being sometimes to the left of the right-wing communists, the Right being a "task force" of no fixed political address. The Left's common denominator is their being available for the "dialogue" with the Marxists. The Right's common denominator is their willingness to compete with the Left even on the basis of compromise with the communists.

The "pluralist polarized systems" include some unfortunate examples: Weimar's Germany and the Fourth Republic in France are the most notorious. It has been observed that longevity is not the privilege of such systems. Their high mortality rate seems to be due to a progressive fragmentation of the body politic, where the centre is a no man's land and the existing balance is always precarious. One has to stand still in order not to fall off; near immobility is the condition of political survival.

[1] *Cf. Survey*, No. 73, Autumn 1969, pp. 201–11

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Obviously, the vacuum of power produced by the paralysis of governments provokes in turn what might be depicted as a political stampede towards power, this delusive entity which can only be retained by not making any real use of it.

That is what has happened in Italy. Power has leaked out of the obsolete public channels, has trickled away in a multitude of devious rivulets, and in the process it has been transformed into a private affair, though on corporate lines. A wayward case of excessive representation has been brought about, where every category which is not completely disregarded has immediate access to power.

Until 10 or 15 years ago big pressure groups would rather try to force the government to submit to their will, either making underhand bids for the takeover of some of its branches, or entrusting to the public administration the safeguard of their vested interests. It was the so-called *sottogoverno*, with wild patronage, corruption and embezzlement in its wake. Gradually, the impotence of governments has made this land of conquest less coveted, while private interests have acquired a political legitimacy of their own. The proverbial antithesis between Italian public vices and private virtues does not hold any more, the paralysis of public institutions having made private actions so powerful as to be confused with the former. National life has thus reached an unforeseeable, informal balance which allows Italy to exist, as it were, unknown to herself. Few societies have led a civilized life so independent of civil institutions—schools, courts, administration, government. A new universal right to civic irresponsibility has been the guarantee of this form of existence. Politics themselves have followed the rule of progressive fragmentation; after being doomed to impotence for a long time, they have lost their character of practical activity, as though the notion of practice had been severed from the notion of utility; they have become either blind expediency and a mere exercise for survival, or a moral duty to be performed irrespective of results.

All this may be beyond the pale of present-day political science. If the historian were to step in at this point he could simply say that Italy, where the word " state " was invented some four centuries ago, seems to have finally dispensed with the state in theory and practice, fulfilling the dream of so many thinkers of the past, from Saint-Simon to Bakunin. All around the big hole that was the state the political scene spins and revolves, ever faster as the hole widens. One could think of a gyroscope, that most ingenious device which confers stability through incessant mobility; or possibly of a merry-go-round captive of its radius, liable only to increase its own speed.

The " dialogue " between Catholics and Marxists is like a funeral dirge for the liberal tradition, a tune which has often been popular in twentieth-century Europe.

In the early years after the second world war the " Catholic communists "—a movement which already propagated the idea of an alliance between Catholics and communists—proposed to make it a

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national anthem. They were the apostles of a messianic compact, still without precise political formulation, to be consumed on the grave of liberalism, originally dug by fascism, but to be sealed for ever by the popular forces which had fought in the Resistance against fascism. Fascism and anti-fascism were thus associated in the same historical operation, geared to clear the way for a new "new world." Needless to say, it also provided a short-cut to a reacquisition of respectability for many who had staked it 25 years before on the losing card.

A certain solidarity between Catholics and communists in the face of fascism was historically motivated, though philosophically unpalatable. They were both alien to the tradition of *Risorgimento*. The communists regarded it—following Gramsci's interpretation—as an abortive incomplete revolution; their opposition to fascism involved an indictment of the whole process of unification as leading to fascism, because the popular masses had been left aside in the making of Italy, betrayed in their expectations; and if the Catholics challenged, in the name of social solidarity, the claim of the Marxists to be the natural representatives of the popular masses ignored by the liberal "forefathers of fascism," they did so because those same masses were largely made of Catholics faithful to a Church "oppressed" by the liberal state. The Catholics were untouched by Marxist recriminations on the past, which soon became applicable to the recent war of national liberation: another missed revolution, another lost opportunity.

The communists, who enjoyed the prestige of having been the major contributors to the Resistance, became the dispossessed trustees of a revolution which, after failing steadily to materialize, reassuringly promised to remain a perennial hypothesis. In those days their Party had many charms. It had the blustering, human voice of the poor and humble, the genuine voice of the people silenced by dictatorship, risen against the nazis, now excluding peasant poetry and a brand new culture spiced with a great deal of local colour; it was a very fashionable intellectual refuge where the existentialist could get along with the materialist theologian; it was a short-cut to popularity, a safe form of eccentricity, a generously rewarding choice for many intellectuals dreading obscurity and fidgeting in search of a place in the "right groove of History"; above all it was the new, authoritarian appeal for many who could not live any more without a reassuring faith. A generation of prim theorists and boisterous bohemians joined the traditional Marxist Left—painters, film directors, writers, visionaries and meddlers—to form the core of the so-called "aesthetic front," the "salon" subsidiary of the "popular front."

Togliatti, the leader, was inclined to take part in all dialogues. As minister of justice in De Gasperi's coalition he was a champion of law and order and social reconciliation, advocating military courts for the trouble-makers, abetting the clerical sway over the country by supporting Mussolini's *Concordat* between the fascist state and the Catholic Church; as chief of the Communist Party he kept the revolutionary machine under steam but not in motion, fanning the hopes of his electorate for a radical

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change while indoctrinating his followers with intricate tactical shibboleths based on the Leninist assumption that revolution was what was good for the Soviet Communist Party. He snubbed the " moralistic anti-fascism " of the non-communist Left, winking at bourgeois politicians to suggest that, given a certain policy, he could accept them as partners—and at the same time addressing the left-wing democratic parties with contempt from a position of tactical superiority, of indisputable dexterity; first a sneer and then another wink, to imply that he was not too fussy about the content of his policy provided it was to keep Italy out of the Western world. He eventually died in odour of sanctified statesmanship for conforming to the democratic rules and postponing his revolutionary aims at a time when it was not yet doctrinally acceptable that one day the communists could get in power by non-revolutionary means. The subtlety of his extremism had made him a compulsive moderate. Ousted from De Gasperi's coalition (1947) he could not do anything else but put his millions of votes into deep-freeze. And the long wait began.

In the period beginning with their papal excommunication (1948) to the present day, when they seem to be on the doorstep of a political compromise with the catholics, the communists have always managed to keep a low profile in face of such events as the XX Congress of CPSU, the Hungarian revolution, Czechoslovakia in 1968, the emergence of neo-Stalinism—while the faults of their opponents constantly made up for their own. After all, their opponents' faults were real and theirs were just reverberations from the East: as for instance when the fascist-Catholic majority in the Capitoline municipal council, confronted by the Communists with the proofs of their complicity in land speculations (1956), reacted indignantly by recalling the dead of Budapest.

In fact, while the test ground for other parties was internal policy, for the communists it was foreign policy. Once the revolutionary solution was ruled out, their professed devotion to democratic political institutions was not sufficient proof of their allegiance to the democratic system itself; it fell short of a straightforward renunciation of the Eastern type of " democracy." Having dialectically justified their Stalinism while Stalin was alive, they became " anti-Stalinist " after his death, still undecided between a posthumous justification of his crimes, which would have been against the Marxist idea of history, and a conclusive condemnation of his methods, which might have played into the hands of bourgeoisie. Stalin's crimes were still described as " errors"; and after having expressed dogmatic certainties in the days when those errors were being made, when faced with the errors of Stalin's successors the Italian communists refrained from any critical judgments, and confined themselves to embarrassed expressions of regret.

The " dialogue " with the Catholics provided a useful loophole. It ignored the actual issues, projected itself beyond the sticky grounds of day-to-day politics, and it was also of interest to their prospective partners. In the early fifties—while the " centrist " coalition was wilting,

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and the gloom of political stagnation was settling on the country with a series of governments all equally impotent and unimaginative—recalling the *Resistenza* had become the keynote of a polemic about who was better entitled to represent the popular masses. This dialogue was officially sponsored by the youth organizations of the two parties, and the discussion centred around the question of why the communists and Catholics, who were both the historical heirs of the liberal state and who maintained their solidarity in the fight against the fascists and the Nazis could not do so any longer. *Rinascita,* the official weekly of the Communist Party, supported the case for a Marxist-Catholic *rapprochement,* also because the socialists were being engaged in a dialogue of their own started by the Catholic monthly *Questitalia*—much appreciated by Cardinal Roncalli, the future Pope John XXIII—which had mooted the possibility of an understanding with them based on the rejection of the neo-capitalist " consumer society."

In *Circoli della Meridiana,* in Tuscany, Catholics and communists together debated such topics, concurring not only in the condemnation of the myth of western affluence, but in supporting a policy of "coexistence" and East-West *détente.* The Catholics insisted on the need to match the international *rapprochement* with an internal one with the communists in order to deal with the major problems of society. Many of the Catholics were *professorini,* young intellectuals who had their most authoritative representative in Pietro Dossetti, a man of undisputed stature who at the time of the Constituent Assembly (1945–47) had spoken for a progressive, socially conscious and semi-theocratic state. He was the personification of both the conflicting souls of the Christian Democratic left, the " political " and the " sociological," reconciled in the sincerity of his religious ethics. Eventually he became a priest, while the fifties witnessed a series of social experiments inspired by the Gospels, fervently aimed at establishing a link between prayers in the convents and strikes in the factories. Along with political restlessness there was also a trend towards religious renewal, a reaction to the aloofness of the traditional Church, immobile in its attitude towards the world—authoritarian, hieratic, indifferent to the poor. To the poor, not yet to the proletariat, to the victims of eternal injustice, and not of a particular system. It was an urge, in which the spirit of Simon Weil and that of the *prêtres ouvriers* was manifestly present, to bridge the gap between Catholic theory, embalmed in the formalities of catechism, and Catholic practice, corrupted in the routine observance of cult.

While Khruschev's denunciation of Stalin's crimes had turned the Italian communists into reluctant revisionists, on the Catholic side there was a spontaneous " revisionism," originating in a guilty conscience about the traditional alliance of the Church with the rich and the powerful. To assuage their political conscience they felt it necessary to come to terms with Marxism—or, in line with the evangelical distinction between the sin and the sinner—with the Marxist world. Their problem was basically the same as that faced by the Church " modernists " at the turn of the century: how to reconcile the eternity

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of dogma with the relativity of history, how to make Christianity an active presence in the world? Hence the acceptance of evolutionist and dialectic thought by some, and the stress on the " existentialist " search for truth by others (Romolo Murri, the promoter of the first Catholic party in Italy, was himself open to the influence of Modernism, though largely indifferent to its unorthodox philosophical implications, and was excommunicated in the same year—1909—in which he was elected to Parliament).

The rise of the dictators in the twentieth century, so often blessed by the ministers of the official Church, stirred opposition within it and created further conditions for its exploitation by outside political forces. In France the policy of the " outstretched hand " (*La main tendue*) was launched by Thorez in the thirties. More recently it was resuscitated by the former ideologue of the French Communist Party, Roger Garaudy, who reformulated the problem in clear terms and provided arguments for similarly thinking Italian communists. (In *De l'Anathème au Dialogue: un Marxiste s'addresse au Concile*, he invited the Catholics to approach Marxism not in order to embrace it, but to have their own faith verified and rejuvenated. He promised that " in such a dialogue it is impossible to put aside the concept of man and discuss only politics—Marxism, like Christianity, does not separate political and social problems from the philosophical." Garaudy's appeal struck an old note: if Lenin said that philosophy is politics carried out by different means, Proudhon had said long before that " at the bottom of politics there is always theology ").

In Italy, given the electoral weight of these two interlocutors, the immediate political implications of the dispute were predominant. The communists were not simply trying to attract the Catholic vote; they did not address the Catholic conscience at large, but the Catholic Party, or at least those in it who were willing to take heed of their words and would convey them to their patrons in the Vatican hierarchy. They aimed at splitting the " political unity of Catholics " in order to give more scope to the " unity of the working class." The Catholics acted in a similar manner; they regarded the communists not as prodigal sons, but rather as competitors to appease. They aimed at taking advantage of the " unity of the working class " to shore up Catholic power. It was indeed a dialogue between two Churches, each dominated by an " integralist " creed, i.e. a conception in which all aspects of life must be regulated in accordance with a given set of principles. The two integralisms could be hitched together only if both renounced their respective claims to absolute supremacy.

In his refutation of this kind of " dialogue," in which Catholic progressivism is presented as Modernism reinterpreted in Marxist terminology, the Catholic philosopher Augusto del Noce quoted Charles Peguy: " Modernism consists in not believing in what one believes. Liberty consists in believing in what one believes, and in conceding (and deep down demanding) that the neighbour also believe in what he

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believes. . . . Modernism consists in not believing in order not to cause wrong to the opponent who also does not believe. It is a system of mutual abdication. . . . Modernism is a system of complacency."

In a contemporary context Peguy's words imply that the progressive Catholic asks the Marxist intellectual not to believe in his professed atheism, offering in exchange an inoffensive Christianity which is prepared to accept a mutual misunderstanding: the Catholic thinks that Marxism, once atheism and dialectical materialism are discarded, is reconcilable with Christianity, while in fact—says Del Noce—it becomes even more irreligious as it retreats to sheer sociological naturalism; and the Marxist thinks that Catholicism, once converted to progressivism, may become the yeast for the materialistic loaf, while it simply remains the autocratic pinch of salt. In the last resort, they both find a haven in the tacitly accepted hope that all human actions bring about different results from those pursued, so that the ends pursued are compatible with any kind of action, even though such acceptance clashes on philosophical level with their "first principles." It is precisely the principles, not the ends, which justify the means. From the realm of relativism, where the "dialogue" began, it thus migrates to the realm of *possibilismo*.

This dialogue was confined to theoretical grounds, but the practical opportunities soon came up. In 1955 the socialists had expressed their willingness to find an understanding with the Catholic party on factual programmes rather than on principles, and the communists felt in danger of finding themselves isolated on extreme left positions. One year later, the Hungarian revolution convinced Pietro Nenni, the socialist leader, that the time had come to part with the communist ally. It was the end of the "pact for united action," signed in 1934 during the clandestine opposition to fascism and renewed in 1945 in the name of the "unity of the working class"—and if its renewal had bereaved the democratic left of a large popular party, it had been fairly good news for many conservatives who preferred to dispense with the Marxists altogether rather than accept some of them as political partners. Finally, when the Socialists accepted a share in the responsibility of government, the same conservatives preached doom and disaster with one voice, ominously prophesying nothing less than the total abolition of private property, and, obsessed by forebodings of the perils of economic planning and of strict taxation, they eagerly wanted to restore the "citadel," as the old centrist coalition had been dubbed. They were scared by Nenni's assurance that the Socialist Party was available only for a policy of radical change, not for one of "the lesser evil" as in De Gasperi's day. But when the socialists—after joining the government (1963) and re-uniting with the Social-Democrats—proved to be quite accommodating, and eventually opted for a policy of no change at all, but rather of enjoyment of power and patronage, the reaction of the conservatives was partly of relief and partly of bewilderment. Once the centre-left "revolution" had failed, what was going to happen next?

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In this atmosphere the Catholic-Marxist dialogue entered its second phase, which was marked by the communist bid for an immediate share of power. Shortly before his death (1964), Togliatti seemed determined to achieve it, as his Yalta "testament" indicates. The logic of the Party's reasoning remained unchanged. The communists pointed out the shortcomings of the centre-left coalition as a proof that a majority staving off the representatives of some 8,000,000 voters, besides being crippled, was anti-democratic—an assumption complementary to the one upon which the old "popular front" theory was based that only a majority spearheaded by the communists was democratic, besides being efficient. They charged the government with betraying a programme of reforms that they had themselves constantly attacked, and offered themselves as partners in a coalition which they had previously constantly opposed. As always they were prepared to sacrifice their principles for the sake of their (prospective) alliances. It was their posthumous homage to the revolutionary flexibility of their leader.

Italian communists are certainly the "best" communists in the world. The label of "idealism" tempered by a streak of scepticism, associated with Togliatti's memory, has rubbed off on their Party, providing them with an aura of respectability. Even if they bowed in awe to Zhdanov and took Stalin's linguistics seriously, they still somehow belong in the tradition of Italian Hegelianism; they purport to be the disciples of Antonio Gramsci, of his neo-idealism and of his "national-popular" ideology, philosophically so superior to the mixture of Marxism and positivism which was so typical of the early Socialists. Politically, the heaviest burden that they bear is their association with the Communist parties in power, which reflects upon them the guilt of the latter. Their presumed influence on eastern comrades has fostered hopes of liberalization in Eastern Europe and the USSR. In the West they are eager to appear as being strongly pro-Europe. On the Italian national scene they show a constant interest in law and order, while at the same time they act as responsible custodians of popular grievances, the only effective force to protect the proletarian left against the inroads of the "Anarcho-Maoists" and similar revolutionary "adventurists." Having never enjoyed the critical moment of success, having never succeeded in coming to power, and thus not having been involved in the political corruption which spoiled the image of most political parties, they appear to be a virtuous party, though not puritanical in their attitudes towards the others.

Italian Catholics, on the contrary, are the "worst" in the world, particularly from a religious point of view. They profess their faith as if it were a condition rather than a choice, and this makes them feel no responsibility for what they are. Such irresponsibility is encouraged by the general assumption that Italy is 98 per cent Catholic, while in fact according to the Central Electoral Office it is at least 30 per cent Marxist. The "dialogue" is thus written in the overlapping figures of statistics, as it is also reflected in the composition of the public at

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Sunday mornings' masses, where this odd 30 per cent is present in the persons of communist voters who do not see any contradiction between their political vote and their church-going habits.

In the Christian-Democratic Party the conventional character of Italian Catholicism has reached the point of a political drama: if the " unity of the working class " is a shibboleth, the " political unity of the Catholics " is a pitiably false pretence. " Unity about what?" asked Pietro Dossetti in the beginning. The majority party is a motley galaxy of creed and attitudes held together by confusion between the adjectives " Christian " and " Democratic." Their association—to quote Del Noce again—might be described as a democratic party inspired by Christian ideals—which would be an extremely vague description—or a party which defends democratically the interests of the Church—which would be a misleading definition, given the wide coincidence of the interests of the Church and of the party. The real alternative, then, is whether the two adjectives describe a party inspired by the conception of " democracy as an expression of the evangelical ferment at political level," or a party inspired by the conviction that " only the religious principle prevents democracy from turning into a power of oppression, concealed or apparent." (To support the second definition Del Noce quotes Hans Kelsen, for whom the idea of pure democracy, if raised to absolute value, implies the negation of absolute values.)

There is a subtle contradiction in this otherwise unobjectionable assumption, in that the religious ferment necessary to keep democracy alive must be compatible with the allegiance to a Catholic Church which is authoritarian and anti-democratic by definition, and can only endeavour to adapt its autocratic structure and its illiberal tradition to the new demands for " democracy " coming from inside itself as well as from the outside. Indeed, it is the political ferment that has had an impact on the pattern of Church life, and not the other way round. It is a commonplace to say that English democracy was born in Church before it was born in Parliament; in Italy democracy was born in salons, in workers' benevolent societies, and finally in Parliament, because nothing could be born in a Church which hardly manages to take care even of religion. Italian Catholicism, historically divided between worldly and spiritual sovereignty, asking in both capacities obedience and conformity, not only has never suggested a civil ethic, but has even failed to produce individual morals.

The impossibility of giving the political version of Catholicism a content that the religious mould did not have has inevitably caused a stress on the " activist " ideal rather than on the " contemplative " one, and thus on the adjective " democratic " rather than on the adjective " Christian." Again, democratic in what sense? Just in the empirical, common sense of the word. The dishonesty of Christian Democrats in public affairs has never impaired their fundamental attachment to liberty. They may have obeyed the Vatican, reluctantly, inadvertently or enthusiastically, but in the end their obedience has been a barrier to further

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clerical encroachments, with their party providing a buffer between the state and the Church. What they always wanted above all was simply to preserve their status of majority party, which allowed them to keep their contradictions unresolved, balancing the authoritarianism of the extreme right-wing with the illiberal progressivism of the left to produce a " moderate " result; and since the crucible of moderation must be kept on the fire of power, all Christian Democrats have always been equally eager to stoke it with someone else's coal—that is to have their partners, or in the last instance their enemies, to shield their bungling and flusters.

The communists have done their best to convince the Catholics that for such a fire they were the best Vestal Virgins—at a certain price, of course. To prove their point they have for years scuttled every initiative of reforms in parliamentary commissions, and have constantly salvaged the government on the floor of the House. In exchange, they have been granted a position in the political establishment, a recognition of influence and a right to be paid the same attention as is due to the ruling class. But, " we can't go on meeting like this," they have whispered every now and then to the majority party—at the same time being aware that they could not go too far in wooing the Catholics, lest they become involved in actual power which was not guaranteed to last, and instead could jeopardize their respectability as the party of renewal. The communists had to take into account their ideological credibility, a problem from which the Catholics were exempted.

The crisis of the centre-left coalition (1972) brought the " dialogue " to a standstill, severing its premises from its goals—the assumption that a reformist government cannot survive without the participation of the communists, from the conclusion that the communists would actually take part in such a government. The Catholic-Communist *rapprochement* appeared suddenly trammelled by the same dialectic of unpredictability upon which it was theoretically founded.

A few months later the military coup in Chile provided the opportunity for a reformulation of the problem. The communist leader, Enrico Berlinguer, drew the following lesson from the Chilean tragedy: even a total of 51 per cent of the votes is not sufficient to govern " from the Left." By this somewhat cryptic—and intrinsically anti-democratic—statement, he seemed resigned to postpone indefinitely his party's accession to power. In fact, he was laying the foundations of a new policy of " coexistence," offering a " historic compromise " to the Catholics—i.e. no longer an understanding to be achieved at the top, but a sharing of " the real popular consensus " necessary to legitimize power, once a new deployment of forces—and a new pattern of relationships among them—could develop in the country, at the bottom of its social structure, through a long process of " evolution " and " maturation."

In a certain sense Berlinguer was summing up the frustrating experience of 25 years in opposition in an immobile political system, incapable

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of reaction to any stimulus, in which the Communist Party had to dally either in hypotheses or in expediency, and in practical terms was forced to delegate its *avant-garde* role to the unions. In another sense the communist leader, setting out a new long-term strategy, was granting a political pardon to those who in the past had kept in confinement, implying that the communists had deeply changed in a changing world, that only they had evolved and matured enough to become something else from what they had been—and however warily this assumption must be taken, the only sure thing is that the other parties have not changed, least of all the Christian Democrats.

A long-term strategy in opposition to the immobility of the Italian system certainly does not suit a period of deep economic uncertainty and social unrest. Being aware of this fact, and of the peril of losing hold of the situation, the communists have also produced a short-term strategy, a recipe designed to combine national recovery with a change in its ruling class. Consequently they have managed to reassure both their electorate and their prospective partners by couching in the old maximalist jargon some very moderate requests, by speaking of " radical changeover of the models of economic development " simply meaning the necessity to carry out rather more efficiently what British conservatives would have considered a somewhat backward programme for hospitals, schools, housing. In fact, the many failures of the Soviet system —that " Byzantine-Bonapartist " bureaucracy, in the words of Gramsci, created by Stalin—have made them aware of the perils inherent in centralized economies, of excessive public burdens, of the need to encourage small industries and private enterprise. They therefore rely on a moderate programme in order to channel the political struggle through different criteria of economic planning; which is, incidentally, the only method likely to pin down the Christian-Democrats to some precise choices, and therefore to weaken their multiple alliances, and therefore to cause a general weakening of their power as majority party. . . . This is the up-to-date version of Togliatti's lesson on how to keep all options open, on how to catch hold of the system without altering it, in order to exploit it to certain ends which are interchangeable in practice, being revolutionary in principle. . . .

It has become a popular occupation to wonder whether the Communists have changed since Togliatti's time, whether they really are now " another party." Obedience to necessity—which remains their principal political virtue—has forced them to change. They have changed so promptly and thoroughly under the impact of circumstances to make it unthinkable that they will not go on changing if the circumstances change (a collapse of *détente*, a return of post-Tito Yugoslavia to the Russian sphere, a process of " Finlandisation " of Europe, for instance, might force them to travel backwards the distance covered since Stalin's death, the twentieth congress of the CPSU, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Togliatti's testament, etc.).

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Undeniably, the Communists have changed, at least inasmuch as they have become more and more like their adversaries. A recent pamphlet of political fiction—something in the taste of Orwell's *1984*—written by an "Anon." suspected of being a senior minister of the Catholic party, contains a pungent passage in the description of events of the year 1980, when there is a tentative "little compromise" as a project to govern Italy with the help of American dollars and communist consent. The following imaginary conversation takes place between Dr. Fanfani and Dr. Kissinger: ". . . Have you ever met any communists who would answer you with a straight 'yes' or a round 'no'? Have you ever made out what sort of government they want? . . . They have always been cautious and vague, exactly like us Christian-Democrats. . . . Are they serious people? We produce the same communiqués, long-winded, devious and ambiguous, we lay the same political plots without ever carrying out a single one of them. We are terrified at the idea of leaving office, they are terrified at the idea of taking it. Even in this respect we are alike."

In the fiction the "little compromise" fails. A series of bizarre political assassinations—made inevitable by Christian-Democratic logic in which a man is entitled to govern if he is supported by a relative majority in the relative-majority faction of the relative-majority party—brings the situation to its extreme consequences. The fragmentation of the country reaches its apex, instability becomes the rule—the police want to elect their officers, even *Carabinieri* and priests shun any form of discipline, the Unions proclaim the doctrine of "full unemployment." The communists, still being doctrinally revolutionary, cannot tolerate such a state of disorder. They come to a secret agreement with Dr. Kissinger, and finally compel Dr. Fanfani to assume power on their behalf. The "great historic compromise" is at last completed.

In reality, the situation appears slightly different. Only slightly. The "historic compromise" is already working in many areas of public and semi-public life, from Parliament to the relationships between industries and unions. Its further advancement, its official recognition, with the due governmental consequences, depends on Washington and the Vatican rather than Rome. It may or may not materialize. In any case the communists are still undecided whether to force the pace or to play hard-to-get. They know that power can either be seized, or negotiated, or inherited, whatever use is made of it. As for the Catholics, they are confident that, if the game remains that of power, the deal, as always, will be theirs. In Italy Machiavelli is constantly reborn in Catholic forms, and Catholicism always manifests itself in conservative, if not reactionary, forms. The communists have nothing to object to. If conservatism swings to the left, they automatically become its guarantors. If their accession to power substantially amounts to a conservative operation (in the spirit of Lampedusa's *Il Gattopardo*: "All has to be changed so that nothing will change")—with less disorder and less liberty, more taxes and more conformity, some reforms and the perpetuation of the reformers

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in office—one should remember that Revolution also nourishes itself on its negations. The "imagination of history" is inexaustible. In this sense a "historic compromise" is as good as any compromise. "Historic" means at the same time something unprecedented or something well experienced. For the communists, quite simply, Rome is always worth a mass.

15 June 1975, is now regarded as the real turning point in Italian politics. In a certain sense it is true. On that date the municipal and regional elections radically altered for the first time the established rating of the different parties. For more than 20 years Italian elections—any kind of elections, local or national—had provided an opportunity to confirm the existing balance of forces, made of a Left pivoted on the Communist Party, a centre-right pivoted on the Christian Democratic party, and a centre-left (Socialists, Republicans, Social-Democrats) with scarcely any internal mobility. At each election the Communists had inched forward; now, overnight, they found themselves nearly on the same footing as the Christian Democrats, at the threshold of relative majority.

The Communist Party passed from 28 to 33·5 per cent, the Christian Democratic party lost 3 per cent, descending to 37 per cent. On the whole the Left gained more than 6·5 per cent, the centre-right lost as much. Five of the biggest and richest regions are today governed by the communists (the traditionally "red" ones, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, plus Piedmont and Liguria), together with all the important Italian cities except Rome. If these results were projected on the next national elections they would produce a Marxist grouping in Parliament (communists and part of the socialists) stronger than any other conceivable combination. It was this realization which gave public opinion a shock. A wind of change suddenly ruffled the whole country. Non-marxist parties recited, or muttered, some hasty *mea culpa*, each one of them soon to find an explanation for the popular vote in a general reaction to the inconclusiveness and corruption of all the other parties.

Indeed, the movement of popular protest was authentic, and found its shrillest note in the votes of the new electors from 18 to 21 years of age (more than 1,000,000) who, because of the fashion, or for other reasons, are practically in the hands of the Marxist Left and of its most extreme branches. They represent the most obvious and picturesque element of a "new" Left whose core is the "new" Communist Party, but where one can find *en masse* young people, intellectuals, women's-libbers, conformist bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie dissatisfied with itself. Altogether it is a Left, so to speak, of a psychological nature, irrational but highly dogmatic, unconsciously anti-democratic, overtly anti-liberal; it sinks its roots in an old Italian paleo-anarchism according to which Italian history will start afresh after a revolution has swept away all the ancient formal bourgeois values including the notion of freedom. This is the so-called "school of the *déluge*," otherwise known as "Noah's Left," particularly attractive to those among the younger

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generation who want to survive the flood, and to those of the older generation who on top of this are eager to appear " à la page." Since 15 June the Marxist Ark of Salvation has suddenly become packed with writers, show-business people, pensive journalists and showmen of every sort. A few days after the elections many personalities joined in unexpectedly, marking—with articles, statements and speeches—the victory celebrations. Others, having sniffed in advance the direction of the wind, had hurriedly hoisted red flags a few days before. Electoral and post-electoral conversions amongst the intelligentsia have been innumerable. But it is clear that the Communist Party is having very little to do with the new converts on its left who are theorizing about the deluge: on the contrary, like every self-respecting church it has a long experience and consequently a deep mistrust for the eleventh hour's adherents and the turncoats; but they are useful, because they create a fashion, and fashion in Italy always pays off. The Communist Party has been the beneficiary of an ancient Italian habit: jumping on the band-wagon. The exodus of the repentant towards the left has reached even more impressive proportions at the grass roots than at the top, as was shown by the queues of aspirants to the membership card which forced some communist federations in the North to close their offices temporarily while waiting for instructions from Rome on how to face the flood of applications. Something similar had been the prize for the Christian Democratic Party in 1948, shortly before and long after the great electoral victory of the Catholic De Gaspari against the communist Togliatti.

Has 15 June really opened the road to government for the Communist Party? The communists shun such an hypothesis. Their refusal is of a tactical nature, but doubtless sincere. The increasing fragmentation of the fabric of Italian politics, the sacrificing of public to corporate interests and institutions, the loss of significance of the very notion of politics, has inevitably caused a rift between " responsibility " and " power " and made it more serious here than elsewhere. One cannot help but ask: Who rules the country, the government or the Trade Unions? The Trade Unions or the secretariats of the political parties? The political clientele of the parties or the industrial patrons financing the parties? The government or the secretariats? In Italy there is a " shadow " government, which is the real and effective one, spanning from local authorities to Parliament through all centres of power: the communists are already in this government, and in a very strong position. Then there is an official government, from Parliament to the Presidency of the Republic: the communists are not in this government, and they may not be longing to be there right now. They already have much of the power they need, and without any responsibility.

Having won an important battle, the communists are not resting on their laurels. They are working to enlarge their bases in the country and to strengthen their newly acquired positions. In the regions where their party is not in power, they have many ways to condition other parties'

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power, particularly by playing on the neurotic frustrations of the Socialist Party. While Noah's Left keeps firing broadsides against consumerism and the alienation of the bourgeois society, brooding over what is really happening in China, and recollecting 1968 in Europe, the Communist Party—always a moderate and authoritative interlocutor in this type of debate—is gradually establishing itself as the party of law and order, of stability, of sound administration, a sort of red Christian Democracy for the seventies and eighties. It offers room for all: for protesting intellectuals, for workers made redundant, for small entrepreneurs nauseated by the economic crisis. Offering at the same time understanding, cooperation and promises of renewal, the Communist Party prepares for the next leap forward, while its traditional adversaries are late even in drawing a purely defensive lesson from what has happened. The political crisis precipitated in January 1976 by the withdrawal of the Socialist Party's support for the Moro government manifested it once again.

Thus the communists may sooner or later get into power, quite imperceptibly; their entry into the government of the country will be accepted, and perhaps it is largely accepted already, as the lesser evil among the possibilities perceived after a series of centre-left governments equally incapable of tackling the problems of the country. The great expectations of 15 June 1975 will then materialize, not in a radical transformation of Italian society or its liberation, but in the hegemony of a party which has a far better developed sense of power than its adversaries.

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Communist Parties in Scandinavia: Democratic–Centralism and the Peaceful Path to Socialism

Richard Cornell

PERHAPS the most fundamental defining characteristic of a communist party has been its adherence to a set of organizational norms and procedures broadly described as democratic-centralism. First set forth by Lenin in 1902 in *What is to be Done?*, it since has been given more concrete and precise meaning through the experiences of the various communist parties, most particularly the Russian party since 1917. All of the non-ruling communist parties, however much they may criticize the CPSU, however much they may tolerate internal discussion and criticism of traditional practices and procedures, have drawn the line at challenges to the concept of democratic-centralism. Although continuously being interpreted and re-defined, Marxism-Leninism remains the source of organizational legitimacy for all communist parties—" official " (pro-Soviet) or dissident. Those who cross this line, or cannot stay on the proper side of it, have been expelled or have withdrawn from the party.

All non-ruling communist parties remain bound by the formal characteristics of democratic-centralism: election of all leading party bodies; periodic reporting of all party bodies; strict discipline, including subordination of the minority to the majority, and the binding character of higher body decisions on all lower bodies. These formal aspects have been augmented by decisions and practices that over the years have created a distinctly communist organizational structure. No party tolerates any form of faction or organized grouping within itself—loyalty is to the collective, the party, and cannot be divided. Factionalism is a cardinal sin for communists, and the accusation of such behaviour is a common justification for expulsion. The party leadership controls, or has a strong voice in, the assignment of party personnel, even those elected by the various party bodies. This serves to protect the party from the perils of " broad democracy," which to Lenin was a fatal weakness for a revolutionary party. Above all, the mystique surrounding the desire for unity and commitment to it within the party acts to dampen democratic impulses and strengthen discipline and conformity.

This adherence to Marxism-Leninism as traditionally defined has been, however, increasingly subject to severe strain. Many of the non-ruling communist parties, notably the Swedish, have modified their application of democratic-centralism. Although still following demo-

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cratic-centralist principles, and quite willing to expel those whose dissident views go too far, the NRCP tolerate a far wider range of opinion than was the case before 1953. One finds in the party press at least the rudiments of a debate on contentious issues. More tolerance has become evident—both on the part of the leadership towards dissidents, and from disaffected minorities towards the leadership. The leadership in most parties, however it may have been selected, does seem to be representative of broad opinion within the party.

THE Swedish party (*Vänsterpartiet kommunisterna*—VPK) all but abandoned democratic-centralism in 1967, refusing even to include a reference to it in the party statutes adopted at the twenty-first congress. The so-called party " progressives " have been pressing for a definition of unity and centralism quite at odds with the bureaucratic model that has developed since Lenin's time. The debate within the party—within many NRCP—on this issue is reminiscent of the debate within the new communist parties in the post-World War I period.

Under pressure from the party traditionalists, the VPK has since dropped the category of associate membership and re-emphasized the centralist aspects. The party leadership still refuses, however, to accept proposals that democratic-centralism be referred to explicitly in the party rules. It has rejected all moves to tighten the rules as efforts to impose " cadaver discipline " on the party.[1] The relatively open nature of the VPK was seen at the recent twenty-fourth congress (March 1975) when a new leader was selected to succeed the retiring C. H. Hermansson. In an open vote between rival candidates, the young (39) Lars Werner defeated a traditionalist-supported opponent with 162 out of 239 votes.[2]

The most severe strain on the centralist character of the non-ruling parties has come from their turn to the peaceful path to socialism.

The most critical problem that the communist parties in Western Europe have had to face over the last half-century has been how to justify their existence. What role can a revolutionary party play in societies in which the prospects for revolution have remained minimal? What need is there for a communist party, for a " vanguard party " that is to provide the leadership for a radical transformation of the existing system? Can, indeed, a communist party affect the process of social change within its society?

The need to justify their existence has arisen in consequence of the continuing dilemma in which the non-ruling communist parties have found themselves. To retain their original identity as replicas in Western Europe of the Russian Bolsheviks, thus perpetuating their position of social and political isolation? Or, to seek wider political influence as

[1] See *VPK kongress 72. Vänsterpartiet kommunisternas 23:e kongress, 26–29 October 1972* (Stockholm, 1972), pp. 230–231 for the position of the leadership on these questions at the twenty-third congress, and pp. 248–249 for the balance of democratic and centralist principles in the party rules.

[2] *Norrskensflamman* (Lulea), 14 March 1975.

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a step toward political power, thus blurring, if not effectively obliterating, the distinction between " communist " and " socialist "? Over the years, both the Russian and West European communists have sought by various means to reconcile this dilemma in theory and in practice. The commitment to the peaceful path to socialism—a commitment with important antecedents reaching back into the 1920s—has increasingly been thought to be the means for expanding communist influence, while at the same time retaining the identity and maximizing the leadership role of the communist party. An essential feature of the peaceful path to socialism is an implied definition of revolution considerably different from the traditional Leninist definition.

In each country the response of the communist party to this " identity dilemma " has been shaped in great part by specific conditions and historical traditions. In three countries—France, Italy, and Finland—the communist party has succeeded in fulfilling a perceived need within the population. To some extent this appears to be true also in Portugal, and perhaps Greece, today. The result has been the growth of the communist party in these countries into a recognizable, and at times and on certain levels an effective, participant in political life. Even in these countries, however, further extension of party influence depends upon a growth in party respectability—i.e. an extension to wider circles within society of the belief that the party has something to contribute to the satisfaction of interests and to social development which is not offered by any other party. Hindering the development of greater respectability is the commitment to democratic-centralism.

The traditional organizational forms understood as democratic-centralism have been a differentiating factor, not to say a divisive force, between communists and socialists. In the past they have seriously restricted communist cooperation with socialists in the United Front and Popular Front periods. Refusal to abandon democratic-centralism led in the post-World War II period to frustration of the communist efforts to promote organizational fusion with the socialists. Continued adherence to the Leninist party norms, even though in many cases interpreted in a much looser fashion than by the CPSU and the parties in the other " socialist " countries, remains for the NRCP a fundamental obstacle to genuine cooperation with all " progressive " parties based on mutual trust and confidence. Can the NRCP successfully pursue a peaceful path to socialism—a strategy of working within the existing system by building a mass movement for revolutionary social change—while at the same time retaining its Leninist organizational structure?

Recent developments in Denmark and Norway demonstrate how two of the smaller non-ruling parties in countries with many similarities have been affected quite differently by the political environment in which they exist. They have come to rather different conclusions concerning the prospects for reconciliation of traditional principles and extended political influence.

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IN Denmark a small, isolated communist party, while fully committing itself to the peaceful path to socialism, insisted on retaining complete organizational and ideological identity. It did so, with great success, in the face of an incredible fragmentation of the socialist or Marxist Left in Denmark: a fragmentation that has been both compounded by, and a source of, the problem of identity generally. Consequently, the Danish communist party, (*Danmarks kommunistiske Parti*—DKP) has been a major beneficiary of the radicalization and polarization of Danish politics over the past three or four years. Although still outside the weakened Danish process of compromise politics, and far from being a major political party, the DKP is nevertheless able to play a significant independent political role within the current chaotic and unstable Danish political scene. The Norwegian party, however, has seen its prospects for developing an independent position of political influence all but disappear. It has sought to break out of its isolation through a coalition policy whose implications for the party's Leninist traditions are quite drastic and controversial.

Having lost all its representation in the Folketing as a result of the party split in November 1958, when Axel Larsen left to form the Socialist Peoples' Party (*Socialistiske Folkeparti*—SF), the DKP remained outside parliament until December 1973. Superseding the DKP as " the party of the Left," the SF effectively shut the communists out of all political influence. The DKP vote dropped to a low of 0·8 per cent in the election in November 1966, while the SF was accumulating 11 per cent of the vote and 20 parliamentary seats, as well as a partnership with the social-democrats in support of a Social-Democratic party " workers' majority " (*arbejderflertallet*) government.[3]

Strength of Danish socialist parties [4]

	DKP		SF		other Left	
	% *vote*	*seats*	% *vote*	*seats*	% *vote*	*seats*
1939	2·4	3				
1945	12·5	18				
1947	6·8	9				
1950	4·6	7				
1953 (Apr.)	4·8	7				
1953 (Sept.)	4·3	8				
1957	3·1	6				
1960	1·1	0	6·1	11		
1964	1·2	0	5·8	10		
1966	0·8	0	10·9	20	*VS*	
1968	1·0	0	6·1	11	2·0	4
1971	1·4	0	9·1	17	1·6	0
1973	3·6	6	6·0	11	1·4	0
1975	4·2	7	4·9	9	2·1	4

[3] For a critical commentary on the *arbejderflertallet* period see Harry Mortensen, ed., *Arbejderflertallet* (Cophenhagen, 1969).

[4] Danmarks Statistik. Statistiske Meddelelser 1974: 7 *Folketingsvalget den 4. december 1973.*

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At the same time as the electoral fortunes of the DKP were plummeting, the socialist Left was being divided and weakened by the constant splitting that was occurring. A third party—the Left-socialists (*Venstresocialisterne*—VS)—split from the SF in late 1967, to be followed by a series of further splits from within the VS as the Trotskyists, anarchists, and various "Marxist-Leninist" groups left or were expelled.[5] Only the VS of these new groups has participated in elections. In fact, the issue of whether or not to do so has played an important part in the internal conflicts through which the VS has suffered since 1967. The VS has contested each of the four parliamentary elections from 1968 (successfully in 1968 and 1975, winning four seats on each occasion), as well as the communal and county (*Amt*) elections. In 1968 the VS polled almost double the vote of the DKP.

The elections in December 1973 saw a dramatic revival of the DKP. It entered parliament again after 13 years, winning six seats while the SF was losing six. It gained a further seat, while the SF was losing two more (although the VS were also coming back into the Folketing with four seats), in the election in January 1975.[6] Better organized and displaying less dissension and perhaps more resolve than the SF, the DKP appeared better able to mobilize the heavily urban, working-class opposition to Danish adherence to the Common Market. The DKP played a leading role in the unsuccessful grass-roots campaign cutting across the political spectrum (*Folkebevægelsen mod EF*) to prevent a Yes vote in the October 1972 referendum. When the worsening economic crisis hit Denmark particularly hard in 1973, and again in 1974 as a result of the "energy crisis," the DKP profited from its organizational strength and stability and from its coherent and consistent opposition to the established system. Less troubled since 1958 by dissension, it has not suffered significantly from the continual conflict over ideological and strategic issues that has fragmented the socialist Left over the last decade.[7] Its image is increasingly one of stability, consistency and

[5] A strongly urban, student and young intellectual organization, the VS finds support at election time from the many splinter New Left, "Marxist-Leninist," Trotskyite, and other revolutionary socialist groups (there are at least 10 such groups in Denmark). The bi-monthly *politisk revy* (Copenhagen), while open to the views of all of the revolutionary groups, gives its support to the candidates of the VS.

[6] It maintained its strength in the local elections in the spring of 1974. The DKP acquired 40 seats in the communal councils, as contrasted with only four previously (and seven county council seats where it had none before), and became an important factor in the Copenhagen city government where the Left (SF–DKP–VS) controls 16 of the 55 seats scattered among 12 party groups.

[7] In early June the party veteran, Carl Madsen, was expelled from the party in culmination of a long controversy. While he had some opportunity to express his views in *Land og Folk*, he had to go outside the party to find an outlet for his major statement of opposition to party policy (see the discussion of Madsen's difficulties with the DKP and excerpts from his brochure, *Stat of magt*, in *politisk revy*, No. 248, 23 August 1974). Although his departure occurred, apparently, without the bitterness and hostility of earlier incidents, his experience demonstrates the bounds beyond which criticism will not be tolerated. Apart from a vociferous criticism of the DKP programme as "social-democratic," Madsen had openly accused the party leadership of incompetence and lacking in the qualities necessary to inspire confidence. The imminent publication by a

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assurance, of complete commitment to the peaceful parliamentary path to socialism, of an "acceptable" party which knows what it wants. As discontent with the traditional five-party dominance of the Danish parliamentary system has grown, the DKP has acquired a significant appeal for the disaffected voters on the political Left.[8] This has been increasingly important in the face of the rapid decline in the political position of both the social-democrats and the SF. Although the former remains the largest party, it has fallen to its lowest point since before 1918. As disillusionment with the SF has grown, the DKP has emerged as the major factor in the spectrum to the left of the social-democrats.

Apart from benefiting from the unstable and more radicalized political milieu, the re-emergence of the DKP has been the result of its expanding influence in several areas of Danish society: it remains an important part of the still active anti-EEC movement; it has been the leading force in organizing the unemployed workers; it is the dominant influence within the *Formandsinitiativet* (semi-formal organization of a number of individual trade union leaders), the only organized opposition within the trade union movement to the national trade union organization (LO); and the *Kommunistiske Studenter* have been winning more support from students in higher education.[9] A more personal factor in the success of the DKP has been the more positive image that the party leader, Knud Jespersen, has succeeded in projecting. Having acquired a new style and feel for his working-class audience, he has succeeded, apparently, in reaching a new audience as a politician who cares for the people rather than for playing the parliamentary game; as a human rather than a "plastic-politician."[10]

From the point of view of the DKP leadership, the political environment in Denmark has become increasingly promising. Its electoral gains, its re-entry into parliament, and its increasing support in the "work-places" (*arbejdspladsene*) have rejuvenated the party. The DKP has been lifted out of its isolation and given a new optimism. At the same time, the commitment of the party leadership to maintaining the traditional party structure and image of the party's role in society has been confirmed.[11] Thus, its calls for "unity of the Left" (primarily DKP-SF-VS, but even with the social-democrats) are reminiscent of the old United Front strategy in which each participant retains its individual identity in a loose coalition for specific purposes. The Danish communist

non-party New Left press (Demos) of Madsen's critical history of the DKP's role in Danish society apparently was the immediate cause for expulsion (*Politiken Weekly*, 7–12 June 1975 and 13–20 June 1975).

[8] The DKP has drawn most of its increased support from former SF and social-democratic voters. See Ole Borre, "Denmark's Protest Election of December 1973," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 9 (1974), 203.

[9] See *politisk revy*, Nos. 251 (4 October 1974), 252 (18 October 1974), 253 (1 November 1974), 254 (15 November 1974), 263 (28 March 1975), and 264 (18 April 1975).

[10] *Information* (Copenhagen), 7 January 1975.

[11] See the comments by Ib Nørlund, long-time member of the DKP leadership and party spokesman on ideological issues, at the DKP national conference in mid-1974 as reported in *Politiken Weekly*, 21–27 June 1974.

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party has thus been able for the time being to resolve its "identity dilemma" and remain a traditional, although enlightened, Leninist party. The traditionalist opponents of C. H. Hermansson in the Swedish party hold the DKP up as an example of how it pays off to stick to the old ways. Having held firm to the Leninist course, the DKP, it is argued, has now seen the "Axel Larsen way" peter out and, with a change in the objective conditions, profited from its organizational coherence.[12]

THE most interesting developments have taken place in Norway. Except for an upsurge during the second world war which could not withstand the onset of the Cold War and the Hungarian intervention, the Norwegian communist party (*Norges kommunistisk parti*—NKP) has never succeeded in becoming an effective political force. Its voting strength has fallen with each post-war election. As with the DKP, the Norwegian party suffered severely from the formation of a Socialist Peoples' Party (SF). Having seen its electoral support wither to a bare 1·0 per cent of the vote in 1969, and the SF surpass it as the largest party to the left of the Labour Party (DNA), the NKP turned to a cautious united front policy. Already in the 1969 election the NKP and SF had run on a joint list in Bergen. Electoral co-operation was broadened during the local elections in autumn 1971. As the SF was experiencing a conflict at this time that was to see the party split

Strength of Norwegian socialist parties [13]

	NKP		SF		other Left	
	% *votes*	*seats*	% *votes*	*seats*		
1936	0·3	0				
1945	11·9	11				
1949	5·8	0				
1953	5·1	3				
1957	3·4	1				
1961	2·9	0	2·4	2		
1965	1·4	0	5·0	2		
1969	1·0	0	3·4	0		
					Rød Valgforbund—RV	
	% *votes*	*seats*			% *votes*	*seats*
1973	11·2	16			0·4	0

and so lose its representation in the Storting, there was fertile ground for the development of a *rapprochement* between the two parties of the

[12] *Norrskensflamman* (Lulea), 23 January 1975.

[13] Norges Officielle Statistiskk. *Statistisk Årbok 1974;* and Henry Valen and Daniel Katz, *Political Parties in Norway. A community study* (Oslo: Universitetsforlag, 1967). The absence of the NKP from parliament in 1949 was the result of the election procedures written into the Norwegian Constitution when first adopted in 1814. The rural areas were guaranteed two-thirds of the seats in the Storting. This was changed after the 1949 election to a system of proportional representation.

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socialist Left.[14] In contrast to Denmark, where the SF had been formed by dissident communists amid much bitterness and personal animosity, the coming together in Norway of the communists and the SF (which broke away from the Labour Party in 1961) has proceeded comparatively smoothly. The way was eased further by the fact that the Norwegian SF never achieved anything like the degree of support and political influence that the SF under Avel Larsen acquired in Denmark during the 1960s.

Extensive and successful co-operation in the anti-EEC movement during 1971 and 1972 led to the creation in March 1973 of the Socialist Electoral Alliance (*Sosialistisk Valgforbund*—SV) in anticipation of the parliamentary elections in September. Joining the NKP and the SF was a dissident left-wing and anti-EEC group (*Demokratisk Sosialister-Arbejderbevegelsens Informasjonskomite*, DS-AIK) which had left the Labour Party. The results were spectacular. From no seats in the Storting and only 4·5 per cent combined vote in 1969, the NKP and the SF shared in the SV's 11·2 per cent of the vote in the 1973 election and 16 seats in the Storting. It has not been the communists, however, who have been prominent beneficiaries of the new arrangements. Although the precise proportion of the SV vote that can be attributed to supporters of each constituent group cannot be discerned, some indication of the relative weight each exerts within the SV can be seen in the distribution of the SV's parliamentary seats—nine for SF, six for DS-AIK, and only one, the party secretary, Reidar Larsen, for the NKP. The communists, nevertheless, have emerged from their isolation and have received a much needed boost in morale. Their influence, especially at the grass-roots level, is probably greater than their parliamentary strength would indicate. They can at least now envisage greater prospects for the future by continued participation in the SV.

Of considerably greater interest, for the development of communism in Norway, and indeed as a precedent for the non-ruling communist parties generally, are the longer-range objectives that its creators have outlined for the SV. Formed in the short-run as a means of increasing the number of anti-EEC members of the parliament, and thus of hindering or preventing further adaptation of Norway to the EEC, over the long-run the SV is seen to be the means by which the " left forces " can be gathered, or re-gathered, within Norway. From a strengthened opposition to the Labour Party and trade union bureaucracy one could build a genuinely socialist movement. It was indicated at the outset that strengthening the opposition to the Labour Party meant, in addition

[14] At the SF congress in February 1969 a " Marxist-Leninist " minority of over one-third of the delegates left, later to form in 1973 a new orthodox Leninist party sympathetic to the Chinese—*Arbeidernes Kommunistiskparti* (*Marxist-Leninistène*); Workers' Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist). Use of parliament only as a forum for propaganda, no co-operation with the social-democrats, insistence on the necessity for violence in the revolution, and the necessity for a dictatorship of the proletariat afterwards characterize the AKP-ml. It finds much in common with the " Marxist-Leninist " party in Sweden, the Communist Party of Sweden (*Sveriges kommunistiska parti*—SKP), and the " Marxist-Leninist " party in Italy built around the *Il Manifesto* group.

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to electoral cooperation and the formation of a joint parliamentary group, agreement on a programme of minimum demands, cooperation within the labour movement (especially within the "work-places"—*arbeidspladsene*) against the established trade union structure (LO), and negotiations for full organizational unification. It is in the latter development that one sees most clearly the "identity dilemma" with which the NKP is now faced.

In April 1974 an SV congress adopted a "unity programme," the main thrust of which was to commit the NKP, SF, AIK, and assorted "independent socialists" (including some Christian socialists indifferent or antipathetic to Marxism) to form a new Marxist party by 15 March 1975.[15] This was to occur in three phases. By January 1975 a common national leadership would be formed, the basis for membership was increasingly to be changed from the constituent parties and groups to individual membership, the drafts of national and provincial programmes would be prepared, and other steps taken to facilitate unity. By mid-March further preparatory steps in a second stage would have led to a unity congress. During the third and final "liquidation phase" extending into 1976, resources from the old parties would be transferred to the new party, and a national congress of the new party would formally complete the unification process and indicate the dissolution of the old parties. The implications for the NKP, as well as for all NRCP, are enormous. Only in the period 1944–47 has one seen before a willingness of the communists to merge organizationally with a socialist party. The terms for merger proposed by the communists at that time, however, in effect meant absorption of the socialists, and as such were impossible for the socialists to accept.[16]

How much the NKP was a leader, and how much a follower, in these developments is hard to say. One has the feeling that the NKP agreement to work towards complete organizational fusion and dissolution of the existing parties by 1976 was not really genuine. It agreed as the price it had to pay for inclusion in the SV, whose most dynamic forces are the SF and the former left-wing Labour Party members. It has been these elements who have been pressing most intensely for the immediate formation of a new, unified Marxist party dedicated to the creation of a socialist Norway.[17] Organizational unity has been the basic long-run objective of a large majority in the SV.

Back in 1969, when the efforts to promote cooperation on the socialist Left were just beginning, Reidar Larsen flatly denied that the communists had any intention of dissolving the party, or that the NKP desired a new left-radical party.[18] Commenting in 1973 at the time the

[15] See the discussion of the planned steps to unity in *Orientering* (SF weekly), No. 16, 1974 as cited in *politisk revy*, No. 243 (17 May 1974).

[16] See *inter alia*, Mogens Nielsen, ed., *Enhed i arbejderbevae gelsen* (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1973) and Alfred J. Rieber, *Stalin and the French Communist Party* (New York, 1962), 212–215.

[17] See *Orientering*, 31 March 1973.

[18] *Friheten* (NKP weekly), 1–6 December 1969.

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SV was formed, Larsen made no mention of a new party. He referred obliquely to this commitment by asserting that cooperation "must be developed in the direction of . . . political fellowship. We must not force future development so that cooperation comes to feel like a strait-jacket." [19]

Ideally, the NKP would indeed wish to see a lively and growing united party of the revolutionary Left—on NKP terms. Having committed itself to creating a new party, the NKP has participated fully and actively in the negotiations. Reversing his earlier stand, Larsen, at the fourteenth NKP congress in November 1973, supported in principle the formation of one revolutionary Marxist party to the left of the social-democrats (the DNA).[20] He has been supported in this even by the party traditionalists, who are quite willing to see a new party if it is "built on Marxist-Leninist ideological principles." [21] He and others have made it clear, however, that in the current circumstances the party prefers a permanent electoral alliance to a new party.[22] As long as cooperation within the SV can be maintained, the predominant feeling in the NKP seems to be to let full organizational unity be pushed into the indefinite future.

For the NKP the paramount strategic objective at the moment has been to break out of its political isolation and, as with all of the European NRCP, to maximize cooperation on the socialist Left. The SV has served this purpose admirably. The tactical problem for the NKP in its relations with its SV partners, a problem which is also of fundamental ideological concern, continues to be how to avoid a forcing of the issue of party dissolution.

For several reasons, the NKP has been a reluctant participant in the creation of a Marxist party at this time. First, turning the SV into a Marxist party could make it difficult for many Christian socialists and others to continue to work within it.[23] As the objective is to attract more and more diverse groups to the struggle for "immediate goals" and "socialism," forcing them to adopt Marxism would only limit the range of potential adherents to a "progressive" front. Second, the NKP is well aware that Marxism means different things to different people. Certainly their conception of it is different from that of the SF. To force a clear choice between different interpretations could mean only a return to a splintered socialist Left. The NKP recognizes that no group is willing at the moment to abandon its version of Marxism. It recognizes that Leninism cannot serve as the basis for unity in the SV, and it is unwilling to accept any other interpretation. Therefore, there should be no effort to create an ideologically unified party. Rather, the debate should continue in the context of a broad, open "organ of cooperation"

19 Ibid. 9–14 April 1973.
20 Ibid. 5–10 November 1973.
21 Ibid. 20–25 December 1973.
22 Ibid. 19–24 November 1973.
23 Ibid. 13–18 January 1975.

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with the NKP as the Marxist-Leninist element.[24] All "progressive" forces in this way could be included within the SV.

This issue of what Marxism means is, of course, the substance of the historical split between socialists and communists, and more latterly of the general fragmentation within the Left. The SF, at its congress in January 1975, envisaged the SV as a party developing a Norwegian path to socialism on Marxist lines, "with democracy and freedom of opinion, independent of models and patterns from other countries and sides."[25] This is reminiscent of the attitudes of the first Norwegian adherents to the Comintern in the early 1920s.[26] It indicates a pragmatism, an independent frame of mind, an openness, a willingness to experiment, and a recognition of and respect for Norwegian cultural traditions and development that is in sharp contrast to the rigidity of the communist definition of Marxism.

The NKP national committee has expressed the view that a Marxist party "in our time" means a Marxist-Leninist party.[27] "Leninism is the only representative of present-day Marxism."[28] The party argues that Lenin's contribution to Marxism is not something specifically Russian (not a "model from another country"), but rather is of universal validity and application.[29] It is a further discovery and refinement of "scientific socialism." Party spokesmen have been critical of the SF version of Marxism, that Marxism is only a social analysis with no role for a vanguard party, and the assertion that Marxism and Leninism are two different things.[30] It is the insistence of the NKP on the importance of Leninist principles, and the unwillingness of others to accept them, that prevents full agreement on a Marxist "programme of principles" for the new party. The structuring of the party according to democratic-centralism, the necessity of a dictatorship of the proletariat after the revolution, and a definition of proletarian internationalism that restricts criticism of the "socialist countries" are the specifics of Leninism that are the source of the differences with the NKP's Marxist partners in the SV.

Most local branches of the NKP have been exerting pressure on the leadership for a firm stand for Marxism-Leninism. While some have gone so far as to call for a revision of the 1974 agreement to dissolve the party by 1976, most have followed the leadership in its efforts to maximize cooperation and avoid a return to a position of isolation.[31] There is a fear that any movement away from democratic-centralism and the leadership role of the revolutionary party would quickly lead to

24 Ibid.

25 *Arbeiderbladet* (Labour party daily), 27 February 1975.

26 See Knut Langfeldt, *Moskva-tesene i norsk politikk* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972) and Per Maurseth, *Fra Moskvateser til Kristianaforslag* (Oslo, 1972).

27 See the reference to the September 1974 meeting of the NKP national committee in *Friheten*, 13–18 January 1975.

28 *Friheten*, 3–8 March 1975.

29 Ibid. 17–22 March 1975.

30 Ibid. 3–8 March 1975.

31 See *Friheten*, 3–8 and 10–15 February 1975 and *Arbeiderbladet*, 27 February 1975.

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" revisionism." Only by following the Leninist organizational forms, it is argued, can the revolutionary character of the party be preserved, and the party maintained on a firm revolutionary path.

It is here that the communist party runs into its " identity dilemma " most agonizingly. On the one hand, the more it follows a peaceful path to socialism and works through the existing system, the more it is under pressure to maintain its Leninist organizational form if a distinction is to be maintained between a social-democratic and a revolutionary socialist party. It is not, as the communists or " Marxist-Leninists " claim, that you cannot have a revolutionary party without Leninism. That depends not only upon what one means by revolution, but also upon the degree to which an avowedly revolutionary party's policies of change find a reception within the society. Rather, it is a question of tradition and *raison d'être*. Communists are committed through an act of faith to the view that progress toward fundamental social change is not possible apart from Leninism. As more and more forces not committed to this view are gathered together by the party, those who are must forge a discipline and a unity sufficient to maintain and to instil more widely the party's sense of revolutionary purpose and dedication. Yet, at the same time it is under pressure to modify its Leninism if it is to win the confidence and trust of new adherents to an expanding " progressive " front, and to create for itself a position of leadership within the front. It is one thing to win more voters or supporters on the basis of specific programmes and positions on public policy questions, or by default because of dissatisfaction with other political parties.[32] It is quite another to keep them and mobilize them into a mass movement for revolutionary social change on the basis of democratic-centralism.

There is also an unwillingness on the part of NKP members to abandon the traditional communist interpretation of proletarian internationalism, according to which Soviet and East European experience is given great weight, and ties to the East European parties and countries are considered essential if one is to be in tune with the course of " progressive " historical development.

So far, the NKP has been able to keep developments within acceptable limits. Meeting in Trondheim on 13 March, the Socialist Electoral Alliance initiated the third phase by transforming itself into the Left-Socialist Party (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*—retaining the designation SV). It adopted a programme of principles, an action programme, a programme for communal and provincial elections, and a set of rules. It also elected a central leadership, with " fair representation " from each

[32] See the results of a Gallup poll published in *Aftenposten* (Oslo), reported in *News of Norway* (Norwegian Information Service, New York), Vol. 31, No. 9 (10 May 1974), which showed a generally low level of confidence in political authorities among the population. Only one per cent of the SV supporters had " very great faith " in the political authorities; 70 per cent had little or no faith.

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of the constituent groups.[33] The action and electoral programmes, and the rules, were adopted unanimously with little controversy. The programme of principles, however, represents at best a tenuous compromise on the basis of those points upon which agreement could be reached. All controversial issues were left out, to be discussed and debated further.[34] The NKP thus succeeded in preserving the movement for cooperation on the socialist Left, without making any concessions of principle. The result, however, is that the new party is a strange creation. At the same time as it is being reconstructed on the basis of individual membership, the constituting organizations remain in existence. Local SV organizations exist side-by-side with local NKP organizations. The old parties retain their own programme of principles and rules. An individual communist is thus a member of both the NKP and the SV, and participates in the local branches of both organizations. The SV at this point is merely a more institutionalized organ for practical political action in pursuit of agreed short-run objectives. Hanging over the new party, and the NKP, however, is the commitment to final organizational unity and dissolution of the old parties during 1976. This involves some form of agreement on the fundamental issues separating the NKP from its partners: the long-run objectives of the new party (its definition of socialism, the forms "socialist power" would take, and the purposes to which it would be directed), its image of itself in relation to socialist traditions and other contemporary socialist and communist parties, and its organizational form.

Struggling with the challenge to its traditional definition of itself as a Marxist-Leninist party, the NKP is seeking to maintain the momentum developed through the successes of the SV. Recognizing that the NKP has an opportunity to break out of its political isolation—perhaps the last such opportunity—the party leader, Reidar Larsen, has been struggling to overcome the scepticism and reluctance to tread new paths which linger within the party. He has suggested that within the new SV party the communists must proceed in a way that breaks with traditional party practice.[35] After agreement on the "main line," a majority position in the SV on individual issues, policies and standpoints should be left to form on the basis of different opinions. It is appropriate for the SV to contain factions and independent groups.[36] Larsen sees this as an NKP concession, as having "partially modified democratic-centralism."[37]

[33] Berit Ås (AIK) is the new SV party leader, with Stein Ornhoj (SF), Reidar Larsen (NKP), and Ove Larsen (Independents) as other members of the top leadership (*Friheten*, 17–22 March 1975).

[34] A major source of controversy was the insistence of most non-communist delegates in issuing a statement concerning Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. The question of the "attitude towards the socialist countries" was left out of the Programme of Principles. Instead, the DS–AIK, SF, and independent delegates adopted a declaration of the Soviet Union, with the NKP delegates abstaining (*Friheten*, 17–22 March 1975).

[35] *Friheten*, 2–4 January 1975.

[36] *Klassekampen* (AKP-ml weekly), 14–20 November 1973.

[37] Ibid.

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The Larsen policy, apparently, is to do all possible to avoid ideological differences from threatening the agreement for joint political action.

Unless the other participants in the new party are willing to accept the present situation, the NKP is going to have to make some important concessions, particularly in the ideological sphere and on organizational forms. Martin Gunnar Knudsen, the most irreconcilable NKP leader from an ideological perspective, has asserted that to renounce democratic-centralism or the dictatorship of the proletariat would be to "betray the vital interests of the working class."[38] Larsen, however, has taken a more flexible and ambiguous view. The political and social life of Norway is in a state of flux, he argues. "Old bastions (i.e. the Labour Party) have fallen," and large parts of the population are "on the move."[39] The most important thing from the point of view of a revolutionary party is to exploit this situation to the maximum. The clear implication is that if some traditional positions and definitions become obstacles to the development of a mass movement on the political Left, then they must be compromised, if not abandoned. How far Larsen in fact may be willing to go in compromising Leninist principles remains to be seen. The national congress of the NKP set for this autumn is to come to some decision on the question of dissolution of the party. Even if a majority can be found for dissolution, the result may well be only a party split.

All but the most implacable opponents of change within the NKP agree that one cannot go back, cannot abandon the SV and return to an independent NKP position. Pursuit of the peaceful path to socialism and effective political influence make the current coalition policy inevitable. Unlike the Danes, the Norwegian communists can see no prospects for independent growth into a powerful political party. On the other hand, there is great reluctance to give up the traditional Marxist-Leninist conception of a revolutionary party. In the negotiations for a programme of principles for the new party the communists have held firm to their views and have sought to retain as much Marxist-Leninist content as possible. How far can the NKP go in accommodating its partners without abandoning its Leninist character? This is the nature of the "identity dilemma" through which the NKP is now suffering, and with which in time other non-ruling communist parties may be faced.

[38] *Aftenposten*, 28 January 1975.
[39] Ibid.

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Recent Sino–Albanian Relations*

Dorothy Grouse Fontana

WHEN Lenin mentioned Japan in his "Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism," the informed reader knew he was in fact referring in code to Russia. So in 1960, when Russia spoke disparagingly of Albania and the "dogmatic sectarians," it was referring to China; or when China criticised Yugoslavia and the "hateful revisionists," it was referring to Russia; the old game of calumny by proxy had begun again. In this way, during the last ten years, one of the tiniest Balkan nations became China's mouthpiece and, indeed, a weather-vane to watch, to help understand its newest tacks in the increasingly widening Sino-Soviet split. However, by 1971, the "unbreakable internationalist friendship" between China and Albania had begun to weather, and commentators started to probe the surface of the "fraternal solidarity" for cracks. A rift between Albania and China has begun to appear, and the basic cause of that rift arose from the events in China which both involved China's agonizing re-evaluation of the major contradictions in the world, and which brought about the fall of Lin Piao. Albania disapproved of both of these events in China. For the benefit of those readers who are not familiar with Albania, its recent history will be briefly touched upon before proceeding to an examination of the current position of Sino-Albanian relations.

OVER the last century, Albania has been pulled by nationalist ties to the *irredenta* population in Yugoslavia, challenged by Greece's claims on Southern Albania (North Epirus), frightened by Serbian and Montenegrin desires for partition of Northern Albania, and both threatened and occupied by her stronger neighbours. To maintain a semblance of independence has been Albania's principal aim, while the major concern of its foreign policy has been to find a protector powerful enough to help guarantee its independence. Even during Albania's communist era, this pattern has persisted. Its Communist Party, which was organized, nurtured and directed by Yugoslavia, took control on 29 November 1944. Until 1948, Albania remained a satellite of Yugoslavia rather than of Russia, yet during that time Yugoslavia's dominance grew increasingly threatening. Tito's Balkan Federation plans, which meant the economic integration of Albania into Yugoslavia, endangered Albanian autonomy, while Tito's preference for Koci Xoxe endangered the Albanian party leader, Enver Hoxha, personally. Thus, Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 was welcomed in Albania as an opportunity to release itself from Yugoslavia's economic and political ties

* The author would like to thank Professor William Griffith for access to his primary research material files. All emphases within quotations are the author's.

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and place Albania under a more distant, and hence safer, protector. Albania became a Soviet satellite to defend her independence.

Soviet-Albanian relations flourished until 1955. By then, with Stalin dead and Khrushchev in control, Albania's leader, Hoxha, began to feel threatened by Khrushchev's new policies. Khrushchev's 1955 *rapprochement* with Tito, Soviet discouragement of Albania's desire for rapid industrialization, and a decline in Soviet interest and economic aid in Albania all confronted Hoxha with the renewed prospect of Yugoslavian dominance. At this time, Albania turned first to China for economic support to counterbalance the Soviet Union's declining aid. Khrushchev's surprise Secret Speech in 1956 at the twentieth congress of the CPSU and the subsequent de-Stalinization became the second threat to Albania's leaders, who were extreme Stalinists and who counted heavily on Stalinist techniques to maintain control of the country.

1960 was a bad year for Albanian-Russian relations. During the summer of 1960, it appears that Russia and Yugoslavia attempted to back an unsuccessful plot to overthrow Hoxha. Also in 1960, other ominous events worried Albania. In an interview with the Greek liberal leader, Venizelos, Khrushchev promised to consider the problem of the autonomy of North Epirus at the forthcoming Bucharest meeting on 20 June 1960. This, of course, could be considered nothing less than a direct threat to Albania's territorial integrity. However, this event was only a part of the overall Soviet "New Balkan Policy" to weaken NATO in the South-East by easing tensions and de-nuclearizing the Balkans. Yet to Albania's leaders, who felt their autonomy was already being gravely threatened by Khrushchev, the idea of surrendering more power over their nation's defences to a Russia which was already inclined to question Albania's territorial integrity was anathema.

At the Bucharest Meeting, Albania was clearly siding with the Chinese against Russia. She had made her break with Russia. By the time of the 81-Party Conference in Moscow in September 1960, Moscow had severely cut aid to Albania and withheld emergency food assistance during the drought in Albania in the summer of 1960. As a result, Albania's speech at the 81-Party Conference was a philippic against Russia, while China supported Albania. In the following year, Russia proceeded to economically and culturally isolate Albania, even publicly castigating Albania at the 22nd Party congress.

China then stepped into this breach, so that by April 1967 China and Albania had concluded an economic agreement amounting to $123 million for Albania. Thus, Albania had shifted to a new ally and protector. The reasons why Russia did not stop this have been suggested by Griffith.[1] The Russians were reluctant to break with the Chinese who were supporting Albania; the geographical isolation of Albania from Russia made a Red Army intervention very difficult; and finally the

[1] William E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964), p. 3.

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unity of the Albanian communist leadership made it difficult for the Russians to infiltrate and factionalize.

Throughout this same period two other trends became clear: Albania's relations with the United States and Great Britain worsened and Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated seriously. The unwillingness of the United States and Great Britain to establish diplomatic relations with Albania, their opposition to Albania's entrance to the UN and their apparent support for Greece and her territorial claims in Northern Epirus left a legacy of distrust which was compounded by Albania's discovery (through Kim Philby) of Anglo-American aid to covert actions aimed at the overthrow of Albania's communist regime between 1949 and 1953.

Sino-Soviet relations were also starting to worsen—beginning with Khrushchev's Secret Speech in 1956 and going up to the 22nd Party congress where China walked out in protest. The issues at stake in the Sino-Soviet rift involved basic ideological differences over (1) the path to follow for achieving socialism, (2) the method of handling the West, and (3) the way that underdeveloped nations could achieve communist revolutions—whether to place priority on coexistence (Russia's view) or revolution (China's view).

In the light of the Sino-Soviet split, Albania's choice of China as her new protector was clearly not based solely on tactical imperatives, but, rather, had a strong ideological motive as well. China and Albania had similar views on how communists should deal with the hostile non-communist world; in addition, both countries felt it unwise to abandon the Stalinist legacy; both countries had similar views on the uses of power; both saw that the " revolutionary spirit " had valuable uses and was essential to constructing communism; both distrusted Khrushchev's new policies, seeing in them revisionistic deviations from true Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the correct path to building socialism; both countries were the left extremists in the socialist movement; both countries strongly opposed Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence, seeing an aggressive imperialist United States as the world enemy with no change in nature likely in the future; and both countries had a recent history of communist revolution won through war and civil war, and hence viewed violent revolution in under-developed countries with favour.

China's motivations for establishing this new ideological and political " tribute " relationship with Albania are more obscure, considering that Albania could only be a drain on the already inadequate Chinese economic, military and technical resources. Certainly, the similar ideological positions had an appeal to leaders in a country where morality and politics have long been interrelated. As China saw her ideological position diverge from Russia, she must also have realized that opposing the Russian bloc as a part of a faction of genuinely socialist countries would be far more attractive than opposing it alone. Albania's geographical distance (as opposed to China's satellite neighbours) lent credence to the

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validity of a split based on ideology, rather than political aspirations. Furthermore, with Albania as an ally, China could strike back at Russia's dominance in the bloc, and while striking, also hit Russia very close to home. The prospect of a hostile Russian presence along the 4,200 mile long Sino-Soviet border was obviously uncomfortable for China, so that being able to split Russia's attention between the Eastern and Western fronts also had its appeal. This desire to divert Russia's attention from building pressure in the East was one of the obvious motivations for China's much later policy of supporting and promoting a potential Balkan axis of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

Thus Albania became China's ally and satellite, while China, in turn, accepted the heavy cost of becoming Albania's protector and supporter. At this time, they both moved into a position where they confronted two major adversaries. They feared, disdained and opposed Russia; and they also implacably hated and distrusted the imperialist United States, knowing that the nature of US imperialism would never change and would always be a danger.

THE Cultural Revolution drew China into the throes of a domestic upheaval which was characterized by sudden changes of policy and growing military involvement in domestic affairs. The Party foreign policy debates which preceded the Cultural Revolution were over the "lean-to-one-side issue." In these debates, it appears that the Chief of Staff, Lo Jui-ch'ing, argued for a pro-Soviet position of Sino-Soviet reconcilation, in order to facilitate aid to North Vietnam and the strengthening of China in view of the possibility of a forthcoming war with the United States.

On the other side:

> Lin Piao took the Maoist line of independent action. His view was that China would assist revolutionaries everywhere to the extent it could, but that they must provide their own solutions by employing Mao Tse-tung's principles of "people's war." Rejecting direct intervention, Lin argued that there was little probability of a Sino-American conflict. Even if China were attacked, the response would be a people's war . . . there was no need for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.[2]

Mao's objectives in the Cultural Revolution have now become somewhat clearer: (1) to purify the country from within, in preparation for the eventuality of war and, in this context, to remove the impure bourgeois or revisionist element, which included top men in the party bureaucracy who advocated accepting Russia's appeal for "united action" or "leaning to one side" and also men in control of the provincial party apparatuses. In uniting his country for the eventuality of war, Mao confronted the question: "Were his people reliable?" and in this way

[2] Richard Thornton, *The Bear and the Dragon*, American-Asian Educational Exchange, Monograph No. 9 (1972), p. 27.

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revisionism was raised in a central way as the central problem. (2) Mao also wanted to further revolutionize the countryside, to remove bourgeois tendencies.

By late 1968, as the Cultural Revolution drew to a close, Mao had at least partially succeeded—he had ousted his major opponents and he had set China on a near-irreversible trend of anti-Sovietism. In the process, however, Mao had greatly weakened and riddled the party apparatus, given the military a far stronger position in domestic affairs, and left China dangerously isolated and in a weakened military position in the world. In late 1968, Mao watched Nixon's election and the first signs of US withdrawal from involvement in Asia, while the shock of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine could only make China more aware of her military vulnerability vis-à-vis Russia—especially when troops were being used for domestic issues and Russia was probing its defences.

The effects of China's Cultural Revolution on Albania were two-fold: (1) Albania approved of Mao's opposition to the "leaning to one side," and (2) it imitated China's Cultural Revolution, although to a milder degree and for domestic expediencies as well.[3] Albania, by siding with China in the Sino-Soviet split, had placed herself in an extremely vulnerable position. Were China to re-establish relations with Russia, then Albania would no longer have a protector from Russia. More particularly, Hoxha would have a very short political future. Thus, it was to be expected that Albania would side with Mao and welcome the Cultural Revolution which could forestall any hope of Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*. Albania's "Cultural Revolution" while removing some "ideologically impure elements," also demonstrated Albania's support for China and at the same time forced China to be aware of Albania, even when its attention was turned inwards. Most importantly, Albania's Cultural Revolution expressed an ideological position which corresponded with and endorsed the ideological and tactical position of one faction in the inter-party struggle of China: Mao's.

The Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia alarmed Albania. More than ever before, she was made aware of her isolation, the threat Russia implied, and the tenuous nature of military support she could expect from an ally over 2,000 miles away who was convulsed in a Cultural Revolution. The primary results of the shock from the Czechoslovakian invasion were a realignment of Albania's position in the Balkans, leading to a tacit and later more explicit *rapprochement* with Yugoslavia (!) and

[3] For an interesting recent discussion of Albania's Cultural Revolution, see Nicholas C. Pano, "The Albanian Cultural Revolution," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (July–Aug. 1974), p. 44. What might be pointed out is that many of the issues and themes which appeared in Albania before the beginning of the Cultural Revolution were also present in China quite early; and once China's Cultural Revolution began, Albania's Cultural Revolution was undoubtedly encouraged by China.

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Rumania (the two other countries threatened by the Brezhnev doctrine) [4]; the beginning of Albania's reassessment of her isolated position in the world; Albania's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact (heartily endorsed by China); and, finally, following the visit of Albania's Defence Minister to China, the trip of Huang Yung-sheng to Albania to discuss military matters. Since China had been encouraging Albania to have friendlier relations with Yugoslavia and Rumania, Albania's decision benefited both China and Albania and would eventually lead to at least a temporary new Balkan axis. With Russia rattling her sabres on China's northern border, a Western diversion for Russia was welcomed by China.

Yet, perhaps the most interesting event was the visit of Huang Yung-sheng, Chinese Chief of the General Staff, to Rumania and Albania. The Chinese group, officially a delegation of the CCP, was dominated mainly by representatives of the PLA. The visit heralded an important economic agreement between China and Albania, yet the sending of high military officials to attend an ordinary Albanian anniversary event was a deliberate Chinese response to previous Russian actions in this region. Although Huang was careful not to mention nuclear weapons, he seemed to concur with Hoxha's view on Russia by stating that the "Stalin Group" in Russia wanted to overthrow the revisionists and restore the dictatorship of the proletariat.[5] What must be noted is that Huang was one of four major leaders who dropped out of sight when Lin Piao disappeared, and who were supposedly closely implicated in Lin Piao's "Project 571" to assassinate Mao and take power. Thus, at this time, Albania had connexions with the Chinese military (which of course was natural) and also seemed to share concurrent views with the military on the nature of Russia.

IN 1969, Sino-Soviet relations reached an all-time low, accompanied by persistent rumours that Russia was escalating border clashes and might apply the Brezhnev Doctrine to China. At the same time, at the Chinese ninth Party congress (April 1–28), Lin was named Mao's heir apparent and he loudly affirmed Maoism and what Harold Hinton has called "the dual adversary strategy." [6] This policy is one of maintaining a "struggle" against the two "superpowers," while trying to gain support from the "small and medium states" against the superpowers. At the same time, China would back those revolutionary movements which it regarded as "progressive."

[4] The first move towards Albanian-Yugoslavian *détente* was almost immediately after Russia's invasion. Albania published the text of Yugoslavia's denunciation of the invasion in the Albanian newspaper *Zeri I Popullit*.

[5] Peter R. Prifti, *Albania and Sino-Soviet Relations* (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1971), p. 14.

[6] Harold C. Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 285.

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As a result of Russian ultimatums following the border fighting, Chou and Kosygin held a discussion, on 11 September 1969, on border questions and as a consequence the escalations began to wind down—trade agreements and the exchange of ambassadors (late 1970) followed. Yet many issues remained to be resolved and it seems that China's ideological and political views of Russia were beginning to change, and along with this came new directions in foreign policy. The intensity and the potentiality of Sino-Soviet friction had apparently led China to conclude that the USSR represented the greatest immediate danger. Correspondingly, China began to see the United States as the most likely and useful counterbalance to the USSR's rising menace—hence she began to abandon the dual adversary strategy. At the same time, China began to de-emphasize revolutionary Maoism and instead started to improve relations with other governments to gain backing against Russia. China's attempts to lead the Third World began to take place through diplomacy rather than subversion. China began to open itself up to the world community: particularly of note was the initiation of Sino-Yugoslavian relations in April 1970. Yet despite Mao's private growing distrust and fear of Russia, Albania was extremely worried over China's apparently better relations with Russia and her growing abandonment of the " revolutionary line " in favour of diplomatic relations with foreign countries.

Since Albania was a very close Chinese ally and was extremely dependent on China both politically and economically, she undoubtedly exerted every effort to keep herself informed of major policies, trends and policy disputes within China. Politically, it was clear that Albania depended on China as her only major defender and ideological ally. Economically, China had provided support for three successive five-year plans (1961–75), and would go on to back most of the thirty major projects in Albania scheduled for the 1971–75 period. It is estimated that between 1961 and 1972, nearly 500 million dollars' worth of technical assistance, credits for equipment and other goods have been given to Albania by China.[7] In this light, it is clear that Albania's interests were best served by maintaining as many contacts as possible within China in order to obtain any information available, whether from normal diplomatic channels or whether from inside sources, special interest groups or rumours. Albania was, in fact, in a very good position to be able to do this: she had a large diplomatic mission in Peking, including military attachés. One of the major duties of that mission was undoubtedly to keep Albania informed of what was going on in China. Owing to the close political and ideological positions of the two countries, as well as to the fact that these close ties had been maintained over the many years of Sino-Albanian friendship, the Albanians had undoubtedly cultivated close and prolonged contacts. This is not to say that Albania could know everything that went on in the Central Committee meetings,

[7] Eric Bourne, " Peking Firmly Advises Albania to Seek Aid From Western World," *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 July 1972.

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nor could she be expected to know of all specific secret events (she was clearly taken aback by Kissinger's surprise visit); yet she was probably better informed of China's policies than any other country and was aware of major policy disputes within China's Party.

During 1969–70, Albania was probably aware of the presence of doubts, fears and divergent views in China over how to handle the Russian threat. The fear that China might give in or compromise with Russia sparked off strong Albanian attempts to encourage and strengthen Chinese anxieties over Russia and, at the same time, expressions of disapproval over China's present course.

Throughout this period it was possible to observe two trends in Albanian foreign policy: (1) a marked opening to the world (excluding the United States and USSR), and (2) a feeling of reticence and fear over China's "improving" relations with Russia, and hence a desire to encourage Chinese fears of Russia. Albania's relations with the West were characterized by a growing interest in trade and increased diplomatic activity. The motivation for this turning outward must have come from Albania's fear at her isolation after the Czechoslovakian invasion, the desire to follow China's lead in coming out of her isolation, insecurity over the amount of attention she could get from a new China with widening external interests, and, lastly, insecurity over the possibility of a Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*. Albania's new outward policy was officially proclaimed by Hoxha in Tirana on 19 September 1970.[8]

During September and October 1969, while China and Russia began to hold talks, articles in the *Zeri I Popullit* continually reminded China not to be "hoodwinked" by the Soviet revisionists' treachery. While China toned down her anti-Soviet polemics, Albania continued hers and added new and ever stronger exhortations to China not to be tricked by Russia. One Albanian editorial of 13 October sets the tone:

> Brezhnev proclaims the policy of encircling China, and Kosygin undertakes the concrete measures to organize in practice the so-called Asian collective security. . . . The whole of this "new policy" [of Russia] . . . was aimed at hoodwinking . . . the Marxist-Leninists, *to create in them illusions with regard to the Soviet leadership, so that they should interrupt the ideological polemics and fight. . . . The supreme interest of Marxism-Leninism* . . . demand from all the communists . . . *to still more intensify their struggle* for the further exposure of Khrushchevian revisionism.[9]

[8] Hoxha's new position is illustrated by the following: "We stand for and wish also to maintain good, correct relations, trade and cultural exchanges with countries and states having different regimes from ours, but provided that these relations are based on rules acceptable to both sides, without blackmail and threats against one another." Enver Hoxha's election campaign speech, "Our Strength Is Based On the Complete Unity of the Party-People-Authority," *Zeri I Popullit*, 19 Sept. 1970.

[9] Editorial, "Five Years of Khrushchevism Without Khrushchev," *Zeri I Popullit*, 13 Oct. 1969; also reported on Albanian Telegraph Agency International Service at 0906 GMT on 13 Oct. 1969.

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As well as through newspaper communications, Albania expressed her disapproval of the Sino-Soviet talks in other ways. The meeting of Chou and Kosygin was not reported in Albania, while only a second-rate party and government delegation was sent to the CPR's Twentieth Anniversary Celebration. In return, contrary to his earlier practice with similar Albanian delegation visits, Mao did not receive this delegation. In early 1970, Hoxha also firmly rejected Russia's moves toward *rapprochement* with Albania. Thus, it seems that Albania feared a Sino-Soviet *détente* and, at times when China moved closer to Russia, the Albanian-Chinese relations became strained. Albania held tightly to the dual adversary position Lin Piao had proclaimed at the ninth Party congress: she felt threatened by the possibility of Chinese abandonment of this position.

THE mysterious happenings of 12 September 1971, when Lin Piao died in a plane crash, and of 1 January 1972, when the Soviets announced that the bodies found in the crash were "bullet riddled", had their foundations in events which took place as early as April 1969. At that time, at the ninth Party congress, Chou and Lin seemed to have clashed over the handling of Russia. The moderate side, probably backed by Chou, apparently urged the use of the United States as a counterweight and restraining influence on Russia, and hence a policy of increasing relations with the United States. Additionally, it urged the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with other countries to also help deter Russian aggression. On the other hand, Lin's side seemed to argue for the dual adversary strategy against both the United States and Russia.[10] At this time, Mao supported Lin's view. Yet, as has

[10] The ninth Party congress was in fact unusually long, hence implying that extensive debate took place. Lin's report, in particular, was delivered on 1 April but not adopted until 14 April (this is in contrast to Chou's report to the tenth congress which was adopted after only four days). Apparently, it was Lin's report which was most extensively debated. Chou confirmed that Lin's policy position at the Ninth Congress came under heavy attack when he says: "Prior to the congress, Lin Piao had produced a draft political report in collaboration with Chen Po-ta . . . . This was a refurbished version under new conditions of the same revisionist trash that Liu Shao-chi and Chen Po-ta had smuggled into the resolution of the Eighth Congress. . . . Naturally, this draft by Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta was rejected by the Central Committee. Lin Piao secretly supported Chen Po-ta in the latter's open opposition to the political report drawn up under Chairman Mao's guidance, and it was only after his attempts were frustrated that Lin Piao grudgingly accepted the political line of the Central Committee and read its political report to the Congress. However, during and after the Ninth Congress, Lin Piao continued with his conspiracy and sabotage in spite of the admonishments, rebuffs and efforts to save him by Chairman Mao." (Chou En-lai, Report to the 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Delivered 24 Aug., adopted 28 Aug. 1973. *The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China Documents* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1973).

Other confirmation of the debate over Lin's speech appeared in the NCNA International Service report of 14 April 1969, where it said "The delegates have made many good proposals for additions and revisions of the report." In fact, Hinton, in *The Bear at the Gate* (Stanford, 1971), p. 55, points out how compromises existed in the final draft between the "Maoist and moderate viewpoints." For discussion of this debate see Harold C. Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest*, op. cit. pp. 284–85; also see Hinton,

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already been noted, during 1969–70, Mao and the party position gradually moved closer to Chou's position. In August 1970, during the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee held at Lushan, Mao and Lin Piao clashed over the issue of whether the genius or the masses bring about human progress.[11] Yet underlying this clash were several disagreements among key policy-makers on the important policies: strategies towards the Soviet Union and the United States, the use of the militia, and economic priorities including defence appropriations and the handling of the peasantry.

Although Lin's downfall was due mainly to domestic issues, the most important of which was party control over the army, Lin's dual adversary position and his support of revolutionary movements were both rejected. In fact, the dual adversary position was in many ways un-Maoist because it placed China in conflict with two major enemies and hence led to a dispersal of strength. Traditional Maoist military strategy had, rather, been to determine who the principal enemy or " contradiction " was and then to concentrate all forces against him. Thus, Maoist strategy condoned tactical alliances with the more minor enemies (the secondary contradictions) to fight the principal enemy.

It seems fairly clear that Mao's view of Russia had been undergoing a radical change. At first, the Russian people were viewed as being betrayed by a revisionist clique. Later, after the Czechoslovakian invasion, Russia became a social-imperialist power. The 1969–70 Sino-Soviet crisis and negotiations convinced Mao that Russia was a growing threat and dangerous to deal with. By 1971, Russia was being analysed in purely class terms as a capitalist nation. Finally, in 1972, China had concluded that Russia, rather than the United States was the major contradiction in the world. To Mao, the United States had been an over-extended giant who was on the decline because of her internal contradictions and the inevitable interactions of the laws of Marx. Russia's social-imperialism was a rising threat. Thus, it was clear that the growth of the struggle against the Soviet Union would inevitably lead to the use of a US counterweight. Mao would re-establish contacts with the lesser enemy (the United States) to facilitate China's opposition to the major enemy, Russia. At the same time, during 1970–71, China re-entered the community of nations not as the militant revolutionary, but

The Bear, (op. cit.) p. 55. Lin clearly opposed the use of the US as a counterweight to Russia, yet the extent of Lin's anti-Soviet feelings (or any shifts in them) remains extremely difficult to gauge.

[11] Mao has later claimed that during the Plenum 23 Aug.–6 Sept. 1970), a " surprise attack " was launched on his authority by Ch'en Po-ta and seven military leaders at the instigation of Lin Piao. These leaders were Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh Ch'un, Li Tso-p'eng, Ch'iu Hui-tso, Li Hsueh-feng, and Cheng Wei-shan. " Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local Cadres During His Tour of Inspection," Document No. 12 (1972) of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, released by *Chung-yang-jih-pao* (Central Daily Taipei), 10 Aug. 1972, and translated in *Chinese Law and Government*, Vols. 3 and 4 (Fall and Winter 1972–73), pp. 31–42. As always, the authenticity of these events and documents remains open to question.

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as a country willing to deal diplomatically with other governments in the hope of uniting all friendly governments behind her.

China's moves towards friendly relations with the United States progressed rapidly after the failure of the Laotian incursion assured Mao that the United States was really intent on withdrawal from Vietnam. On 10 April 1971, the United States' ping-pong team visited China, while Kissinger's surprise trip on 9 July 1971 to Peking was followed early in 1972 by a visit by Nixon. It should be noted that Lin seemed to disappear from public view in the week of 3 June 1971, just before the negotiations with Kissinger for Nixon's visit were to begin.

IN the light of these major Chinese policy re-evaluations and their corresponding effects within the Chinese Party leadership, Albania's position must now be examined. It will be seen that Lin's dual adversary position and his support of revolutionary movements were two issues which had great importance for Albania. After the clash at Lushan, and while China slowly moved towards her new positions, Albania began to respond to China's changes. In a speech marking the 25th anniversary of the Albanian People's Republic on 11 January 1971, Vice-President and Central Committee Member Shefqet Peçi stated:

> The forces of *imperialism, reaction and revisionism* are continually falling deeper into difficulties . . . Nixon has never stopped saying that he will end the war in Vietnam. . . . However, the reality is that *the policy of the U.S. imperialists is as aggressive and barbarous today as it was yesterday.* . . . Their one aim is to enslave the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and turn this peninsula into a base of aggression against the other people of the area . . . *especially against People's China.*[12]

The speech is unusual for several reasons. Peçi has inverted the normal order of the slogan "imperialism, revisionism and reaction," hence emphasizing that the forces of reaction are still to be feared more than those of revisionism—this being directed at an evolving Chinese view that Russia is the major contradiction in the world. Further, Peçi goes on to warn China very strongly and specifically against trusting the United States. Yet Albania remained equally opposed to trusting Russia; only six days before Peçi's speech Albania presented a particularly intransigent editorial calling for a determined struggle against Russia on both the political and ideological fronts, since the "situation calls for waging the struggle against modern Khrushchevian revisionism not only from the ideological, but also from the political . . . point of view. . . . We will fight against revisionism to the end." [13] Thus, Albania was still in the

[12] Tirana Domestic Service at 1900 GMT on 11 Jan. 1971. This speech is covered by recorded excerpts.

[13] "Historic Victory of Marxism-Leninism Over Revisionism," *Rruga e Partise* (*Road of the Party*), January 1971; *Zeri I Popullit* also had a two-page reprint of this article on 5 Jan. 1971.

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dual adversary position, as can be seen later in Peçi's speech: " The US imperialists and the new Soviet imperialists mainly direct their dangerous, aggressive and counter-revolutionary activities against the PRC." [14]

During this time (early 1971), although observers reported that the number of Chinese advisers in Albania had dropped,[15] the Chinese apparently began to export MIG-21 fighter planes to Albania. China was using her ally to help her distract Russia from the East and to counter Russia's expanding presence in the Mediterranean. Chinese loans to Albania led Russia to suspect the concluding of a secret military agreement in July 1971. The Russians believed that " according to this agreement Albania's territory was put at Peking's disposal for the placement of armed forces and the building of military bases on the Adriatic." [16] On the outside, Albanian-Chinese relations were still " cordial and friendly," while military ties seemed especially close. Yet, throughout March, Albania continued to warn China of the danger from both super-powers (" the Vienna talks are a continuation of these two imperialist powers' anti-China plot ") [17] and to urge a two-fronted battle: those who would attempt to hinder our forward march " would be crushed, and the first ones to be crushed by this colossal force are the US imperialists, the Soviet social-imperialists and the world reactionary bourgeoisie." [18]

On 14 April, the Albanian press tersely announced the visit on 10 April of the US ping-pong team to China. The delay in announcing the event, plus the terse unelaborated method of reporting, implied Albania's disapproval. Yet if there was any doubt, on 17 April, one week later, Albania made her position more explicit. Using an article condemning the CPSU 24th congress, four factors became clear. First, Albania was still following China's lead by analysing Russia in class terms and applying the laws of Marx to the " capitalist " nature of Russia:

> In the present day Soviet Union there exists a known conflict between the bureaucratic apparatus of party and government on one side and the people's broad masses on the other side; *there exist profound contradictions* between bureaucratic centralism in power and the demands of the masses. . . . The Khrushchevian revisionists, in conformity with their political and ideological concepts, *undertook the introduction of the capitalist methods* of organization and

[14] Tirana Domestic Service at 1900 GMT on 11 Jan. 1971, op. cit.

[15] Two separate observers report this steady decrease of Chinese in Albania. Pero Zlater, a Yugoslavian observer, mentioned this decrease, reports the *New York Times* in an article by Alfred Friendly Jr., on 31 Jan. 1971, entitled " Albania Soften Pro-Mao Stance." A second observer also reports this decrease six months later: " In the Chairman's Footsteps," *The Economist*, Vol. 240, No. 6674 (24 July 1971), p. 38.

[16] Moscow in Albanian to Albania 2130 GMT, Valeriy Modestov commentary, " Albania in Peking's Plan," 20 July 1971.

[17] Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian at 1922 GMT, commentary " A New Round of Soviet-US Bargaining in Vienna," 15 Mar. 1971.

[18] Editorial in *Zeri I Popullit* quoting Enver Hoxha, " Ardent Revolutionary Greetings to the Fraternal Chinese People for Their New Brilliant Victory," 17 Mar. 1971. It is to be remembered that on 22–24 March, Lin Piao and his military leaders were allegedly outlining their " Project 571 " plan to take control.

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> management of production and distribution. . . . The aim of the present day production in the Soviet Union is the drawing of profits to the advantage of the bureaucratic caste in power. The promised measures . . . *are a concession which the bourgeois ruling class at given moments of the intensification of the class struggle is forced to make in order to preserve its rule.* . . . The Khrushchevites . . . *transformed* [the party] *into an instrument of their rule . . . over the working class* and the Soviet people. . . . The aggression against Czechoslovakia . . . revealed . . . the true character of the present-day imperialist policy of the Soviet Union. . . . The revolutionary struggle of the working class and the working masses cannot be extinguished because it is ignored by Brezhnev. . . . *It has its laws of development.*[19]

Secondly, Albania was also continuing to follow China's lead in another area—she condemned Japanese militarism: " Now the revisionist chiefs of the Soviet Union have joined the common anti-China front of the most aggressive forces of the world, U.S. imperialism, Japanese militarists and all reactionary cliques." [20] Japan's militarism (which as yet was hardly developed), of course, is a far greater worry to China than Albania. Yet, thirdly, Albania states very clearly that she considers the Maoist revolutionary movements important.

> The ever growing Marxist-Leninist forces and their struggle disturb Brezhnev and company a lot. He tried to present the new . . . parties as creations of the leadership of the [CCP] and to identify them with the Trotskyist groupings. . . . The new Marxist-Leninist parties are not artificial creations. They have emerged from the fold of the working class as an historical need. . . . They were a logical and inevitable product of the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. . . . As such, the new Marxist-Leninist parties are constantly being increased and strengthened. *The future belongs only to them.*[21]

Albania reminds China that in fighting revisionism, she must support the new Maoist revolutionary parties. With China de-emphasizing the revolutionary movements, Albania's stand is a reprimand to China. Fourthly (and most importantly considering that the article comes one week after the US ping-pong team's Chinese visit), Albania explicitly reaffirms the dual adversary position and again warns China of the danger of trusting the United States.

> That is why the defence of peace and of the international security, the liberation from national and social oppression, *can be reached only by a consistent and determined struggle on two fronts*, against US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism.[22]

[19] Editorial, " Congress of Restoration of Capitalism and Social-Imperialism," *Zeri I Popullit*, 17 Apr. 1971.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] *Zeri I Popullit*, 17 Apr. 1971, op. cit.

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Throughout May, Albania continued to talk of the two-fronted threat and the importance of the " new Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations and all the revolutionary forces of the world to whom the cause of the workers . . . is dear." [23]

Sometime in early June (Richard Thornton places it at 3 June),[24] Lin Piao dropped out of sight. Remembering that Lin's position on the dual adversary strategy and revolutionary movements was very close to the policy Albania espoused, it is clear that Albania was particularly interested in and conscious of Lin Piao. While the Albanians were not necessarily aware of the extent of the Lin-Mao clashes, they almost certainly must have been aware of the major policy disagreements that arose from China's new evaluation of domestic and foreign policy, as well as Lin's policy position in those disagreements, and possibly the fact that those disagreements were coming to a head. The Albanian mission in Peking probably played an important role in information gathering and the Albanian military attachés' duties also included regularly contacting China's military and keeping informed on what was going on there. In view of Albania's known agreement with foreign policy positions which Lin Piao also advocated, one should not rule out the possibility that Albania got information from the Lin Piao factions in the army, especially in the light of the earlier Albanian contacts with Huang Yung-sheng (November 1968) and their continuing contacts with the military. Yet, even if Albania did not specifically get information from these factions of the army, the close military liaison between Albania and China in both Peking and Tirana undoubtedly provided Albania with a good idea of events in the Chinese army around the period of Lin's fall. However, no matter what the extent of the Albanian knowledge of the crisis, they were given an even stronger tip-off of what was happening when Lin dropped from public sight. The Albanians were undoubtedly particularly concerned with and sensitive to Lin Piao's situation, given their common sympathy and affinity on foreign policy issues. Hence, the absence from public view of someone whom Albania was certainly watching very closely would immediately attract Hoxha's attention and cause him to ask questions.

On 14 June, the Albanians published an article which most definitely responded to Lin's disappearing from public view and was very clearly siding with Lin's policy position in the Chinese intra-party disputes. The article appeared in the theoretical and political organ of the Central Committee of the PLA, *Rruga E Partise*, and was entitled " People's War and Its Main Characteristics." [25] Since Lin's most famous theoretical work was " Long Live the Victory of People's War " (3 September 1965), an extensive discussion and praise of the efficacy of people's war at

[23] " The People Vigilantly Preserve the Historic Victory of May 9th," *Zeri I Popullit*, 9 May 1971.

[24] Richard Thornton, *The Bear and the Dragon*, American Asian Educational Exchange Monograph No. 9 (Jan. 1971), p. 66, op. cit.

[25] " People's War and Its Main Characteristics," *Rruga E Partise*, 13 June 1971.

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this time of Lin's mounting troubles and disappearance is significant. More extraordinary still for an article of this nature is that Mao, who is famed for his tactics of people's war, is not mentioned once in the article, although Lenin (!) is quoted. This article must have been a double affront to Mao. First, it proclaimed Albania's sympathy for Lin Piao and his foreign policy position, and secondly, it reiterated Albania's positions on the deadly nature of both the United States and Russia:

> Our party and all the Marxist-Leninists, in contrast with the opportunists and revisionists who are seeking to arouse pacifist illusions and to lull the popular masses *do not forget for a single moment* that the anti-popular and counter-revolutionary policy of imperialism and its servants *not only has not changed, but it has still more intensified*. US-led imperialism and modern revisionism with Soviet social-imperialism at the head . . . are doing everything in their power to strangle revolution and socialism.[26]

And it again emphasized the importance of revolutionary movements (an article on revolutionary warfare does this all by itself): "The stand towards the People's War is a touch-stone for all the political forces in the world." [27]

Kissinger's surprise trip to China in July and the announcement of Nixon's coming visit were apparently a shock for Albania, although Albania was certainly aware of the direction Chinese policy had been heading. Yet, because of Albania's political, economic and military dependence on China, it did not express its opinion openly, and its greatest form of disapproval was silence. Thus, Albania maintained virtual silence on the subject of Nixon's coming visit to Peking, issuing, three days late, only a terse announcement of Nixon's acceptance of Peking's invitation.[28]

In an article appearing on 9 July (Kissinger's first day in Peking), Politburo member Kapo, in a speech at a PRC Friendship Meeting, said some surprising things. Albania's position was in part conciliatory and in part intransigent. He gave "dear leader Chairman Mao" profuse credit for developing the tactics of people's war (Albania had certainly overlooked this in the article of 14 June): "Comrade Mao Tse-Tung

[26] *Rruga E Partise*, 13 June 1971, op. cit.

[27] Ibid.

[28] *Zeri I Popullit*, 18 July, p. 4. Before Nixon's trip to Peking in 1972, a list of the major articles appearing in Albania at the time can give a good idea of how Albania treated the Nixon visit, of which the Albanians disapproved. On 13 Feb. 1972, the *Bashkimi* carried an article entitled "Nixon's Blusters About Peace Cannot Conceal the Aggressive Policy of American Imperialism." The next day the *Bashkimi* carried a commentary entitled "Reflection of the Aggressive and Hegemonic Policy of US Imperialism." In case the message still had not got across to China, on 16 Feb. yet another article appeared. This article attempted to demonstrate how Laird's huge military budget demands refuted the US peace claims. On 21 Feb. 1972, the Albanians quote directly from the Chinese source the arrival of Nixon. Their lack of commentary, coverage or elaboration were eloquent of Albanian disapproval. One follow-up article on 7 March in the *Zeri I Popullit* reiterates Albania's position: "US Imperialism, Enemy of Peace and Security of the Peoples."

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further developed and enriched in an original way the teachings of Marxism-Leninism on revolutionary armed struggle." [29] Kapo also gave Mao something he must have expected to hear about the relation of the army to the Party (remembering this was a major controversy between Mao and Lin): "This was the true army of the people, closely linked with the people, educated in the spirit of proletarian policy, and always guided by the Communist Party." [30] Yet, at the same time, he went on to add—"It [the army] has been and continues to be the faithful defender of the interests of the Chinese people and of the victories of the revolution and of socialism in China." [31] This added comment appears to indicate some support for Lin. The article discussed at great length the Chinese Cultural Revolution and condemned Liu Shao-chi, whose name had suddenly begun to reappear in the Albanian press. In the light of the Party split between Mao and Lin, the message of an article strongly condemning Liu for his divergence from the dual adversary position toward a "leaning to one side" position could not be missed by Mao who was also diverging from the dual adversary position and leaning to the other side. Albania's message came through more clearly later in the article. It again stressed the nature and importance of revolutionary warfare—that it is the "new era of history." [32] Regarding the nature of US imperialism, Albania gave this warning:

> People's China is continually waging an irreconcilable and blow for blow struggle against imperialism, especially against *US imperialism, the most savage and dangerous enemy* of socialism, the freedom of the peoples, and world peace.[33]

Yet Albania's position on the need for a dual front becomes clearer when she harks back to the Chinese ninth Party congress.

> By implementing the directives of the ninth CCP congress to be fully prepared to counter a great and rapid war fought with conventional or nuclear weapons on the part of the *imperialist, revisionist, and reactionary forces,* the PRC is continually strengthening its defensive might with the most modern means of war such as nuclear weapons and guided missiles. The PRC is in a position and fully determined, as *Comrade Lin Piao stressed at the Ninth Congress,* to definitely liquidate thoroughly, wholly and finally all the aggressors if they dare launch an aggression against China.[34]

One month after Lin's disappearance from public view, at a time when it was probably known that there was dissension between Lin and Mao, for a top official of a close ally to be quoting Lin is extremely strange. If one adds to this fact that throughout 1971 up to this time Lin Piao's

[29] Recording of speech by Hysni Kapo, Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT, 1 July 1971.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT, 1 July 1971, op. cit.
[34] Ibid.

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name appeared extremely infrequently in the Albanian press (this author in a brief scan found only one other reference to Lin in the Albanian newspapers up to this date in 1971),[35] this *gaucherie* was unprecedented. Albania was making her position on both Lin Piao and the foreign policies that he advocated clear.

Yet perhaps the most interesting event was the appearance in the Albanian press on 10 July of a letter entitled "Lin Piao Greets Balluku."[36] The letter, commemorating the Albanian army's 28th anniversary, was written by Lin Piao in Peking on 9 July 1971, and signed Lin Piao, Minister of Defence of the People's Republic of China. The most telling part of the letter came when Lin said:

> *American imperialism and social-imperialism* find themselves in the most difficult situation ever. *Their end is not far off*. Let the peoples of China and Albania *unite with the peoples of the whole world and struggle together with them* to smash completely *the American oppressors and all their servants*.[37]

Lin's statement was, in fact, a re-affirmation of both the dual adversary and support of revolutionary struggles, positions that Albania and Lin held in common. Clearly, Lin's emphasis is on the American enemy rather than the Soviet one. It is apparent that Lin Piao (while out of the public eye for over a month, and having embarked on a growing confrontation with Mao) was maintaining his ties with Albania, as well as assuring her of his policy stand.

Throughout August and September, while the Lin-Mao struggle mounted in intensity and finally came to a climax, the Albanian position appeared to solidify and become more vocal.

On 1 August, in an article celebrating the 44th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation army,[38] the Albanians were still recalling the decisions of the ninth CCP congress with its principle of "let us make revolution." In addition, they continue to warn of the counter-revolutionary alliance of the United States and Russia. By the end of the month, the Albanian statements had become more open. Interestingly enough, by then the Albanians apparently had a more appreciative audience, because, on 16-22 August, the second highest

[35] This occurred in February in a quote from Liu Chen-hua's speech. This discussion excludes the use of Lin's name in the addresses of cablegrams where it did occur in the Albanian press.

[36] "Lin Piao Greets Balluku," *Zeri I Popullit*, 10 July 1971, p. 1.

[37] *Zeri I Popullit*, 10 July 1971, op. cit. One might be left to wonder what other information Albania got either directly or indirectly from Lin Piao in this or other exchanges. A letter from Lin to Albania at this time was clearly significant. An interesting sidelight to this letter from Lin appeared in the *Zeri I Popullit* of 30 July 1971, while reporting a meeting in Tirana to honour the CPR army day's 44th anniversary. At this meeting the CPR military attache, Ting Shan, attached to the CPR embassy in Tirana, spoke. In his speech he repeated exactly the formula Lin Piao had written on 10 July: "American imperialism and social-imperialism find themselves in the most difficult situation ever." While this speech by Ting Shan was probably innocent, the fact that Albania chose to publish it probably was significant.

[38] "Ardent Greetings to the Fraternal Chinese People and to Their Glorious Army." *Zeri I Popullit*, 1 Aug. 1971.

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ranking Chinese military delegation ever to visit Eastern Europe arrived in Albania. (Huang Yung-sheng's delegation was the highest.) The visit began with a speech by Petrit Dume, CC Politburo candidate member and Chief of Staff of the Albanian People's Army.[39] He referred to the "historic decisions of the ninth CCP congress," and advocated the "complete destruction of the aggressive plans of American imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism."[40] In addition, he rejoiced in Liu Shao-chi's defeat and went on to conclude that "we are presently witnessing a favourable revolutionary situation in the world."[41] As can be seen, many of the themes of earlier articles were coalescing into a strong Albanian position.

Throughout the Chinese military delegation's visit, the Albanians, in referring to the PLA, employed the set formula: "created and led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and commanded directly by Deputy Chairman Lin Piao."[42] This formula, although used in China, was apparently unpopular with Mao.[43] However, in this way, Lin's name began to appear quite regularly in the press, with an emphasis on Lin's close position to Mao (Deputy-Chairman). On 21 August, Petrit Dume talked of the great successes of the Cultural Revolution in "smashing the plots of internal and external enemies."[44] He went on to specifically commend the PLA "under the command of Vice-Chairman Lin Piao" for its staunch support of "the peoples who are fighting for freedom, independence and socialism."[45] Finally, he emphasized the importance of those revolutionary movements in the two-fronted struggle:

> The forces of revolution and liberation are growing in strength in the *uncompromising struggle against the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists*. These forces have understood more clearly that *the sole road to their rescue lies in people's armed struggle*.[46]

The farewell speeches added little new, although the Albanian speaker, Beqir Balluku, member of the Politburo, Minister of People's Defence and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was very explicit when he called US imperialism "the most fierce enemy"[47] and when he quoted Mao saying "The peoples of various countries of the world are rising, there has begun a new historic period, the period of the struggle

[39] *Zeri I Popullit*, in Albanian, 7 Aug. 1971, pp. 1, 4.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] This formula is found in almost all the speeches during 16–22 Aug. One specific example is found in ibid.

[43] Mao in his talks with Local Cadre *Chinese Law and Government*, op. cit. p. 38, expressed his disapproval of this formula when he said "He [Lin] also said that the People's Liberation Army was founded and led by me, but personally commanded by Lin—why can't the founder also command?"

[44] Peking NCNA International Service 0059 GMT 22 Aug. 1971.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Tirana, Albanian Telegraph Agency International Service in English 1000 GMT, 22 Aug. 1971.

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against U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism."[48] The Albanian position had hardened. Yet there might have been an additional implication to this Chinese military delegation's visit to Albania. The possibility that some persons in this delegation provided Hoxha with further information concerning internal developments in China should not be altogether ruled out,[49] even though information at this late date probably could do little more than harden Albania's already fixed position.

On 12 September 1971, Lin Piao supposedly died.[50]

On 6 November 1971, Albania held its sixth Party congress and the Western papers were quick to notice the absence of a Chinese party delegation at the Albanian Congress.[51] The contrast seems all the sharper when it is recalled that China's delegation to the Albanian's fifth Party congress was headed by K'ang Sheng, then member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Twenty-six delegations attended the Albanian sixth Party congress.[52] Yet, in addition to the

[48] Ibid.

[49] The leader of the military delegation was Li Te-sheng, then CCP Central Committee Politburo candidate member and director of the People's Liberation Army General Political Directorate. One is left to wonder why the decision was made to send Li. Was Li sympathetic to Lin Piao? The evidence is equivocal, although primarily negative. Li's fate has been mixed since Lin's fall. Since Li was promoted at the tenth Party congress after Lin's fall to the standing committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, he apparently was not so close to Lin that his career was damaged. In fact, he appears to have been rewarded. Yet, more recently, his military base has been shifted and he has come under some attack, although probably as part of the moves to weaken the military's political strength in general. Yet a case can be made that while never very close to Lin, Li still felt sympathy for him. The *China News Analysis* No. 762, for 27 June 1969, mentions several features of Li's life which suggested some sympathy for Lin. First brought to public attention in September 1966 in the Shanghai press during the Cultural Revolution, Li's article celebrating the 20th anniversary of one of Mao's writings was of interest. Li, while commemorating Mao's work " refers to Lin Piao's famous Sept. 1965 article and echoes Lin's doctrine of applying the strategy of concentration of force for the annihilation of the enemy to the whole world. The first words in Li's article are ' Comrade Lin Piao in his Hail People's War . . .' " Li Te-sheng " became visible to the public in the beginning of 1967 when in the middle of the cultural revolution the No. 12 army . . . entered the neighbouring Anhui province. It should be recalled that in 1960 one company commander of the No. 12 army received from Lin Piao a special citation as a model for the PLA." (*China News Agency.*) Li, originally from Lin's home province of Hupei, had his base of power in Anhwei, from which he was not moved until very recently. Li is listed in a different field army from Lin. It is certainly not definite whether Albania got any information, either negative or positive, from Li or other members of the delegation, even though the possibility deserves to be considered.

[50] In Oct. 1971, China entered the UN. At that time, one Chinese observer to the UN told Professor Ross Terrill of Harvard University that China had tried to have Rumania rather than Albania speak on her behalf.

[51] At the time of the Congress there was a very low-level Chinese delegation circulating in the north of Albania. This delegation did not attend the Congress, as a low-level and purely governmental delegation was an inappropriate emissary. Yet the Chinese ambassador to Albania, Liu Jen-hua, accompanied the Chinese delegation, so that the absence of the Chinese ambassador from the opening activities was a further gesture to the Albanian Communists.

[52] These delegations included: North Viet Nam Worker's Party; National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam; Communist Party (CP) of New Zealand; Central Committee, Indonesian CP; Polish CP, Marxist Leninist (M-L); M-L CP Australia; CP Brazil; M-L CP Italy; Malayan CP; CP Peru; M-L CP France; M-L CP Britain; Left CP of Japan; Revolutionary CP Chile; M-L CP Spain; CP Ceylon; M-L CP Ecuador;

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absence of the Chinese delegation, China's rather scanty coverage of the congressional proceedings was very noticeable.[53] This appears to have been China's initial reaction to Albania's criticisms (although one must not overlook the fact that China's leaders were probably still in disarray after Lin's death). Yet one did not have to search far for Albania's response to China's actions. In his opening address, Hoxha uncompromisingly stated his dual adversary position and lashingly attacked China's policy of using one form of imperialism to fight another.

> As long as the imperialist United States and the revisionist Soviet Union are two imperialist super-powers and come out with a common counter-revolutionary strategy, it is impossible for the struggle of the peoples against them not to merge into a common trend. *You cannot rely on the one imperialism to oppose the other* . . . The experience of our country until now has still convinced us even more completely that the freedom and independence can be defended and guaranteed only by a *continuous struggle against imperialism and revisionism, without compromise,* everywhere and in every aspect, and *this is still as true today as it was in the past.*[54]

He goes on to say:

> Conscious of its lofty responsibility to its people and to socialism our Party will never stop half-way. It will fight with determination and with all its strength against imperialism and social-imperialism, till their complete destruction and the triumph of the revolution world-wide. *Our people and Party regard this struggle as one and indivisible, because one cannot successfully oppose imperialism without also fighting Soviet social-imperialism at the same time and vice versa.*[55]

Other interesting events occurred at the Albanian Party congress. Raul Marko, central committee member of the Spanish Marxist-Leninists, launched an attack on Santiago Carillo (the leader of the older Spanish Communist Party), accusing him and his party of being " agents of the

Revolutionary Leadership of CP of Sudan; M-L CP Austria; M-L CP of (W) Germany; M-L CP Holland; M-L CP Belgium; M-L Communist League of Sweden; Communist Vanguard of Argentina; M-L Communist League Denmark; Central Committee of M-L group of Norway. Most of these delegations were Marxist-Leninist splinter parties. Source: " Opening Speech of Comrade Hyshi Kapo," *Zeri I Popullit*, 2 November 1971, p. 15. Of interest was that while the opening speech of the congress listed all twenty-six delegations, the Chinese in *Hsin Hua* of 1 November chose only to say that " many delegations of foreign Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations attended the congress " without listing them.

[53] A discussion of China's newspaper response to Albania's attacks appears below. The Chinese press coverage of the opening ceremonies of the Congress was scanty, while instead the Chinese press reported on Albania's 1966–70 five-year plan, an inauguration of a computer centre built in Albania with Chinese aid, and a discussion of agriculture in Albania during 1966–70. The Chinese, apparently, were reminding Albania of the aid it had got from China as well as recalling a time when relations were far smoother.

[54] Enver Hoxha, *Report Submitted to the Sixth Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania* (Tirana: Naim Frasheri Publishing House, 1971), p. 30.

[55] Ibid. p. 45.

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bourgeoisie." [56] Yet, at the same time, Santiago Carillo and four other top men were arranging an agreement *in Peking* with the Chinese leadership to resume normal relations despite several unsolved differences. Later, when the Spanish Marxist-Leninist party met with a similar Italian splinter group which had left the older Italian Communist Party, the subsequent communiqué was published in Tirana, but not Peking.[57] It appears that Albania was still supporting revolutionary Maoist splinter parties, and in fact criticizing China for de-emphasizing support for these parties.

From 9-11 November, China published the full text of Hoxha's report to the Central Committee of the Party of Labour in the *People's Daily*, *Guangming Ribao* and *Jiefangjun Bao*. As mentioned earlier, the Albanian Congress got very little attention in the Chinese press, while the nearly obligatory gesture of an editorial marking the event was omitted. Finally on 8 November 1971, the *People's Daily* produced an editorial commemorating both the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Albanian Party of Labour (12 November) and the sixth Party congress lumped together.[58] China's answer to the Albanian attacks came through the editorial. The editorial focused at length on Albania's domestic development (perhaps reminding Albania of the aid China had already given her); while the formulations for Albania's international stand were quite extraordinary:

> The Albanian Party of Labour headed by the great Marxist-Leninist Comrade Enver Hoxha has *waged an uncompromising struggle against opportunism and revisionism* in order to defend Marxism-Leninism and displayed a high degree of adherence to principle. He has taken a clear-cut stand and performed immortal merits in the great polemics between the two lines in the contemporary international communist movement and in the *historic struggle against modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism as its centre*.[59]

While later in the article Albania is commended for her correct stand on "US-led imperialism, modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism at its centre and the reactionaries of various countries" [60], on the issue of US imperialism it is virtually silent. On the question of support for revolutionary movements, while Albania is congratulated because it "resolutely supports the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed

[56] This event has had widespread commentary. For discussion of this event see Dietrich Schlegel, "Chinese-Albanian Tensions Assessed," *Aussenpolitick* (June 1972), which has been translated in the JPRS file 56611 (26 July, 1972), Eastern Europe, No. 561, p. 9; "Albanians Reject Invitation to Italian Party Congress," 28 Feb. 1972, *Radio Free Europe Research: Albania*; Paul Wohl, "Coolness Parts Albania, China," *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 May, 1972; Peter Kuntze article in *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 Mar. 1972.

[57] This is also referred to in all the sources quoted in footnote 56.

[58] The text of this editorial appears under the title "Glorious Course, Great Victory," *Peking Review*, No. 46, 12 Nov. 1971, pp. 6–7.

[59] Ibid.

[60] *Peking Review*, 12 Nov. 1971, op. cit.

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people," [61] a new caveat is added. The Albanians' support for " all just struggles *for safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty* and against power politics of the super-power " [62] is discussed. In fact this formulation had only minor currency as a minor principle in Albania. The Albanians would certainly have been loath to elevate a policy of supporting the state sovereignty of other countries to a major principle. Yet the Chinese editorial, through its wording, gives this policy an equal standing with the policies of opposing US imperialism and supporting the revolutionary struggles, thereby raising it to a major principle.[63] Thus, China is warning Albania that in the future, support for revolutionary struggles will be tempered with a concern for the safeguarding of potential allies' state sovereignty.

On 13 February. the *Zeri I Popullit* published an editorial with a two-fold attack on China. The pretext for the article was the rejection of an invitation to attend the 13th Italian Communist Party congress; while, at the same time, a corresponding Albanian attack on the political and ideological line of the PCI led the way for a denunciation of " contacts " with any revisionist parties. The editorial, which was unsigned (this usually implies authorship by a high party official), was a break from past tradition in that, while Albania had been invited to the 12th Italian Party congress, they had not made any reference to the invitation until after the congress had convened. The main thrust of the editorial is a warning not to make " compromises " with one faction of the revisionist camp to oppose the other. The analysis follows:

> Everywhere in the revisionist camp, one notices the existence of two main opposing lines, both of them anti-Marxist and counter-revolutionary. . . . The path to the complete destruction of modern revisionism *can never lead through contacts and talk* with dissident revisionists on the so-called joint struggle against imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism. . . . The Albanian Party of Labour has rigorously adhered to the Marxist-Leninist principle that . . . *one cannot have contacts and discussions* with some revisionists just because differences and contradictions exist between them and other revisionists. *Just as one cannot side with one imperialist to oppose another, one cannot side with some revisionists in order to oppose others.*[64]

This analysis was apparently an attack on China's talks with the Spanish " revisionist " leaders in November 1971, as well as her new attitude towards the Marxist-Leninist splinter parties. The repetition of

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid. The full quotation reads: " The Albanian Party of Labour upholds proletarian internationalism, resolutely opposes the US imperialist policies of agression and war, resolutely supports the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed people and nations of the world and firmly supports all just struggles for safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty and against power politics of the super-powers.

64 " The Dividing Line Between Marxist-Leninists and Modern Revisionists Cannot Be Obliterated," *Zeri I Popullit* editorial, 13 Feb. 1972.

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Hoxha's formulation from the sixth Party congress made quite clear who the target of the editorial was and at the same time reminded China of Albania's view of the American connection as well.

In March 1972, the *Zeri I Populit* roundly condemned the conclusion of the successful negotiations between Britain and Dom Mintoff of Malta, charging Mintoff with accepting financial gain for the ruling powers of Malta, rather than demanding Malta's final independence from British military intrusion. Yet, after leaving London, Mintoff proceeded to Peking where he was also granted aid.[65] Albania's position was hardly one of a faithful ally. By July 1972, the upsurge of emphasis on Albanian self-reliance combined with the disappearance of portraits of Mao and Chinese slogans from the newspapers and in the countryside, had even led some observers to conclude that Peking had warned Tirana that the volume of Chinese aid given to Albania would be tapering off.[66]

THE major ideological issues between China and Albania thus centre in two areas. First, China, following Mao's theory on contradictions, has now placed Russia as the major world contradiction and hence feels justified to ally with other powers (overlooking other but less major contradictions) against the major enemy. Thus, China abandoned her dual adversary position, sought a *détente* with the US and tacitly supports both NATO and the Common Market. The Chinese had also started to campaign in Europe against the Soviet-proposed European security conference.[67] China had gone out into the world to form tactical alliances to help her combat Russia.

Albania, on the other hand, moved into the dual adversary position when she sided with China back in 1960. She maintained that position of uncompromising disdain of both US and USSR up to the present. For that reason she sided with Mao against Liu Shao-chi's " leaning to one side," and for that reason she was undoubtedly sympathetic to Lin in the recent Lin-Mao confrontation.[68] In her eyes, China has compromised

[65] Discussion of this in Dietrich Schlegel's article in *Aussenpolitick*, op cit.

[66] " Peking Firmly Advises Albania to Seek Aid from Western World," *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 July 1972, op. cit. This article says Peking gave " Albania advice designed to curb its expectations about further Chinese contributions to its economic development. . . . Peking told the Tirana leaders this volume of ' cooperation ' could not continue indefinitely . . . since the essential industrialization structure will be completed with the present [five-year] plan, their further needs will inevitably taper off and that they should in any case start seeking some of them from sources nearer home." The article says that China has urged Albania to begin to court the Western World. The author of the article cites the disappearance of Chinese portraits of Mao and slogans as well as the new emphasis on Albanian " self-reliance " as signs of this new situation in Albania. The article says " everywhere there are exhortations to Albanian effort, Albanian revolutionary ideas, and Albanian achievement." It might be noted that with China's growing outside concerns, a decrease in aid to Albania was extremely likely, especially since Albania had laid her basic industrialization structure.

[67] " China's Marco Polo Act in Europe," *Newsweek*, 22 Jan. 1973, p. 34.

[68] It must be remembered that while Lin was denounced for " leftist " policies the Albanians did not join in the denunciation. However, with the rising strength of the leftist Shanghai faction in China, after the 10th Party congress, Lin was denounced for allegedly " rightist " crimes. It was only after Lin's crimes became " rightist " in

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pure Marxist-Leninist thought. Albania's attitude toward the Common Market follows closely from this: she rejects it. She views the Common Market as a new super-power which must be opposed just as any other super-power. Albania opposes a new super-power rather than using it to combat and counterbalance the other super-powers (which might call for some tactical compromises). Hoxha said " we hold that the peoples of Europe can and will achieve their security only by strengthening their national independence and sovereignty." [69] This divergence of perception between Albania and China is quite basic and seems likely to bode no good for future Albanian-Chinese relations, unless one side modifies its position.

The second and last area of Chinese-Albanian divergence is on the treatment accorded to Maoist splinter parties. China has de-emphasized her role as revolutionary leader; Albania, on the other hand, continues to hold sacred her duties to world revolutionary movements—witness the Spanish Marxist-Leninist issue.

At present Sino-Albanian relations have tended to stabilize. The common interest of opposing Russia has kept them together, while the ceasing of substantive Chinese gestures to the US has kept the Sino-Albanian relations from further deterioration.

nature that Albania began to follow the Chinese lead in denouncing Lin Piao. Therefore it appears that Albania sacrificed their support of an already dead Lin, while managing to hold onto their own " leftist " positions. Since the 10th Party congress, Albania has been re-publishing the Chinese articles attacking Confucius.

[69] Enver Hoxha, Report Submitted to the sixth congress, op cit. p. 38.

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Lenin and Malinovsky

David Anin

DESPITE the vast amount of material which has been published on the history of Bolshevism, a considerable number of "grey areas" still remain unexplored. The reason why these areas have not been fully investigated lies in the peculiar nature of Bolshevism and its methods. The illegal (and, after 1905, semi-legal) Bolshevik Party, showing little concern for future historians, sometimes attempted to conceal certain incidents and facts, covering up, in particular, any evidence which would cast doubts on its infallibility. In the history of Bolshevism, as in many other aspects of the Bolshevik Party, it is the "gain" or "profit" element which has prevailed. Furthermore, many facts were not even recorded, and, from the thirties onwards, much of what had been written down was removed, thereby eliminating any compromising evidence.

As for the archives of the *Okhrana,* many were destroyed in the early days of the revolution. In some instances police establishments were sacked by indignant insurgents who regarded them as symbols of illegality. In Petrograd, for example, the archives of the police department were burned in huge bonfires on the Fontanka. The building of the Moscow *Okhrana* was looted on 1 March 1917. A crowd smashed open safes and threw out bundles of files. Large number of documents were destroyed in an enormous bonfire.[1]

However, those who destroyed the archives were not only people who sincerely hated the old regime and who gave vent to their hatred through these acts; they were also people who simply enjoyed sackings and pogroms; there were also some who took advantage of the sackings to try to conceal their own collaboration with the *Okhrana.* The net result of all this was that many "dossiers" on the *Okhrana's* undercover agents were never found.

Speaking specifically about Roman Malinovsky and the Bolshevik Party, it should be borne in mind that until Malinovsky entered into the service of the *Okhrana* and rose within the Party, the police authorities were rather badly informed about what was really going on in the Bolshevik faction. Neither to the authorities nor to "society" did the Bolsheviks appear a dangerous force. At that time, Lenin, who was later to fool everyone and twist them around his little finger, was known chiefly in Social-Democratic Party circles. The authorities were so deluded and blind that the *Okhrana* regarded the "ultra-left Bolsheviks" led by Bogdanov, Lunacharsky and others (the boycotters and *otzovisty*: those who demanded the recall of the Bolshevik deputies from the Duma) as much more dangerous enemies of the regime than the

[1] *Arkhivnoye Delo* (1921), XIII, p. 35.

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"moderate" Leninist Bolsheviks who participated in elections to the State Duma.

The Bolsheviks themselves usually cite the clandestine character of Party activities and the sacking of police departments during the first days of the revolution as factors hampering research into the history of Bolshevism. There is undoubtedly a certain amount of truth in this; but there are other factors more important, perhaps, than those already mentioned, which will probably never be known to historians.

One of the principal factors was the actual structure of the Bolshevik Party and the unique role which Lenin played in it. The Bolsheviks were not the only illegal party; the terrorist Social Revolutionaries, because of the very nature of their activities, had to lead an even more clandestine existence than the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, in none of the other parties is there such an abundance of "grey areas."

All pre-revolutionary parties had leaders and chiefs. It was different with the Bolsheviks. They had a *single* leader whose authority was virtually unchallengeable. In the other parties, *all matters*, even the most delicate, were dealt with, if not always by the *entire* Central Committee, then at least by a part of it. In the Bolshevik Party, decisions (even those relating to the most important matters) were often taken by Lenin alone.

In the Bolshevik Party (and this is an aspect of the Party leadership that has not been explored in depth), there were, to all intents and purposes, *two* parallel types of leadership. One was the formal leadership, whose decisions were taken and implemented by the Central Committee, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, the editorial boards of Bolshevik newspapers, and by Party plenums and congresses; the other was the *personal* leadership of Lenin, who recruited into his personal leadership those who were closest to him. Depending on the matter in hand, these might sometimes be Zinoviev, Krasin, Taratuta, or Ganetsky; at other times, Sverdlov, Stalin or Kollontai, or sometimes Inessa Armand or Radek. Nobody, however, was fully initiated; in these special, delicate matters, the reins were held firmly by Lenin—and him alone. It is quite possible that not even Krupskaya knew everything.

One typical "grey area" which is unlikely ever to be completely elucidated is the so-called "Malinovsky affair." This was a very strange and highly intricate affair, which demonstrated Lenin's ability to conceal the extent of his involvement. Was Malinovsky really just an *agent provocateur*, or was he also Lenin's agent, helping him to "remove" people whom the Bolshevik leader decided he could do without? Why did Malinovsky never inform on Lenin himself? Why did Lenin so persistently and passionately defend Malinovsky when no one any longer doubted that the latter was in contact with the *Okhrana*? Why did Lenin re-establish contact with Malinovsky during the war, by which time Malinovsky's role as a provocateur had already been acknowledged by the Bolsheviks? Why did Krupskaya send Malinovsky parcels when

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he was in a German prisoner-of-war camp? And why did Malinovsky return to Russia after the Bolshevik coup, when he knew that, according to the documents exposing him, he could only expect to be shot?

There are many " whys." The answers are to be found in the situation in Russia generally at that time and, in particular, in the Social-Democratic Party, which was then still formally united.

After the 1905 revolution, a constitutional monarchy was slowly being established; some people, in particular the liberal opposition leader, P. N. Milyukov, called the system " pseudo-constitutional." The State Duma was gaining a more or less firm foothold. It was not a real parliament, independently governing the country, but it was reflecting, to an ever greater degree, the moods and aspirations of society and the people. The parties and their presses became (if not always formally, then by acting on their own initiative) legal or semi-legal. In the same way, trade unions, benefit funds, workers' tea-rooms and other such meeting-places began to spring up throughout the country. Greater opportunities arose for workers to organize their own activities. Promising changes began to make themselves felt in agriculture too. The Stolypin reforms not only improved conditions in the overpopulated Russian countryside; they also created new and often tempting prospects for enterprising elements in the population.

The new situation which had arisen could not fail to affect the programmes and activities of the Russian political parties. In the Cadet Party, more and more voices were heard advocating collaboration with the government. In the Social-Democratic Party, the so-called *praktiki*—better known as the " liquidators "—(those who believed that in the changed situation, the Party ought either to cease altogether its illegal activities or at least to curtail them and instead throw its cadres and its energy into legal trade union and similar activities) were becoming more influential.

So-called " conciliatory " attitudes were also gaining ground. Many Bolsheviks began to exhibit " pro-Menshevik " leanings; the conciliators wondered whether, under these changed conditions, anti-Menshevik factional activity should be continued at all; indeed, the reasons which might have justified its keenness in the past had now largely disappeared.

The conclusions drawn by Lenin from the new situation were, however, quite different. They can be briefly summarized as follows. The *praktiki*, and concomitant circumstances, as well as the Stolypin reforms, would lead to the liquidation of the illegal party. The ground was therefore slipping from under Lenin's feet. The slogan " the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry "—which, in fact, meant the establishment of the dictatorship of the *apparat* of Lenin's Party—was becoming increasingly unrealistic and unattainable. It was essential to discredit the " liquidators " and " conciliators " and get them out of the way, otherwise the Bolsheviks would drown in a " Menshevik-liquidationist mire."

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Lenin, therefore, resorted to an old method: schism. Without co-ordinating his action with the other groups in what was formally still a united Social-Democratic Party, he summoned his staunch adherents to a "Party congress" in Prague and elected a new Central Committee which included, as well as Lenin himself, Zinoviev and Kamenev, who were then his closest collaborators, and some little known or totally unknown Bolsheviks (a few Caucasians, or "all-Russian" socialists, such as Goloshchekin, Shvartsman and Belostotsky). Two members, however, of this first, purely Bolshevik, Central Committee deserve to be singled out: they were subsequently to gain world-wide notoriety. These were Roman Malinovsky and Stalin; the latter was co-opted shortly afterwards to the Committee.

Thus there was a total split, a complete division of the Party. This was all in accordance with Lenin's design; but, as it turned out, not only with *his* design. The split was also a trump card for the *Okhrana*. A weakened divided party represented far less of a threat than a united one. The chiefs of the *Okhrana* sent out instructions explaining how and why tendencies towards schism should be encouraged.

Leading Bolshevik organs were flooded with police agents trying to carry out their orders from above. In the Moscow Committee, police agents formed the majority; the situation in the Petersburg and other city Party Committees was much the same. For the moment, Lenin's aims coincided with those of the *Okhrana*, just as, a few years later, his short-term aims would coincide with those of the German General Staff.

It was against this background of a community of interests between different persons that the figure of Roman Malinovsky emerged. He was an eminently suitable person possessing all the right qualities. A superb public speaker whose vital energy drew the workers to him, Malinovsky charmed Lenin. Himself a former working metallurgist, Malinovsky soon won a majority in the Metal Workers' Union, until then a traditional bastion of Menshevism.

IT is important to note that during the Prague period, Lenin became increasingly disillusioned with the intelligentsia and tried even harder to introduce true workers into the organs of leadership. The intelligentsia, he reasoned, had "betrayed" the workers and peasants in the years 1905–07 by trying to make a deal with the bourgeoisie and the land-owning classes. During those years, Malinovsky evidently seemed to Lenin the ideal type of worker-leader who did not need the wardship of the intelligentsia. The liquidators and conciliators, who consisted either of intellectuals or of well-paid workers who had fallen under the influence of spineless intellectuals, must be dealt a final blow. Malinovsky was doing all he could to prevent an alliance or at least any concerted action by the six Bolsheviks and seven Mensheviks in the Duma. But this was no easy task since there was at that time amongst workers and rank-and-

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file party members (both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) a tendency towards conciliation and unity.

In 1912, with the assistance of the police on the one hand and the Bolsheviks on the other, Malinovsky was elected a deputy to the State Duma for the Moscow workers' curia. Amongst the six Bolsheviks elected (out of a total of 442 deputies to the Duma) Malinovsky stood out by virtue of his oratorical skill, his "independence" and his immense energy. He was setting up legal Bolshevik newspapers, and in working-class circles he was already being called "the Russian Bebel."

Of course, his speeches in the Duma, written or edited sometimes by Lenin, sometimes by Zinoviev or Bukharin, and delivered with tremendous fervour, were also censored by the director of the police department, Beletsky, or by his assistant, Vissarionov. The police made only slight and virtually imperceptible changes, so as not to compromise the speaker.

In 1912–13, Malinovsky had risen to the height of his power. He became chairman of the Bolshevik faction in the Duma and, even more important, following the Prague congress and the conference at Poronino he was, after Lenin and probably Zinoviev, the most influential member of the Central Committee.

His very rise, however, marked the start of his downfall. In both Bolshevik and Menshevik circles, arrests and police traps became increasingly common, and they tended to occur even in the most secret Party enterprises. Suspicions were aroused that these arrests were not due to the efficiency of the *Okhrana*, but were the work of some very highly placed informer. In Menshevik circles, many *praktiki* and "liquidators" were arrested, which, of course, was exactly what Lenin wanted. On the Bolshevik side, it was enterprises known only to a few people which collapsed. Warnings came from all quarters; and suspicion fell upon Malinovsky.

A Soviet historian who tried to go back to the "Malinovsky affair" after an interval of 50 years could add nothing new to what was already known. Reiterating old facts and assumptions, he did emphasize, however—and this is very significant—that "not all the documents relating to this affair have been published." [2]

Why, even now, has everything relating to an affair which belongs to history still not been published? Perhaps it is precisely these unpublished documents which hold the key to the mystery.

Warnings and accusations came from all sides. Of the Bolsheviks, Bukharin, Pyatnitsky (who managed the transportation of literature), Troyanovsky and Nogin accused Malinovsky. Martov charged him openly in the Menshevik press. That renowned specialist in exposing provocateurs, Burtsev (the "Sherlock Holmes" of the Russian revolution), warned Lenin that provocateurs were at work in the Bolshevik

[2] *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 7 (1965).

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centre; in reply, Lenin—as if mockingly—advised Burtsev to communicate his suspicions to . . . none other than Malinovsky. To whom else? After all, Malinovsky was the most prominent Bolshevik in the whole of Russia.

True to his customary tactics, Lenin passed from defence to attack. The Mensheviks, he claimed, were slandering Malinovsky because they could not forgive him for his victory in the Metal Workers' Union in particular, and his success in the country in general. Lenin reproached his Bolshevik friends for having succumbed to Menshevik tittle-tattle. The Mensheviks, he asserted, would not succeed in destroying the reputation of a man who had rendered such great services to the Party.

It was then that Troyanovsky, one of Malinovsky's chief accusers, resorted to an extraordinary trick. His wife, Elena Rozmirovich, had recently left for Moscow on a special secret mission. Only a few people knew about this mission, and Malinovsky was one of them. Immediately upon arrival in Moscow, Elena Rozmirovich was arrested. Troyanovsky was resolved to outwit the *Okhrana*. He wrote a postcard, warning that if his wife were not released at once, he would reveal the whole truth about Malinovsky's activities as a provocateur. Intercepted by the censor, the card found its way to the *Okhrana*. In order to avoid compromising Malinovsky (" the pride of the *Okhrana*," as Beletsky later called him), Elena Rozmirovich was immediately set free.

The *Okhrana*, however, had here miscalculated. The Bolsheviks who had accused Malinovsky drew precisely the opposite conclusions from Rozmirovich's release: that the *Okhrana* had panicked. Unwillingly to lose an agent as valuable as Malinovsky they had yielded to the threat; therefore, Malinovsky had had a hand in the arrest of Rozmirovich too.

Lenin, however, remained adamant. In response to all the suspicions and accusations which had been voiced, he suggested that an open examination of Malinovsky's case be conducted before the court of a neutral country. In vain did the Mensheviks object that, in a case of this kind where the witnesses would have to include clandestine members, an open trial with agents of the *Okhrana* present would be impossible. Failing to obtain consent for an open trial, Lenin appointed a commission to investigate the case; the commission, however, was so constituted that it would be certain to whitewash the defendant, whatever the evidence against him. It consisted in fact of three Bolsheviks: Zinoviev, Ganetsky (both Leninists) and Lenin himself.

DURING and after the Prague congress, when he was surrounded exclusively by his own supporters and his own provocateurs, without the Mensheviks and the other " troublemakers," the Bolshevik leader at last felt himself the absolute master. According to Burtsev, as early as two years before the war (in May 1912), Lenin held negotiations with the Germans and promised that, in the event of war, he would organize defeatist agitation in Russia. Burtsev alleges that Lenin had similar talks

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with the Poles and with other nations.[3] This allegation is of vital significance. As early as 1912 . . . and no one took any notice. It is certain that the German General Staff attached tremendous importance to those negotiations. It is not impossible that it was this very "promise" which led the German General Staff to start the war.

Was Lenin aware of Malinovsky's dual role? General Spiridovich, for many years chief of the secret police in Russia, wrote books as an *émigré* on the history of the revolutionary movement, one of them being a history of Bolshevism. In the latter, General Spiridovich wrote that Lenin "in all probability knew that Malinovsky was in the pay of the Police Department, but tolerated the situation because he reasoned that, under cover of the Department, Malinovsky could be of far greater use to the Party and do far more damage to the government; and so Lenin took him under his protective wing." Lenin was also well aware that Malinovsky had a criminal record, but this was to him a trifling consideration.[4] V. P. Burtsev, on the whole well-informed on the activities of provocateurs, is the source of another authoritative assertion. He has proved that four provocateurs participated in the Prague congress itself: Malinovsky, Brendinsky, Romanov, and a former member of the Third State Duma, Shurkanov.

On the first anniversary of Lenin's death (21 April 1925), Bukharin's account of the Malinovsky affair was published. In it, Bukharin tells how Lenin suffered over the affair. . . . At the time when Malinovsky's case was being investigated by the notorious commission (in June and July 1914), Bukharin spent a night *chez* Lenin. After long arguments about whether Malinovsky could possibly be a provocateur, neither could get to sleep.

> I could hear Ilyich downstairs, pacing back and forth for a long time. He came out onto the terrace, made himself some tea, then took to pacing up and down once more. Then he would stop again. The whole night passed in this way. Next morning Lenin appeared, neatly dressed. He looked ill but he was in a good mood. "Well, how did you sleep? Want some tea or bread? Why don't we go for a walk?" As if nothing at all had happened, as if he had not spent a sleepless night filled with doubts and suffering. . . .

What was on Lenin's mind that night, as he paced back and forth and sipped tea from time to time? Various possibilities can be speculated on. Was he weighing the evidence of Malinovsky's guilt or innocence, as Bukharin would have us believe? Hardly. Everybody agrees that Lenin had the knack of seeing through people. Rather, one would imagine that he had already decided long ago, under the pressure of the evidence (circumstantial, if not direct), that Malinovsky was an agent of the *Okhrana*. He was hardly troubled, however, by the amorality of such an act, for Lenin worked from the point of view of usefulness, not

[3] *Byloye, novaya seriya. Sborniki po noveishei russkoi istorii.* 1933. Book 46, pp. 66–69.
[4] General A. K. Spiridovich, *Istoriya bolshevizma v Rossii* (Paris, 1922), p. 260.

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morality—" whatever is useful is moral." It was true that, thanks to Malinovsky, many people had been sent to Siberia. His victims had included Sverdlov, Stalin, Nogin and many others. But neither under Stolypin nor since, had the Bolsheviks, as distinct from the Social-Revolutionaries, been threatened with the death penalty.

On the other hand, did not Malinovsky's *services* outweigh the damage he had done, and especially the damage he would do in the future, should he be exposed after Lenin and other Bolsheviks had so unreservedly defended him. . . . ? Would he not be the cause of irreparable demoralization in the Party, as happened to the Social-Revolutionaries after Azef's treachery was exposed? There had been revolutionaries who had served in the *Okhrana*, who had even been sent there expressly, and who had been of tremendous benefit to the movement. Lenin might (hypothetically) have recalled the famous Kletochnikov, who was sent deliberately by the " People's Will " to work in the offices of the *Okhrana*, and to keep a watch on the activities of the *Okhrana* and the information it possessed. He might have recalled Stolypin's assassin, Bogrov, who, it is assumed, worked for the *Okhrana* not through mercenary, but revolutionary, motives. The maximalist Ryss was a similar case and had acted in the same way. Even Azef and Gapon (especially Gapon) had been a tremendous benefit to the revolutionary movement, despite the fact that they were in contact with the police authorities. . . . Of course, Malinovsky must have been receiving money from the *Okhrana*. But how could he have refused? To have turned it down would arouse suspicion. Even the noble Kletochnikov had had to take money.

Such arguments (and I repeat, they are hypothetical, there being no documentary confirmation of them, or if there is, " it has not yet been published," to quote the Soviet historian), would confront Lenin with the Hamlet-like question of whether to censure Malinovsky and throw him over, thereby preserving the purity of his petty bourgeois morality, or to continue with his stubborn defence of him. The question is not an easy one and might have been the cause of more than one sleepless night. . . . Lenin's high spirits after a night such as Bukharin describes may have signified that both for himself and for the Party (for Lenin always identified his own personal opinions and interests with the Party's), he had made up his mind on the question. Malinovsky would, for lack of direct evidence, be acquitted. There would be no changes of mind or Hamlet-like vacillation.

IT was not only on Lenin that Malinovsky's fate depended. The police department, which considered him a first-rate acquisition, could, nonetheless, deal with him as they pleased. A deputy to the Duma and a Bolshevik leader, Malinovsky was not merely a provocateur. He also had several criminal offences on his record, including several burglaries. All that, of course, had been in the distant past, during his youth. However, a man with such a past could not legally be a member of the Duma.

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His youthful transgressions had only been forgotten thanks to the indulgence of the police and to bribery, which had enabled him to obtain " clean " papers.

What, in those July days of 1913, was the police's interest in Malinovsky? Provocateurs and police informers were necessary, of course. But even in the arbitrariness of Tsarist Russia, it sometimes happened that honest people who respected the law and adhered to customary moral principles were appointed to the most responsible posts, even in the police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Such a person, for example, was Lopukhin, the director of the Police Department, who revealed to Burtsev that Azef was an *Okhrana* agent, and was punished for this. Another one, apparently, was General Dzhunkovsky, the new Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs who, having learned of Malinovsky's activities as a provocateur through his department, informed the President of the State Duma, Rodzianko, of this. Both decided that it was imperative to " liquidate this shame " at once and force Malinovsky to tender his resignation. Both Rodzianko and Dzhunkovsky realized that exposure of the provocation would be a powerful moral blow to an institution as fragile as the State Duma.

Malinovsky could not resist the simultaneous pressure from Dzhunkovsky, one of his superiors in the Police Department, and Rodzianko, the President of the Duma, and delivered a scandalous speech—a sort of swan-song—in the Duma. At several points, Rodzianko tried to cut him short. Then, alluding to tiredness and nervous strain, and without having previously notified either Lenin or his colleagues in the Duma of his intention, Malinovsky handed Rodzianko a written statement offering his resignation. He then disappeared. As it turned out, Malinovsky had, immediately after tendering his resignation, rushed off to see Lenin in Cracow. Naturally there was consternation in the Duma. His activities as a provocateur, which until then had been a matter for speculation, now seemed to be an established fact.

The Bolsheviks' reaction to Malinovsky's resignation was interesting and surprising: they censured him and expelled him from the Party, not for his activities as a provocateur, but for . . . " desertion " of his post in the Duma. As for Lenin, instead of approving the action taken by Rodzianko and Dzhunkovsky, he launched a campaign against them " for concealing a provocateur." Rodzianko and Dzhunkovsky, he alleged, had known for a long time that Malinovsky was an *agent provocateur* but they had concealed this fact. His tactics recall the story of the thief who, fearing capture, himself cried " Stop thief! " In socialist and even Party ranks, this cunning device was quickly seen through, but, in spite of its patent absurdity, it found approval in " loyal " Bolshevik circles.

THE saga of Malinovsky did not end with his expulsion from the Party. Fortunately for him and for his real " harbourer," Lenin, war broke out. Malinovsky was called up. He was soon taken prisoner

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and, encouraged by the German authorities, he engaged in vigorous defeatist agitation amongst prisoners-of-war.

Malinovsky established contact with socialists, organized meetings, delivered speeches, and once again enjoyed enormous success. There was enthusiastic reaction to his activities. As a loyal Leninist, he was, of course, an absolute defeatist. According to some reports (though here, again, Soviet historians admit that published materials on the case are incomplete), he entered into correspondence with Lenin. Krupskaya sent him parcels. . . .

The February revolution came. Malinovsky, naturally, did not hurry back to Russia. In June 1917, during an examination of the archives, Malinovsky's work as a provocateur was finally exposed *by documentary evidence*. Now even the Bolsheviks began accusing him.

Suddenly in 1918, when the Bolsheviks were already in firm control, there was a sensation. Malinovsky had come back to Russia. Immediately after crossing the frontier he went to Petrograd and presented himself at Zinoviev's office. He was arrested, tried and shot.

Why did Malinovsky return? What prompted him and what did he hope for? The same question was put rhetorically by prosecutor Krylenko. " Through what psychological motivation, and with what expectations did the provocateur Roman Malinovsky of his own free will present himself here and give himself up to the revolutionary authorities? " the prosecutor passionately declaimed.[5]

However, Krylenko gave no meaningful answer. Nor did Malinovsky himself. Nevertheless, as if in anticipation of the show trials of the Old Bolsheviks in 1936–38, Malinovsky said during his final plea at his trial: " The sentence [i.e. execution] is clear, and I have fully deserved it." [6]

Malinovsky asked Lenin to appear at his trial as a witness. Apparently, Lenin did attend the trial, but refused to act as a witness. Malinovsky swore that he had never betrayed Lenin, nor revealed matters personally concerning Lenin. This, apparently, was the truth. But Lenin was not an intellectual milksop who could be moved to pity or who was given to gratitude. Guided by his famous rule that " in a big household any trash can come in useful," he defended that " trash " just as long as it " came in useful " or might come in useful. By 1918, Malinovsky had outlived his usefulness; now he could only compromise and be a hindrance. The sentence, therefore, was indeed clear.

COMPARATIVELY little has been written about the Malinovsky affair in Soviet historiography on the Bolshevik party and in " Leniniana." Indeed, Malinovsky is not even spoken of with the usual Bolshevik hatred. His activities as a provocateur are, of course, sharply censured, but the provocateur himself is presented in a comparatively mild, even sympathetic light. We are given to understand that, despite

[5] N. V. Krylenko, *Sudebnye rechi. Izbrannoye*. p. 26.
[6] Ibid. p. 27.

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the damage he caused, Malinovsky greatly benefited the "workers' movement" and the Party, both by his work in the *Okhrana* and by his popularity and his indefatigable activity in the Duma. He strayed from the straight and narrow, he betrayed his friends, he ruined both the transportation of illegal literature and printing-presses; but, on the other hand, what splendid Bolshevik speeches he delivered in the Duma, and how talented he was at organizing the workers—and at carrying the gospel of Lenin into their midst.

Of the Bolshevik sources on the Malinovsky affair, the fullest account is that of Badayev, a colleague of Malinovsky's in the State Duma. A loyal Leninist, Badayev reproduced, for the most part, the official version, with telling gaps and omissions. We can gather from this detailed account that Malinovsky could sense when he was taking a risk and had his own peculiar brand of courage. He behaved arrogantly in the Duma towards "henchmen of the bourgeoisie," such as Rodzianko. He expressed himself, when he felt it necessary, crudely. He thrust his resignation in Rodzianko's face, declaring that he was leaving to go abroad that very day. To the other Bolshevik deputies, his resignation came as "a complete surprise." [7] When they tried to make him see reason, or at least to obtain some sort of explanation from him, he replied by shouting: "Try me! Do what you like; but I shan't say anything." *Pravda*, which by then was being published legally, censured Malinovsky, but, being aware of Lenin's favourable attitude towards him, refrained from printing a sharp condemnation of him: temporary damage . . . nervous strain . . . loss of mental stability . . .

Badayev attempted to reconstruct Malinovsky's activities as an *agent provocateur*, which, according to him, had begun in 1910 when Malinovsky joined the *Okhrana* under the code name "the tailor." Malinovsky had offered his services on the occasion of his first arrest on some petty charge. It is interesting, too, that at first he tried to ingratiate himself with the Mensheviks, although, in the company of Bolsheviks he made himself out to be an opponent of the Mensheviks. It is probable that Malinovsky deliberately confused the issue to make it easier for him to gain control of the Metal Workers' Union. In 1917, when the archives were opened, it became clear that he had betrayed both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, and even members of the Polish Socialist Party and the Bund.[8] Here, too, he evidently had an ulterior motive: by betraying people in different parties, he made detection of himself more difficult. When Martov, Burtsev and some Bolsheviks said that there was a provocateur in the Bolshevik leadership, Lenin could always counter the allegation by pointing out that it was not only the Bolsheviks who were being betrayed and arrested—it was happening to their opponents as well. Badayev claims that Malinovsky was especially zealous in his betrayals of conciliators and Menshevik liquidators.[9] These

[7] *Byloye*, op. cit. p. 73 (see footnote [3]).
[8] Ibid. p. 77.
[9] Ibid. p. 77.

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betrayals eliminated his own (and Lenin's) opponents both inside and outside the Party. However, Badayev is clearly mistaken in his assertion that Malinovsky's speeches to the Duma were " moderate "; if this were really so, Lenin would not have made so much of him, nor have introduced him into the Central Committee or other leading Party institutions.

As we have said, Lenin refused to appear as a witness at Malinovsky's trial. But he did leave one or two pieces of written evidence on the affair. What did Lenin say, or rather write? So as not to compromise himself, Malinovsky, declared Lenin, could not bring himself to betray the *entire* Party and liquidate *Pravda*. On the other hand, this outstanding public speaker and organizer probably influenced through his speeches 40–60 thousand workers. . . . In other words, his activities as a provocateur were somehow justified. Lenin had no moral constraints. Since the provocation was proving worthwhile, it should be tolerated. . . . Do not these words of Lenin's bear out what we said earlier about the community of interests between himself and Malinovsky?

The secret of the Malinovsky affair still remains undisclosed despite the passage of time. Another Bolshevik secret, the story of the German financing of Lenin, has been cleared up with the help of documentary evidence. In certain respects these two affairs are similar: it seems to me that the resemblance between them lies in the fact that neither the receipt of the German money nor the " toleration " of Malinovsky's employment by the *Okhrana* was sanctioned by any—even narrowly—elected Party institution. The decision, if any, came directly from Lenin and from a group of " comrades-in-arms " *chosen by him*: an example of the parallel leadership, in the Party, by Lenin in person and by his acolytes.

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Lenin, Terror, and the Political Police *

G. H. Leggett

Terror . . . that means of persuasion and influence.

Lenin (5th ed.) Vol. 39, p. 405

ONE of the first actions of the liberal democratic Provisional Government upon assuming office in the February Revolution was to abolish the Department of Police along with the gendarmerie and the entire "Okhrana" security system—hated symbols of Tsarist political oppression. By ironic contrast, a bare six weeks after he had seized power in the October *coup d'état*, Lenin—the Social Democratic revolutionary—resurrected the political police in the shape of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage.[1] This institution, commonly called Vecheka (VChK) or Cheka (ChK)[2] after the initial letters of its abbreviated Russian title, was established in Petrograd by a Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) resolution on 7 (20) December 1917,[3] and was destined to be the precursor of a succession of formidable Soviet political police organizations ranging via the GPU, OGPU, NKVD, etc. down to today's KGB.

The immediate explanation of this paradox is that in founding the Vecheka Lenin did not appreciate all the implications of his act, for at that time he harboured no intention of recreating the police, let alone the political police, in any professional or permanent form. Lenin improvised the Vecheka overnight in order to suppress the escalating public service strike in Petrograd, as also other such acts of "counter-revolution" and "sabotage" throughout Soviet territory. As originally constituted by Lenin, the Cheka was essentially an investigative organ, with no judicial status and with strictly limited administrative powers; for the first 10 days it lacked power of arrest. It functioned alongside several similar security commissions, all concerned with investigating and suppressing anti-Soviet subversion. Not until 22 March 1918 did it achieve a monopoly for dealing with counter-revolution, economic speculation, and misuse of official position or of the press.[4] As its name implied, this "Extraordinary Commission" was conceived by Lenin as a temporary agency operating outside the normal system of law. Significantly, however, it was attached direct to the Sovnarkom, the effective cabinet of the

* The material for the present essay has been taken from a comprehensive study of the Cheka by the author.

1 *Vserossiiskaia Chrezvychainaia komissiia po borbe s kontrrevoliutsiei i sabotazhem.*

2 *Vecheka* and *Cheka* are both used to denote the overall organization; more precisely *Cheka* signifies a subordinate commission of the *Vecheka.*

3 *Iz istorii Vserossiiskoi Chrezvychainoi komissii, 1917–1921 gg.* (Moscow, 1958, ed. G. A. Belov), pp. 78–79. (Hereafter—*Iz istorii VChK.*)

4 Ibid. p. 103.

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Soviet Government; equally significantly, its Chairman, Felix Dzerzhinsky, a Polish Social Democratic revolutionary who had spent 11 out of his 40 years in prison and Siberian exile, held membership of the Bolshevik Party Central Committee from August 1917 until his death in July 1926, with immediate access to Lenin. Dzerzhinsky dedicated all his energies and talents to developing the Vecheka as a country-wide, efficient and ruthless security organization, adapting it to the Bolshevik regime's requirements as that regime moved from one emergency to the next.

Before October 1917, the police had no place in Lenin's vision of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, the transitional period between Capitalism and Socialism, inaugurated by the Bolshevik coup. Postulating that "the state is an organ of class *rule*, an organ for the *oppression* of one class by another," [5] Lenin affirmed that, having become transformed into the ruling class by overthrowing the bourgeoisie, the proletariat must impose its dictatorship: "The proletariat needs state power, the centralized organization of force, the organization of violence, for the purpose of crushing the resistance of the exploiters." [6]

In his *Third Letter from Afar, Concerning a Proletarian Militia,* written in Zurich in March 1917, Lenin described the nature of the future proletarian state:

> We need revolutionary *government,* we need (for a certain transitional period) a state. . . . We need a state, but *not* the kind the bourgeoisie needs, with organs of government in the shape of a police force, an army and a bureaucracy separate from and set against the people. . . . The proletariat . . . must "*smash,*" to use Marx's expression, this "ready-made" state machine and substitute a new one for it by *merging* the police force, the army and the bureaucracy with *the entire armed people.*[7]

There can be no doubt that Lenin was sincere in advocating the formation of a universal people's militia composed of workers and peasants on a part-time basis—a mass para-military body combining the functions of army, police and administration, serving as the executive arm of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.[8] There is a consistency on this topic in Lenin's pre-October writings. Moreover, once in power, he made some attempt to realize this vision by dismantling the existing army and police force, and endeavouring to replace them by a "Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" and a part-time "Workers' Militia," both composed of volunteers drawn from "the more class conscious and organized elements of the toiling masses." These experiments proved impracticable, and 1918 saw the creation of a conscript Red Army led by ex-Tsarist officers, dubbed "military specialists," and a professional, centrally-controlled police organization, the "Workers' and Peasants' Militia."

[5] Lenin (5), Vol. 33, p. 7.
[6] Ibid. p. 26.
[7] Ibid. Vol. 31, pp. 39–40.
[8] Ibid. pp. 40–44.

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Such restoration of a conventional army and police, as also the gradual restoration of the political police, in the shape of the Cheka, testified to Lenin's self-imposed dilemma: he was intent on making a proletarian revolution in a country virtually without a proletariat,[9] intent on exercising a dictatorship on that slender proletariat's behalf through a minority party,[10] and, if necessary, as the Kronstadt phase would indicate, he would not shrink from exercising that dictatorship against the proletariat itself. In such conditions a universal people's militia was not a realistic proposition. Maxim Gorky summed up Lenin's predicament aptly: "A social revolution without the proletariat is an absurdity, a senseless utopia." [11] Despite Lenin's denials ("We are not utopians, we do not indulge in 'dreams' . . . "),[12] he was committed to implementing a utopia by violence; implicit in this undertaking was the application of terror. Lenin had few illusions about the ferocity of the conflict ahead. In September he wrote: "Revolution is a most intense, furious, desperate class struggle and civil war." [13]

Lenin distinguished between three categories of terror. Firstly, there were the individual, uncoordinated acts of terrorism, which, as practised by the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), Lenin had already repudiated in 1901 as representing a useless fragmentation of effort.[14] Secondly, there was the systematic resort to acts of terrorism as part of a calculated campaign in pursuit of a considered objective. This, wrote Lenin in 1901, was quite a different tactic: "We have never rejected terror on principle, nor can we ever do so, for that is one of those military actions which can be very useful and even indispensable in certain moments of battle." [15] Thirdly came Lenin's own chosen weapon: mass terror, to be exercised by the proletariat to consolidate its revolution. Paradoxically, Lenin's projection of the Bolshevik revolution drew deeply not only on the French Jacobin tradition and on the pre-September 1850 canon of Marx's doctrine, wherein was concentrated the voluntarist, Blanquist, insurrectionary aspect of Marx's by no means consistent philosophy, but also on the Russian Jacobin prophets of Populism, men like Zaichnevsky and Nechaev who preached the application of ruthless terror in support of a dictatorship imposed by a party of professional, dedicated revolutionaries. Lenin's concept of revolution led him to the following definition of the Bolshevik regime:

[9] In 1917 industrial workers in Russia numbered 2·6 million (out of a population which in 1914 totalled 135 million)—see Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR* (London, 1969), pp. 66–67.

[10] In late April 1917 the Bolshevik Party membership numbered 80,000—see Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (London, 1970), p. 173, and even after its mushroom growth in 1917, it returned only 168 deputies out of a total of 703 to the Constituent Assembly.

[11] *Novaia Zhizn, Petrograd*, 11 (24) Jan. 1918.

[12] Lenin (5), Vol. 33, p. 49.

[13] Lenin (5), Vol. 34, p. 321.

[14] Lenin (3), Vol. 4, pp. 108–9.

[15] Ibid.

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> The revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is power secured and sustained through coercion of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat, a power unrestricted by any laws.[16]

Thus a vital resource on which Lenin's regime would ultimately depend was terror. Limitless terror would go far to compensate Lenin for a paucity of popular support on which to base a dictatorship professedly operated by the proletariat, but in fact involving the regimentation of an entire people. To effect such a terror a suitable agency would be required; in Lenin's state that agency would take the form of a political police combining the traditional characteristics of the Tsarist Okhrana with the features of a novel repressive organism adaptable to the totalitarian techniques of the twentieth century.

LENIN achieved his October coup almost bloodlessly, stepping into the power vacuum created by the vacillating Provisional Government and by the SRs who, secure in the backing of the huge peasantry, scrupulously refrained from taking power before it was conferred democratically by the Constituent Assembly; the waning Mensheviks for their part, as befitted orthodox Marxists, did not believe in leap-frogging the entire historical process of bourgeois capitalist parliamentary democracy which, according to the classic prescriptions of Marx, must intervene between feudal absolutism and proletarian socialism—they were content to act out the role of a critical but loyal opposition during that predestined phase.

Immediately after the October coup Lenin began to rule by restrictive decree. On 27 October the Sovnarkom passed a Decree on the Press, justifying the closure of hostile newspapers as being a temporary, exceptional measure. Other illiberal acts followed, demonstrating the Bolsheviks' disregard for basic civil liberties. On 4 November the Left SRs, a secessionist SR group generally sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause, declared in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK):

> We refuse to walk arm in arm with a party which legalizes an unacceptable system of repression. . . . The resolution on the press just passed by a VTsIK majority constitutes a glaring manifestation of a system of political terror and kindling of civil war.[17]

There followed the resignation from the Sovnarkom of several Bolshevik People's Commissars, who stated:

> We hold that it is essential to form a socialist government comprising all the Soviet parties . . . we consider that beside this there is only one path—the maintenance of a purely Bolshevik government by means of political terror. The Council of People's Commissars has entered upon that path.[18]

[16] Lenin (5), Vol. 37, p. 245.

[17] *Protokoly zasedanii vserossiiskago Tsentralnago Ispolnitelnago Komiteta Sovetov Rabochikh, Soldatskikh, Krestianskikh i Kazachikh Deputatov II Sozyva* (Moscow, 1918), p. 27.

[18] Ibid.

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In an address to the Petrograd Soviet the next day Lenin asserted:

> We are reproached for using terror, but we are not using the kind of terror practised by the French revolutionaries who guillotined defenceless people, and I hope that we shall not do so, for we have strength on our side.[19]

On 28 November Lenin proposed using a slogan urging "revolutionary terror" against the striking state employees,[20] and on the same day he signed a decree outlawing the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) as "enemies of the people" and ordering that members of that party's directing organs be arrested and handed over for trial by revolutionary tribunal.[21] By this decree, Lenin introduced the term "enemies of the people" into the Russian legal and political vocabulary, a term which would often be used as a sanction depriving individuals and political parties of their civil rights, thereby theoretically exposing them to imprisonment and possible execution.

LENIN desperately needed allies, however transient, to buttress the isolated Bolsheviks in their first precarious period in power. He attracted Left SR (LSR) allegiance by the tactical masterstroke of jettisoning Social Democratic dogma and adopting, in effect, the SR land distribution programme; later he admitted that he had entertained no intention of implementing this undertaking, which was merely a bid for peasant support.[22] Although the LSRs had initially shied away from Lenin's offer—first made on 26 October—of a coalition, since they could not bring themselves to condone the unrepresentative character of the Bolshevik Government, they presently succumbed to his overtures and on 10 December seven LSRs entered the Sovnarkom.[23]

Certain of LSR support, Lenin was now better equipped to negotiate the next obstacle—the Constituent Assembly. This, the Holy Grail of generations of liberals and revolutionaries over the past century, had been an immutable tenet of Mensheviks and Bolsheviks alike. Upon assuming office, the Provisional Government had undertaken to summon a Constituent Assembly; equally the second congress of soviets had, in its first enactment establishing the Sovnarkom, specifically given the latter a lease to govern "until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly." Despite Lenin's strong inclination, after the October coup, to postpone the Constituent Assembly elections, he was overruled by his Party colleagues,[24] and the elections were duly held on 12 November, the SRs achieving an overall majority. By 21 November Lenin, sensing

[19] Lenin (5), Vol. 35, p. 63.
[20] Lenin Ibid. p. 125.
[21] Lenin Ibid. p. 126.
[22] Lenin (3), Vol. 26, p. 446.
[23] I. N. Steinberg, *In the Workshop of the Revolution* (New York, 1955), p. 50. (Hereafter *I.W.R.*)
[24] L. D. Trotsky, *O Lenine* (Moscow, 1924), p. 91.

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the likely outcome, argued at a VTsIK meeting that the elections were irregular; ominously he harped on his accustomed theme:

> The state is an instrument for coercion. Formerly it was the coercion of the whole people by a handful of moneybags; but we desire to transform the state into an institution for enforcing the will of the people. We want to organize violence in the name of the interests of the workers.[25]

LENIN first publicly indicated his intention to suppress the Constituent Assembly in a speech to VTsIK on 1 December. On 13 December he published anonymously in *Pravda* his "Theses on the Constituent Assembly" in which he uncompromisingly asserted that, just as in a bourgeois republic the highest form of democracy was the Constituent Assembly, so in a revolutionary social democracy the highest form of democracy was represented by a republic of Soviets.[26] Meanwhile he characteristically set about making meticulous practical preparations to extinguish the Assembly. He moved the most proletarian-manned of the reliable Lettish regiments to Petrograd, remarking: "If anything should happen, the *muzhik* might hesitate: here we require proletarian resolution."[27] In this political crisis Bolshevik tenure of power was all-important; Lenin later observed that the Bolsheviks had "an overwhelming preponderance of force at the decisive moment in the decisive points."[28] To forestall any "counter-revolutionary" disorders planned for 5 January, the date of the Constituent Assembly's convocation, the Extraordinary Commission for the Protection of Petrograd declared the city "in a state of siege."[29] In Moscow on 3 January the Cheka succeeded in rounding-up 63 SRs, including the party's city committee.[30] In Petrograd, however, the LSR Commissar for Justice, Steinberg, on 18 December thwarted an attempt by the Cheka, acting on Dzerzhinsky's instructions and with Sovnarkom assent, to arrest a number of prominent SRs and Mensheviks (including several delegates elected to the Constituent Assembly) as they attended a rally of the Constituent Assembly Defence Committee. Steinberg countermanded Dzerzhinsky's order, releasing those arrested. A determined trial of strength ensued between the Commissariat of Justice and the Vecheka.[31]

In the event, the Constituent Assembly met on 5 January 1918; the Bolsheviks and LSRs were outvoted by the Right SR majority, whose leader Chernov was elected to the chair, but after the Bolsheviks, followed by the LSRs, demonstratively left the meeting, the proceedings at the

[25] *Izvestiya*, 23 Nov. 1917.
[26] Lenin (5), Vol. 35, p. 162.
[27] Trotsky, op. cit. pp. 92–93.
[28] Lenin (3), Vol. 24, p. 638.
[29] *Iz istorii VChK*, p. 88.
[30] V. M. Chernov (ed.), *Che-Ka. Materialy po deiatelnosti chrezvychainoi komissii* (Berlin, 1922), p. 47; Vera Vladimirova, *God sluzhby "sotsialistov" kapitalistam* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1927), p. 10.
[31] I. Steinberg, *Als ich Volkskommissar war* (Munich, 1929) pp. 62–64.

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Tauride Palace were closed by Anatoly Zhelezniakov, anarchist sailor and commandant of the Palace guard, on the celebrated excuse: "The guard is tired." Thereafter the delegates were not readmitted. The next day the Third All-Russian congress of Soviets formally dissolved the Constituent Assembly. The Workers' and Peasants' Government symbolically shed the word "Provisional" from its title. And so the Bolsheviks, invoking the Soviets as the supreme repositories of the people's will, appropriated the legitimacy which, for a brief moment, had been vested in the Constituent Assembly. Lenin had dispelled the last illusions that he might be prepared to respect majority opinion—even if this were socialist.

The extinction of the Assembly coincided with the killing of Shingarev and Kokoshkin, two prominent and respected Kadets and ex-ministers of the Provisional Government, murdered in their hospital beds by Baltic Fleet sailors responsible for guarding them. After initial revulsion, the Bolshevik leaders took the line that this was "merely an act of political terror," and the perpetrators were not brought to justice.[32] The only other blood spilled was that of some seven or eight unarmed demonstrators on whom the Bolshevik soldiery had fired.[33]

Thus ended the only parliament in the history of Russia to be freely elected on the basis of universal unrestricted franchise and secret ballot. The dispersal of the Constituent Assembly provoked no general protest or disturbance; liberal traditions in Russia were too weak for the emergence, at this stage, of a viable parliamentary democracy backed by broad public opinion and resolute political conviction. Lenin commented:

> The dispersal of the Constituent Assembly by Soviet authority means a complete and frank liquidation of the idea of formal democracy in the name of revolutionary dictatorship. It will serve as a good lesson.[34]

Although, in defence of delegates to the Constituent Assembly, Steinberg challenged the Cheka's right to carry out political arrests, and otherwise defended his concept of the rule of law—albeit the relative law of revolutionary justice—he nevertheless, along with other LSRs, explicitly approved the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly, both at the time, and subsequently when, as an *émigré*, he castigated the Bolsheviks for their rule of terror.[35]

IN the past Lenin had evinced an innate distrust of spontaneity (*stikhinost*) of the masses, but in the post-October crises provoked by his deliberate policy of polarizing class conflict, he gave free rein to such spontaneity in its least attractive aspect—that of mob violence. He

[32] Steinberg, *I.W.R.*, pp. 74–83.
[33] Maxim Gorky in *Novaia Zhizn*, Petrograd, 9 Jan. 1918.
[34] L. D. Trotsky, *O Lenine* (Moscow, 1924) p. 94.
[35] Steinberg, *I.W.R.*, pp. 53–56.

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launched a campaign of incitement to terror, encouraging the masses to take the law into their own hands, to "rob the robbers" (despoil the landlords and the bourgeoisie) and to carry out street justice (practise lynch law) against "speculators" (black marketeers). In a speech made on 14 January Lenin counselled:

> The workers and soldiers of Petrograd must realise that no one will help them except themselves. Malpractices are blatant, the profiteering is monstrous, but what have the masses of soldiers and peasants done to combat this? Unless the masses are roused to spontaneous action, we won't get anywhere. . . . Until we apply terror to speculators—shooting on the spot—we won't get anywhere.[36]

IN February 1918 the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations foundered and the German armies advanced. Whilst still intent on making peace with Germany, at whatever cost, Lenin nevertheless signed, on 21 February, a militant proclamation—issued as a Sovnarkom decree[37]—entitled "The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger," carrying the injunction: "Enemy agents, speculators, thugs, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies, are to be shot on the scene of their crime." When Steinberg protested against inclusion of this paragraph on the grounds that it would spoil the pathos of the proclamation, Lenin exclaimed: "On the contrary, this is precisely the essence of true revolutionary pathos. Surely you do not imagine that we shall be victorious without applying the most cruel revolutionary terror?"[38]

On the basis of this decree, which was in the nature of a temporary martial law edict, the Vecheka arrogated to itself the long-term right to dispense summary justice.[39] However the LSRs, who were represented in the Vecheka Collegium from 8 January to 6 July 1918, consistently vetoed the application of the death penalty to political adversaries, as opposed to criminals.[40] Ironically, the first political adversaries to be executed by the Vecheka were 13 Chekists (among them the LSR, V. A. Alexandrovich—Dzerzhinsky's Deputy) who had participated in the LSR rising in Moscow on 6 July 1918.[41]

Whilst approving of the execution of criminals through summary justice, the LSRs illogically opposed capital punishment under the law. There was a curious ambivalence in the whole Russian tradition on the issue of capital punishment. At the second congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party in 1903, a proposal to include the abolition of the death penalty in the Party programme was rejected by a large majority; however, under the influence of western humanitari-

[36] Lenin (5), Vol. 35, p. 311.
[37] *Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti*, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1957), pp. 313–14.
[38] Trotsky, op. cit. p. 104.
[39] *Iz istorii VChK*, p. 95, footnote; Steinberg, op. cit. p. 146.
[40] M. Ia. Latsis, "Tov Dzerzhinsky i VChK" in *Proletarskaia Revoliutsia* (Moscow, 1926), 9(56), p. 88.
[41] *Krasnaia Kniga VChK* (ed. P. Makintsian) (Moscow, 1920), p. 179; *Izvestia*, 14 July 1918.

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anism, most Russian Social Democrats came to reverse their position on this issue.[42] Nevertheless Lenin, who firmly believed in the necessity of terror as an integral element in waging revolution, continued to favour retention of the death penalty. In a pamphlet published just before the October *coup*, he asserted: "No kind of revolutionary government could dispense with the death penalty as applied to *exploiters* (i.e. landowners and capitalists)." [43]

The death sentence, which was abolished after the February revolution, was restored by Kerensky in July 1917, its application being limited to the military front.[44] One of the first legislative acts of the second congress of Soviets, on the morrow of the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, was the repeal of Kerensky's measure.[45] When Lenin, who had missed this enactment, heard of the decree, his rage knew no bounds. "Nonsense," he said, "How can one make a revolution without firing squads?" And when Kamenev, on whose initiative the decree had been introduced, tried to reason with him, explaining that the disputed law was limited to shooting army deserters, Lenin, unmoved, retorted: "This is a mistake, an inadmissible weakness, a pacifist illusion." Eventually he was persuaded that annulment of the new decree would make an unfavourable impression, and he accepted the compromise suggestion that it would be easiest simply to start executions at the front when there was no alternative.[46]

The death penalty under the law was officially restored by the Bolsheviks on 16 June 1918, three months after the LSR withdrawal from the Sovnarkom. In his announcement, the new Commissar of Justice, Stuchka, did not explicitly sanction the measure, but casuistically put it that "Revolutionary tribunals are not bound by any limitations in their choice of measures to combat counter-revolution, sabotage, etc." [47] This evasiveness typified Russian moral aversion to the death penalty as a judicial sanction, an aversion that persisted under the Bolshevik regime; Soviet squeamishness showed in the custom of euphemistically referring to capital punishment as "the highest penalty" (*vysshaia mera nakazania*).

LENIN'S greatest scourge in the inexorably dwindling opposition press was Maxim Gorky, whose articles, entitled "Untimely Thoughts," in his independent, though Menshevik orientated daily newspaper, *Novaia Zhizn*, never failed to criticize Bolshevik excesses, to spotlight Lenin's personal responsibility, to analyse the character and trends of the Soviet regime, and to predict dire consequences for the doctrinaire policies it pursued. Gorky denounced Lenin's "Nechaev and Bakunin

[42] E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (Harmondsworth, 1966, Pelican ed.), Vol. I, pp. 162–63, footnote 3.
[43] Lenin (5), Vol. 34, p. 174, footnote.
[44] W. H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution* (London, 1935), Vol. I, pp. 103, 185.
[45] *S.U.R.* (*Sobranie Uzakonenii i Rasporiazhenii*), 1917, No. 1: 10.
[46] Trotsky, op. cit. p. 101.
[47] *S.U.R.* 1918, No. 44: 533.

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brand of anarchism," [48] and accused Lenin, the aspiring "Napoleon of Socialism," the born Russian nobleman and natural leader—possessing "the lack of morality necessary for this role, as well as an utterly pitiless attitude . . . toward the lives of the common people"—of "performing upon the Russian people an experiment doomed to failure beforehand. . . . This inevitable tragedy does not disturb Lenin, the slave of dogma. . . . Life in all its complexity is unknown to Lenin, he does not know the popular masses, he has not lived with them; but he—from books—has learned how to raise these masses on their hind legs and how—easiest of all—to enrage their instincts." [49]

In mid-January 1918, Gorky wrote:

> Recently the sailor Zhelezniakov, translating the ferocious speeches of his leaders into the crudely elementary speeches of the mass man, said that, for the welfare of the Russian people, even a million people could be killed. . . . A wholesale extermination of those who think differently is an old, tried method of the domestic policy of Russian Governments. From Ivan the Terrible to Nicholas II this simple and convenient method of combating sedition was freely and widely used by all our political leaders: why then should Vladimir Lenin renounce such a simple method? And in fact he does not renounce it when he frankly declares that he will shrink from nothing to eradicate enemies.[50]

In conversation with Steinberg, his Commissar of Justice, Lenin expressed himself with remarkable candour: Steinberg, seeing that his opposition, based on grounds of revolutionary justice, to the introduction of a harsh police measure with far-reaching implications of terror, was making no headway with Lenin, exclaimed in exasperation: "Then why do we bother with a Commissariat of Justice? Let's call it frankly the Commissariat for Social Extermination, and be done with it!" At which Lenin's face suddenly brightened and he replied: "Well put . . . that's exactly what it should be . . . but we can't say that." [51]

GORKY'S constant fusillade of criticism in *Novaia Zhizn* was silenced by the closing down of the newspaper on 16 July 1918, on Lenin's orders. This coincided with the murder, at Ekaterinburg, of ex-Tsar Nicholas II, together with his family and closest retainers. Trotsky has described how, on returning from the front, he was told by Sverdlov (after whom Ekaterinburg was presently named Sverdlovsk) of the execution of the Imperial family. When Trotsky asked: "And who made the decision?" Sverdlov replied: "We decided it here. Ilyich believed that we shouldn't leave the Whites a live banner to rally around, especially under the present difficult circumstances." [52]

[48] *Novaia Zhizn*, 7 Nov. 1917, quoted in Maxim Gorky, *Untimely Thoughts: Essays on Revolution, Culture and the Bolsheviks 1917–1918* (London, 1970), p. 85.
[49] *Novaia Zhizn*, 10 Nov. 1917, quoted ibid. pp. 88–89.
[50] *Novaia Zhizn*, 17 Jan. 1918, quoted ibid. p. 131.
[51] I. N. Steinberg, *I.W.R.*, p. 145.
[52] *Trotsky's Diary in Exile (1935)* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p. 81.

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The Vecheka bore no responsibility for the decision to execute the Tsar; in carrying out the execution, the Ural Regional Cheka acted merely as the obedient instrument of the Regional Soviet, which itself first obtained sanction from Moscow. Nor did the Vecheka respond instantly to the assassination by an SR in Petrograd, on 20 June 1918, of Volodarsky. On 26 June, Lenin sent a letter of rebuke to the Chairman of the Petrograd Committee of the Communist Party:

> Comrade Zinoviev! Only today did we hear in the Central Committee that the Petrograd *workers* wanted to reply to Volodarsky's murder by mass terror, and that you (not you personally, but members of the Petrograd Central Committee) restrained them. I emphatically protest! We are compromising ourselves: even in resolutions of the Soviet we threaten mass terror, and when it comes to action, we *obstruct* the *absolutely* correct revolutionary initiative of the masses. This is in-ad-miss-ible! The terrorists will take us for milksops. The time is ultra-martial. It is necessary to encourage the energy and mass-character of the terror against counter-revolutionaries, and especially so in Petrograd, whose example is *decisive*. Greetings. Lenin.[53]

The Vecheka was now also being caught up in Lenin's campaign of terror, even though the LSRs still vetoed political executions. Early in June 1918, Dzerzhinsky and one of his two LSR deputies, the militant G. D. Zaks, gave a joint press interview in which they declared:

> The public and the press misunderstand the character and tasks of our commission. They imagine the struggle waged against counter-revolution to be on the plane of normal state life, and consequently they wail about courts of law, about guarantees, about inquiries, investigations, etc. We have nothing in common with the military-revolutionary tribunal.[54]
>
> We stand for organized terror—this should be frankly stated—terror being absolutely indispensable in current revolutionary conditions. Our task is to fight against the enemies of the Soviet Government, and of the new order of life. Such enemies are our political adversaries, as well as all bandits, rogues, speculators and other criminals who undermine the foundations of socialist authority. Towards these we show no mercy. We terrorize the enemies of the Soviet Government in order to stifle crime at its inception.[55]

THE "official" Red Terror, unleashed in reprisal for the assassination of M. S. Uritsky, Chairman of the Petrograd Cheka, and for the wounding of Lenin—both events occurring on 30 August 1918—was declared in the Sovnarkom Decree on the Red Terror of 5 September. Under its terms the Vecheka, strongly reinforced by "responsible Party comrades," was to isolate class enemies in concentration camps and to shoot all persons "involved in" counter-revolutionary activity.[56]

[53] Lenin (5), Vol. 50, p. 106.
[54] *Novaia Zhizn*, 9 June 1918.
[55] *Svoboda Rossii*, 9 June 1918.
[56] *S.U.R.* 1918, No. 65: 710, *Izvestiya*, 10 Sept. 1918.

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This was open licence to apply summary justice indiscriminately throughout Soviet territory. The Chekas had been executing "political adversaries" of the regime since 6 July; now they killed on a mass scale. Already on 3 September *Izvestiya* announced that the Petrograd Cheka had shot over 500 hostages. Such unbridled retaliation was, in part, the desperate reaction of an isolated and minority-based regime striking out wildly against a ring of enemies. In part, also, it stemmed logically from Lenin's doctrine of class conflict, which postulated the dictatorship of the proletariat imposing its will on the bourgeoisie by a reign of fear. The Cheka, having been assigned the responsibility of implementing the Party's Draconic policy of the Red Terror, dutifully performed as the obedient instrument of the Party's will. Some Chekists took Lenin's doctrine of ruthless class conflict to the extreme conclusion of advocating the physical extermination of hostile classes if they resisted the dictatorship of the proletariat. The classic statement of this fanatical attitude was formulated by Latsis, Chairman of the Eastern Front Cheka,[57] writing in that Cheka's publication, *Krasnyi Terror*:

> We are not waging war against individual persons. We are exterminating the bourgeoisie as a class. Hence, when conducting an examination, the first step should be, not to seek evidence that the accused has acted against Soviet rule by word or deed, but to put three questions to him: To what class does he belong? What is his origin? What is his upbringing, education and profession? And solely his answers to these questions should determine his fate. For this is the essence and significance of the Red Terror.[58]

Lenin, whilst quick to rouse and exploit class conflict, remained a cool pragmatist, averse to wholly alienating the non-proletarian classes, among which there were to be found indispensable allies, such as Trotsky's "military specialists." For that matter, the Bolshevik leadership itself was almost entirely non-proletarian in origin. Consequently Lenin took Latsis sharply to task in an article written in late 1918 or early 1919, but significantly not published at the time [59]; perhaps Lenin did not care to restrain the Cheka overmuch while his regime was at risk.

The Chekas ran riot during the Red Terror. Their arbitrary conduct provoked bitter and sustained criticism in the Party press. The Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), to whose Soviet executive committees the local Chekas were attached, resented the latter's arrogant autonomy: there were now two parallel authorities in the provinces—the Soviets and the Chekas. The Commissariat for Justice (NKIu) condemned the Chekas' complete disregard of the judicial system of revolutionary tribunals. A vocal element in the Party, appalled by the cruel and arbitrary nature of the Red Terror, demanded that the Chekas

[57] Martyn Ianovich Latsis (1888–1938), a Latvian, was one of Lenin's principal lieutenants in the early days of the Cheka.

[58] Latsis, in *Pravda*, 25 Dec. 1918, reprinted from *Krasnyi Terror*, No. 1, Kazan, 1 Nov. 1918.

[59] Lenin (5), Vol. 37, p. 410, first published in *Pravda*, 7 Nov. 1926.

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be called to order and made accountable. Lenin attempted, through several Party and state commissions,[60] to control the Vecheka apparatus, but to no avail. Although theoretically, by the Sovnarkom's resolution of 21 December 1917,[61] the NKIu, jointly with the NKVD and the Petrograd Soviet Presidium, exercised supervision over the Vecheka, in practice the Vecheka suffered no such constraint. Subsequently the belated Statute on the Vecheka of 28 October 1918,[62] prescribed that representatives of the NKIu and NKVD should sit on the Vecheka Collegium. This did not work. After an attempt at co-operation, the NKIu representatives staged a demonstrative exit, never to return, and henceforward the NKIu and the Vecheka remained in a state of "open warfare and ruptured diplomatic relations." [63]

Eventually criticism of the Vecheka was silenced by the Party Central Committee's forthright declaration, in *Izvestiya* of 8 February 1919, acknowledging that "the Chekas were founded, exist and work solely as the direct organs of the Party under its direction and supervision" and that "the need for a special organ of merciless summary justice was recognised by our whole Party from top to bottom. Our Party entrusted this task to the Vecheka, equipping it with extraordinary plenary powers, and placing it in direct contact with the Party centre. . . . The Chekas . . . were merely fulfilling the will of the Party and proletariat when they tirelessly hunted down the enemies of the working class." [64]

The Vecheka's conflict with the NKVD was resolved in March 1919 by making Dzerzhinsky Commissar for Internal Affairs, enabling him to co-ordinate the work of both departments without damage to the Vecheka. A compromise was reached with the NKIu, whereby, under the VTsIK's resolution of 17 February 1919, the function of passing sentence was confined to the revolutionary tribunals, although the Vecheka still exercised the prerogative of meting out summary justice in areas under martial law (during the civil war such areas were extensive and elastic) and of consigning prisoners to concentration camps.[65] In practice, the Vecheka's powers were not seriously curtailed.

AT the seventh congress of Soviets in early December 1919, the ailing Menshevik leader, Martov, condemned the Chekas and the system of terror. During the preceding year, he declared, the apparatus of the Extraordinary Commissions had grown to a huge size, and the attempts to subordinate it to the control of revolutionary tribunals and Soviets

[60] See *Leninsky Sbornik*, Vol. 21, pp. 225–26; *Iz istori VChK*, p. 232, footnote 1; A. V. Tishkov, *Pervyi Chekist* (Moscow, 1968), p. 25; *Protokoly sezdov i konferentsi vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi parti (b). Vosmoi sezd RKP (b), 18–23 marta 1919* (Moscow, 1933), note on p. 515.

[61] *Leninsky Sbornik*, Vol. 21, pp. 113–14.

[62] *S.U.R.* 1918, No. 80: 842, *Izvestiya*, 2 Nov. 1918.

[63] N. V. Krylenko, *Sudoustroistvo RSFSR* (Moscow, 1924), pp. 100–101.

[64] Text in *Iz istorii VChK*, pp. 248–50.

[65] *S.U.R.* 1919, No. 12: 130, *Izvestiya*, 21 Feb. 1919.

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had failed. The "monstrous growth of terror," the abolition of any semblance of legality, and the terrible ascendancy of arbitrary rule had been the consequences of a policy of capitulation to the Chekas, as had the steeping of wide masses of the population in hatred, a condition that represented a greater danger to the Revolution than the conspiracies which the Chekas were combating.[66]

As in the past, Lenin leapt to the defence of the Chekas, roundly declaring that both terror and the Chekas were "absolutely indispensable"; the Chekas were "splendidly organized."[67] Lenin was consistent in championing the Chekas in public. Addressing a Chekist gathering on the first anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, at a time when the Chekas were the target of violent criticism, Lenin had spoken words of consolation and encouragement:

> It is not at all surprising that we hear attacks on the activity of the Chekas, not only on the part of enemies but also of friends . . . What does surprise me about these wails concerning the Chekas' mistakes is the inability to put the problem in a wider perspective. They pick upon individual mistakes of the Chekas, they sob and fuss over them . . . When I contemplate the activity of the Chekas and set it against the criticisms, I remark: these are petty trivialities, of no importance . . . What is important for us is that the Chekas are implementing the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, and in this respect their role is invaluable. There is no other way to liberate the masses except by crushing the exploiters by violence. That is the occupation of the Chekas, and therein consists their service to the proletariat.[68]

OF the Bolshevik leaders, Lenin alone kept a firm and continuous grip on the Vecheka; he had presided over its foundation, he defended its existence, he regulated its powers, he apportioned praise and, occasionally, blame, he from time to time inquired minutely into its investigation of individuals, and, when the Vecheka's work was done and its notoriety became a political liability, he "reformed" it and changed its name.

Lenin took a very close interest in the operational work of the Vecheka. When Unshlikht[69] was deputising for Dzerzhinsky in the Vecheka, as from April 1921, he was in virtually daily communication with Lenin, either over the telephone or by direct contact.[70] Dzerzhinsky had similarly kept Lenin closely informed regarding Vecheka affairs.[71] Despite his many pressing preoccupations, Lenin found time to visit

[66] *Sedmoi vserossiiskii Sezd Sovetov. . . . Stenograficheskii otchet, 5–9 dekabria 1919* (Moscow, 1920), pp. 60–63.

[67] Ibid. pp. 75–80.

[68] Lenin (5), Vol. 37, pp. 173–4—speech on 7 Nov. 1918.

[69] Yosif Stanislavovich Unshlikht (1879–1938), a Pole, served as Deputy Chairman of the Soviet political police, Apr. 1921–Sept. 1923.

[70] Unshlikht, I.S., "Vospominaniia o Vladimire Iliche" in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, 1965 No. 4, p. 96.

[71] See, for example, *Leninsky Sbornik*, Vol. XXXVII, p. 167.

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Vecheka Headquarters at No. 2 Bolshaia Lubianka, where he would stay closeted in Dzerzhinsky's office, giving his attention to current Chekist concerns.[72]

In shaping and directing the Vecheka, Lenin and Dzerzhinsky complemented each other. Dzerzhinsky was admirably fitted for Chekist work; not for nothing had he spent 20 years as an operational revolutionary, mostly in the underground, engaged in a battle of wits with the pursuing Okhrana, living under false identities, organizing a clandestine party, spending many years in prison and Siberian exile, and perpetually escaping in order to resume his struggle against Tsarist authority. He emerged a hardened, battle-scarred revolutionary veteran; this practical education, this accumulated experience, had prepared him for leadership of the Vecheka.

Lenin, by contrast, had been an armchair revolutionary; after a 14 months' spell in Petersburg prison (20 December 1895–early 1897), followed by three years (May 1897–March 1900) spent in the relative ease and tranquillity of Siberian exile—where he was able to marry, to write and translate, to associate with other political exiles, and to engage in his favourite pastimes of hunting, fishing, skating and chess—he never again saw the inside of a Tsarist prison, and, except for a period during the 1905 Revolution and its aftermath, he sojourned in self-imposed emigration, mainly in Western Europe. In practical security matters Lenin was the complete innocent: fallible and gullible, he allowed his party to be riddled with Okhrana agents and, against the evidence, he accepted the word of the most celebrated of them all, the Duma deputy, Roman Malinovsky.[73] In this field, for all his proffered advice on the tactics of conspiracy, on methods of exterminating informers and attacking police posts,[74] Lenin was the inexperienced theorist, Dzerzhinsky the professional. But in character and outlook, in political adroitness and determination, Lenin was the supreme—and, be it said, extreme—revolutionary leader: he had the requisite ruthlessness, the inner certitude, the compelling will to power, the readiness to sacrifice millions of lives for the good of the cause, his sole ethical criterion being that of expediency in the interest of the Revolution—his Revolution.

Unlike the highly strung Dzerzhinsky, that "soul of deep poetic sensibility, constantly stirred to compassion for the weak and suffering . . . living in permanent tension between his lofty idealism and the butchery which was his daily job,"[75] Lenin was virtually devoid of compassion; he was never consumed by remorse, he did not weep for his victims. Yet Lenin was not without personal kindness and consideration, albeit within the strict limits of revolutionary justice, as he

[72] Khatskevich, A. F., *Soldat Velikikh Boev* (Moscow, 1970, 3rd ed.), p. 284.
[73] Wolfe, Bertram D., *Three Who Made a Revolution* (Harmondsworth, 1966, Pelican ed.), pp. 596–620.
[74] Lenin (5), Vol. XI, p. 342, Oct. 1905.
[75] Deutscher, Isaac, *The Prophet Unarmed* (London, 1959), p. 85.

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demonstrated by his innumerable interventions with the Cheka on behalf of individual prisoners. He was concerned to established, in each case that was brought to his attention, whether the arrest had been based on reasonable evidence of counter-revolutionary activity or intent. Where such evidence could be shown to exist, Lenin left the prisoner to his fate, regardless of his social or political standing.

Lenin's interventions with the Vecheka were legion. Why had the Kotelnichi Cheka arrested the teacher Lubnin?[76] Why had the Vecheka not released Kiril Semenovich Ginzburg, despite assurances given by two Party members?[77] Why had the Samara Gub-Cheka arrested the members of an expedition of irrigation experts to Turkestan?[78] Had the food-confiscation detachments and the Gavrilovo-Posadnaia Cheka acted correctly in confiscating grain?[79] Could not Viktor Ivanovich Dobrovolsky, under arrest in Petrograd, be released? He was said to be ill, apolitical, and his family's only breadwinner. In this instance, despite Lenin's intercession, a decision was taken by the Vecheka in March 1919 to confine Dobrovolsky, on charges of counter-revolutionary implication, in a concentration camp until the end of the Civil War.[80] Occasionally, Lenin's enquiries were accompanied by threats. On 20 May 1919, Lenin telegraphed to the Executive Committee of the Novgorod Soviet, with a copy to the local Cheka:

> It appears that Bulatov was arrested for putting a complaint to me. I warn you, for that I shall arrest the Chairman of the Cheka, and the Chairman and members of the Executive Committee, and I shall press for their execution. Why did you not reply at the time to my enquiry?" [81]

On the other hand, Lenin himself was on occasion responsible for over-hasty or unjustified arrests: on 6 January 1919 he ordered the Kursk Cheka to arrest one Kogan for not helping 120 hungry Moscow workers; ten days later he ordered Kogan's release as senior party members vouched for him.[82]

Sometimes, Lenin's interventions had a happy sequel. On 10 February 1919, Lenin informed the Vologda Cheka that he had received an appeal from the children of a certain Mikhailov, who had been taken from hospital straight to prison. It emerged that a local Cheka had already sentenced Mikhailov to death as an enemy of the people, on account of counter-revolutionary activity; following Lenin's intervention, the case was transferred to the Vecheka Special Department, which, finding the charges against Mikhailov insufficiently substantiated, passed the

[76] Lenin (5), Vol. L, pp. 153–54, 17 VIII 1918.
[77] Ibid. pp. 203–4, 11 Nov. 1918.
[78] Ibid. pp. 215–16, 6 Dec. 1918.
[79] Ibid. p. 242, 12 I 1919.
[80] Ibid. pp. 255, 470.
[81] Ibid. p. 318.
[82] *Iz istorii VChK*, pp. 242–43. For other examples of Lenin's intervention in Cheka cases, see: ibid. pp. 219, 459; *Leninsky Sbornik*, Vol. XXI, pp. 233, 235, 238; ibid. Vol. XXXVIII, p. 98, etc.

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case on to the Revolutionary Tribunal attached to VTsIK. On 17 March 1919, the case against Mikhailov was quashed, and he was set free.[83] But for Lenin's enquiry, Mikhailov would have been shot. One can only speculate as to how many thousands of other guiltless Cheka prisoners were summarily executed without proper examination of the evidence brought against them.

Lenin's well-known show of consideration and concern for individuals went hand in hand with an impersonal cruelty. At the end of a Defence Council meeting Lenin arranged, with characteristic solicitude, for one of those present, Liberman, a Menshevik timber expert, who had a racking cough, to be driven home by Lenin's own chauffeur, yet at that very meeting he had ruled that state foresters should be shot by the Cheka if peasants, for whose work they were made responsible, failed to produce their full quota of firewood.[84]

AS time went on and Lenin was increasingly faced with evidence of bureaucratic sloth and inefficiency in Soviet administration, he tended more and more to apply terror and Cheka action as a remedy for such failings. Terror became with him an administrative technique, a simple way of solving problems and achieving results. If there was a faulty telephone connection, Lenin advised in a telegram to Stalin: "Threaten to shoot the idiot who is in charge of telecommunications."[85] Or, again, in August 1921, when there was a printing delay in the Vecheka press, Lenin sent word to his Chekist secretary, Belenky, that he was angry, and that there must be no further delay, "otherwise I shall lock them up."[86]

Lenin's actions, and his use of the Chekas, were guided by the simple criterion of revolutionary expediency, disregarding all accepted notions of morality, or any suffering involved. The lengths of cruelty and perfidy to which he was prepared to go against the class enemy are illustrated by a handwritten note passed by him, at a meeting in August 1920, to Trotsky's deputy on the Revolutionary War Council, Skliansky:

> A beautiful plan. Finish it off *together* with Dzerzhinsky. Under the guise of "Greens" (and we will pin it on them later) we shall go forward for 10–20 versts and hang the kulaks, priests and landowners. Bounty: 100,000 roubles for each man hanged.[87]

This "beautiful plan" must have concerned the Polish front, where Dzerzhinsky was then serving. By such a stratagem the Soviet authorities would be doubly advantaged: at one stroke they would annihilate some of their most resolute class opponents in the countryside, whilst blaming

[83] *Leninskii Sbornik*, Vol. XXXVII, p. 127.
[84] Liberman, Simon, *Building Lenin's Russia* (Chicago, 1945), pp. 14–15.
[85] Ulam, Adam, *Lenin and the Bolsheviks* (London, 1969, Fontana ed.), pp. 552–53.
[86] Lenin (5), Vol. LIII, p. 55.
[87] Meijer, Jan M., *The Trotsky Papers, 1920–1922* (The Hague, 1971), Vol. II, pp. 278–79.

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the atrocity on the "Green" bands of brigands and army deserters who obstructed the imposition of Soviet "law and order."

The above incident is representative of Lenin's general attitude on ethics, as proclaimed, for instance, on 2 October 1920 in his speech on the theme of communist morality at the third All-Russian Komsomol congress:

> Does Communist morality exist? Of course it does . . . We say that our morality is wholly subordinated to the interests of the class war waged by the proletariat . . . We say that morality consists in destroying the old exploiting society and in uniting all workers around the proletariat which is creating a new Communist society.[88]

Communist morality, as preached by Lenin, became the morality of the Chekas. It found forceful expression in the first issue of *Krasnyi Mech* (the Red Sword), weekly periodical of the Political Department of the Special Corps of Ukrainian Cheka Troops, published in Kiev on 18 August 1919:

> For us there do not, and cannot, exist the old systems of morality and "humanity" invented by the bourgeoisie for the purpose of oppressing and exploiting the "lower classes." Our morality is new, our humanity is absolute, for it rests on the bright ideal of destroying all oppression and coercion.
>
> To us, all is permitted, for we are the first in the world to raise the sword not in the name of enslaving and oppressing anyone, but in the name of freeing all from bondage . . . Blood? Let there be blood, if it alone can turn the grey-white-and-black banner of the old piratical world to a scarlet hue, for only the complete and final death of that world will save us from the return of the old jackals.[89]

The Cheka system, after all, was the translation into action of Lenin's doctrine of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Did not Lenin himself say: "The Cheka organs should become the weapon for the realisation of the centralised will of the proletariat." [90] And so the key to understanding the Red Terror and the Cheka system lies essentially in Lenin's doctrine and Lenin's character. A penetrating insight into that mind and character has been afforded by a contemporary observer, Alexander Berkman, himself an Anarchist, who came to Russia in January 1920 to serve the Revolution, only to depart in bitter disillusion. He concluded that Lenin's strength was intellectual, "that of the profound conviction of an unimaginative nature." [91] After a meeting with Lenin he recorded:

> The total impression I carried away was that of a man of clarity of view and set purpose. Not necessarily a big man, but one of strong mind and unbending will. An unemotional logician, intellectually flexible and courageous enough to mould his methods to the

[88] Lenin (5), Vol. XLI, pp. 309, 311.
[89] *Krasnyi Mech*, Kiev, No. 1, 18 Aug. 1919.
[90] *Iz istorii VChK*, pp. 370–71.
[91] Berkman, Alexander, 1925, *The Bolshevik Myth: Diary 1920–1922* (New York, 1925), p. 90.

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> requirements of the moment, but always keeping his final objective in clear sight. "A practical idealist" bent upon the realisation of his Communist dream by whatever means, and subordinating to it every ethical and humanitarian consideration. A man sincerely convinced that evil methods may serve a good purpose and be justified by it. A Jesuit of the Revolution who would force mankind to be free in accordance with his interpretation of Marx. In short, a thoroughgoing revolutionist in the sense of Nechaev, one who would sacrifice the greater part of mankind—if need be—to secure the triumph of the Social Revolution.

Ironically, this diagnosis was formulated even earlier by V. R. Menzhinsky, the future chairman of the OGPU, in his article on Lenin in the Paris Russian *émigré* journal, *Nashe Ekho* (15 July 1915):

> Lenin . . . is a political Jesuit, who for many years has adapted Marxism to his aims of the moment, and has ended by entangling himself.

LENIN'S decision to introduce NEP carried two contrasting consequences: economic liberalization, on the one hand, but political tightening of the screws, on the other. Such political constriction extended both to the Communist Party ("putting the lid on opposition") and, much more drastically, to other socialist parties: Mensheviks and SRs were now subjected to even severer repression than previously at the hands of the Cheka. Whatever economic concessions and doctrinaire retreats might be necessary to save the Soviet regime, Lenin was determined that the Party leadership—now a narrowing oligarchy—should exert an iron grip on the political and security situation.

Although Civil War on the external fronts had been successfully terminated in November 1920, internally the Soviet regime was under heavy stress; unrest among the industrial proletariat, mutiny in revolutionary Kronstadt, serious rebellion in Tambov, and "political banditry" rife in many other regions, especially in the Ukraine and in Siberia; all these and other danger signals gave the Party ample cause for alarm. The Vecheka's services were still considerably in demand. At the 10th Party congress Zinoviev declared:

> I do not protest against the existence of an institution of ours called the Vecheka, although I know very well that such an institution as the Vecheka is not in itself in keeping with a workers' democracy. Without doubting that for a moment, I did not—and do not now—propose that the Vecheka be abolished. . . .[92]

On 17 March 1921, immediately after the 10th Party congress, the Orgburo decided to strengthen the Vecheka by recalling for service former Chekists who could be spared from their current work.[93]

[92] *Protokoly sezdov i konferentsii Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b). Desiatyi sezd RKP (b), mart 1921* (Moscow, 1933), p. 400.

[93] *Iz istorii VChK*, p. 437.

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NEVERTHELESS, the implementation of NEP and the relaxation of relations with other countries called for a new, liberalized image of the Soviet state, an image which would not go well with the dreaded name and continued existence of the Cheka. Lenin decided that here too concessions must be made, observed though they be ultimately in the letter rather than in the spirit.

By November 1921, a new statute for the Vecheka, consonant with the mood of NEP, was in process of formulation. The Vecheka Collegium's draft for the proposed statute was supported by Kursky, People's Commissar for Justice. In a covering note, forwarding the draft to Lenin, Kamenev commented that this represented Dzerzhinsky's maximum terms; Kamenev outlined his own maximum *desiderata*:

> *1.* Relieve the Cheka of everything except political crimes, espionage, banditry, security of roads and stores. Nothing more. The rest to go to the NKIu.
>
> *2.* The Cheka's investigation apparatus to be merged with the NKIu, subordinating it to the Revolutionary Tribunals.

The Vecheka Collegium objected to the proposed transfer of its investigation machinery and regarded as premature the separation of political cases from others of major damage to the state, and of abuse of official position. Lenin, however, was determined to reform the Vecheka. In reply to Kamenev, he wrote, on 29 November:

> Comrade Kamenev; My position is closer to yours than to Dzerzhinsky's. I advise you not to give way, and to raise [the issue] in the Politburo. Then we shall make a stand for the very maximum. In addition, we shall make the NKIu responsible for any failure to report to the Politburo (or Sovnarkom) on the Vecheka's defects and errors.[94]

Lenin brought the issue before the ninth All-Russian congress of Soviets in an evening speech on 22 December 1921. He said of the Vecheka:

> This is the institution which was our trenchant weapon against innumerable plots, innumerable attempts against Soviet authority by people who were infinitely stronger than ourselves. . . . You know that it was impossible to counter them otherwise than by merciless, swift, instant repression, backed by the support of workers and peasants. That is the merit of our Vecheka. . . . The workers' power could not exist without such an agency, so long as exploiters remain in being. . . . We shall continue to value and utilise such an agency as the Vecheka. That we can guarantee to all and sundry. But at the same time we state categorically that it is essential to subject the Vecheka to reform, to define its functions and competence, and to limit its work to political tasks. We are now faced with the task of developing a civil course—that is required by the New Economic Policy—and that calls for more revolutionary legality.[95]

[94] Lenin (5), Vol. LIV, pp. 39, 569 *note*.
[95] Lenin (5), Vol. XLIV, p. 327.

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There followed, on 27 December, a brief resolution by the Congress, praising the Vecheka for its past achievements but ruling that its activities be restricted, and that judicial organs should take over the task of combating infraction of Soviet laws. The Congress bade the VTsIK Presidium to review urgently the existing Vecheka statute with a view to that agency's reorganization, limitation of its competence, and strengthening the foundations of revolutionary legality.[96]

On 23 January 1922, the Politburo, having considered afresh the problem of the Vecheka's reorganization, determined the basic tasks and functions of the State Political Administration (*Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie*—GPU) which, replacing the Vecheka, was to be attached to the NKVD; this proposal was to form the basis for the VTsIK decree of 6 February 1922 on the reorganization of the Vecheka.[97]

Meanwhile the Vecheka fought a rearguard action to retain at least some of its threatened prerogatives and functions. The brunt fell on Unshlikht's shoulders, owing to Dzerzhinsky's absence.

On 18 January 1922, Unshlikht submitted to Lenin a fresh draft of the proposed Vecheka statute, formulated by the Vecheka Collegium. Under its terms, the Vecheka's functions were to be limited to combating counter-revolutionary activities—an extensive enough definition capable of elastic interpretation—the Vecheka retaining its punitive powers, its name, and its direct subordination to the Sovnarkom. In his covering note, Unshlikht insistently defended this draft, following it up on 26 January with further representations to Lenin. Lenin disagreed. He wrote in reply that Unshlikht's aims could and should be attained not by way of his proposals but through the draft worked out by the Party Central Committee's special commission. Lenin observed that Revolutionary Tribunals need not always conduct their business in public, that their personnel could be reinforced by inclusion of Chekists, that their contact with the Vecheka could be tightened, the speed and weight of their repressive measures increased; the Central Committee's attention should be directed to these points. The slightest increase in banditry, etc., should lead to martial law and summary execution. The Sovnarkom would be able to see to this swiftly; Lenin suggested that Unshlikht should consult Stalin.[98]

The Politburo met again on 2 February (Lenin excused his absence through illness), to discuss the Vecheka, and approved a draft decree on the GPU for the Politburo's confirmation.[99]

ON 6 February 1922, VTsIK finally passed this Vecheka-into-GPU decree[100] abolishing the Vecheka and transferring the following of

[96] Ibid. pp. 567–68; *S.U.R.* 1922, No. 4: 42, *Izvestiya*, 30 Dec. 1921.
[97] Lenin (5), Vol. XLIV, p. 568.
[98] Lenin (5), Vol. LIV, pp. 144, 604.
[99] Lenin (5), Vol. LIV, pp. 149, 608.
[100] *S.U.R.* 1922, No. 16: 160, 6 Feb. 1922, *Izvestiya*, 8 Feb. 1922.

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its functions to a simultaneously established State Political Administration (GPU), which was to be an integral part of the NKVD, whose Chairman would personally direct the GPU:

(a) suppression of overt counter-revolutionary activity, including banditry
(b) counter-espionage
(c) protection of railways and waterways
(d) guarding the RSFSR's frontiers against illegal crossing and smuggling.

Furthermore, the GPU stood at the disposal of the VTsIK Presidium and of Sovnarkom "for the fulfilment of any special assignments for the maintenance of revolutionary order"—a conveniently flexible clause.

The declared intent of the decree was to make the GPU responsible for dealing specifically with politically subversive activities; all other, purely criminal, matters, such as speculation and misuse of official position, were to be the preoccupation of the law courts and revolutionary tribunals (leaving out of account, however, the wide ambit of the GPU's Economic Administration, which concerned itself by no means least with departmental efficiency and staff probity). The Vecheka's rights of meting out sentence and punishment to offenders were not transferred to the GPU.

The GPU and its organs were authorized to search and arrest, where necessary, persons involved in activities falling within GPU competence, subject to certain conditions: where such persons were caught red-handed on the scene of the crime, GPU local organs were empowered to take search and arrest action on their own initiative, provided permission was obtained *post facto* within 48 hours from the GPU, but in all other cases such authorization had to be obtained in advance; the arrested person must be notified of the charge against him within 14 days of arrest; within 2 months of arrest the arrested person must either be released or sent to the courts for trial, unless the GPU secured the VTsIK Presidium's agreement to further detention.

ALTHOUGH this Vecheka-into-GPU decree reflected Lenin's and Kamenev's rather than the Vecheka Collegium's conception of the new security agency, specifically depriving it of the Vecheka's responsibility for non-political crime, changing its name and denying it punitive powers, including power of execution, in point of fact, its restricted functional competence enabled the GPU to concentrate its attention on political security matters instead of dissipating it on the mass of petty transgressions of a criminal or economic nature.

Despite restriction of the Vecheka's authority, its organization, machinery and manpower were handed over to the GPU virtually intact. The same headquarters personnel remained in the Lubianka, and little change of staff occurred down the line. Although the GPU was incorporated in the NKVD, instead of (like the Vecheka) being directly

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subordinated to the Sovnarkom, its Chairman, Dzerzhinsky, in his capacity as People's Commissar for the NKVD of the RSFSR—a post retained by him until his replacement on 7 July 1923 by his NKVD deputy, A. G. Beloborodov[101]—continued to speak for the political police in the Sovnarkom. Moreover, by its formal integration in the NKVD, under statute, the political police now became a regular department of state, shedding the ill-defined, provisional status attaching to its predecessor, the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution.

Within 18 months, the political police would further consolidate and extend its position. On 30 December 1922, the self-constituted first congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) approved the proposed formation of the USSR, with the RSFSR as one of its constituent republics. The USSR Constitution, adopted on 6 July 1923 (and finally ratified on 31 January 1924), provided for three categories of people's commissariats: the all-union commissariats responsible for foreign affairs, defence, etc.) which existed only in the central government, in the Sovnarkom of the USSR; the unified commissariats, which existed both at USSR level and in the union republics, with the latter executing decisions taken at the centre; and the republic commissariats, which existed only at republic level. The NKVD fitted into the last category. As a special case, under article 61 of the Constitution, the GPU—now renamed OGPU (Unified State Political Administration)—was lifted out of the republic-level NKVD, and was attached directly to the USSR Sovnarkom, whilst functioning locally through representatives attached to the republic governments; in effect the OGPU enjoyed unified commissariat status. Both the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of OGPU were *ex-officio* members of the USSR Sovnarkom, with a consultative vote.[102] The OGPU's powers and functions were defined by a VTsIK Presidium decree of 15 November 1923.[103] Continuity of leadership was maintained, the USSR Sovnarkom appointing Dzerzhinsky as Chairman, and V. R. Menzhinsky as Deputy Chairman, of the OGPU.[104] The political police was now enshrined in the Constitution, and its writ ran throughout the Soviet Union.

In the meanwhile the GPU's powers of detention and punishment did not stay curbed for long; in any event the VTsIK Presidium could be relied upon to extend beyond the statutory two months' period, and indeed indefinitely, the detention of persons deemed dangerous by the GPU. This clause of the decree of 6 February 1922, described optimistically by Kursky as equivalent to Habeas Corpus,[105] turned out often

[101] *S.U.R.* 1923, No. 66: 640, 7 Jul. 1923.

[102] Fainsod, Merle, *How Russia is Ruled* (Cambridge/Massachusetts and London, 1963), pp. 367–68; Wolin, Simon and Slusser, Robert M. (eds), *The Soviet Secret Police* (London, 1957), pp. 10, 39 *note* 43; Batsell, W. R., *Soviet Rule in Russia* (New York, 1929), p. 609.

[103] Translation in Batsell, op. cit. pp. 609–10.

[104] Tishkov, A. V., *Pervyi Chekist* (Moscow, 1968), p. 121.

[105] *Ezhenedelnik Sovetskoi iustitsii*, Moscow, No. 7, 1922, p. 2.

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enough in practice to be rather a case of Habeas Cadaver. As for punishment, Lenin did not intend to bind the GPU by the decree's restrictions. On 1 March 1922 he wrote to Peters,[106] who had complained that the dissolution of the Vecheka was untimely and that all sorts of disorders and bribery were rife:

> Comrade Peters! Because of illness I cannot unfortunately see you. As regards bribery, etc., the State Political Administration can and should combat and punish by shooting, through the law courts. The GPU should come to an agreement with the NKIu, and should get the Politburo to issue a suitable directive to the NKIu and to all organs.[107]

Even before this, on 20 February, just a fortnight after abolishing the Cheka, Lenin wrote a highly confidential letter to Kursky, Chairman of the NKIu, with copies to the Politburo and to the VTsIK Presidium, in which he rebuked the NKIu for not fulfilling its responsibilities under the new conditions of NEP:

> Formerly the combat organs of the Soviet regime were, chiefly, the People's Commissariat for War and the Vecheka. Now this particularly militant role falls on the NKIu; unfortunately there is no evidence of understanding of this on the part of the NKIu's leadership and its principal executives. The intensification of repression against enemies of Soviet authority and agents of the bourgeoisie (especially the Mensheviks and SRs); the implementation of such repression through revolutionary tribunals and people's courts in the most speedy and revolutionary-minded manner; the essential staging of a series of model trials (exemplary as regards swiftness and strength of repression, and enlightenment of the masses through the courts and the press as to that repression's meaning) in Moscow, Petrograd, Kharkov, and several other major centres; the bringing of influence to bear, through the Party, upon people's judges and members of revolutionary tribunals, with a view to improving the courts' performance and to intensifying repression . . .

All this, wrote Lenin, should be done systematically and persistently; similarly, exploiters of NEP should be punished mercilessly, to the point of applying the death sentence.[108]

Lenin continued to put pressure on Kursky. On 15 May he wrote:

> Comrade Kursky! In my view the application of shooting must be extended . . . to all aspects of Menshevik, SR, etc., activity; a formula should be found associating such activity with the international bourgeoisie.[109]

Two days later Lenin sent Kursky a draft paragraph for the envisaged Criminal Code, and wrote:

[106] Yakov Khristoforovich Peters (1886–(?)1938/1942), a Latvian founder-member of the Vecheka, and one of Dzerzhinsky's principal lieutenants.

[107] Lenin (5), Vol. LIV, pp. 196, 324.

[108] Ibid. Vol. XLIV, pp. 396–97.

[109] Ibid. Vol. XLV, p. 189.

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> The law should not abolish terror: to promise that would be self-delusion or deception; it should be substantiated and legalized in principle, clearly, without evasion or embellishment. The paragraph on terror should be formulated as widely as possible, since only revolutionary consciousness of justice and revolutionary conscience can determine the conditions of its application in practice.[110]

THE GPU played its part in this continuing regime of terror. Under the terms of its founding decree, the GPU initially lacked the Cheka's prerogative of passing and carrying out extra-judicial sentence. This deprivation was designed to demonstrate that the rule of law was paramount under the liberalized conditions of NEP. But Lenin still required the isolation or elimination of militant class-enemies, as also of political adversaries such as Mensheviks, SRs and Anarchists. Consequently the GPU was soon equipped with wide extra-judicial powers. Under the VTsIK decree of 10 August 1922,[111] the GPU was authorized to exile, by administrative order, either abroad or to designated localities within the RSFSR (for residence there under local GPU supervision), for a period not exceeding three years, persons engaging in "counter-revolutionary activity." Such procedure had to receive the assent of a Special Commission (Osobaia Komissiia) of the NKVD, chaired by the latter's Chairman and composed of NKVD (i.e. doubtless GPU) and NKIu representatives.

Furthermore, under the decree of 16 October 1922,[112] the GPU was authorized, in cases of bandit raids and armed robbery, to punish by summary process, including execution by shooting, any persons caught red-handed on the scene of the crime. The decree also conferred upon the NKVD Special Commission the right to exile and to confine in forced labour camps at the place of exile, for a period up to three years, "activists of anti-Soviet political parties" and certain categories of criminals upon their second conviction for criminal offences.

The GPU ensured that exile to forced labour camps was tantamount to a sentence of death. It inherited from the Vecheka the nucleus of a group of concentration camps in a northern region of Russia, situated on the White Sea coast and on the archipelago of islands—the Solovetskie Islands—colloquially called Solovki. The archipelago was isolated from the mainland by ice floes from October to June. The official title of this complex of camps was: The Northern Camps of Special Purpose (Severnye Lageria Osobogo Naznacheniia, i.e. SLON—to use the Soviet acronym). These and other GPU concentration camps were administered from Moscow by the Old Chekist, Gleb Boky, a member of the GPU Collegium, and chief of the GPU Special Department (Spetsialnyi Otdel).

[110] Letter of 17 May 1922 to Kursky—see Lenin (5), Vol. XLV, p. 190. Lenin's draft formed the basis of paragraph 57 of the first RSFSR Criminal Code.

[111] *S.U.R.* 1922, No. 51: 646, 10 Aug. 1922, *Izvestiya*, 18 Aug. 1922. See also *S.U.R.* 1923, No. 8: 108.

[112] *S.U.R.* 1922, No. 65: 844, 16 Oct. 1922, *Izvestiya*, 19 Oct. 1922.

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In the early years the conditions of existence in these camps were such that prisoners could not expect to survive more than about a year. These were, literally, extermination camps: extermination through extreme cold, hard labour, chronic malnutrition and savagery by the guards, who used the gun arbitrarily, sometimes resorting to mass execution. Those prisoners who did survive their three-year sentence were usually given a further term of imprisonment on some pretext, or else were exiled to a " free settlement " in Siberia, where they equally perished. Prisoners fell into four categories:

(1) criminals considered incorrigible
(2) counter-revolutionaries (" KRs "), i.e. adherents of former right wing parties, other supporters of the *ancien régime*, e.g. Tsarist and White Army officers, members of liberal parties—such as the Kadets
(3) " politicals," belonging to the socialist or anarchist parties
(4) ex-Chekists, punished for some offence.

The first contingents of prisoners sent to the Northern Camps were captured White Army officers, soon joined by sailor survivors of the Kronstadt Revolt. Anarchists arrived in February 1922, harbingers of the Mensheviks and SRs to come. Very few of the variegated concentration camp population had been sentenced by regular courts; the majority had been disposed of administratively by the Cheka or GPU.[113]

The decree of 16 October 1922 permitted the GPU to shoot bandits apprehended on the scene of their crime, but there was no legal provision for execution of " counter-revolutionaries " or " politicals." Despite this, the GPU engaged from the start in execution of the latter categories on a large scale, both centrally, e.g. in Petrograd,[114] and in the Northern Camps, which were under martial law.[115] Such executions were normally subject to confirmation of sentence from the GPU in Moscow, but in the Northern Camps they were absolutely arbitrary.[116]

LENIN suffered his first stroke on 26 May 1922. His recovery and convalescence in Gorki lasted until 2 October 1922, so he could not be held technically responsible for the decree of 10 August 1922, although that decree was clearly composed in the spirit of Lenin's letters to Kursky on terror, making it formally possible, as it did, to exile Mensheviks and SRs by administrative process. The further decree of

113 Dallin, David J. and Nicolaevsky, Boris I., *Forced Labour in Soviet Russia* (London, 1948), pp. 168–174; Cederholm, Boris, *In the Clutches of the Tcheka* (London, 1929), pp. 280–83, 288–91, 333; Brunovskii, V., " Delo bylo v S.S.S.R.: Stranichka iz vospominanii byv. smertnika " in *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii* (I. V. Gessen, ed.) (Berlin 1928), Vol. XIX, p. 132; Agabekov, G.S., *G.P.U.: Zapiski Chekista* (Berlin, 1930), pp. 14–15; Solzhenitsyn, A., *Arkipelag GULag, 1918–1956* (Paris, 1974), Vol. II, Pts. III–IV, pp. 18–20.

114 Cederholm, op. cit. p. 248.

115 Ibid. pp. 59, 64, 248, 279–80, 290–91.

116 Ibid. pp. 248, 280.

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16 October, enabling the GPU to commit "activists of anti-Soviet political parties" to concentration camps for up to three years, must have been passed with the recovered Lenin's assent.

ON the surface, the abolition of the Vecheka appeared to be a significant reform, in line with the liberalism of the New Economic Policy. Lenin made a particular point of changing the Vecheka's name —a symbolic act of disassociation from the old order. But in substance the old order survived; the political police, reincarnated in the GPU, almost immediately recovered many of the arbitrary powers of its predecessor, regardless of the ending of the Civil War emergency which had been used to justify the Vecheka's uncompromising repression. For Lenin, NEP and its consequences represented a vital breathing space, a temporary tactic which did not detract from the long-term revolutionary aims of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. In conditions of internal crisis and capitalist encirclement, it was a case of *reculer pour mieux sauter*. In his speech on 5 July 1921 at the third Comintern congress, Lenin asserted:

> Dictatorship is a state of intensified war. We are precisely in that state now. At the moment there is no military invasion. However we are isolated . . . Until the final issue is decided, the state of terrible war will continue. And we say: war is war, we do not promise any freedom nor any democracy.[117]

PLUS ça change, plus c'est la même chose. This adage applies not merely to the cynical charade of the Vecheka's transformation into the GPU, but also, at a deeper level, to the about-turn performed by certain key Soviet institutions which under Lenin reverted to a pre-revolutionary pattern.

In his last articulate months, before his third stroke silenced him in March 1923, Lenin was a prey to doubt and despair as he engaged in a reappraisal of communist achievements. His regime, having opened hopefully with the libertarian experiment of workers' control, had then oscillated to the opposite extreme of militarization of labour, before swinging over to the free-market economy of NEP. NEP was a calculated, time-buying, tactical retreat, but could the same be said of compromises in other domains of the Soviet system? Writing *The State and Revolution* in 1917, Lenin had vowed to demolish three essential bastions of bourgeois capitalism: after seizing power, the proletariat, organized as the ruling revolutionary class, would have the opportunity—

> to crush, to smash to atoms, to wipe off the face of the earth the bourgeois, even the republican bourgeois, state machine: the standing army, the police and bureaucracy; to substitute for all this a *more* democratic, but still a state machine in the shape of the armed masses of workers who become transformed into a universal people's militia.[118]

[117] Lenin (5), Vol. XLIV, pp. 53–4.

[118] Lenin (5), Vol. XXXIII, p. 100.

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Subsequently, speaking on 8 March 1918 at the seventh Party congress, and reviewing the achievements of the post-October regime, Lenin had declared:

> Soviet power is a new type of state in which there is no bureaucracy, no standing army, no police . . . " and he had gone on to assert: " The state is a machine for coercion. The exploiters must be suppressed, but they should not be suppressed by the police, they can only be suppressed by the masses.[119]

At that time, Lenin was still deluding himself that a professional police was no more necessary than a regular army: he was possessed by his vision of a part-time " universal people's militia " which should do duty as police and army and administration. As for the Vecheka, that was seen as an improvised *ad hoc* agency, in no way intended to become an institutionalized feature.

All too soon, Lenin's vision vanished: on 26 March 1918 a Lenin decree ended workers' control on the railroads—an initial step towards the replacement of workers' control over industry by a state system of bureaucratically controlled labour compulsion; a decree of 22 April introduced military conscription as a basis for building the regular Red Army; and the same month saw the first foundations laid for a centralized, full-time militia, i.e. professional police. And now, at the start of 1923, over two years since the end of Civil War, here was the Soviet state still saddled with a flourishing bureaucracy, a regular Red Army, a professional militia, and an entrenched political police. The wheel had come full circle. Was it for this ironic ending that the Revolution had been carried out, the Civil War fought? It was a bitter *dénouement*. Lenin had led a sustained crusade against bureaucracy only to conclude, in February 1923, that his chosen vehicle for bureaucratic reform, Rabkrin (the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate), until recently headed by Stalin, had utterly failed in its purpose.[120] As for the vigorous survival of the standing army and the police, Lenin the utopian may have comforted himself casuistically by reflecting that these were purely temporary devices—to be dispensed with just as soon as the Dictatorship of the Proletariat was firmly established, if not throughout the world, then at least over Europe. But Lenin the pragmatist must have realized in his heart that the prospects for such a consummation were at present negligible, and that for the foreseeable future the Red Army and the political police remained indispensable.

The Vecheka had been founded explicitly as a temporary organ, an " Extraordinary Commission," which, as Latsis wrote in 1920, " has no place in our constitutional system. The time of civil war, the time of extraordinary conditions of existence of Soviet power, will pass and

[119] *Sedmoi ekstrennyi sezd RKP(b): mart 1918 goda, stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1962), p. 144.

[120] See Lenin's article in *Pravda*, 4 Mar. 1923.

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the Chekas will become superfluous." [121] Zinoviev, addressing a Chekist conference in Petrograd in October 1918, looked to the time when all Chekas would be disbanded and a kindergarten replaced the Petrograd Cheka at No. 2 Gorokhovaia Street.[122] But the Chekas grew roots in the Soviet state until the Vecheka's successor, the GPU, duly upgraded to OGPU, became established as a regular institution of state under the terms of the USSR constitution of July 1923. *Il n'y a que le provisoire qui dure*: the temporary expedient had come to stay.

HOW effective had the Vecheka been and how essential to the survival of the Soviet regime? The rule of the Bolshevik Party in the face of stern military resistance by the White Armies (supported by Entente intervention), of large scale peasant insurrection, of political opposition by rival socialist parties, of industrial unrest, and of the significant revolt of the Red sailors of Kronstadt, had all too conspicuously depended on naked force; it was indeed, as visualized by Lenin in 1917, a case of " power shared with none," but it was not, after the heady coup of October, wholly " power relying directly upon the armed force of the masses."[123] It was, instead, government by a minority party ruling in the name of the proletariat—itself a minority element of the population—but without the proletariat's wholehearted support. In such a desperate predicament, Lenin's dictatorship, like all dictatorships, had to rely on naked armed strength (Red Army, reinforced by Internal Security Troops) and on coercion exercised by a political police competent to identify and suppress internal threats to the regime from whatever quarter. The Vecheka fulfilled these requirements brilliantly, if bloodily. The ex-Deputy Chairman of the Vecheka/GPU, Unshlikht, speaking on the 10th anniversary of the Vecheka's foundation, was not greatly overstating the case when he asserted:

> Without the Vecheka and the OGPU, the realization and consolidation of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat would not have been possible.[124]

The initial realization of the Soviet Dictatorship *had* in fact come about without Vecheka aid, for the Vecheka did not begin to play a vital role until midway through 1918; however, the regime's subsequent consolidation and eventual victory were signally indebted to the Vecheka's application of ruthless terror and to its successful suppression of major military conspiracies, especially in the latter part of 1919.

Equally, without the Vecheka's successors, the OGPU and the NKVD, Stalin's inhuman compulsory collectivization of agriculture, his vast system of concentration camp forced labour, and the holocaust of the

[121] Latsis, M.Ia., *Chrezvychainye komissii po borbe s kontrrevoliutsiei* (Moscow, 1921), p. 27.

[122] *Ezhenedelnik V.Ch.K.*, Moscow, No. 6, 27 Oct. 1918, p. 22.

[123] Lenin (5), Vol. XXXIII, p. 26.

[124] *Izvestiya*, 18 Dec. 1927.

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purges under his Great Terror, could not have happened. Stalin let loose the political police—basically Lenin's creation—to destroy first his rivals for power, then the upper and middle hierarchies of the Party and Red Army, and finally the upper echelons of the NKVD itself, so as to expunge all first-hand evidence of his own deep complicity in the preceding carnage. So perished the Old Chekists. This savage aftermath of Lenin's rule was not inevitable but it was Lenin who laid the police-state foundations which made it technically possible.

THE principle of democratic centralism, as interpreted by Lenin and practised by the Bolshevik Party since its inception, pointed unmistakably towards dictatorship, whether oligarchic or autocratic in character. Indeed, at an early stage of the Bolshevik regime, in April 1918, Lenin spoke up for the very real administrative advantages of one-man dictatorship:

> In the history of revolutions the dictatorship of single individuals has often been the expression, the personification, so to speak, of the dictatorship of revolutionary classes . . . Therefore there is decidely no inconsistency in principle between Soviet (i.e. socialist) democracy and the assumption of dictatorial power by individual persons.[125]

Two years later, in March 1920, Lenin reiterated his advocacy of personal dictatorship:

> Soviet socialist democracy is not in the least incompatible with individual rule and dictatorship. The will of a class may sometimes be carried out by a dictator who can sometimes do more all by himself and who is frequently more essential.[126]

A voluntarist predisposition, dressed-up as historical determinism, combined with an oligarchic Party system equipped with a powerful political police—such was the lethal legacy which Lenin bequeathed to his successor. Neither Party nor police were bound by any external law or ethic, their conduct being dictated by Central Committee (and, increasingly, Politburo) fiat. In the hands of a power-addicted, paranoiac despot of Stalin's dimensions, such limitless licence was put to devastating, horrendous effect. Dictators require obedient instruments of coercion; the state security organs founded by Lenin served that need.

THE heir to the traditions of Lenin's political police is today's Committee of State Security (KGB), whose personnel proudly call themselves *Chekisty*. The security apparatus of the years of Stalin's terror is mostly passed over in discreet silence, and the KGB harks back instead to the idealized Leninist service under Dzerzhinsky, when the political police was still the Party's servant and operated in the spirit

[125] Lenin (4), Vol. XXVII, pp. 235, 238, *Pravda and Izvestiya*, 28 Apr. 1918.
[126] Lenin (5), Vol. XL, p. 272, Lenin's speech on 31 Mar. 1920.

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of " revolutionary justice "—even if that justice frankly signified merciless, arbitrary and wholesale repression against all opponents of Lenin's single-party state. There exists today a veritable cult of the Vecheka; a considerable volume of adulatory literature has been devoted to it over the past decade,[127] and the 50th anniversary of its foundation was celebrated in the Soviet Union with full propaganda honours. The mantle of the Vecheka confers prestige and Leninist legitimacy upon the KGB; the line of continuity between the two institutions is exemplified by the KGB's use, for its headquarters, of the same Lubianka building (once Bolshaia Lubianka 2, now Ul. Dzerzhinskogo 2)[128] in which Felix Dzerzhinsky presided over the Vecheka.

The Soviet state, based from the start not on a democratic consensus but on authoritarian control, depends today upon the KGB as crucially as Lenin's state ever did on the Vecheka; it is a measure of the KGB's influence and power that, since his appointment as KGB Chairman in 1967, Yur. Andropov has sat continuously in the Politburo, first as a candidate-member and, since April 1973, as a full member—the first State Security chief since Beria to have attained such status. Even Dzerzhinsky in his heyday did not advance beyond candidate-membership of the Politburo.

It was Stalin who promoted Dzerzhinsky politically, Stalin who set the police above the Party, Stalin who used it for his despotic ends; it is symbolically fitting therefore that Stalin, since his deposition in October 1961 from Lenin's mausoleum by decision of the 22nd Party congress, now lies interred next to Dzerzhinsky in Moscow's Red Square by the Kremlin wall, the tyrannical dictator beside his first chief of police. But it was under Lenin that the Soviet political police was born, served its grim apprenticeship, and came to maturity.

[127] See *Soviet Intelligence and Security Services, [Vol. I] 1964–1970, A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications, . . .* prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, at the request of and based on materials provided by the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (Washington, 1972), pp. 5–93, 225–237; also Vol. II (Washington, 1975), pp. 5–97, 279; see also Heller, Michael, " Stalin and the Detectives " in *Survey*, Vol. 21, No. 1/2 (94/95), Winter–Spring 1975, p. 168.

[128] *Kratkaia adresno-spravochnaia kniga* (Moscow, 1965), p. 30. For a photograph of the building, see Barron, John, *KGB* (London, 1974), facing p. 270.

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Lenin, Parvus and Solzhenitsyn

Michael Heller

ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN never ceases to surprise and to startle us by his courage, his fecundity, his immense talent and his impatience. Like an active volcano he is constantly throwing fire, burning-hot lava and rocks into the world. The echoes of his " studies in literary life "—*The Calf Butted the Oak*—published last spring have hardly died away, and now, in the autumn of the same year, 1975, he offers his readers a new work: *Lenin in Zurich.*

The structure of *Lenin in Zurich* determines the book's strength and its weakness. Solzhenitsyn has assembled the chapters on Lenin which he had written for his gigantic historical novel about the revolution (indeed, the subtitle is *Chapters*). The book consists of Chapter 22 of the novel *August 1914* (which Solzhenitsyn had removed from the manuscript while he was living in Moscow), seven chapters from the " second knot," *October 1916* and three chapters from the " third knot," *March 1917.*

These 11 chapters which run to 240 pages are a portrait of Lenin: Lenin the *émigré*, leader of a tiny sectarian party, a fanatic obsessed by a single idea, a single desire, a single feeling—revolution; Lenin the human being, living through the agonies of fear, despair and falling in love.

INNUMERABLE books have been written about Lenin: historical researches, lives of the saint, hymns, and even the occasional hostile lampoon. Shortly before Lenin's death the proletarian poet Nikolai Poletayev sadly noted: " No portraits of Lenin are to be seen/There are none and never have been. Clearly centuries will pass/Until the portrait is finished at last." Since that time Lenin has been " portrayed " millions of time but only now after the publication of Solzhenitsyn's book can we speak of the appearance of The Portrait. And the question is not one of whether or not the portrait is a likeness. Who can tell us? Its importance lies elsewhere, in that it is a vivid portrait, written with passion and partiality and with the anguish of betrayed love.

The portrait Solzhenitsyn paints of Lenin will become *The* portrait of the leader of the Russian revolution, not only because it is the work of a master craftsman whose literary talent has reached its acme, but also because it is the work of a believer who has lost his faith.

The key to *Lenin in Zurich* is to be found in the first volume of *Gulag Archipelago.* Recounting his meeting in a prison cell with an old revolutionary, Fastenko, Solzhenitsyn remarks:

> There was much about Fastenko I could not yet understand. In my eyes, perhaps the main thing about him, and the most surprising, was that he had known Lenin personally. Yet he was quite cool in recalling this . . . (Such was my attitude at the time that when someone in the cell called Fastenko by his patronymic alone, without using his given name—in other words simply " Ilyich," asking: " Ilyich, is it your turn to take out the latrine bucket?"—I was utterly outraged and offended because it seemed sacrilege to me not only to use Lenin's patronymic in the same sentence as

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"latrine bucket," but even to call anyone on earth "Ilyich" except that one man, Lenin.) [1]

The fanatical side of Solzhenitsyn's temperament, which he displayed in the way he continued to admire Lenin long after his arrest, has now found expression in a book in which the idol he once worshipped is destroyed. Fastenko "did say to me, in the clearest Russian: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image! But I failed to understand him!" [2] When Solzhenitsyn did come to understand, the idol was overthrown and trampled into the dust.

But even this background of admiration, disillusionment and overthrow would not, I think, have been sufficient material for Solzhenitsyn to create the Lenin we find in his latest book. His portrait of the father of the Soviet state contains one other exceedingly important element: its resemblance to the portrait's painter. In his worship of the idol and its subsequent dethronement Solzhenitsyn suddenly discovered his own inner kinship with Lenin. *The Calf Butted the Oak* was a double portrait: Solzhenitsyn saw Tvardovsky as his mirror-image. *Lenin in Zurich* is another double portrait in which Solzhenitsyn sees himself mirrored in Lenin. He understands Lenin through himself, and probably himself through Lenin.

Little lines and insignificant details merge together into a portrait. But a portrait of whom? The Lenin who reads books on Basedow's disease to check that the Swiss doctors are giving his wife the right treatment (p. 27) is the prisoner Solzhenitsyn reading books on cancer to check on the treatment he is getting from doctors in Kazakhastan. The Lenin who "felt ill at a single hour of time lost" (p. 59) is Solzhenitsyn in *The Calf Butted the Oak* counting every second of his life not spent on the writing of his "main work." When we read that Lenin ". . . saw the conclusions of his books exceptionally early, before he even sat down to write them," do we not sense that this applies also to the author of *Lenin in Zurich?*

ONCE embarked upon his marathon work on the revolution which is planned to run to 20 volumes, Solzhenitsyn could not avoid an encounter—before anything else—with "the man who made the revolution." Mayakovsky wrote: "I cleanse myself in Lenin, in order to sail further into revolution." Solzhenitsyn cleanses himself *of* Lenin, painting a portrait which penetrates to Lenin's heart in order to understand him and thus understand the revolution. Publication of the portrait is a matter of urgency for Solzhenitsyn, a way of getting a weight off his mind which was preventing him from moving forward.

Lenin in Zurich exposes the myth of Lenin the genial, wise, kind, brave man, the "most humane of all human beings." There are three Lenins in the book. The first of them is the Lenin of August 1914. War has broken out and Vladimir Ulyanov, a Russian *émigré* living in Poronino, is arrested by the Austrian authorities. Released before very long at the request of Austrian socialist leaders, he travels to Switzerland. The first Lenin is a happy man. His dreams have come true, war has

[1] *The Gulag Archipelago* I–II, translated by Thomas P. Whitney (Collins, 1974), p. 193.
[2] Ibid. p. 193.

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begun: "It's marvellous that war has begun! It's a joy that it's happened! . . . And it's a happy war!—it will be of enormous benefit to international socialism. . . ." The chapter ends with these words: "It is a gift of history, a war like this!"

The Lenin we meet in the first chapter is the exact opposite of the mythological Lenin: a poor conspirator (having lived the life of a conspirator for 30 years Solzhenitsyn is particularly aware of his own superiority in this respect), something of a coward, ruthless with people, discarding those of whom he no longer needs, forgiving no-one (for) their mistakes, not even his wife, and unable to tolerate jokes at his own expense. But the portrait also contains a trait from the mythological character: ". . . what strength of confidence he needed not to waver, not to lose his balance . . . but to see into the future, stand firm and know" . . . Strength of confidence, awareness of "commanding power through himself," consciousness of being the bearer of a mission—these are what Solzhenitsyn sees as the mainsprings of Lenin's behaviour and his character—at least, in the first chapter.

THE second Lenin is the Lenin of October 1916, leader of a small group of staunch servants and schemers. His motto is: "To split—always! To split at every level of the movement! To go on splitting even if you end up as the tiniest of tiny groups—until you become the Central Committee! And even if you are left with only the most mediocre, even the most worthless people, just let them be uniformly obedient and you can achieve anything!" The second Lenin is obsessed by revolution, but only a revolution of which he himself will be the leader. The second Lenin is consumed with a lust for power particularly terrifying for its ascetic quality. An adamant believer in his own mission, Lenin has no need of any earthly blessings, only power, which will enable him to be the benefactor of the proletariat. But even Lenin has a soft spot, even the iron Messiah of the working class has a weakness—love for a woman. The second Lenin is a Lenin in love. Solzhenitsyn tells of Vladimir Ilyich's strange love for Inessa Armand, strange because it involved three people together, strange because the writer does not like either the object of Lenin's love, Inessa, who had deserted two husbands and five children for revolution, or the conduct of Lenin himself who would not allow his wife Nadzhda to leave him because she was "necessary," because "living with Nadya is the best variant." It may be that what Solzhenitsyn especially disliked was the fact that Lenin "depended on her directions. Inessa was the only person in the world upon whom he felt and acknowledged his dependence." This is why Solzhenitsyn writes with savage irony:

> It's true, the three of them were always together, together in the Bernese forest where they came to meet from neighbouring streets; on mountain walks near Zörenberg picking alpine roses and mushrooms (and occasionally, whenever Inessa and Lenin walked alone together, spending nights at remote mountain chalets) . . .

and even more ironically of how the simple thought that Inessa had not come to him for a long time would break in on Lenin's complicated meditations on the state of the world and revolution: "After all, if one

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is defending free love in theory, why not allow oneself to be persuaded to put it into practice?" However, this is immediately followed by the consoling thought: "But it cannot be! A comrade and a friend! How splendidly she fought against the centrists in Kietintal! . . ."

THE third Lenin is the Lenin of the spring of 1917, a man driven in different directions, a confused man who has lost all his supporters and all his connections with Russia. Convinced that revolution in his fatherland is an impossibility, Lenin chases after chimeras—revolution in Switzerland, revolution in Sweden. Where it happens is unimportant, just so long as there is a revolution. And he suffers more and more headaches: "No matter where you go, you can't get rid of this head. Everything in the world awaits your appraisals and decisions! You can steer everything in the world at your will! But you yourself are caught in a vice-like grip and it's impossible to break free!"

But a way out does emerge. Contrary to Lenin's predictions and despite his conviction of its improbability, revolution flares up in Russia. Soon all the preparations have been made for Lenin's departure for his homeland, for his passage through Germany. The book ends with Radek prophesying: "The way things are going, Vladimir Ilyich, in six months we shall either be ministers or we shall hang." It is April 1917.

THIS portrait of Lenin debunks the myth of the wise, far-sighted leader, the prophet who saw 100 years into the future. It debunks the myth of the kind-natured man who loved children and cats. It is a portrait of a man who is cruel, single-minded to the point of callousness, whose love of power knows no bounds and who is obsessed with his mission. Are these qualities reprehensible in themselves? Yes, says Solzhenitsyn. However, he writes: "Lenin was the string. Lenin was the arrow." The way he strained every nerve to achieve his aim, and the inflexible will be displayed in the process cannot but impress the writer. But Solzhenitsyn rejects the goal to which, like an arrow striking everything in his path, Lenin aspired. The writer rejects the revolution. He rejects it first and foremost because the revolution Lenin is preparing and to which he devotes all his thoughts is for Solzhenitsyn an anti-Russian, anti-national revolution.

Solzhenitsyn demonstrates this obliquely: Lenin's entourage includes no Russians—Jakub Ganetsky, Karl Radek, Grigorii Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Brilliant-Sokolnikov, Christian Rakovsky, Platten (the naïve and credulous Swiss), and the feverish and determined German, Münzenberg. In Solzhenitsyn's book the internationalism of the Social-Democratic Party becomes hostility towards Russia. None of the revolutionaries who surrounded Lenin, nor Lenin himself in the first instance, has anything to do with Russia or feels any sympathy for that country. "Aha, that's caught the greedy carrion crow on the coat of arms!" thinks Lenin, rejoicing at the outbreak of war. "Your claw has been trapped and you won't be able to pull it out! . . . Let's amputate the whole of Russia. Cut off Poland and Finland! Cut off the Baltic region! Cut off the Ukraine! Cut off the Caucasus! Amputate to the death! . . ." But the destruction of the Russian empire is not Lenin's only dream. When he read summaries of military operations,

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> Lenin always ran his finger down the page until he found the figures for Russian losses, which he noted with surprise and satisfaction. The larger the figures the greater was his joy: all these men killed, wounded and taken prisoner were falling like stakes from the fence of autocracy and weakening the monarchy.

In a long inner monologue Lenin settles his scores with Russia, and Solzhenitsyn his scores with Lenin; and the reader cannot tell whether it is Lenin thinking about himself or Solzhenitsyn writing about Lenin:

> Why had he been born in this homespun land?! Because a quarter of the blood in you is Russian, because of that little quarter, fate has tethered you to that broken-down old Russian wagon! He had a quarter of its blood, but by his character, his will and his inclinations he had no kinship whatsoever with that botched, bungled and forever drunken country. . . . What was it, then, that bound him to the country? He could have mastered three European languages just as well as this half-Tartar tongue if he'd taken the trouble. Was he bound to Russia by his 20 years of concrete revolutionary bonds? Yes, by this and only this. But now . . . he was well enough known in the world socialist sphere to cross over to there. Socialism knew no nationality."

Socialism knows no nationality, socialism is anti-national, socialism is the enemy of Russia: thus is the significance of Lenin's activities revealed. To make their significance still more obvious and striking, Solzhenitsyn places Lenin alongside that prominent socialist and merciless enemy of Russia Alexander[3] Lazarevich Helphand, known by his pseudonym Parvus. Five of the book's 11 chapters are allotted to Parvus —his life, his conversation with Lenin, his plan for the destruction of Russia, and his assistance in organizing Lenin's journey through Germany to Russia in April 1917.

ONE of the most important theoreticians of the Second International (as early as 1930 the Small Soviet Encyclopedia was calling Parvus "a distinguished theoretician of Marxism"), leader, with Trotsky of the 1905 revolution in Russia, a millionaire who had made his fortune supplying goods of a somewhat suspicious nature, wartime counsellor to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and an enemy of Russia which he viewed as the chief obstacle barring the way to a victory for socialism, Parvus was a character Solzhenitsyn could have invented if he had not existed. Z. Zeman's and W. Scharlau's excellent biography of Parvus[4] provided Solzhenitsyn with a wealth of material with which to create his demonic portrait of the conspirator and the revolutionary of genius who did not balk at using any means to achieve his goal.

Parvus's and Lenin's goals are one and the same: "the task of world socialism . . . the crushing defeat of Russia and revolution in that country." Hence Parvus's thesis: "The way to a victory for world socialism is the military reinforcement of Germany . . . Germany's victory is the victory of socialism!" Hence Parvus's plan: "to muster

[3] Having spent 19 years in emigration from Russia Helphand changed his first name, Izrail, to Alexander, but Solzhenitsyn continues to call him Izrail Lazarevich.

[4] Z. A. B. Zeman and B. Scharlau, *The Merchant of Revolution* (London, 1965).

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all resources, all forces and all facilities under a single leadership, to direct the activities of the central powers, the Russian revolutionaries and the outlying nationalities from a single headquarters. . . . The combined explosion of a social revolution and a national revolution with German financial and material support."

By putting Parvus and Lenin on the same level, comparing them and measuring them against each other, Solzhenitsyn shatters the myth of the unique genius of the leader of the October revolution. Seen side by side with Lenin, Parvus is no less of a genius, no less far-sighted, and a better judge of what the future holds (it was Parvus who realized all the potentialities of the soviets of workers' deputies, and it was Parvus who at the turn of the century foresaw that Europe would become the object of a struggle between two superpowers. America and Russia). By placing Parvus and Lenin alongside one another Solzhenitsyn underlines the anti-Russianness of Lenin for whom, as they were for Parvus, revolution and socialism are more important than his own country.

Only in one respect did Lenin turn out to be wiser and more perspicacious than Parvus: he was unwilling to link himself publicly with Germany. "That is where you are mistaken, Izrail Lazarevich!" Lenin mentally shouts at his ally. "Take what you need from others? Yes. But tie your *own* hands? No."

In the central scene, a conversation imagined by Solzhenitsyn between Parvus and Lenin which is depicted as a haggling match between a "Merchant of the Revolution" and a "Kalmuk in an Astrakhan bazaar," Lenin shows the greater self-possession and less impatience.

HISTORICAL novels are always written with the present in mind; this is a truth needing no proof. Solzhenitsyn's Lenin is a Lenin seen by the author of *Gulag Archipelago*. But amazingly, the same view of Lenin was taken by his friend and contemporary Maxim Gorky during the brief period after the October Revolution.

It was Gorky who, a month after the October revolution, wrote:

> Yes, I love Russia and the Russian people agonizingly and anxiously. . . . The people's commissars regard Russia as material for an experiment, they see the Russian people in the same way bacteriologists regard the horse they inoculate with typhus so that its blood will produce an anti-typhus serum. It is just such a cruel experiment, and one which is doomed in advance to failure, that the commissars are performing on the Russian people. . . .

Six months after the revolution Gorky again wrote that the Bolsheviks "are performing the cruellest scientific experiment on the living body of Russia."

Gorky understands very well, and Solzhenitsyn agrees with him absolutely, what the motives are which impel the Bolsheviks, those "revolutionaries for a while," as the author of *Untimely Thoughts* calls them: "such a revolutionary regards people in the same way that an untalented scientist looks upon dogs and frogs earmarked for cruel scientific experiments, but with the difference that when the untalented scientist tortures animals to no purpose he is at least doing so in the interests of mankind, whereas the modern revolutionary is far from being always sincere in his experiments on people."

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Gorky is analysing not some abstract "people's commissars" or "revolutionaries for a while"; he is analysing Lenin. The picture he gives of Lenin corresponds in every detail with the image we find in *Lenin in Zürich*: "Lenin himself, of course, is a man of exceptional power . . ., a talented man, he possesses all the qualities of a 'leader' and also the necessary lack of morality and the sheer lordly, pitiless attitude to the life of the popular masses." Gorky a few months after the revolution and Solzhenitsyn more than half a century later take an identical view of Lenin. But they offer quite different explanations for the origin of his character. The difference between them must be seen as a sign of the times, or perhaps it is a consequence of the revolution. For Gorky, "Lenin is a 'leader' and also a Russian *barin* [gentleman], not devoid of some of the qualities of this estate which has vanished into non-existence, and that is why he feels he has a right to perform a cruel experiment and one doomed in advance to failure on the Russian people." For Solzhenitsyn Lenin's attitude to the Russian people is explained by his un-Russianness. For Gorky, the revolution, of which he was an eye-witness, was the work of a handful of intellectuals cut off from their people and their country and directed by the "Russian *barin*," Lenin. For Solzhenitsyn the revolution he chronicles as a historian was the work of a handful of non-Russian and foreign conspirators.

This approach to the revolution was prophetically foreseen by another witness of it, Ivan Bunin, who wrote in his diary:

> The "leftists" heap the blame for all the "excesses" of the revolution on the old regime; the Black Hundreds blame the Jews. But the people are not to blame! Indeed, the people themselves will later pour all the blame on others—on their neighbours, on the Jews saying: "What has it got to do with me? I'm no more to blame than the next man. It was the Jews who put us up to all this."

LENIN IN ZÜRICH is a brilliant portrayal of a party leader, a fanatic obsessed with his mission. The power of the book lies in its intense concentration, its rare single-mindedness of purpose and the exclusivity of its vision: it focuses on Lenin and Parvus, while everything at the edges is faint and blurred. But herein also lies the book's weakness. By isolating Lenin from Russia—even though the device is a logically justifiable one since Lenin was an *émigré* and as such was isolated from Russia—Solzhenitsyn deprives his hero of a background which is absolutely essential to him. To convince oneself just how important this background is one has only to insert the first chapter of *Lenin in Zürich* (Chapter 22 of *August 1914*) into its rightful place between Chapters 21 and 23 of *August 1914*. The brutality and bloodiness of the fighting underline the monstrousness of Lenin's joy at the outbreak of war. Shown out of context the gladness with which as a socialist he welcomes the war which will hasten the revolution has an abstract, theoretical character. In the novel this gladness is inhuman in character.

One may agree or disagree with Solzhenitsyn, confirm or deny his views. For all the readers of *Lenin in Zürich* Lenin now will always remain as Alexander Solzhenitsyn has portrayed him. One may argue with Solzhenitsyn the historian or philosopher. But with Solzhenitsyn the artist there is no arguing.

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An Interview with Political Prisoners in Perm Camp No. 35[1]

SOVIET prisoners are deprived of the opportunity to meet representatives of the press and to answer questions: they are totally isolated from the outside world. Nevertheless, despite great difficulties, a series of questions was transmitted to the labour camp near Vsesvyatskaya. The individual who received them conducted an interview with several political prisoners. The first question dealt naturally with the very fact of isolation, the methods through which it is realized, and the reasons for its implementation.

Ivan Svitlychny: The camp administration really does strive towards the most total isolation possible. All direct contacts with the outside world take the form of two general meetings and one private meeting per year. These meetings can only be held with one's closest relatives. A prisoner can be deprived of all these meetings following an administrative decision, and the reason for such a decision can be anything which is found to be convenient. In my own case, for example, in 1974, I was denied two general meetings, once because I was sitting on my bed (such an infringement had not been foreseen in the regulations), the other time because several poems which had been taken from me were not appreciated.

A general meeting, if it is granted, lasts from one to four hours. It is always held in the presence of a supervisor, who ensures that the conversations do not extend beyond the bounds of sanctioned topics, that they do not touch on politics, conditions of camp life, and so forth. Personal meetings take place in rooms specially equipped with eavesdropping devices. Naturally, nothing can be brought to such meetings, and it is forbidden to make use of papers, pens, etc. One can judge how total the isolation of political prisoners is from the fact that even the overseers, individuals specially selected and carefully trained, are not allowed to converse with the political prisoners. Representatives of the prison administration carefully assess all permissible topics of discussion.

Another means of communication with the outside world—correspondence—is subject to the strictest type of censorship. It is forbidden to write about the circumstances of camp life, to name one's fellow political prisoners, to speak of the poor state of one's health. It is even forbidden to describe nature and the weather.

[1] Perm Camp No. 35 holds 240 inmates, most of whom were arrested under Art. 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda) or parallel articles in other republics. The camp is located in the Urals, 1,000m. above sea-level. In Winter, the temperature drops to −50° Centigrade.

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The same strict censorship is also applied to incoming mail. Censorship, as a rule, does not burden itself with debating seriously the confiscation of letters. . . . For a letter to be confiscated, it is enough to state that it contains information which is not based on official announcements, is of suspicious content, or that it contains "distortions of international reality." How arbitrary this practice is can be seen from the fact that I. Kalynets and I had letters from our families confiscated in the Mordovian political camp, and that those letters which the Mordovian censors had passed were found to be seditious by the Ural censors, and vice versa. In addition to this, the camp censors can react in a totally different way at any given moment. Towards the end of 1973, I had a letter to my wife confiscated. After that, I decided to carry out a simple experiment: I wrote the same letter a second time, mentioning only in addition the confiscation of my previous letter. And this second letter passed the censors. Even now, I don't know what that proves: either the letters were reviewed by different individuals or everything depended on the disposition of a certain person. . . And I would like to add just one last comment. The worst thing of all is the fact that correspondence is placed in the hands of the camp administration, and thus, in the event of confiscation, it becomes impossible to appeal to anyone higher up. Confiscated letters are destroyed and an appeal, therefore, is out of the question.

Why is such strict isolation called for?

I. Kalynets: To me, it seems obvious that this is done solely to cover up the facts and the reality which violate international law and moral standards, as well as the articles of the Soviet Constitution. For example, I was tried solely for my literary output, never having harboured any anti-Soviet inclinations, nor possessing to a greater or lesser degree a tangible socio-political temperament. It is ridiculous, therefore, to say that my case involved some sort of state or war secrets. In spite of this, my trial was held *in camera*; even my closest relatives were not allowed to attend. This is understandable: there could be no real proof of "extremely dangerous anti-state crimes" based on several totally apolitical poems. And knowledge of this could have shocked even a Soviet public which is used to just about everything.

Attempts are naturally made to keep transcripts of all similar cases under the strictest cloak of secrecy possible; and in many cases, again in contravention of existing legal procedures, even copies of the verdicts are not issued. Clearly, this is possible only within the context of the total isolation of prisoners.

In addition, the camp administration keeps all conventional "criminals" in inhuman conditions. They are maintained on a semi-starvation diet, exhausted by cold and by hard work. Their human dignity is

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constantly degraded. If all this became common knowledge, such conditions could not exist outside the law.

The authorities want to cover up the truth, and this is only possible through the strict isolation of the people who are undergoing this barbarous experiment.

What can you say about the actual status of political prisoners in the USSR?

Ivan Kandyba: It is a known fact that in the USSR the authorities usually deny the existence of political prisoners, and we are forbidden to call ourselves political. This tradition stems from Tsarist Russia; only then, political prisoners were called "enemies of the state," now the expression "extremely dangerous" has been added. Another difference is that in the USSR "extremely dangerous enemies of the state" are far more numerous than in Tsarist Russia, and the authorities treat them far more viciously.

The status of political prisoners in the USSR has one peculiar characteristic. If one maintains that the Constitution in the USSR manifests itself as the fundamental law, then the majority of those who are referred to as political prisoners, who have been convicted of violating the Constitution, are held illegally; they were only attempting to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed rights. To call these people "political" prisoners in the strict sense of the word is truly difficult. Nevertheless, the criminal code can also be applied, defining as it does, the exercising of rights guaranteed by the Constitution as crimes, and calling people who dare to assert their rights "extremely dangerous enemies of the state."

Thus, even the political prisoners assess themselves and their situations differently. Those who take the Constitution into account consider themselves innocent, while those who base themselves on the criminal code admit their guilt. The status of political prisoners in the USSR is therefore ambiguous from the outset.

Lev Yagman: In addition to the rift between the written constitution and the actual code, there also exists a gap between the statutes of the CL Code (Corrective Labour Code) and the actual rights given to prisoners.

I will try to give you some examples. In the preamble to the CL Code, it is stated that a sentence is not supposed to cause physical or mental suffering. But then how are we to explain the practice of transferring political prisoners, for terms of up to six months, to the PKT [2] (camp prison), where they are maintained on the infamous Category 9 diet. This is surely a well-thought-out way of ruining the health of the individual. You can imagine what it means for a prisoner to be main-

[2] *Pomeschcheniye kamernovo tipa*: an isolation cell. Literally: "cell-type premises."

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tained on a lower level of nourishment when, according even to the testimony of camp physicians, who are employed by the KGB, the normal camp diet during the course of several years normally causes intestinal disorders.

How can there be any talk of the avoidance of mental suffering, when religious believers are forced to shave their beards, and those who refuse, are tied down and forcibly shaved; when it is impossible to receive religious literature in the camp; when what is sanctioned by lists is confiscated during searches; when hindrances are placed in the way of religious observances and holidays; when work is assigned on Sundays, and those who refuse are punished?

The question of correspondence has for a long time been a subject for ridicule. In Article 30 of the CL Code, it is stated that letters are supposed to enter and leave the camps at three-day intervals. But the camp administration and the representatives of the KGB tell us we should be grateful if letters are received or sent at all, and that to speak of the intervals at which they come and go is unnecessary. Letters in Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Armenian and other languages take months to arrive. It is several months before letters from abroad, written in English and Hebrew, are delivered. It takes 10–15 days for them to reach Moscow, and then from one and a half to two months to arrive at the camp. " We have no translators " is the answer to all our inquiries. Then why is it that letters from abroad which are written in Russian take a month and a half to be delivered? And what happens to scores of other letters? We haven't been given an answer to these questions for several years. Clearly, the mythical Institution No. 5110 in Moscow, through which letters from abroad pass, is a body which is not even subject to the control of the administrative organs of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

In the CL Code, it is stated that prisoners are to be assigned work on the basis of their capabilities, and, whenever possible, in the field in which they specialize. Nevertheless, in practice, everything possible is done to prevent prisoners from working in their field—and this at a time when there is, as a rule, a need for specialists. Engineers work as unskilled labourers, physicians as stokers, philologists as lathe-operators, etc.

Ivan Kandyba: Non-Russian political prisoners suffer additional infringements of their rights. They are taken out of their own republics, and kept in environments with an extremely severe climate. Their relatives often cannot visit them, even for the meetings that they are entitled to.

Not only the political prisoners, but their relatives as well, suffer from this. In such circumstances, families frequently break up. The authorities want to break up families and they do this deliberately, later stating that such break-ups occur as a result of political differ-

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ences. Non-Russian political prisoners are forced to converse with camp administrators exclusively in Russian, and both incoming and outgoing letters are held up for the reason that they are not written in Russian. It is forbidden to speak in one's native tongue even with relatives during public visits. The numerous pleas and petitions requesting that political prisoners be allowed to remain within their native republics are denied.

Lev Yagman: It is interesting to note that in all cases where the law gives the administration some leeway, the administration always decides against the interests of the political prisoner. If long meetings are scheduled to last one to three days, and short meetings one to four hours, there is practically no chance that the prisoner will be allowed the maximum. If the law does not specifically define the right to rest during the daytime or to smoke in specially designated areas, then the administration does not allow it. Even to this day it is forbidden to take a break from work—there is no mention of that in the regulations.

Ivan Kandyba: In such circumstances, talk about the unacceptability of physical and moral suffering becomes so much empty rhetoric. The whole system maintains itself because political prisoners endure the various means and methods that cause physical and mental anguish. It is in this way that the system attempts to achieve its ends.

Every penal system strives towards the goal of rehabilitation. In what ways are attempts made to reach this goal in your circumstances?

Slava Gluzman: The treatment of *zeks* in the camp can mean only one thing: that an attempt is made to lower their normal and ethical outlook to such a point where they become indifferent to all problems, with the exception of one—the problem of personal survival. There can be no thought of a sincere change in a prisoner's convictions, or any improvement as a result of such a change, because the attempted implementation of legality, the "humanity" of the methods that are employed, strips away all illusions and not a few ideals. It is impossible for the MVD system to "rehabilitate" the *zeks* by legal methods. More than this, *zeks* will often become disenchanted with their earlier political beliefs, and turn to religion, etc., but never towards official dogma.

The work of political education in the MVD system consists in the conducting of lessons, personalized discussions, and, most importantly, personal example. The direct responsibility for the implementation of this work is in the hands of the assistant camp warden for political education. The actual political education lectures are administered by the camp section leader. The level of these lectures, discussions and activities is extraordinarily low, reflecting the lack of education

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and immaturity of the MVD officers. Therefore our teachers will, quite often, make patently absurd, " ideologically dangerous " statements, which on the basis of the current Party line, very often fall under Article 191 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.[3] Such a case occurred when, during one of our discussions, an officer told me that he " esteems and honours Stalin."

Regulations do not make attendance at lectures and activities compulsory for prisoners. Still, attempts are made to " stimulate " participation. One of the reasons Meshener was confined to the PKT —a blatant infringement of the law—was his lack of participation in camp social life, and his refusal to attend political activities on Sundays.

The total stupidity of similar methods of education becomes all the more apparent when one considers the fact that the majority of political prisoners have had higher education, and are quite familiar with socio-political and Party literature, while very few of their " teachers " even bother to read newspapers.

Naturally, with the goal of " rehabilitation " being what it is, we are forbidden to subscribe to any foreign periodicals, including communist ones and those with a scholarly content.

Frequent interrogations, searches, confiscations of manuscripts, and the like disrupt systematic work on books, and any creative work. In political camps, the printed word by no mean facilitates " rehabilitation."

Nevertheless, there are cases of political prisoners who have " rehabilitated." Usually, those who have " rehabilitated " are individuals who fell into the camps quite by chance, never having possessed either strong moral convictions or well-defined beliefs. They are individuals who were not charged because of " actions," but rather for their " words." But even they do not conceal the fact that the basic reason for their " rehabilitation " was not the realization of the evils of their " criminal past," but, rather, a desire to ensure their personal well-being.

Sometimes (and this is quite a rare occurrence), a political prisoner, weakened by camp life and seriously debilitating illnesses, will announce himself formally " rehabilitated." But in such cases, even the administration understands the total formality of such a gesture. On their release, such " rehabilitated " individuals never get what had been promised them earlier, be it the right to higher education or the right to move from one city to another.

Zinoviy Antonyuk: In the CL Code, an important place in the re-education of the political prisoner is given to work, since it is in the experience of work that all the basic human qualities, such as collectivism, love of work and respect for the work of others are formed. But I could

[3] " Slandering the Soviet State."

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very well ask, which of my colleagues did not develop these qualities 10–20 years earlier, without the intrusion of the camp administration?

Lev Yagman: I think that the crux of the matter is that the law does not differentiate between individuals tried for ordinary crimes and those who find themselves in political camps. For this latter group, work as a means of "rehabilitation" becomes yet another form of punishment.

It is possible to divide the prisoners in the camp into several categories, according to their attitudes towards work. The first category consists of individuals who, for one reason or another, try to lose themselves in their work, who see work as a way of killing time, and who cannot or do not want to confront its other aspects. They are contented when they work. A second group is composed of those for whom work is yet another way of currying favour with the camp administration. And finally, there is the third category, for whom work in the labour colony is truly hellish, since it takes them away from the activities which truly interest them, is physically debilitating and disabling and often pointless. Prisoners are often employed in dangerous activities, such as working with polyester varnishes, cleaning latrines (in Mordovian Camp No. 19), or repairing filters (at the chemical combine of Camp No. 35). Naturally, there can be no thought of work-safety under such conditions.

Zinoviy Antonyuk: Yes, and in general work, the establishment of elementary technical norms and material stimulation strive towards one goal—to obtain the maximum amount of work at a minimal rate of pay. The compulsory combination of jobs is commonly practised (without extra pay, naturally!). The extension of work hours into the night is not regulated. Continual attempts are made to force prisoners to work two shifts in a row without any overtime pay. There are no shorter working days for dangerous work, or any sort of compensation for such work, special diets (usually evaporated milk) are administered at infrequent intervals, and even then, to far fewer workers than are entitled to them: food becomes yet another incentive. All this becomes farcical: there is no opportunity to rest for those on the second shift; all shifts are confined together in the same huge quarters. . . . Theoretically, there are supposed to be only two eight-hour shifts per day, but in reality, there are actually three, since the second shift is really two shifts. The minimum wage established by law is not paid; a different form of payment is practised instead. Official work assignments are pure fiction: individuals who have worked at one job for a whole month are listed as having worked at another job at the end of the month, and are paid according to some unknown wage-schedule. During the course of a month, the same job can be salaried at two different rates, each of which is lower than the wage which the

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worker is entitled to. The distribution of wages shows a similar tendency: one day a worker is paid according to the fourth wage rate, the next day according to the third wage rate, tomorrow he may be paid according to the second rate—all for the same work. This is one of the legally sanctioned ways of improving the economic indicators of productivity at the prisoner's expense. Special clothing and footwear have also become an incentive for improving the economic output.

Lev Yagman: The camp administration truly dislikes our drawing parallels between their methods and the methods which were used by the Nazis. But how can we help being reminded of the Nazi practice of using prisoners to move stones for no reason from one place to another, when in the Punishment Isolation of Camp No. 35, political prisoners are made to carve manually bolts which are specially transported from a neighbouring camp where this work is done by machines. If one compares their output, one find that 10 bolts are made mechanically for every one made by hand. This sort of work is not easy for individuals who are fed only every other day for several months.

I contend that everything we have been speaking about indicates clearly that labour plays absolutely no educational role in the political camps but, rather, that it is just another means of oppression, another way of burdening the lives of the prisoners and of ruining their health.

A. Khnokh: Yes, the main goal of prison life is served by an entire complex of activities which constitute the conditions of maintenance of political prisoners: the semi-military regime, with its endless searches during day and night; the sheltering of 40 or more men in one barrack section; the uniform clothing and shoes; the degrading name tags which every prisoner must sew to his prison garb; the monotonous, low-calorie diet bought for 43 kopecks a day, etc., and, in addition to this, the numerous interdicts. One is allowed to write two letters per month and to receive an unlimited amount of correspondence, but the censors retain their right to confiscation and they make extensive use of this right. One is allowed to receive one five kg. package per year and to purchase food in the camp canteen for up to five rubles per month, though its variety is severely limited. But even this right is often denied to the prisoner. One is entitled to one long (24–72 hour) and two shorter (one to four hour) visits per year from one's close relatives. But often when one's relatives have travelled one, two, or three thousand kilometres to the camp, they are told that the camp administration decided the day before to deny the prisoner his visiting rights. It is unnecessary to go any further. It is quite clear that in practice the goal of the political camp system in the Soviet Union is not the reform of the inmates. Such a goal is not within its means. Rather, all its aims are channelled towards one end—forcing the political prisoner at least outwardly, to renounce his beliefs. If this

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aim is not achieved, everything possible is done to break the individual physically. The administration employs a whole series of legal (e.g. poor diet, denial of normal medical treatment, SHIZO,[4] PKT, prison) and illegal (e.g. hard and dangerous work, physical and moral exhaustion as a result of constant petty criticism) means towards this end.

What can you say about the representatives of the camp administration?

Lev Yagman: In order to answer this question, it is necessary to bear in mind that the government, in placing special emphasis on the political camps, sends its finest cadres here. One can only imagine who is "reforming" the "ordinary" criminals. An extensive renewal of cadres in the staff of political camps was implemented with the aim of raising the educational level of the camp administrators. From this several conclusions can be made. The attempt to change conditions in the political camps through an infusion of young cadres ended in total failure for two reasons: the first is the almost simultaneous change that occurred in the contingent of political prisoners. The second reason is the fact that, in spite of the higher educational level of the new overseers and officers, they were basically no different from their predecessors. If the older staff had been composed of individuals who were largely unskilled, and who had found a position which enabled them to earn a pension without great strain, then the new cadres were composed of individuals who, because they were indolent or lacking ability, looked for ways to make "easy money." But both the former and the latter are united by an absence of ideals. They don't believe that what they are doing is correct and necessary. This attitude shapes their moral outlook and brings with it alcoholism, debauchery and cynicism.

Yosif Meshener: We can obtain a clearer picture of the attitudes of the camp administrators by grouping them according to their characteristic traits:

Sadists. Here I am speaking of those who derive pleasure from persecuting and mocking political prisoners, using the most refined techniques available. If they deny the prisoner his visiting rights, then it is after the prisoner's relatives have already left for the camp. If they decide to deny the right to receive a package, then it is after the package has already arrived. During the summer, they forbid us to sunbathe; during the winter they take away our warm clothes. The most typical members of this group are Captain Bakaikin (from Camp No. 17, Mordovia), Major Fyodorov (from Camp No. 36), Captain Khromushin and Lieutenant Chaika (both from Camp No. 35, Perm region).

[4] *Shtrafnoi izolyator*: punishment isolation cell.

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Cynics. There are individuals who understand what they are doing, but, nevertheless, are willing to continue carrying out the degrading persecution of prisoners. They are quite high up in the camp hierarchy. Members of this category are the Assistant Minister for Internal Affairs in Mordovia, Colonel Nikolayev, who told a *zek*: " If we kept you well fed, you'd never want to leave the camps "; Lieutenant-Colonel Usov (warden of Camp No. 19), Major Pimenov (warden of Camp No. 35), who during a month-long hunger-strike, told the strikers: " I can force you to do anything I want; I have 200 soldiers behind me."

Those who suffer from an inferiority complex, and who try to compensate for this at the expense of the *zeks*. Members of this category are quite vulnerable to any comments about themselves. Usually they are officers who rarely get promoted. Good examples are Lieutenant Bulochnikov and Lieutenant Kuznetsov from Camp No. 35, and Capt. Tishkin from Camp No. 19.

An extremely large group of fools, and fools with initiative. Excellent examples are Lieutenant-Colonel Velmakin (Camp No. 19), who has one answer to everything—punishment; Kitmanov (deputy for political education, Camp No. 35), who searched a map for ten minutes for the Jewish Autonomous Republic and still couldn't find it; Lieutenant Nikolayev (Camp No. 35); who stated: " I have already attained much in life, I'm only 26, and already a Lieutenant "; Captain Zhuravkov (warden of Camp No. 36), who thought the word " German " was a curse; and Lieutenant Baibushev (from Camp No. 17) who stated: " I will give you the kind of references that will even ruin you in Israel."

The last group is made up of those who are totally indifferent, and who do nothing (either good or bad) on their own initiative. They are typical Soviet bureaucrats. They treat us more decently than any of the other groups, though of course they carry out all their orders.

Naturally, these categories are rather arbitrary and no one individual fits his type perfectly. Nevertheless, certain traits are more dominant in some individuals than in others.

Lev Yagman: Interestingly, the camp representatives of the KGB, who consider themselves an elite, will often, in speaking with political prisoners, admit to the low calibre of the MVD staff and state that unfortunately, candidates in the pedagogical sciences do not join the ranks of the MVD.

But the standard of the camp KGB representatives has also diminished. It is no coincidence that the local newspapers of the Perm Region regularly carry advertisements for jobs in the Correctional Labour Administration system of the MVD. The job of overseer has never enjoyed great popularity, and this is a fact that cannot be buried beneath rosy pronouncements.

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What are the relations between prisoners and other prisoners, and prisoners and the administration?

Slava Gluzman: In political camps, there are people of various nationalities, beliefs, educational levels, and ages (from 18 to 70 and over). All these factors influence interpersonal ties within the camp.

All *zeks* can be divided into three basic categories: the chastisers, the common criminals, and the political prisoners.

The chastisers—those who participated formerly in activities against the partisans, Jews, and communists during the second world war. As a rule, they are poorly educated, socially inactive and aggressively amoral individuals who seek to earn the favour of the camp administration at any cost. For the most part, they are the informers who enjoy fixed privileges and actively oppose all efforts of prisoners to secure their rights. We are constantly kept in the company of chastisers: this is an important method of psychological debilitation. Let me give you an example of this. My grandfather was killed at Babiy Yar, yet here in the camp, a man who took part in that affair sleeps near me. And not much further away from him, there is an individual who helped crush the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. Another of their ilk, a Byelorussian, is very close to the administration. He openly speaks of his hatred for Jews, stating that he sees " no difference who he serves—be it the Germans or the Soviets."

The common criminals—individuals who had earlier served their sentences in zones for common criminals, and, while there, were sentenced to new terms under one of the " political statutes " (usually for having prepared handwritten leaflets, or for having worn tattoos " of an anti-Soviet nature "). Arriving in the political camps is, for some of them, a kind of blessing, which awakens their interest in reading, in spiritual development, and even in politics. Some strive to educate and improve themselves. Nevertheless, a part of this group remains, psychologically, common criminals. These individuals are, as a rule, quite communicative. The administration attempts to make informers out of them.

The composition of the category of *political prisoners* is quite varied. There are three types of true political prisoner: participants in national liberation movements (Ukrainians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians), people who fell into the camps for their " activities," and those who were incarcerated for their " words."

The first group is made up of worldly-wise individuals, without a systematic education, who have attended the splendid " camp university." They are the witnesses to Stalinist illegality and to Khrushchev's " evasiveness." Age, illness and weariness force some to withdraw from active participation in camp life. Still, they manage to retain their human dignity. The psychology of some has been irreparably damaged by decades of camp life, and they are still not set free or

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forgiven. They, the so-called "old-timers," are the preservers of the camp traditions and camp morality (there is something like this). In spite of illness and age, they support the younger prisoners in their struggle for rights. They usually stick to in-groups, according to nationality, but they do associate with the other political prisoners.

A second category of political prisoners is those who have been incarcerated for their "actions." Imprisoned usually in their youth, they possess specialized secondary or higher educations, and they continue their education in the camp, actively opposing the illegal practices of the administration. As a rule, they do not submit to "rehabilitation" or intimidation.

The final category of political prisoner is those who have been incarcerated for their "words." It is these who are the most numerous, and who suffer the greatest psychological damage. The boredom of camp life forces them to choose one or the other side: in the case of two *zeks* sentenced for similar reasons, one, Chekalin, joined the ranks of the socially conscious and active, while the other, Zhuchkov, collaborates with the administration.

The ineffectiveness of the direct, legally sanctioned methods of "rehabilitation" is no secret. Those methods which stand outside the law, such as the provocation and intimidation of political prisoners and their families, small gifts in the form of packages, assignment to easier work, etc., are much more effective. And the administration itself defines very carefully its relationship with the various categories of prisoners.

Political prisoners who are especially active become the subjects of reports concerning their infringements of the rules. They are often punished, are never allowed to do easy work, and are denied visiting rights. The chastisers not only benefit from all the rights granted the *zek*, but are also allowed a greater number of visits and packages, and are hospitalized for even the slightest illness. The same also applies to informers and members of the "amateur" organizations (the SKK [5] and SVV [6]).

Spurious information often makes its way into the closed universe of the camp. Usually it enters by way of the informers and serves one or another of the administration's purposes. Sometimes the information is chauvinistic in nature, and has as its goal the fragmenting of groups, especially the groups of younger prisoners (the principle of divide and conquer).

On the whole, I would like to say that here in the camp I have seen, for the first time, an internationalism of deeds and not of words; primarily amongst those who are called "bourgeois nationalists"—

[5] *Soviet kollektiva koloniyi*: Soviet of the Colony Collective. An organization of informers and inmates who collaborate with the administration and help to maintain stability and order.

[6] An organization similar to the SKK.

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and this despite the numerous attempts by the KGB and the MVD to cause dissension among political prisoners of different nationalities.

What differences do you discern in the contingents of political prisoners?

Yevhen Pryshlyak: In the years after the war, concentration camps held a fairly large group of political prisoners, who were referred to as those imprisoned " for the war." Some of these prisoners were released, some died, and the remainder are still serving out their sentences. A small number of such " criminals " are still occasionally tried and incarcerated in the camps. The reason for this, I believe, is no secret. Until the 1960s, this category of *zek* was primarily made up of participants in the Ukrainian armed underground, their relatives, and anyone who materially or spiritually supported the resistance. For the most part, these were peasant youths, but there were also some artisans and craftsmen, students and intellectuals in their ranks. This was also true of the political prisoners from the Baltic areas. The terms these individuals were sentenced to were barbaric: from 10 to 25 years. Many of those who were sentenced did not survive the harsh conditions of camp life and died. In 1957, the majority of such prisoners were freed, some were freed after having served their entire sentences, and those who remained in the camps were people whose health and nervous systems had been ruined.

After the total annihilation of the armed insurgent underground in the latter half of the fifties, a second category of political prisoner found its way into the camps. This category consisted primarily of individuals who had grown up under Soviet rule. They were almost all workers and intellectuals. Living in a situation where even the most elementary democratic rights were denied, they decided to struggle to obtain these rights. Their activities resulted in new arrests and trials. In Lvov in 1961, a group of seven men (all of them with secondary and higher educations) were tried for the reason that, having based themselves on an existing Constitutional statute, they had disseminated propaganda for the secession of Ukraine from the Soviet Union (the Lukyanenko-Kandyba group).

The following year, a group of 20 individuals—the " Ukrainian National Committee "—was put on trial; their aim was the printing and disseminating of materials calling for an independent Ukraine. Two members of this group were executed; the others were sentenced to terms ranging from five to 15 years in labour camps. Approximately 20 people were tried for their statements in defence of democratic rights in Lvov, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kiev and other cities in the Ukraine. In 1967, an organization called the " Ukrainian National Front " was tried in Ivano-Frankivsk for the publication and dissemination of *samizdat* literature. It is impossible to mention all the trials that occurred, but the element unifying all these instances of repression

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was that they were directed against writers, artists, and scientific workers; in other words, the intelligentsia.

V. F. Balakhonov, why did you return to the USSR?

V. F. Balakhonov: I returned to the USSR purely for personal reasons; because of my extremely strong family ties—especially with my daughter, who is the dearest thing in the world to me. So after my wife had left Switzerland for the USSR, taking with her our daughter, I couldn't find the strength within me to withstand my great yearning for my daughter knowing that I would never see her again. (My wife had from the moment of our arrival in Switzerland insisted on returning). I realized that to return to the USSR would mean almost certain ruin for me, if not physical then certainly mental, but I could not resist the desire to be with my daughter. I must say that while I was in Switzerland, my friends tried to do everything possible to alleviate my sorrow, but it was to no avail.

I have nothing but the highest praise for the Swiss authorities, who granted me full freedom in the question of whether to remain in Switzerland or return to the USSR. (This I noted during my inquiry. They knew of my wife's persistent desire to return to the USSR, and of my close kinship with my family and my daughter). The Swiss, without trying to frighten me into any decision, did warn me that a long imprisonment and a great deal of moral anguish awaited me if I returned to the USSR. They only wanted to protect me. My fate is yet another example of the inhumanity of the Soviet system; a system which invariably destroys individuality, and brings suffering, tragedy and misfortune to men. I would like to mention here that at a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, Chistyakov, in Berne on 11 October 1972, a meeting which was also attended by the Swiss authorities, I was told that my mother had died on 10 October, and that my relatives were requesting that I return to attend her funeral. Today I am more familiar with the circumstances of my case, and I know that on 11 October my mother was still alive, and that she died only several days later.

After I had been to the Soviet Embassy in Berne to dispel any doubts which I might have had about returning to the USSR (it would be more accurate to say that I was weighing my options, for certainly, at that point, I had got rid of any doubts), I was given a letter from my wife which contained an ardent appeal for me to return. In addition, it was arranged for me to listen in on a telephone conversation between the embassy and my wife.

The Soviet consul gave me assurances that I would not be arrested on my return. The authorities used their usual bag of tricks, but they couldn't fool me. I admitted to the ambassador that I didn't believe that the reprisals would be waived, but that I was returning anyway,

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because I didn't have the strength to endure separation from my family.

On my arrival in Moscow I was placed under constant watch. I was interrogated several times by the KGB, who demanded that I give a written deposition of my behaviour; while at the same time warning me that " if I concealed anything, there would be no mercy." During these interrogations I asserted my independence. It was only later that I learned that this had been described as " insolent and defiant behaviour." On 7 January 1973, I was arrested and incarcerated in Lefortovo Prison. (I had arrived in Moscow on 1 December 1972).

Are there opportunities for you to defend your rights? In what ways do you do this?

Lev Yagman: In the context of the series of mutual guarantees that exist between the staff and the supervisory departments, it is very difficult for a political prisoner to uphold his rights, all the more so since the actual administrator of the camp is the KGB. The decisions of the KGB representative are final, and they are binding on the camp warden, as well as on the prosecutor. In such circumstances no one burdens himself with the formality of written law. There are many examples of this.

Here are the most recent ones: V. Bukovsky was placed in the PKT (camp prison), without actually having infringed the rules; nevertheless, the KGB decided he should be imprisoned. This is what Bukovsky was told in a conversation with the camp warden, Major Pimenov. The same thing is currently happening to prisoners Pavlenko, Butman and Meshener. In such a situation the struggle for one's rights through complaints and petitions to supervisory institutions is quite ineffective. A response is received only in cases where the illegal activities which occur in the camps become public knowledge and mobilize world public opinion in our defence.

Of the other methods employed by us in our struggle for our rights the most interesting is the boycott. It evokes a response from even the most odious representatives of the administration. During the past year a large contingent of political prisoners has refused to communicate with the chief of the operational section, Captain Khromushin, well known for his crassness and anti-Semitism. An effective weapon in the struggle against anti-Semitism and chauvinism is communication with administrators in their native tongue. This is not a violation of any regulation. There is, however, really no possibility for the administration to socialize with the prisoners. This year, many political prisoners refused to communicate with the KGB representatives, accusing them of taking part in numerous illegal activities.

In instances where the administration does not deny certain rights totally, it attempts to limit them as much as possible. To protest, we refuse all concessions made to us, which are presented as favours. Such

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was the case with correspondence, where in a show of protest against the systematic loss of about 50 per cent of the letters which were arriving, a group of Zionists denied itself the right to correspondence for a half a year. In an expression of protest against their illegal arrest and incarceration, all Zionists incarcerated in political camps in the Soviet Union renounced their Soviet citizenship, and are now seeking the status of Israeli citizens. This year, political prisoners of other nationalities also began to renounce their Soviet nationality, hoping in this way to demonstrate their feelings about what has happened to them.

More recently, political prisoners have resorted to yet another desperate measure—refusal to work. This was the case in May 1974, when about 30 *zeks* from Camp No. 35, in protest against the denial of visiting rights to one of their fellow inmates, refused to work. This also occurred in Camp No. 36, where approximately 40 prisoners from 23/UI refused to work, seeking the punishment of the on-duty officer of the colony, Colonel Milentyi, who had beaten prisoner Sapelyak.

Ivan Svitlychny: Another form of struggle for prisoners' rights which is worthy of special attention is hunger strikes. The camp administrators and the prisoners respond differently to hunger strikes. "You're only hurting yourselves," some officers told us, not without wisdom, in May and June of this year, when a large group of political prisoners, in protest against the arbitrary behaviour of the camp administration, endured a month-long hunger strike. There was a good deal of truth in the officers' words: such a long hunger-strike certainly does not strengthen the organisms of those who are maintained on a prison diet. The hunger-strikers themselves know this. If, despite this, they decide on such a course of action, it is only because they are forced to by circumstances in which their choice of weapons is limited. For, truly, complaints and petitions to supervisory and Soviet bodies cost no more than the paper and ink which is wasted on them. In more successful cases the petitioner receives a sombre bureaucratic response. But sometimes not even this is received.

A hunger strike in a Soviet camp, of which a prisoner cannot even inform his family, and where there can be no thought of reaching the general public, is clearly far less effective than in other countries. Nevertheless, even here it has an effect: It is no accident that prisoners regularly resort to this means of resistance. I have been in this camp for less than a year, but I have already taken part in four hunger strikes. And up till now this method has at least drawn the attention of supervisory departments to the state of affairs in the camp. It is only during a hunger strike, or immediately after it, that representatives of higher bodies visit the camp and request an explanation of conditions in the camp. But since the camp administration commits a large number of atrocities, they can only pay attention to some of

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them, and attempt to correct even fewer. For example, some notes on philology were taken from me towards the end of 1973. For more than a year, I requested in vain an explanation of the grounds for their confiscation. I considered them totally lost, but during the hunger strike, they were unexpectedly returned to me.

Questions which lead directly to hunger strikes are not, as a rule, decided in favour of the strikers (the administration never makes concessions in such circumstances). But anyone who assesses the effects of a hunger strike solely with this in mind inevitably gains the wrong impression: it is indeed possible to obtain one's rights through hunger strikes. And although after the May-June hunger strikes individual demands were not met by the administration, and even though the immediate consequence of the hunger strike was punishment for the participants, the general atmosphere in the camp did improve, and the administration did become more circumspect in its actions. In many cases, it began to exercise some degree of restraint. Certainly, this was also because such a serious action as a hunger strike often becomes known outside the confines of the camp, and certain social circles do exert some degree of influence on the authorities.

Therefore, though the hunger strike is a difficult and risky form of resistance, there are few more effective methods of struggle which can be employed by political prisoners. It will continue to be used. More than that, I would say that circumstances in the camps being what they are, it is impossible to live without resorting to hunger strikes.

Lev Yagman: It is sometimes even necessary to resort to the most extreme form of resistance, one which the political prisoner chooses in extremely rare circumstances: suicide. This form of resistance is not only a theoretical one. You do find your Jan Palachs in the political prison camps. In June of this year, during the long hunger strike in Camp No. 35,[7] prisoner Opanasenko took his life.

Several other prisoners had contemplated suicide, but the fact that they did not carry this out should not be attributed to any efforts on the part of the administration. I am personally opposed to such an extreme form of struggle, but I nevertheless think conditions in the political camps make inevitable the grave possibility of more suicides, which will not be prevented as they have been in the past.

Do you regret the fact that your fate has led you into a political camp?

Zinoviy Antonyuk: In reassessing my life, from the beginning of the 1960s, and having come to an understanding of the mechanisms of "legality," I can only regret that I began to consider myself a real citizen so late in life; that for too long I had confined myself to the

[7] A diary of the hunger strike appears in the *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 33, published in Russian by Khronika Press, 505 Eighth Ave., New York.

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role of an observer of the sociological processes in the Soviet Union. I knew very little about the aspects of Soviet law. I am therefore glad that I have had the opportunity to learn through first-hand experience: "He who has not been in the DOPR,[8] is not a true citizen."

Lev Yagman: Do I have any regrets? Certainly. I do not derive great pleasure from the fact that I have been separated from my family, deprived of the basic pleasures of everyday life, and put behind barbed wire. Clearly, all this does take its toll: it affects one's health; it changes one's character to some degree. These factors are always constant. I am sure of only one thing: that my personal imprisonment has rid me of that "intellectual softness," of which Lenin accused the intelligentsia. And I don't regret that.

Aryeh Khnokh: Many years spent far from my homeland and family evoke great regret, but at the same time, in many respects, I am satisfied. The arrest and trial of my friends and myself was one of the factors which influenced a change in the Soviet position on the question of the emigration of Jews.

Being here has helped considerably towards my gaining a better understanding of the system, and, in that sense, I would never have learned as much if I had left the USSR, and had never been here.

Ihor Kalynets: Like every prisoner, I crave freedom. But having assessed soberly the current stifling situation in the Ukraine, I prefer prison: like Antonych,[9] "I praise the harsh and austere life." Here I have found brothers, whose loyalty is confirmed in daily trials.

Ivan Kandyba: I do not at all regret having embarked on a path which has led me to a long sentence in a concentration camp.

I cannot regret the loss of freedom that I have suffered. How can you consider yourself free, when you know that your nation is imprisoned? Although here one comes to endure much hardship, I feel that I am stronger morally than before when I was formally free, but couldn't work to promote the improvement of my own fate or the fate of my homeland. The longer I have to endure these conditions, the more clearly I realize that I have taken the right path, and that true freedom and total happiness will only come about when my country —the Ukraine—is free.

Slava Gluzman: Yes, I do have regrets. I am serving more than a "punishment sentence," for, if I were free, I would be able to oppose actively the criminal commitment of healthy individuals to psychiatric

[8] *Dom prinudityelnikh rabot*: Forced Labour Building.

[9] Bohdan Ihor Antonych (1909–1937). Considered to be among the finest Ukrainian poets of the twentieth century.

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hospitals. I am a psychiatrist, a competent individual, and unfortunately every profession except my own has been actively protesting against these unjustified abuses. Here I am deprived of such opportunities. I have an objective reason for my concern—a friend of mine, Leonid Plyushch [10] is in a special MVD psychiatric hospital. These are my "ashes of Klaas." [11] In some ways, my knowledge of my profession has been increased even here: in the camp for example; I have witnessed sadism *in vivo* outside the walls of the clinic. One can at least humour oneself with such an opportunity.

Ivan Svitlychny: In my case, the transition from freedom to "unfreedom" was not as rapid as in other cases. For many years before my arrest, I was unable to secure employment in my field. My literary works, which were not at all anti-Soviet, remained unpublished solely because my name was officially unacceptable. In essence, before my arrest, I was outside the law. In that sense, I haven't lost much as a result of being arrested. Of course it is difficult not to be able to see one's wife, one's mother, one's close friends and relatives with whom one shared all one's joys and sorrows. In addition to this, the main purpose of my life was my philological research (and certainly not "politics"); here in the camp there are not even the most elementary preconditions for such pursuits. All these losses are irreplaceable for me.

My arrest, trial, imprisonment, and everything connected with this, has made me somewhat less naïve, and has allowed me to make a more serious formulation of my convictions. The "school of life" has in some cases been far richer than my earlier formal one. I have lost some of my friends who were unable to endure their severe trials, but my friendship with others has been strengthened. In addition, I have made some friends, about whom I could only have dreamt earlier. As a literary critic, here in the camp I come upon so many diverse characters, and become familiar with so many unbelievable human trials, that I could never have known them in a lifetime of liberty. Therefore it's difficult for me to say whether I've lost more than I've gained, or vice versa. But in any case, I don't complain about my fate, and I do not envy my many friends who are at liberty.

Vladimir Balakhonov: I have no regrets. Just before I left Switzerland, I knew that for me imprisonment was almost inevitable. Until my incarceration in the camp, I gave no thought to the possibility of

[10] Plyushch, a Ukrainian cyberneticist, was arrested on 14 January 1972 for his involvement in the Initiative Group for Human Rights in the USSR. Subsequently, he was diagnosed as suffering from "a slow onset of schizophrenia with messianic delusions and reformist ideas," was allowed to go to the West in Jan. 1976.

[11] Klaas was burned at the stake by the Inquisition. His son carried his father's ashes in a small pouch that he wore around his neck as a sign that he sought revenge for his father's murder.

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active struggle, since the conditions of strict isolation in which I found myself, and also my lack of knowledge and unfamiliarity with the conditions of camp life, gave me no opportunity to begin a struggle by myself, or even to prepare for it. But here I have been liberated from many constraints: from the fear of losing material goods; the fear of persecution; the fear of personal trials, pain and suffering. All I have been through has rid me totally of even the fear of torture and death. In the past year, I have experienced a great spiritual resurgence, and obtained a great sense of satisfaction from the fact that I can be honest with myself, with the ideas, principles and convictions which I had hidden within myself, and which I had lived and acted contrary to for nearly 10 years. I consider the turn in my fate which made it possible for me to struggle for my principles and ideals a happy one, despite the fact that I have endured many severe trials.

Bagrat Shakhverdyan: I knew what sort of fate awaited me. But without sacrifice, one cannot achieve freedom. For the true patriot, to be able to struggle for his nation's sovereignty is a privilege and an honour: the very meaning of life. A fight to the final victory: this is our motto! Our method of struggle is peaceful and honest, though we are facing deceit, cruelty and despotism. We can be physically annihilated but never defeated. Though it is difficult for me in the concentration camp, it is also difficult to make one's peace with those who mock you, and with the compulsory, difficult and degrading regime. I will never renounce or abandon my ideals and goals. Though I am ill (with heart and stomach disorders), willpower, steadfastness, spiritual energy, my hopes and dreams give me my strength. In the concentration camp, I have come to know and observe people who have been imprisoned for 25 years and more: young patriots and democrats. It has been a university of life for me. People from a score of different nationalities: Ukrainians struggling for an independent Ukraine; Balts, whose only transgression is that they love their nation totally; Jews who want to live in their homeland—Israel; young people of various nationalities who believe in the democratization of society. The only fault of all these people is that they want to live in freedom and dignity.

I love life and freedom. I want to see a free democratic, independent Armenia. And I should not be blamed for having been born here or for being the way I am. It is incomprehensible how government, political and social activists can say that the repression of patriots and democrats, their arrest and incarceration in psychiatric hospitals, prisons and concentration camps is an internal matter for the USSR. To us political prisoners, such an undignified, petty compromise with one's conscience is all too transparent. Such lies and deceptions: as if tyranny could coexist peacefully with democracy. Can this still not be apparent?

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Freedom for all political prisoners in the USSR! Freedom for all political prisoners!

Do you believe in the possibility of an amnesty for political prisoners?

Slava Gluzman: No, I don't believe that an amnesty is possible; because, unfortunately, people do not learn from history.

Ihor Kalynets: No. An amnesty will only be possible once society rids itself of its oppressive terror; and that, under any circumstances, would be catastrophic for the KGB.

Ivan Svitlychny: No, I don't believe an amnesty is possible, although the actual number of political prisoners is not great, and a general amnesty for them would not be dangerous to the regime. Even though, in carrying out such an amnesty, the regime would be gaining no small measure of moral capital, I am used to the fact that those in power not only do not act on the basis of reason, but that they also discern their own interests poorly and act with great delay. Because of this, I don't believe in the possibility of an amnesty for political prisoners, unless the Soviet leaders are compelled by circumstances to take such a course.

Aryeh Khnokh: I think this depends on the kind of pressure public opinion can exert on the Soviet leadership. And, in confirmation of this, I need only mention that in the Soviet Union, those who are not well known in the West are far more likely to be charged with crimes and sentenced to longer terms for anti-Soviet activities than those who are well known. But it is difficult to assess the strength of a movement for amnesty for political prisoners in the Soviet Union, and so I can't give you a more exact answer.

Lev Yagman: Theoretically, yes. But practically, no. Why is an amnesty theoretically possible? From the point of view of common sense, an amnesty for political prisoners would, on the basis of the current world situation, create more good than harm. Why is amnesty impossible from a practical point of view? First of all, because influential circles have a vested interest in concealing the existing state of affairs. This strengthens their position, and raises the role they play in the government—a government in whose entire history there has never been an amnesty for political prisoners. Such a step will not only never be taken but it is even impossible to contemplate.

Bagrat Shakhverdyan: Yes. If progressive people in the West were to wage a broadly based, intensive campaign for the liberation of political prisoners in the USSR, then an amnesty would be possible. However, an amnesty could not occur if the West failed to raise the basic issues of freedom and democracy.

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Do you have anything to add to your statements?
Lev Yagman: I would like to remind everyone again that the question of free emigration from the Soviet Union stopped being a moot point only as a result of the pressure of world public opinion, which was attracted to this issue as a result of massive arrests of Zionists, which were followed by the trials of 1970–71.

Only as a result of protests in the West was it possible to force the Soviet leadership, at least to some degree, to honour the right of Soviet citizens to emigrate. Up to this moment, this right has been exercised by thousands of Jews from the Soviet Union, as well as non-Jews. Therefore we must understand the lesson: we can continue our struggle only if we are the subject of the indefatigable attention of world public opinion.

Ivan Svitlychny: Please give our heartfelt greetings to Solzhenitsyn, to whose courage we all pay homage.

Participants

Antonyuk, Zinoviy Pavlovych, b. 1933. Ukrainian, from Kiev. Economist. Sentenced in 1972 to seven years in prison camps and three years' exile under Article 62, section 1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR.
Balakhonov, Vladimir Fyodorovich, b. 1935. Russian, from Moscow. Worked as a translator for the UN in Geneva. In 1972, he sought asylum in Switzerland and later returned to the USSR. Sentenced in 1973 to 12 years' imprisonment under Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the Russian SFSR.
Gluzman, Semyon Filipovich, b. 1946. Jew, from Kiev. Psychiatrist. Sentenced in 1972 to seven years in camps and three years' exile under Article 62, section 1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR.
Kalynets, Ihor Myronovych, b. 1939. Ukrainian, from Lvov. Poet. Sentenced in 1972 to six years in camps and three years' exile under Article 62, section 1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR.
Kandyba, Ivan Alekseyevych, b. 1930. Ukrainian, from Lvov. Lawyer. Sentenced in 1961 to 15 years' imprisonment under Article 56 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR.
Khnokh, Aryeh Leib, b. 1944. Jew, from Riga. Electrician. Sentenced in 1970 to 10 years' imprisonment under Articles 64, 70 and 72 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.
Meshener, Yosif Yakovlevich, b. 1931. Jew, from Bendery. Historian. Sentenced in 1970 to six years for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.
Pryshlyak, Yevhen Stepanovych, b. 1913. Ukrainian. Sentenced in Lvov in 1952 to 25 years under Article 54–1a.
Shakhverdyan, Bagrat Levonovich, b. 1940. Armenian, from Yerevan. Engineer. Sentenced in 1973 to five years in camps and two years' exile under Articles 65 and 67 of the Criminal Code of the Armenian SSR.
Svitlychny, Ivan Alekseyevych, b. 1929. Ukrainian, from Kiev. Philologist. Sentenced to seven years in camps and five years' exile under Article 62, section 1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR.
Yagman, Lev Naumovich, b. 1940. Jew, from Leningrad. Sentenced to five years' camp in 1970 under Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

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Mustafa Dzhemilev

Andrei Grigorenko

ON 21 June 1975, Mustafa Abduldzhemil's (Dzhemilev's) third labour camp term was due to finish. However, on 19 June he was transferred to Omsk prison, and a new charge was preferred against him, one of circulating slanderous falsehoods derogatory to the Soviet state and social system. For me, this development was not unexpected.

The first news of the attempt to fabricate a new charge against Mustafa Dzhemilev reached me from Mustafa's fellow prisoners early this year.

In May, a document reached me, entitled " Testimony " and signed by Dzhemilev's fellow prisoner Vladimir Dvoryansky. This document described how the camp's operative section and administration were trying to recruit false witnesses from among Mustafa's fellow prisoners. For this purpose the administration was making use of both threats and promises as well as plain blackmail.

About the same time I learnt that one of the Tashkent KGB officers had declared that people like Mustafa Dzhemilev should be either behind bars or in a psychiatric hospital. He had also added that in the immediate future he was going to Omsk in order to fabricate a new camp criminal case against Dzhemilev.

I notified the camp administration and Mustafa himself of the fact that I had this material in my possession. It seemed to me that, if these machinations did not escape publicity, the administration would not dare to fabricate a new case. Some time later I learnt that Mustafa had received papers for completing his release formalities.

However, two days before his release from the camp was due the Omsk procuracy had a search made in the camp, both at the work place and in the living quarters zone, after which Mustafa Dzhemilev was transferred to Omsk prison.

Having received from the camp a copy of the record of Dzhemilev's search, I wrote about his case once again to Academician A. Sakharov. In particular, I pointed out in this letter that my worst fears voiced six months earlier in my first letter had been confirmed.

But before giving publicity to the documents in hand it was decided to try to stop Mustafa Dzhemilev's persecution, by appealing to the Chairman of the KGB, Yuriy Andropov. For this purpose, on 1 July 1975, a telegram was sent to Andropov signed by six individuals. This telegram told of the documents in our possession which revealed the machinations on which the new case against Mustafa Dzhemilev was based. Since Dzhemilev had declared a hunger strike from the day of his arrest the telegram contained a plea to reply by 8 July. There was, however, no reply.

After the lapse of the time limit stated, a press conference was called in Moscow with the participation of Mustafa's mother and sister. At this press conference all the material was given publicity, as well as letters of protest signed by a number of democratically-minded individuals, among them Academician Andrei Sakharov.

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How can it be explained that the Soviet authorities have decided to extend Mustafa Dzhemilev's term of imprisonment? Perhaps the life itself of that man to whom I am linked by the bond of many years of friendship can serve as an answer.

MUSTAFA ABDULDZHEMIL was born on 13 November 1943 in the village of Boskoy in the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Six months later, on 18 May 1944 he, like the rest of his compatriots, was deported into the remote regions of the Asiatic part of USSR. At dawn that morning soldiers of the Soviet Army forced an entry into all the homes of the Crimean Tartars. They were given 20 minutes for packing.

Then followed long months of transportation in overcrowded cattle-trucks where people died from overcrowding, thirst, cold and starvation.

Mustafa's first childhood impressions were of the special deportation settlement lost in a Central Asian desert. Crossing the boundary of this settlement meant being shot on the spot, even for the youngest "special settlers."

In school, his teachers constantly sang the praises of the most just state in the world, the state of workers and peasants, while in history lessons he heard that his people had never been a native population of the Crimea but had lived by constant brigandage and the oppression of the local population which was alleged to have consisted of Russians. People of other nationalities around him asserted that he was a traitor and a son of traitors.

But in the evenings Mustafa heard from the old men poetic legends of his native land. He heard with rapture about the defender of the poor and the terror of the rich, the noble hero Alim, about the bitter times in the life of his people, about innumerable invaders, and about the fearless struggle of the people, forced to leave their old valley farms and then when they returned again, having to bring them back to life.

His family had a difficult life, and Mustafa had to start early to earn his living. He spent any time free from work in the factory reading in libraries and collecting grains of unfalsified history. This search brought him into the company of a number of young compatriots interested in the same problem. They began meeting and sharing their thoughts and historical finds. In the course of these discussions the idea of creating the "Union of Crimean Tartar Youth" came into being. The Union made its task the explaining to Crimean Tartars of the need to begin a struggle for their rights. The programme and statutes of the Union were discussed at one such meeting. At the same time Dzhemilev stated his opinion that the struggle for the right to return to their Fatherland had to be based on common human principles proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 16-year-old young man insisted upon the indivisibility of freedom irrespective of race, class, nationality or any other group membership. He still holds these views today.

It is possible that it was this position which straight away attracted to him the close attention of the KGB which "guards the ideological purity of Soviet society." Soon a criminal case was brought against the Union of Crimean Tartar Youth. Four of its members were arrested.

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Those remaining free tried to organize a protest demonstration outside the building of the Tashkent KGB on 11 April 1962. With several other young people, Mustafa managed to get an audience with the KGB. But at that audience they were showered with insults, and the names of all those who had come to it were taken down.

After several days Dzhemilev began to be summoned to the KGB for interrogations. These used to begin early in the morning and ended late after midnight, without a break for dinner. They were conducted coarsely and alternated with attempts to persuade the young man to collaborate. Mustafa refused. The result was not long in coming. Two days after the end of the interrogations he was dismissed from his job.

In the autumn of 1962 he enrolled in the Tashkent Institute for Engineers of Irrigation and Mechanisation of Agriculture. In 1965 at the expanded meeting of the rectorate and the Party and Komsomol *aktiv* of that Institute, Dzhemilev's personal case was considered. Mustafa was accused of " participating in nationalist gatherings, writing ' A brief historical outline of the Turkish culture of the Crimea in the thirteenth-eighteenth centuries,' and refusing to join the Komsomol." This personal case dragged on from March to September 1965 and ended with Dzhemilev's expulsion from the Institute " for lack of academic progress." On the eve of his expulsion from the Institute, on 29 August, he was beaten up by the police of the town of Gulistan after speaking at a rally of the Crimean Tartar youth.

Dzhemilev attempted to appeal against his unlawful expulsion from the Institute. The appeal was supported, though unsuccessfully, by a group of students and by the Institute's legal officer Nikanovich.

On 29 September 1965 Mustafa was subjected to a search in the street, and on 30 September his flat was searched in his absence. Money and documents were confiscated.

In order to appeal to higher authorities against the illegalities Mustafa took a plane to Moscow. After several attempts he managed to get from the Higher Education Department of the Ministry for Agriculture of the USSR a ruling on the illegality of his expulsion from the Institute. However, on leaving the Ministry he was detained by the Moscow police. He was kept in prison for several days and then despatched under guard to Tashkent.

Despite the Ministry's ruling Dzhemilev was not reinstated in the Institute, and on 31 December 1965 a criminal case was started against him on a fabricated charge of evading call-up to active service in the Soviet Army. He had to sign an undertaking not to leave Tashkent. On 9 January the police agencies attempted a frame-up, having planted a wrist watch in his pocket when he was in a bus. But this frame-up failed, and then, in order to make up for their gaffe, the police imprisoned Dzhemilev for 15 days " for petty hooliganism."

On 12 May 1966 in the Tashkent City Court the trial took place at which Mustafa Dzhemilev was charged with evading the regular call-up to the Army. At the trial Mustafa spoke of the tragedy of his people, and of his beliefs which brought him into the dock. He said in particular: " As a result of the crime of 1944 I have lost thousands upon thousands of my brothers and sisters. This, too, must be remembered! Remembered as much as the gas chambers of Auschwitz and Dachau. Remembered

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so that this would never again be repeated, so that the Nazi and chauvinist serpent, whose creature these crimes were, would be eradicated." The court passed its verdict: one and a half years' imprisonment in a corrective labour colony.

In the camp, the pressure on Dzhemilev did not cease. The camp's chief operative agent Sitnikov and the camp commandant Gabrielyan repeatedly tried to obtain from Dzhemilev a written undertaking renouncing participation in the national movement. On 11 August 1967 for yet another refusal to sign such an undertaking he was put into the penal isolation block. Mustafa began a hunger strike in protest against illegal punishment. His health declined sharply. As a result of publicity the authorities were compelled to back down, and within five days he was back in the living quarters zone.

After his release from the camp Mustafa was unable to find any work. His attempts to get reinstated in the Institute also ended in failure. The authorities plainly declared that it was impossible for him to complete his education. A highly placed KGB officer, Major M. Svalov, declared in a talk with Reshat Dzhemilev, a well-known participant in the movement for human rights in the USSR and for the rights of the Crimean Tartars, in late January 1968: "Mustafa shall never again study in the Institute. . . . It is more difficult for us to struggle with intellectuals than with labourers. . . ."

Nor did the judicial persecution of Mustafa cease after his leaving the camp. At the trial of a group of Crimean Tartars in Tashkent between 28 November and 13 December 1967 the court added a rider in respect of Dzhemilev concerning opening a criminal case against him on charges of circulating slanderous falsehoods derogatory to the Soviet state and social system.

At the same time Mustafa Dzhemilev was elected the permanent representative of the Crimean Tartars for petitioning the Soviet authorities concerning the solution of the problem of a return to their Fatherland. In May 1968 he was to take part in a demonstration, several thousand strong, outside the building of the Central Committee of the CPSU in Moscow on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the expulsion of the Crimean Tartars from the Crimea. However, on the eve of the demonstration the Moscow police rounded up the people's representatives throughout the city and transported them under guard into Central Asia. Mustafa Dzhemilev was among them.

In the same year Mustafa became acquainted with many participants in the all-Union Movement for Human Rights: Alexey Kosterin, Piotr Grigorenko, Ilya Gabay, Anatoliy Levitin-Krasnov, Leonid Plyushch, Genrikh Altunyan and many others. Having since his early youth considered that freedom was indivisible, Dzhemilev immediately showed a lively interest and involvement in the fortunes of other people. It was to a considerable degree thanks to his efforts that the lack of understanding between a number of representatives of the nationalities movements in the USSR and the all-Union democratic movement was overcome. It was by no means accidental that Mustafa Dzhemilev became one of the 15 founder members of the Action Group for the Defence of Human Rights in the USSR.

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Between 1967 and 1969 Mustafa Dzhemilev signed a number of protest letters and the appeals of the Action Group for the Defence of Human Rights in the USSR, and protested against the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet troops. For participation in this activity he was repeatedly detained by the KGB agencies, and on 11 September 1969 he was arrested in Tashkent in connexion with the case of Piotr Grigorenko and Ilya Gabay who had been arrested earlier.

When arrested, Mustafa immediately made a statement, the essence of which was that he refused the services of Soviet defence lawyers since he was not guilty of anything, and in such cases the authorities applied administrative punishment to honest lawyers, while officially appointed defence lawyers acted as ordered by the state. Mustafa Dzhemilev's arrest caused a wave of protests among the democratic circles in the USSR.

During the period of the pre-trial investigation Mustafa repeatedly went on hunger strikes, protesting against the illegality of his arrest and the methods of conducting investigations of Berezovsky, the senior investigator for the especially important cases of the Uzbek procuracy. Protesting against his illegal arrest Dzhemilev refused to take part in the investigation or to give testimony.

The trial of Mustafa Dzhemilev and Ilya Gabay took place in the Tashkent City Court from 12 to 19 January 1970. As is evident from the record of this trial, now circulating in *samizdat*, the accused conclusively refuted the indictment. Dzhemilev successfully forced the procurator to admit the fact that the state prosecutor himself had taken an active part in punitive actions against the Crimean Tartars. Therefore on the basis of legislation in force in the USSR the individual in question had no right to participate in the trial as a procurator. Apart from that, Mustafa caught the chairman of the court in the act of getting notes with directions as to how to conduct the trial, which violated the principle of the independence of the court and, according to USSR legislation, is a punishable criminal offence.

In his speech Dzhemilev quoted a number of facts testifying to the systematic persecution of the Crimean Tartars. He noted that at the trial their completely legal juridical activity was being forced to fit articles of the criminal code.

The court sentenced Dzhemilev and Gabay to the maximum permissible terms under the article in question: three years' imprisonment.

At the end of the court sitting Mustafa declared a 30-day hunger strike in protest against the illegal decision of the court.

Dzhemilev was freed from imprisonment in autumn 1972. By that time his health was seriously undermined by numerous hunger strikes and harsh camp conditions. Despite this the authorities continued to persecute him in various ways. Twice after release he was put under administrative surveillance which without a judicial procedure deprives one of elementary rights. Several times he was subjected to arrests for terms of up to 15 days. The last such short-term arrest took place on the eve of the thirtieth anniversary of the Crimean Tartars' deportation, on 13 May 1974. Dzhemilev declared a protest hunger strike. By the ninth day of his strike, his life was in danger. This fact was admitted by the authorities themselves and received wide publicity. They again

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retreated, and Dzhemilev was released. But a month later, still in a seriously ill condition, Mustafa was again arrested on charges of avoiding army training.

Just as at the previous arrest, this new arbitrary act caused a wave of protest among democratic circles. On 6 July the Action Group of the Crimean Tartars of Syr-Darya Region sent a protest to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Nikolay Podgorny as well as to the Secretary-General of the UN Kurt Waldheim. On 16 July, Academician Andrey Sakharov and the Action Group for the Defence of Human Rights in the USSR wrote to Kurt Waldheim, the International League for the Rights of Man and the International Red Cross. Apart from this, letters from a number of individuals with a demand to stop the persecution of Mustafa Dzhemilev were submitted to various Soviet authorities. But, as in many other cases, the Soviet authorities preserved a total silence.

In the middle of July 1974 the trial was held *in camera.* Not one of Dzhemilev's relatives or friends was even told of the place and time of the trial. To date it is unknown what went on behind the closed doors of that trial. It only became known that, in connexion with the fact that the charges had been manifestly fabricated, Mustafa Dzhemilev had declared a hunger strike without a time limit.

Soon the news percolated from the KGB that Dzhemilev's physical condition was dangerously weakened to the extent that the administration of one of the Central Asian prisons had refused to accept him, not wishing to be responsible should he die while on hunger strike.

In the second half of November 1974 I learnt that Mustafa Dzhemilev had been transported while on hunger strike to a camp on the outskirts of the Siberian city of Omsk. This news was very sinister. The transportation itself while in a state of hunger strike is very dangerous for the life of the prisoner. Apart from this, when prisoners sentenced for a term of not more than three years were sent outside the region in which they had lived before their arrest it meant as a rule that an extension of the term by the camp court was being prepared. Thus it was with Anatoliy Marchenko, Andrey Amalrik, Vladimir Dremlyuga and a number of others.

These considerations compelled me to draw public attention to them. With this aim I wrote to Sakharov in the second half of November last year explaining my fears. He turned to the Soviet and world public regarding this matter.

Regrettably, my worst surmises have been confirmed. Today Mustafa Abduldzhemil (Dzhemilev) is awaiting a new trial and his fourth, in his 32 years, term of imprisonment.

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Letter to the Editor

Sir,

Baron's article "Marx's *Grundrisse* and the Asiatic Mode of Production" [1] provides a detailed account of the recent Soviet discussions on this topic. It overlooks, however, one interesting fact. In 1964 when Eugene Varga was reopening the debate on the Asiatic mode of production he complained that: "Throughout the 51 volumes of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia there is no mention of an 'Asiatic Mode of Production.' All attempts to find out why so important a tenet of Marxist theory has been omitted will be in vain. It is simply passed by in silence, condemned and forgotten."

In the third edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, which Varga did not live to see, this omission has finally been made good. The Asiatic mode of production is given a separate entry, in which there is no questioning of its legitimacy as an autonomous mode of production. A brief historical sketch is given by a recent supporter of the concept, N. B. Ter-Akopian, who although he avoids direct reference to the content of the concept makes a number of significant statements which are summarized below.

Ter-Akopian begins with the appearance of the concept in the correspondence of Marx and Engels in 1853 and in Marx's article "The British Rule in India." The subsequent "disclosure of its essence" in the *Grundrisse* and the associated research "permitted" Marx to rank it among the epochs of the progressive economic formation of society in his 1859 Preface. Marx looked at separate aspects and characteristics of this mode of production in *Das Kapital*, as did Engels in *Anti-Dühring*. The further development of their views on the subject was especially connected with the work of L. Morgan.

Ter-Akopian goes on to explain that the concept did not receive further elucidation in the Marxist literature of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries although in several works, for example those of G. V. Plekhanov, it was construed as a special type of development contemporary with the ancient mode of production. Lenin did not pay any particular attention to the concept.

The discussions of the 20s to 30s "contributed to the deeper understanding of Marx's teaching on socio-economic formations, but the significance and place among them of the category of the Asiatic mode of production was not revealed in its correct form." (I.e. many of the earlier Soviet Aziatchiki followed Plekhanov in rejecting the unilinear pattern of history, unlike the more recent Soviet supporters of the concept, who have on the whole fitted it into a universal progression.)

Ter-Akopian concludes that "the discussion of the Asiatic mode of production remains essentially incomplete. From the beginning of the sixties it has been in fact renewed, and has embraced the problem of early class-societies as a whole." (This volume of the third edition was

[1] Samuel H. Baron, "Marx's *Grundrisse* and the Asiatic Mode of Production." *Survey* (Winter/Spring 1975), Vol. 21, No. 1–2 (94–95), pp. 128–47.

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published in 1970; the discussion has died down since 1971.) A reasonable bibliography of primary and secondary sources on the concept follows the historical sketch.

Elsewhere in the third edition, the leading proponent of the Asiatic concept in the 1925–31 discussion, L. I. Mad'iar, has been rehabilitated. (Mad'iar was purged in 1934, and died in 1940.) The biographical sketch of Mad'iar is by V. N. Nikiforov, and while he mentions Mad'iar's most important book, *Ekonomika sel'skogo khoziaistva v Kitae* (1928 and 1931) he does not mention that this book was a focal point of the early Soviet discussions of the Asiatic mode of production. Although Nikiforov is an opponent of the concept, he has written extensively elsewhere of Mad'iar's important role in the debate. The explanation lies perhaps in the later date of this volume (1974), published after the close of the recent discussions and the apparent victory of the opponents of the concept.

Yours faithfully,

Marian Sawer
University of Adelaide, Australia

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

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